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Preface
Almost two years after the publication of the first edition in German, I am
delighted to be able to present this English edition which aims at meeting
the need to reach broader audience. In this respect, I owe my particular
gratitude to Birgit Böttner, Leonie Spangenberger und Prof. Dr. André
Thomashausen who were entrusted with the translation.
Substantially the topical issue remains, in my view, relevant and perti-
nent as it did in 2015 when I have completed the researches, since the
court is always confronted by the problematic at the centre of this reflec-
tion and its jurisprudential practice has not really changed until now. The
examination at hand broaches the subject of a supra-constitutional func-
tion of the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS). . A particular source of inspiration for this book has
been the research project “Constitutional Jurisdiction and Democratisa-
tion in West Africa” financed by the German Research Foundation (DFG).
Although I became a Member of the project team rather late, the work
within the project inspired me to think about the role of the ECOWAS
Court of Justice. For example, I refer to the decision in Ameganvi et al vs.
Togo and its relevance for the relationship between the regional courts and
the courts of the Member States, in particular, the Constitutional Courts. I
especially wanted to show the development of human rights jurisdiction
since the inception of the additional protocol in 2005 and on this basis the
possible individual complaints before the Court of Justice. based on recent
developments in international law, my main objective is to clarify all the
legal consequences arising from this extension of competence of the Court,
in particular with regard to the international responsibility of member
states in the event of human rights violations. Moreover, this paper aims to
examine the constitutional implications of this reform and the guarded use
by the court of its own competence.
Finally, I would also like to contribute to the reduction of the deficit of
legal protection within the Economic Community of West African States
by strengthening the constitutional role of the ECOWAS Court of Justice.
According to my thesis, the declaratory judgments by the Court of Justice
should be able to unfold their legal force in the signatory-countries to their
fullest extent.
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During the preparation of this research, which was completed in De-
cember 2015 and accepted by the Justus-Liebig-University of Gießen’s Fac-
ulty of Law as a dissertation, I have received support from numerous per-
sons and institutions.
Firstly, I would like to thank my mentor Prof. Dr. Thilo Marauhn for
his mentorship during this dissertation. I am endlessly grateful for his
steadfast trust and patience. The exchange of ideas with him was always ef-
fective and constantly resulted in new findings. These exchanges belong to
my fondest memories. I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Rainer Grote for
contributing a second opinion and for his valuable further inspirations.
Furthermore, I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Dres. h.c. Herbert Kronke for
his constant support and for being a willing partner for discussion.
I would like to particularly thank Vera Strobel for her support regarding
the editorial revision of the German edition.
I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Sven Simon for his tremendous support.
I owe my special gratitude to the numerous discussions and professional
suggestions. I would further like to extend my sincere thanks to Dr. Ignaz
Stegmiller for his critical review of the completed version before the paper
went to print.
I would like to sincerely thank professors Adama Kpodar, Joèl Aivo,
Babakar Kanté and Akuété Santos for their valuable advice during my re-
search trip in West Africa.
Moreover, I would like to thank Dr. Daniel Behailu as well as Katharina
Bielka, Dr. Prosper Simbarashe Maguchu, Dr. Wisdom Momodu, Dr.
Collins Mbuayang and Dr. Asmin Franziska for the constant exchange of
ideas. Similarly, I would like to thank my colleagues Dr. Ayṣe-Martina
Böhringer, Judith Thorn, Joscha Müller, Marie-Christin Stenzel, Dr.Lisa
Hemann, Dr. Anne Winter and Chadischa Schöpffer for their collegiality
and support. I would like to sincerely thank Ms Ulrike Rein and Ms Su-
sanne Seitz for the friendly environment and their helpfulness within the
team of the professorship.
Furthermore, my circle of friends in Germany has contributed consider-
ably to the realisation of this paper. I would like to thank my friends Fabi-
an Kiehlmann, Edem Atsiatorme, Juliane and Cornelia Glinz as well as Ve-
ra Bense, Fanny Raisch, Robin Azinovic, Gabriel Noll, the Degbè family
(Brussels), the Doglo family and the Tèko family.
This work presented thrilling scientific challenges for me. The handling
of these would not have been possible without the support of my family.
In particular, I owe my brothers Ékoé Richard and Messanh Nicolas as
Preface
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well as my sisters Marie Povi and Ayélévi endless gratitude for giving me
strength through their continued support and encouraging words.
Amongst various instutitions which I would like to thank, I owe my
thanks first and foremost to the Konrad-Adenauer Foundation which not
only financed significant part of my researches in Germany but also cov-
ered the costs of translation and publication of the English edition of the
manuscript. I must acknowledge my sincere thank to Dr. Arne Wulff who
has been available to coordinate the English translation and publication of
this work. Moreover, I am genuinely grateful to Ms Anja Berretta’s and
Mr. Berthold Gees’ for their understanding during my scholarship period
at the Konrad-Adenauer foundation. In the same manner, I owe gratitude
to the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy and the Max
Planck Society for making the Open Access publication of this Book possi-
ble. Furthermore, I am also grateful for the German Research Founda-
tion’s (DFG) interest in the legal developments in Africa and for their
funding.
I would also like to thank the Max-Planck Institute for Comparative
Public Law and International Law (Heidelberg) for making their library
available to me. Besides, I would like to thank Mr. Albrecht Günther of
the branch library for Law and Economy for his assistance in trying to lo-
cate documents that were not available in Gießen. My sincere thanks go to
the library manager, Mr. Vincente Mendes Correia, for giving me access to
the ECOWAS-Court of Justice Library and for making numerous official
documents by the ECOWAS Community.
This dissertation is dedicated to my sisters Kayi and Tsotso.
Kangnikoé Bado Munich, in the spring of 2019
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Abstract
Whereas the Court of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) had originally been established to address matters of regional
integration only, it has been tasked to rule on human rights violations
since 2005. This has led to jurisdictional conflicts between national (consti-
tutional) courts of ECOWAS member states and the Court itself. This
study analyses the relationship between the national and the regional level,
and develops proposals on how to overcome such jurisdictional conflicts.
This thesis is based on the ruling of the Constitutional Court of Togo N
°E-018/10 of 22 November 2010 and the position of the ECOWAS Com-
munity Court of Justice, N°ECW/CCJ/JUG/09/11 of 7 October 2011 and N
°ECW/CCJ/JUG/06/12 of 13 March 2012, concerning the aforementioned
ruling of the Constitutional Court of Togo. The thesis is an attempt at
finding an answer to the question as to whether the judgments of the
Court carry a binding effect within the Member States and particularly on
judgments of constitutional courts.
This work explores real and potential tensions within the ECOWAS le-
gal order. The tensions stem from the legal force of judgments of constitu-
tional courts of Member States and the admissibility of individual peti-
tions before the Court according to Art. 9.4 and 10.d of Supplementary
Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 Amending the Protocol A/P.1/7/91 Relating to the
Community Court of Justice. Since the binding effect of the rulings of the
Court is not clearly defined, Member States resist implementing the
Court’s decisions particularly in constitutional matters. Pursuant to article
9.4 of the aforementioned supplementary protocol the Court has authority
to examine the conformity of the actions of Member States‘ institutions
with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights whether the or-
gan exercises legislative, executive, and judicial or any other similar func-
tions. However, it is interesting to note that the decisions of Constitutional
Courts or Supreme Courts of ECOWAS Member States are final and not
subject to further appeal. It is true that a Constitution and decisions of
Constitutional Courts express the sovereignty of a state. Nevertheless
Art. 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties forbids the states
to invoke their national law to hinder the implementation of their interna-
tional obligations. To that extent the res judicata is not a valid argument to
hinder the implementation of the Court’s rulings. Then a state party en-
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dorses the obligation of restitution in integrum according to international
customary law and judicial precedents of the International Court of Jus-
tice. Moreover, according to international customary law, all organs of the
state involved in a case are bound by the rulings of the Court. Constitu-
tional Courts are state organs. Hence, they are also bound by the findings
of the ECOWAS-Court.
This work also identifies some deficiencies in the current regime of the
human rights mandate of the Court. Gaps exist not only at the level of the
Member States constitutional order but also at the community level. At the
national level, there are no legal provisions in ECOWAS Member States
about the legal force and how the rulings of the Court should be domesti-
cated. At the community level, the binding effect of the rulings of the
Court is not adapted to its human rights mandate. With regard to its hu-
man rights mandate, the Court plays a role of supranational constitutional
court. For instance, the Court is empowered to decide on individual peti-
tions and its rulings are final and binding. For a better compliance with
the judgments of the Court, this thesis suggests innovative remedies to ren-
der national legislation adequate to the human rights mandate of the
ECOWAS Community Court of Justice. Some of the key remedies pro-
posed in the thesis include the following: the Court should be empowered
to order concrete measures about how its rulings should be implemented.
Art. 15 par. 4 of the Revised Treaty should be adapted to extend the juris-
diction of the Court; a Committee should be created to work with the
Court about the implementation of its rulings; Member States should pro-
vide exceptional provisions that permit a new enrolling of a case after the
rulings of the Court, as available in many Member States of the European
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Introduction
This paper is concerned with the conflict of jurisdiction within the
ECOWAS Community and the function of the ECOWAS Court of Justice
resulting from it’s nature as a supranational Constitutional Court.1 In or-
der to explain the term “conflict of jurisdiction”, it is necessary to define
the term “jurisdiction” in greater detail. Jurisdiction can be understood in
a formal and material sense.2 In a formal sense, jurisdiction means the
competence of a court to decide on a legal dispute.3 In this sense, the term
“jurisdiction” is understood as the competence of the court in a judicial in-
stance. In contrast, jurisdiction in a material sense describes the material
manifestations of these responsibilities, i.e. the contents of the deci-
sion.4Since the conflict relates to the term “jurisdiction”, the term of “con-
flict” is also to be understood from both points of view.5 Formal conflicts
arise when two or more courts claim jurisdiction as only one claim can be
fulfilled at a time.6A divergence in the content of decisions taken by differ-
ent courts on the other hand refers to a conflict in a material sense.7
Finally, regarding the conflict of laws, the term of conflict of jurisdic-
tion has another, very different meaning. It insofar concerns the conflict of
competence between courts of different countries as these have not neces-
sarily signed an international treaty. This conflict of jurisdiction is two-di-
mensional. A positive conflict arises in cases where multiple courts, accord-
ing to the relevant collisionregulations, claim their power to adjudicate in
a particular case so that, in theory, this case could be brought before nu-
merous courts. In contrast, a negative conflict of jurisdiction arises, when
1 Cohen-Jonathan, La fonction quasi constitutionnelle de la Cour Européenne des
Droits de l’Homme, in: Renouveau du Droit constitutionnel. Mélanges en l’hon-
neur de Louis Favoreu, 1127 (1028); Wildhaber, Eine verfassungsrechtliche Zukun-
ft für den Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte?, in: EuGRZ (2002), 569
(569) [A constitutional future for the European Court of Justice for Human
Rights].
2 Klatt, Die praktische Konkordanz von Kompetenzen, 34. [The practical concor-
dance of competences].
3 Klatt, Die praktische Konkordanz von Kompetenzen, 34.
4 Klatt, Die praktische Konkordanz von Kompetenzen, 58.
5 Klatt, Die praktische Konkordanz von Kompetenzen, 60.
6 Klatt, Die praktische Konkordanz von Kompetenzen, 60.
7 Klatt, Die praktische Konkordanz von Kompetenzen, 60.
21
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none of the courts may be approached due to a conflict of law regarding
the rules of competence or all approached forums reject responsibility due
to the aforementioned rules. As a result, none of the courts may adjudi-
cate.
For the purpose of this paper, the term “conflict of jurisdiction” has a
more specific meaning. Whilst not necessarily, conflicts of jurisdiction are
often conflicts of competence.8 The examination presented here looks at
the competing or contradictory conflicts of competence of different organs
of jurisdiction in multi-level-governance systems.9 To be specific, it is
about the theoretical possibility of conflicts of jurisdiction between nation-
al Constitutional Courts or Supreme Courts of West African countries and
the ECOWAS Court of Justice. In general, national constitutional courts
have the competence to issue legally binding and final judgments which
develop an erga-omnes effect on national level. The conflict and its effects10
can, for example, be found in Art. 46 (3) of the Nigerian Constitution or
in Art. 106 of the Togolese Constitution. Therefore, the conflict of juris-
diction has its origin in the juxtaposition of the finality of decisions of na-
tional courts and the possibility of legal action at the court of justice on the
ECOWAS-level.11 By challenging the final binding decisions of national
Constitutional Courts12, these conflicts of jurisdiction not only represent a
theoretical paradox but are also the basis for a substantial and real risk po-
tential, because they challenge the final binding decision of domestic con-
stitutional courts.13 This risk potential comes to show in such cases where
courts on different levels reach contradicting verdicts.14 It is then no
8 Sauer, Jurisdiktionskonflikte in Mehrebenensystemen, 59. [Conflicts of jurisdic-
tion in multi-level-governance systems].
9 Linder, Grundrechtsschutz in Europa – System einer Kollisionsdogmatik, in:
EuR (2007), 160 (161); Schilling, Deutscher Grundrechtsschutz zwischen
staatlicher Souveränität und men- schenrechtlicher Europäisierung, 10. [Protec-
tion of fundamental law between state sovereignity and Europeanisation in terms
of Human Rights].
10 Enabulele, International Community Law Review (2010), 111 (119); Ebobrah, A
critical Ana- lysis of the human rights mandate of the ECOWAS Community
Court of Justice, 14, available at: http://docs.escr-net.org/usr_doc/S_Ebobrah.pdf
(last accessed on 16/05/2015); Knop, Völker- und Europarechtsfreundlichkeit als
Verfassungsgrundsätze, 57. [Openness toward International and European Law].
11 Enabulele, International Community Law Review (2010), 111 (132).
12 Sauer, Jurisdiktionskonflikte in Mehrebenensystemen, 60. [Conflicts of jurisdic-
tion in multi-level-governance systems].
13 Sauer, Jurisdiktionskonflikte in Mehrebenensystemen, 60.
14 Sauer, Jurisdiktionskonflikte in Mehrebenensystemen, 60.
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longer comprehensible for the parties to the dispute which judgment is
binding.15 This state situation could lead to a loss of confidence in the va-
lidity of the law. Because of this, the risk of a conflict of jurisdiction was
removed at a continental level by Art. 10 of the Protocol (2005).16Theoreti-
cally, the conflict arises out of the fact that the protection of human rights
does not fall exclusively in the competence of national Constitutional
Courts but also in the jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court of Justice.17 Just
as in the European judicial area, the possibility of such conflicts of jurisdic-
tion is not impossible. The conflict also arises at a European level when the
European jurisdiction contradicts that of the constitutional courts of the
Member States.18 Within ECOWAS, the conflict is revived especially, if the
ultimately binding decision by the national Constitutional Court is de-
clared to be in violation of human rights by the ECOWAS Court of Jus-
tice. How can this conflict be resolved? How can a harmonious function-
ing between the ECOWAS Court of Justice and national constitutional
courts of Member States be created? These questions form the fundamental
object of this paper.
From a procedural point of view, the conflict arises when two different
legal systems with contradictory judgments that are difficult to overcome
in their respective procedural principles, collide. These quasi insurmount-
able differences concern, on one hand, the legal force and the binding ef-
fect of constitutional court-decisions (Chapter 2), and on the other hand,
the possibility to the ECOWAS Court of Justice to supersede the decisions
of national courts (Chapter 3).
15 Sauer, Jurisdiktionskonflikte in Mehrebenensystemen, 60.
16 Ebobrah, A critical analysis of the human rights mandate of the ECOWAS Com-
munity Court of Justice, 15, available at: http://docs.escr-net.org/usr_doc/S_Ebob
rah.pdf (last accessed on 16/05/2015).
17 Alter/Helfer/McAllister, A new international human right court for West Africa:
the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, in: The American Journal of Interna-
tional Law (2013), 737 (759).
18 Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht, 2. edition, erstes Kap., Rn. 63 [Benda/
Klein, Constitutional Process Law, 2. edition, first chapter., see recital 63].
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Research Question and Structure of the Study
In the following, the term “the Court of Justice” is used to describe the
ECOWAS Court of Justice and "Charta“ is used for the African Charta on
Human and Peoples’ Rights. I would like to mainly discuss in this chapter
the historical background of the ECOWAS Court of Justice as an Interna-
tional court (A), the competences of the Court of Justice (B) and in partic-
ular its jurisdiction regarding human rights (C). Thereafter, the reason be-
hind this paper is explained (D). The jurisdiction poses complex funda-
mental questions regarding the binding effect of the decisions taken by the
Court of Justice and the consequences regarding the national legal system
of the contracted states stemming from them. These complex questions are
examined in section (E). Not all forms of jurisdiction of the Court of Jus-
tice are discussed in this study. Rather, the relationship between the Court
of Justice and the highest court of the Member States (Constitutional
Court or Supreme Court) with respect to the binding legal effect form the
focus of this dissertation. Therefore, in order to clarify this relationship,
the complex questions need to be narrowed down (F).
The ECOWAS Court of Justice as an International Court
It should be noted that we assume the association of the African states in
the African Union constitutes a continental organisation. Therefore, the
term “regional organisation” is used for the respective region within the
African Union instead of “sub-regional organisation“. In West Africa, the
term „regional organisation of West African States“ is used at a continental
level, as the institutions of the African Union constitute a continental orga-
nisation. Effectively, the term ECOWAS summarises the Economic Com-
munity of West African States.1It was founded in Lagos on 28/05/1975 and
is an intra-regional organisation of currently 15 countries, since Maureta-
nia’s exit in 19992. The starting point for the establishment of an economic
Chapter 1
A.
1 In the French version: La communauté des Etats de l’Afrique de L’ouest (CE-
DEAO).
2 Ebobrah, A critical Analysis of the human rights mandate of the ECOWAS Com-
munity Court of Justice, 6, available at: http://docs.escr-net.org/usr_doc/S_Ebobrah
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association in West Africa was the Biafra War in Nigeria. Goals of the re-
gional ECOWAS are stipulated in Art. 3 of the Amendment Agreement of
Cotonou. According to this objective, ECOWAS strives to achieve acceler-
ated and sustained economic development in West Africa3. According to
the original objective of the association, the key-issue was step-by-step eco-
nomic integration and cooperation of the Member States by forming a cus-
toms union, economic union, and currency union.4 All this will be possi-
ble, if there is economic collaboration within the framework of eco-politi-
cal coordination. For this purpose, the presidents of state may add addi-
tional objectives which seem necessary to reach the goals of the associa-
tion.5 Therefore the policies of the Member States must be harmonized
and coordinated.6 However, the question may be posed how ECOWAS has
evolved from an economic association into a community of values. Before
methodically demonstrating how the jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court
of Justice is a supra-national Court of Justice, the reasons why the Signatories
granted the Court of Justice the authority to decide on questions of human
rights will be briefly outlined.
The Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice
The assignment of the Court of Justice of responsibilities regarding ques-
tions on human rights stems from a curious history in the region. One in-
deed wonders why a Court of Justice, which was originally meant for eco-
nomic integration, barely operates in this field.7 The inactivity of the
Court of Justice in the field of economic lawsuits, can be explained by vari-
ous factors8.Remarkably, the ECOWAS Court of Justice was turned into a
B.
.pdf (last accessed on 16/05/2015); Hartmann, in: Freistein/Leininger (Publ.), Man-
ual International Organisations, 86.
3 Hartmann, in: Freistein/Leininger (Publ.), Manual International Organisations, 86.
4 Art. 3 of the amendment agreement of Cotonou (23/07/1993).
5 Art. 3 Abs. 2 (0) of the amendment agreement of Cotonou (23/07/1993).
6 Ebobrah, A critical Analysis of the human rights mandate of the ECOWAS Com-
munity Court of Justice, 6, available at: http://docs.escr-net.org/usr_doc/S_Ebobrah
.pdf (last accessed on 16/05/2015).
7 Alter/Helfer/McAllister, A new international human right court for West Africa:
the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, in: The American Journal of Interna-
tional Law (2013), 737 (738).
8 Alter/Helfer/R.McAllister, A new international human right court for West Africa:
the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, in: The American Journal of Interna-
tional Law (2013), 737 (756).
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court for human rights in 2005. How can this shift be explained? The
Member States agreed that successful economic development and integra-
tion are dependent on political stability, the adherence to human rights
and the principles of the rule of law within the Community.9 Regarding
the regional integration in West Africa, politics were at first considered to
be a side-issue.10 The overwhelming attention on political stability and the
monitoring of human rights by the ECOWAS Court of Justice essentially
has to do with the security policy and the role of the Community as well as
the consensus regarding economic integration conditional on human
rights11. Precisely because of this, the Signatories came to the conclusion in
the early stages of integration that the economic purpose can not be at-
tained if the political stability within the Member States and the region
cannot be secured. Securing political stability by observing the principles
of the rule of law and human rights,is a good prerequisite for the attain-
ment of economic growth.12 This raises an important question: why does
the question of security within the ECOWAS Community play such a sig-
nificant role? How did ECOWAS become a force for peace in the region13?
The answer to this question dates back to the exciting and difficult history
9 Saliu, Governance and development questions in West Africa, in: Bamba/Igué/
Sylla (Publ.), Sortir du sous-développement, 185 (196); Ebobrah, Legitimacy and
feasibility of human rights realisation through regional economic communities
in Africa: the case of ECOWAS, 4; Ahadzi-Nonou, Droits de l’Homme et Déve-
loppement: Théories et Réalités, in: Territoires et Liberté, Mélanges en Hommage
au Doyen Yves Madiot, 107 (108); Ndiaye, Les organisations internationa- les
Africaines et le maintien de la Paix: L’exemple de la CEDEAO, 37.
10 Ebobrah, Legitimacy and feasibility of human rights realisation through regional
economic communities in Africa: the case of ECOWAS, 3.
11 Ebobrah, Legitimacy and feasibility of human rights realisation through regional
economic communities in Africa: the case of ECOWAS, 5; Alter/Helfer/McAllis-
er, A new international human right court for West Africa: The ECOWAS Com-
munity Court of Justice, in: The American Journal of International Law (2013),
737 (753); Ebobrah, Human rights developments in sub-regi onal court in Africa
during 2008, in: African Human Rights Law Journal (2009), 312 (313).
12 Ebobrah, A critical Analysis of the human rights mandate of the ECOWAS Com-
munity Court of Justice, 7, available at: http://docs.escr-net.org/usr_doc/S_Ebobra
h.pdf (last accessed on 16/05/2015).
13 Van den Boom, Regionale Kooperation in Westafrika, 92; Obi, Economic Com-
munity of West African States on the Ground: Comparing Peacekeeping in
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Còte d’Ivoire, in: Söderbaum/Tavares
(Publ.), Regional Organizations in African Se- curity, 51 (62); Söderbaum/
Tavares, Problematizing Regional Organizations in African Security, in: Söder-
baum/Tavares (Publ.), Regional Organizations in African Security, 1 (3);
Dampha, Nationalism and Reparation in West Africa, 121; Mair/Peters-Berries,
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of the ECOWAS Community. The association was indeed founded with
the purpose of ensuring economic collaboration. However, events led to a
necessary extension of the Community’s objectives, e.g. in the area of secu-
rity. It all began with the involvement of Nigeria in Liberian conflicts in
1990–1999. The ECOWAS Community has effectively taken on a humani-
tarian mandate in the region with this intervention.14 The concern for se-
curity and peace in the region has led to a situation where the observation
of human rights and the rule of law has become a main priority for the or-
ganisation. On the basis of the objectives stipulated by the Community in
the Amendment Agreement, further military interventions have taken
place in the region, such as in Sierra Leone (1998–2002), Guinea-Bissau
(1998–1999), again in Liberia (2003) and in the Ivory Coast (2002–2004).15
In order to find a legal framework for such interventions, an additional
Protocol regarding the creation of a Mechanisme de prévention, de règlement
des conflits, de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité was adopted in 1999. The
regulations stipulated in this additional Protocol are unusual in the light
of Art. 2 paragraph 7 of the Charta of the United Nations. This Protocol
does not only grant ECOWAS extensive rights of intervention but also
mentions extensive reasons and possibilities for the authorisation of an in-
tervention in other Member States.16 Among these are, besides severe hu-
manitarian emergencies and serious human rights violations, cross-border
and internal violent conflict and the prevention of coups against the con-
stitutional order within Member States.17 Ultimately, an intervention is
justified under any circumstances which pose a severe risk to the security
Regional Integration and Cooperation in Africa south of the Sahara: EAC,
ECOWAS and SADC in comp., 189.
14 Hartmann, in: Freistein/Leininger (Publ.), Manual International Organisations,
88.
15 Hartmann, in: Freistein/Leininger (Publ.), Manual International Organisations,
88.
16 See inter alia Art. 22, 25 et 26 du Protocol relatif au mécanisme de prévention,
des gestions, de règlement des conflits, de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité
(10/12/1999); Ebobrah, Legitimacy and feasibility of human rights realisation
through regional economic communities in Africa: the case of ECOWAS, 7.
17 Edi, Globalization and Politics in the Economic Community of West African
States, 105; Gambari, Political and comparative dimensions of regional integra-
tion: the Case of ECOWAS, preface, vii; Mair/Peters-Berries, Regional Integration
and Cooperation in Africa south of the Sahara: EAC, ECOWAS and SADC in
comp., 233.
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and peace in Member States.18 Voices in literature consider the immediate
vicinity of the Signatories to be the main reason for this particular regu-
lation of interventions within ECOWAS, namely the concern for the guar-
antee of security in the region.19
At a universal level and after the horrors of the Second World War, the
issue of human rights has moved away from the complete exposure of the
fundamental rights of the individual in totalitarian regimes and a purely
nationalistic relationship towards an issue of supra-national and interna-
tional understanding.20 Thus, citizens are also entitled to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
besides the fundamental freedoms and constitutional individual rights of
the Togolese Constitution (to name one example). The Charta is at the
centre of the West African Architecture of Human Rights. It was conceived
in the instruments of Community not only as a standard of review of na-
tional government action but also as the minimal standard of regional pro-
tection of human rights – as per the Protocol of Good Governance and
Democracy.
This brief historical insight is important because the aforementioned
acute crises in the region are the prerequisites for the involvement of the
ECOWAS Community in reinforcing human rights protection within the
system of the Community. In order to contain a repressive political regime
and military coups stemming from it, the Signatories decided to adopt a
peoples’ rights pact that recognised the principles of human and peoples’
rights in the rule of law as standards of the Community. Indeed, an addi-
tional Protocol for Good Governance21 was adopted as a reaction to the in-
stability and the endangerment of the rule of law within the Community.
It codifies the significant principles of constitutional convergence, the rule
of law and human rights set out in the African Charta. A number of funda-
mental principles of the rule of law, such as separation of powers, fair elec-
18 Hartmann, in: Freistein/Leininger (Publ.), Manual International Organisations,
88.
19 Ebobrah, Litigating Human Rights before Sub-Regional Court in Africa:
Prospects and challenges, in: African Journal of International and Comparative
Law (2009), 79 (87).
20 Rohleder, Protection of Constitutional Rights in the European Multi-level-Sys-
tem, 29.
21 Protocole A/SP.1/12/.01 sur la Démocratie et la Bonne gouvernance, Additionnel
au Protoco le relatif au mécanisme de prévention, de gestion, de règlement des
conflits, de maintien de la paix et de la sécurité (21/12/2001).
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tions as the only legitimate path to power and the guarantee of political
freedoms for the citizens are laid down in this Protocol as basic principles
of the Community.22 Furthermore, inclusive and political participation in
political life in the country as well as free activity for political parties is
guaranteed. According to the Protocol, the army must, in the secular con-
stitutional system, play a subordinate role to the government (Art. 1 of the
Protocol A/SP.1/12/01). As per this Protocol, amendments to the electoral
acts without consent by the most important political actors of a Member
state in the last six months before new elections are strictly prohibited
(Art. 2 of the Protocol A/SP.1/12/01). Moreover, it allows for an interven-
tion in a Member state if it is found that the democratic order of a signato-
ry has been severely breached or the human rights situation is endangered
in a fundamental manner (Art. 45 of the Protocol A/SP.1/12/01). There-
fore, the defense of democratic rules of governance constitutes, as set out
in this Protocol, an indispensable standard within the Community. All of
these principles must be adhered to by the Member States. A contraven-
tion of the stipulated principles of the rules of law is punished with sanc-
tions. According to a few voices in literature these requirements in the Pro-
tocol for good governance establishes a Constitution for West African
states.23 Based on the considerable threat to the constitutional state in West
Africa, this opinion is justified. However, it must be stated here that de-
spite the implementation of the Protocol in July 2005 with new instru-
ments of ratification, there have been repeated political upheavals (Burki-
na Faso, October 2014) and unconstitutional transfers of power as well as
military coups in the region, e.g. in Togo (February 2005), Guinea (2008),
Niger (2010). This legal situation within the region clearly shows that
democracy within the constitutional order of the Member States is still
fragile.24 For this very reason, an impartial and independent organ of juris-
diction at Community-level seems particularly necessary, as the disregard
for constitutional principles can directly lead to such constitutional crises
and consequently to political instability within the legal order of the Com-
munity. The adherence to human rights and the inherent democratic prin-
ciples will therefore become the current task of the ECOWAS Court of Jus-
22 Likibi, La Charte africaine pour la démocratie, les élections et la gouvernance, 69.
23 Fall/Sall, Une constitution régionale pour l’espace CEDEAO: le protocole sur la
démocratie et la bonne gouvernance, available at: http://la-constitution-en-afrique
.org/article-34239380. html (last accessed on 16/05/2015).
24 Hartmann, in: Freistein/Leininger (Publ.), Manual International Organisations,
91.
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tice, effectively formalizing the role of human rights in the development
process25.
The legal foundations for the ECOWAS Court of Justice are only laid
out in the Founding Treaty. Art. 6 of the amendment agreement (1993)
defines the institutions of the Community. The decision-making organs of
the Community include the Conference of the Heads of State, the Council
of Ministers, the Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, the ex-
ecutive administration and the ECOWAS Court of Justice.
The ECOWAS Court of Justice can look back on 23 years of history as
the judicial pillar of the Community. Effectively, the Protocol A/
P1/7/9126on the Court of Justice for the Community was adopted on 6 July
1991. This Protocol, however, is a firm component of the Founding Treaty
(28/05/1975) and later of the amendment agreement, the so-called
Cotonou-Agreement, of 23 July 1993.27 Therefore, its date of inception was
05/11/1996. According to Art. 6 (e) of the amendment agreement, the
ECOWAS Court of Justice embodies the supra-national core of the Com-
munity.
Concerning its factual competences, the Court of Justice disposes of a
broad competence in comparison to other intra-regional judiciary bodies.
According to Art. 9 of the Protocol A/P1/7/91 (1991), the Court of Justice
is responsible for the decision on legal disputes regarding the interpreta-
tion of the ECOWAS founding Treaty as well as the inherent Protocols
and Conventions.28 Therefore, the Court of Justice may adjudicate on the
breaches of the treaty by a Member state and decide on disputes regarding
the interpretation and implementation of the treaty. Disagreements be-
tween the institutions of the Community and the civil servants also fall
within the Court’s sphere of responsibility. It is important to point out
that there are still many inconsistencies regarding individual complaints
against breaches of the Community’s economic laws.29 The ECOWAS
Court of Justice should also be called a hybrid court. In fact, the court is
mutatis mutandis a combination of ECJ (European Court of Justice) and
ECtHR (European Court of Human Rights).
25 Bryde, Überseeische Verfassungsvergleichung nach 30 Jahren [Overseas Compari-
son of Constitutions after 30 years], in: VRÜ (1997), 452 (460).
26 Protocole A/P1/7/91 (06/07/1991), relatif à la Cour de Justice de la Communauté.
27 Art. 34 Abs. 3, Protocole A/P1/7/91 (06/07/1991), relatif à la Cour de Justice de la
Communauté.
28 In addition Art. 15 of the Amendment Agreement.
29 Hartmann, in: Freistein/Leininger (Publ.), Manual on International Organisa-
tions, 89.
Chapter 1 Research Question and Structure of the Study
30
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748901808, am 26.10.2021, 13:00:44
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Indeed, the ECOWAS Court of Justice can in many respects be com-
pared to the ECJ. It is the court in the first and last instance30 for legal dis-
putes regarding the interpretation and application of the founding Treaty
of the Community and the inherent additional protocols.
The factual competences of the Court of Justice are set down in Art. 3 of
the additional Protocol.31 According to Art. 3 of the additional Protocol A/
SP.1/01/05 (19/01/2005), the court is responsible for the adjudication of ev-
ery legal dispute regarding the following areas:
« 1. La Cour a compétence sur tous les différends qui lui sont soumis
et qui ont pour objet:
a)L’interprétation et l’application du traité, des Conventions et proto-
coles de la Commu- nauté; b) l’interprétation et l’application du Trai-
té, des règlements, des directives, des déci- sions et de tous autres ins-
truments juridiques subsidiaires adoptés dans le cadre de la CEDEAO;
c) l’appréciation de légalité des règlements, des directives, des décisions
et de tous autres instruments juridiques subsidiaires adoptés dans le
cadre de la CEDEAO; d) l’examen des manquements des Etats
membres aux obligations qui leur incombent en vertu du Traité, des
Conventions, Protocoles et Règlements, des décisions et directives; e)
l’application des dispositions du Traité, Conventions et Protocoles, des
règlements, des directives ou décisions de la CEDEAO; f) l’examen des
litiges entre la Communauté et ses agents; g) les actions en réparation
des dommages causés par une institution de la Communauté ou un
agent de celle- ci pour tout acte commis ou toute omission dans l’exer-
cice de ses fonctions. 2. La Cour est compétente pour déclarer engagée
la responsabilité non contractuelle et condamne la Com- munauté à la
réparation du préjudice causé, soit par des agissements matériels, soit
par des actes normatifs des Institutions de la Communauté ou de ses
agents dans l’exercice ou à l’occasion de l’exercice de leurs fonctions. 3.
L’action en responsabilité contre la Communauté ou celle de la Com-
munauté contre des tiers ou ses agents. Ces actions se prescrivent par
trois (3) ans à compter de la réalisation des dommages. 4. La Cour est
compétente pour connaitre des cas de violation des droits de l’Homme dans
tout Etat membre. 5. En attendant la mise en place du Tribunal Arbi-
tral, prévu par l’Article 16 du Traité Révisé, la Cour remplit également
30 Art. 19 Parag. 2 du Protocole A/P1/7/91 (06/07/1991), relatif à la Cour de Justice
de la Communauté.
31 Protocole Additionnel A/SP.1/01/05 (19/01/2005) Portant Amendement du Pro-
tocole (A/P.1/ 7/91) Relatif à la Cour de Justice de la Communauté.
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des fonctions d’arbitre. 6. La Cour peut avoir compétence sur toutes
les questions prévues dans tout accord que les Etats membres pour-
raient conclure entre eux, ou avec la CEDEAO et qui lui donne compé-
tence. 7. La Cour a toutes les compétences que les dispositions du pré-
sent Protocole lui confèrent ainsi que toutes autres compétences que
pourraient lui confier des Protocoles et Décisions ultérieures de la
Communauté. 8. La Conférence des Chefs d’Etat et de Gouvernement
a le pouvoir de saisir la Cour pour connaitre des litiges autres que ceux
visés dans le présent article ».
“1. The Court has the competence to adjudicate on any dispute relat-
ing to the following:
a) the interpretation and application of the Treaty, Conventions and
Protocols of the Com- munity; b) the interpretation and application of
regulations, directives, decisions and other subsidiary legal instru-
ments adopted by ECOWAS; c) the legality of regulations, directives,
decisions and other subsidiary legal instruments adopted by ECOW-
AS; d) the failure by Member States to honour their obligations under
the Treaty, Conventions and Protocols, reg- ulations, directives or deci-
sions of ECOWAS Members States; f) the Community and officials,
and g) the actions for damages against a Community institution or an
official of the Community for any action or omission in the exercise of
official functions. 2. The Court shall have the power to determine any
non-contractual liability of the Community and may order the Com-
munity to pay damages or make reparation for official acts or omis-
sions of any Com- munity institution or Community officials in the
performance of official duties or functions.
3. Any action by or against a Community Institutions or any Member
of the Community shall be statute-barred after three (3) years from the
date when the right of action arose. 4. The Court has jurisdiction to
determine cases of violation of human rights that occur in any Mem-
ber State. 5. Pending the establishment of Arbitration Tribunal pro-
vide for under Article 16 of the Treaty, the Court shall have the power
to act as arbitrator for the purpose of Article 16 of the Treaty
6. The Court shall have jurisdiction over any matter provided for in
any agreement where the parties provide that the Court shall settle dis-
putes arising from the agreement.
7. The Court shall have all the power conferred upon it by the provi-
sions of the Protocol as well as any other powers that may be conferred
by subsequent Protocols and Decisions of the Community. 8. The Au-
thority of Heads of State and Government shall have the power to
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grant the Court the power to adjudicate on any specific dispute that it
may refer to the Courtother than those specified in this Article”.32
Except for paragraph 4, the rules of competence for the ECOWAS Court of
Justice are mutatis mutandis comparable to the ECJ. Essentially, the deci-
sion-making competences of both courts extend to safeguarding the laws
of the European Union regarding the interpretation and application of the
agreements (Art. 19 EUV). It is the task of the Union’s jurisdiction to en-
sure the adherence to the community legislation when it comes to the in-
terpretation and application of the instruments of the Community. This
includes compliance control regarding the legal acts of the Executive and
the Legislature.33 The organs of the Union are bound by the lawfulness of
their actions. Thereby, the area of competence for both Courts of Justice
encompasses the damages caused by the unlawful conduct of organs of the
Community and civil servants. Moreover, the ECOWAS Court of Justice
and the ECJ deal with official liability claims According to Art. 3 para-
gr. 1.g of the Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 and Art. 268 TFEU. The
permitted official liability claims, According to Art. 3 paragr. 1.g of the
Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 and Art. 268 TFEU fall within the exclu-
sive competence of both courts.34 The extra-contractual liability regulation
of the respective area of competence can also be compared (Art. 3 Abs. 2
of the Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 and Art. 340 TFEU). By way of
preliminary rulings, collaboration can be noted in the ECOWAS-court sys-
tem as well as the ECJ. Because for the guarantee of the unified validity of
the fundamental norms of the ECOWAS Community and the European
Union, national courts are obligated, According to Art. 10.f of the Addi-
tional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 and Art. 267 TFEU, to submit to the respec-
tive Court a legally relevant question concerning the interpretation of the
agreements or Protocols of the respective community to the respective
Court of Justice.
Those entitled to file a suit are also similar at both courts. These include
the signatory states, the organs of the respective Union as well as natural
and legal persons. In addition, the individual courts ofthe Member States,
by way of preliminary ruling, as well as the parties to the disputes are both
directly entitled to approach the intra-regional court. As only the courts of
32 Emphasis by the author.
33 Pache, in: Vedder/Heintschel von Heinegg (Publ.), Europäisches Unions-
recht[European Union Law], commentary, 1. edition, Art. 19 EUV, Rn. 5.
34 Pache, in: Vedder/Heintschel von Heinegg (Publ.), Europäisches Union-
srecht[European Union Law], commentary, 1. edition, Art. 268 TFEU, Rn. 4.
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the member states are directly entitled to litigate in this regard, the possi-
bility of the parties to indirectly act by inducing the filing of a suit is of
great importance. The parties to the initial proceedings are, however, not
entitled to submit.35 Moreover, there are differences between the system of
the ECJ and the ECOWAS Court of Justice regarding the question of sub-
mission. Indeed, there is a difference between the entitlement to submit
and the duty to submit. Entitled to submit are, according to the stipula-
tions in Art. 267 paragr. 2 TFEU only the courts of the Member States.36
However, Art. 267 paragr. 3 TFEU prescribes a duty to submit to the court
in the last instance for the Member States of the European Union.37 Obli-
gated to submit are therefore all courts against whose decision, in a partic-
ular case, no legal remedies are available. This does not only include court
of cassation but also the Constitutional Courts of Member States.38 This
second scenario, the duty to submit, does not exist in the system of the
ECOWAS Court of Justice. As in Art. 10 a) of the Additional Protocol A/
SP.1/01/05, the ECOWAS Court of Justice, just like ECJ, is responsible for
bringing legal action in cases of a breach of the agreement (comparable to
Art. 258 and 259 TFEU).39 With regard to the action of annulment, both
systems show similarities regarding the right to bring proceedings. Natural
and legal persons actively have locus standi before both courts regarding an
action of annulment.40 Subsequently, there are no substantial differences
in both systems regarding the object of dispute. Effectively all legally ad-
verse actions caused by an organ of the Community constitute an object of
dispute.41
35 Pache, in: Vedder/Heintschel von Heinegg (Publ.), Europäisches Unionsrecht
[European Union Law], commentary, 1. edition., Art. 267 TFEU, Rn. 22; also see
Art. 10 f) Protocole Additionnel A/SP.1/01/05 (19/01/2005) Portant Amendement
du Protocole (A/P.1/7/91) Relatif à la Cour de Justice de la Communauté.
36 Pache, in: Vedder/Heintschel von Heinegg (Publ.), Europäisches Union-
srecht[European Union Law], commentary, 1. edition, Art. 267 TFEU, Rn. 21.
37 Pache, in: Vedder/Heintschel von Heinegg (Publ.), Europäisches Union-
srecht[European Union Law], commentary, 1. edition, Art. 267 TFEU, Rn. 21.
38 Pache, in: Vedder/Heintschel von Heinegg (Publ.), Europäisches Union-
srecht[European Union Law], commentary, 1. edition, Art. 267 TFEU, Rn. 28.
39 Tsikrikas, Die Wirkungen der Urteile des Europäischen Gerichtshofs im Ver-
tragsverlet- zungsverfahren. [The Effects of Judgments by the Court of Justice of
the European Union in Proceedings due to Breach of Agreement], 82.
40 Art. 10 c) Protocole Additionnel A/SP.1/01/05 (19/01/2005) Portant Amende-
ment du Proto-cole (A/P.1/7/91) Relatif à la Cour de Justice de la Communauté
(Comp. with Article. 263 paragr. 4 TFEU).
41 Art. 10 c) Protocole Additionnel A/SP.1/01/05 (19/01/2005) Portant Amende-
ment du Proto- cole (A/P.1/7/91) Relatif à la Cour de Justice de la Communauté
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.Furthermore, both courts show similarities when it comes to the moni-
toring of the lawfulness of the legislative procedure of the Community as
well as the actions of organs of the Community (Art. 10 b of the Addi-
tional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 and Art. 263 TFEU).
However, the sequence of competences of the ECOWAS Court of Jus-
tice is significantly longer in comparison to the otherwise – as shown –
rather similar ECJ. In fact, since 2005 the ECOWAS Court of Justice has
been given jurisdiction in questions of human rights. As the Protocol for
Good Governance of 2001 clarifies, ECOWAS is not only an economic
community but also and particularly so, a community of values. Therefore,
principles of the rule of law and human rights are seen as an important pil-
lar of the Community. This particular status of human rights can already
be observed in the ratification of the Agreement of Cotonou.42 The
strengthening of the competence of the court was the best solution to en-
force these goals. In contrast to other intra-African, intra-regional courts of
law, ECOWAS was given jurisdiction with regards to human rights not by
its own interpretation of the legal norms of the Community but, and this
is significant, by an explicit decision by the Member States.43 This conces-
sion of jurisdiction in human rights questions to the ECOWAS Court of
Justice took place by way of the Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05, signed
in Accra in January 2005. The jurisdiction in human rights questions by
the ECOWAS Court of Justice was set out in Art. 4 of this Additional Pro-
tocol A/SP.1/01/05. This, on the other hand, shows how highly the Mem-
ber States rate the compliance with human rights and the rule of law with-
in the territory of the Community.44
However, a significant question regarding the liability of the Member
States with regard to a breach of the order within the Community has not
yet been clarified. The question is whether individuals are entitled to bring
proceedings against a Member State for actions which are inconsistent
und Art. 263 paragr. 4; also Pache, in: Vedder/Heintschel von Heinegg (Publ.),
Europäisches Unionsrecht [European Union Law], Handkommentar, 1. edition,
Art. 263 TFEU, Rn. 32.
42 Fourth section of the preamble and Art. 4 (g) of the Amendment Agreement of
Cotonou (23/07/1993).
43 Ebobrah, Litigating Human Rights before Sub-Regional Court in Africa:
Prospects and challenges, in: African Journal of International and Comparative
Law (2009), 79 (86).
44 Ebobrah, Litigating Human Rights before Sub-Regional Court in Africa:
Prospects and challenges, in: African Journal of International and Comparative
Law (2009), 79 (88).
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with Community law. This question can be affirmed in the ECJ-system.45
It can thus be deduced that the ECOWAS-Community, like the European
Union, constitutesa legal order of peoples’ rights in whose favour the states
have limited their sovereignty on a narrow basis. Legal entities within this
new legal order are not only the states but also individuals.46 However, one
can clearly deduct from the wording of Art. 10 c) of the Additional Proto-
col A/SP.1/01/05 (19/01/2005) that the individual has a legal remedy
against unlawful action or inaction by a Member State with the ECOWAS
Court of Justice.The Court of Justice saw itself confronted with this
question in its first decision in 2004.
I would first like to briefly present the main facts. A Nigerian lodged a
complaint with the ECOWAS Court of Justice against the Republic of
Nigeria and Benin. The object of the dispute was the fact that the plaintiff
was supposed to have had an important appointment in the Republic of
Benin regarding his trade activities. Unfortunately, the border between
Nigeria and Benin was closed on the said day from the Nigerian side and
due to this, the plaintiff suffered considerable economic losses. For this
reason, he lodged a complaint against the Republics of Nigeria and Benin.
His complaint was dismissed with the reason that the ECOWAS Court of
Justice does not have a mandate for individual complaints. Moreover, the
court clarified that the only possibility for private persons to bring pro-
ceedings was for a Member State to take the reins in the legal matter and
bring proceedings on behalf of the private person.47 The judgment caused
enormous attention and triggered a campaign in the region to allow com-
plaints by individuals before the ECOWAS Court of Justice.48 Even if the
question of locus standi was eventually clarified after this judgment by the 
Protocol A/SP.1/01/05, it is still unclear whether the Member States are
also liable for their unlawful actions within the Community in favour of
natural or legal persons. The question still remains unanswered whether or
not natural and legal persons have a declaratory claim regarding the breach
of the fundamental rights of free traffic of goods and capital as well as the
45 Pache, in: Vedder/Heintschel von Heinegg (Publ.), Europäisches Unionsrecht
[European Union Law], commentary, 1. edition, Art. 340 TFEU, Rn. 16.
46 ECJ, 26/62, Van Gend & Loos (5/02/1963), 25.
47 CCJECOWAS, Afolabi v. Nigeria, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/01/04 (27/04/2004), in:
Community Court of Justice, Law Report (2004–2009), 1 (12); Sall, La Justice
d’Intégration, 273 (274).
48 Alter/Helfer/McAllister, A new international human right court for West Africa:
the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, in: The American Journal of Interna-
tional Law (2013), 737 (738).
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freedom of movement within the territory of the Community. There is
also currently no clear answer to the question, whether natural and legal
persons are entitled to bring legal proceedings if they lodge a complaint
against the breach of their basic rights by organs of the Community. Until
2005, only Signatories were privileged to bring proceedings. Since then.
the situation has, however, changed significantly.
In particular: the Jurisdiction of the Court with regards to Human Rights
since the Inception of the Additional Protocol of 2005
The Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 from 2005 brought institutional
changes regarding the competences of the Court of Justice. Following the
inception of the Additional Protocol A/ SP.1/01/05 of 2005 the Court re-
ceived jurisdiction over human rights disputes. The turning point in that
year can be explained by the objective by the Community discussed above.
ECOWAS represents a unique linking of human rights jurisdiction and
economic litigation on the African continent.49 There are many reasons in
favour of such an exception and stance with regards to general Peoples’
Rights. The changes in the policy of the rule of law and human rights in
the Community included the extension of factual responsibilities of the
Court of Justice. The court was supposed to make a significant contribu-
tion to the implementation of the human rights entrenched in the African
Charta for Human Rights and the accepted Principles of Good Gover-
nance in the Protocol for Good Governance. The last step toward human
rights jurisdiction by ECOWAS was eventually triggered by the case Afo-
labi which was briefly presented above.50 Therefore, one can speak of a
double face of the ECOWAS Court of Justice since the inception of the
Additional Protocol (ratified in Accra on 19 January 2005).
The mentioned Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy was in-
deed signed in 2001 in the course of regional integration. In order to en-
force the requirements of this Protocol on Democratic Principles and
Good Governance the court received a special, corresponding, compe-
tence. The Signatories also extended the decision-making authority of the
C.
49 CCJECOWAS, Afolabi v. Nigeria, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/01/04 (27/04/2004), in:
Community Court of Justice, Law Report (2004–2009), 1 (12).
50 CCJECOWAS, Afolabi v. Nigeria, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/01/04 (27/04/2004), in:
Community Court of Justice, Law Report (2004–2009).
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Court of Justice. According to Art. 10 of the Additional Protocol of 200551,
the Court of Justice decides on violations of human rights in the territory
of the Member States. Consequently, the Protocol on the Court of Justice
of 1991 was improved in many places by the Additional Protocol A/
SP.1/01/05 on 19/01/2005 in Accra. According to this, individual com-
plaints with regards to human rights violations are permissible before the
Court of Justice. This is a judicial guarantee to regard the human rights
laid out in the African Charta of Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights
(Art. 7 of the Charta).
Through its human rights mandate, the ECOWAS Court of Justice re-
sembles the ECtHR in many ways because, just like the ECtHR, the
ECOWAS Court of Justice now adjudges on human rights violations in
Member States. The protection of human rights by the ECOWAS Court of
Justice is therefore equal to the ECtHR in various ways (Art. 10 d of the
Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 in comparison to Art. 34 ECHR). How-
ever, there is a significant difference between the wording of Art. 10 d of
the Additional Protocol (A/SP.1/01/05) and Art. 34 ECHR (this will be en-
larged upon in the 2. chapter.)
However, the attribution to the court of special competences regarding
human rights and democratic principles entails legal problems. As a result,
there is no clearly defined relationship between the Court of Justice and
the constitutional organs of the Member States. Indeed, the results of the
changes to the Protocol A/P1/7/91 (06/07/1991), concern the admissibility
requirements and the entitlement to lodge a complaint. The great differ-
ence between the two intra-regional human rights instances lies in the fact
that complaints before the ECOWAS Court of Justice are admissible with-
out the prior exhaustion of other legal remedies. Here, the access require-
ments to the ECOWAS Court of Justice differentiate from those of the EC-
tHR (Art. 35 paragr. 1 ECHR). Since the recognition of the human rights
jurisdiction of the court through the Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 of
Accra (2005), the jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court of Justice is marked
by four significant features: it differs from other sub-regional Economic
courts of law because of the direct access for individual complaints, there is
no requirement of prior exhaustion of legal remedies, it has unlimited fac-
tual competence regarding human rights and has a relatively broad adjudi-
cation on human rights and barely noticeable jurisdiction regarding com-
51 Protocole Additionnel A/SP.1/01/05 (19/01/2005) Portant Amendement du Pro-
tocole (A/P.1/7/91) Relatif à la Cour de Justice de la Communauté.
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plaints of a legal economic-integrational nature. 52 Through its jurisdiction
and institutional form, the ECOWAS Court of Justice is qualified as being
sui generis.53
However, there is still no clarity which human rights fall within the
sphere of the court’s responsibility.54 In fact, the teachings agree that the
African Charta for Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights of 1981 constitutes
the material basis for human rights jurisdiction of the Court of Justice.
Nevertheless, the question remains whether, over and above this, the viola-
tion of other human rights instruments may function as an object of litiga-
tion. However, it is indisputable that the court itself refers to the African
Charta for Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights as a core element of the
community of values of West African states in its judgments.55 Therefore,
we must assume that the ECOWAS Court of Justice is supposed to moni-
tor the adherence to the Charta by the Member States. In order to over-
come possible conflicts with the African Court for Human and People’s
Rights, all complaints that have already been adjudicated by other interna-
tional court are admissible, According to Art. 4 d) of the Additional Proto-
col A/SP.1/01/05 (19/01/2005). This finally confirms the status of the
ECOWAS Court of Justice as an international court of law. In its latest
judgment, the court emphasised its international character with the fol-
lowing words:
« Dans leurs écritures, les requérants se sont en effet référés aussi bien à
la Constitution na tionale […] qu’à la Charte de la Transition […] La
Cour doit considérer de telles références comme inappropriées dans
son prétoire. Juridiction internationale, elle n’a vocation à sanc-tionner
52 Alter/Helfer/R.McAllister, A new international Human Rights Court for West
Africa: The ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, in: The American Journal of
International Law (2013), 737 (753 ff.).
53 Ebobrah, Legitimacy and feasibility of human rights realisation through regional
economic communities in Africa: the case of ECOWAS (200), 10.
54 Ebobrah, A critical Analysis of the human rights mandate of the ECOWAS Com-
munity Court of Justice, 8, available at: http://docs.escr-net.org/usr_doc/S_Ebobra
h.pdf (last accessed on 16/05/2015).
55 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. Etat du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/12
(13.03.2012), par. 11, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on
16/07/2015); CJ CEDEAO, Af- faire Congrès pour la démocratie et le Progrès
(CDP) & Autres c. Etat Burkina, N°ECW/CCJ/ JUD/16/15 (13/07/2015).
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que la méconnaissance d’obligations résultant de textes internationaux
opposables aux Etats ».56
The system does, however, show weaknesses resulting in the emergence of
an extensive range of topics which definitely require clarification. Since
the concession of the jurisdiction on human rights to the ECOWAS Court
of Justice. One of the main problems in the ECOWAS system of protection
is that there are no set of rules concerning the implementation of declara-
tory judgments under international law. There is a lack of regulation on
Member State level for the reception and intra-national effectiveness of
ECOWAS declaratory judgments. Especially the question of implementa-
tion requires clarification, because the effective legal protection in favour
of the individual plaintiff logically assumes that the elimination of breach-
es of the convention, as ascertained by the ECOWAS Court of Justice, can
also be implemented at intra-national level. In this respect, the awarding of
damages does currently not constitute full compensation.57
Reason for the Study: The Case of Ameganvi et al vs. Togo
The ECOWAS Court of Justice has in the past already reached four signifi-
cant verdicts58 which are especially important for the present paper. Addi-
D.
56 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Congrès pour la démocratie et le Progrès (CDP) & Autres c.
Etat Bur- kina, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/16/15 (13/07/2015), par. 26.
57 Polakiewicz, Die Verpflichtung der Staaten aus den Urteilen des Europäischen
Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte (2012), 4.[The Obligation of States resulting
from Judgments by the European Court of Human Rights (2012), 4.].
58 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques 54 (74); Olinga, Les Droits
de l’Homme peuvent-ils sous- traire un ex-dictateur à la justice? L’affaire Hissène
Habré devant la Cour de justice de la CEDEAO, in: Revue Trimestrielle des
Droits de l’Homme (2011), 735 (736); Sall, L’affaire Hissène Habré, Aspects judi-
ciaires nationaux et internationaux, 16; CC CEDEAO, Mamadou Tandja c.
République du Niger, Arrêt, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/05/10 (08/11/2010), available at:
www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on 16/07/2015); CC CEDEAO, Hissein
Habré c. République du Sénégal, Arrêt, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/10 (18/11/2010),
available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on 16/07/2015); CJ CEDEAO,
Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. Etat du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11 (07/10/2011),
par. 66, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on 16/07/2015); CJ
CEDEAO, Affaire Gbagbo c. République de la Côte d’Ivoire, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/
03/13 (22/02/2013), accesible at: www.courtecowas .org  (last accessed on
16/07/2015); Ebobrah, Human rights development in African sub-regional econo-
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tionally, the latest decision by the ECOWAS Court of Justice against the
Republic of Burkina Faso, in which the court considered an electoral act as
a breach of the principles of the rule of law anchored in the Protocol on
Good Governance of 2001 in Art. 1.g) and 2.3, is of great importance.59
With regard to these judgments, the question is justified, whether the
ECOWAS Court of Justice can be considered to be a supra-national Consti-
tutional Court60 as the ECOWAS Court of Justice hereby demonstrates
that the last word no longer belongs to the Constitutional Court or
Supreme Court of the Member States.61 Due to their constitutional refer-
ences these Court of Justice judgments trigger a tense relationship between
the Court of Justice and the Constitutional jurisdictions of the Member
States.
The present study concerns itself primarily with the question of the rela-
tionship between constitutional jurisdiction of Member States and the
ECOWAS-jurisdiction on human rights. In this respect, the case of
Ameganvi against the State of Togo is a prime example where the Court of
Justice arrived at a groundbreaking judgment following the examination
of a decision by the Togolese Constitutional Court. The Togolese Constitu-
tional Court decision and the resulting declaratory judgment by the
ECOWAS Court of Justice represent the main subject matter of the present
study.
Decision by the Togolese Constitutional Court
Nine parliamentarians of the opposition party UFC left the party and
founded a new party, the ANC. On 18 November 2010, the President of
the Parliament submitted a list of these parliamentarians to the Constitu-
tional Court with the request to find successors for them. With the deci-
sion N° N°E018/10 of 22 November 2010, the Togolese Constitutional
Court gave notification of substitutes for these parliamentarians in court.
I.
mic communities during 2010, in: African Human Rights Law Journal (2011),
216 (236).
59 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Congrès pour la démocratie et le Progrès (CDP) & Autres c.
Etat Bur- kina, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/16/15 (13/07/2015), par. 31.
60 Bolle, La Cour de Justice de la CEDEAO: une cour (supra)constitutionnelle?,
available at: http://la-constitution-en-afrique.org/article-la-cour-de-justice-cedeao-u
ne-cour-supra-constitutionnelle-87092524.html (last accessed on 09/07/2015).
61 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (75).
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This happened without consulting the concerned parliamentarians (de-
tailed presentation of the facts in chapter 1).
Declaratory Judgment by the ECOWAS Court of Justice
The nine parliamentarians lodged an individual complaint with the
ECOWAS Court of Justice against this decision by the Togolese Constitu-
tional Court. The Court of Justice was thus confronted with two questions.
The first is of a procedural nature and the second represents a material le-
gal question. The ECOWAS Court of Justice summarises these two ques-
tions in the following words:
« Les questions soumises à l’appréciation de la Cour, à savoir la trans-
mission par le Président de l’Assemblée Nationale à la Cour Constitu-
tionnelle de lettres de démission attribuées aux requérants et contes-
tées par ceux-ci, et la décision n°E18/10 du 22 novembre 2010 de la
Cour constitutionnelle prise à la suite de cette transmission, relèvent-
elles de la compétence de laCour comme étant susceptible de consti-
tuer des violations de droits de l’homme des requé rants comme ils le
soutiennent? »62
In its decision of 07 October 2011, the ECOWAS Court of Justice found an
obvious breach of Art. 1 and 33 of the Protocol on Democracy and Good
Governance, ratified by Togo in 2001, and of Art. 7/1, 7/1c and 10 of the
African Charta for Human Rights. According to Art. 7 paragr. 1 of the
Charta, everybody is entitled to a legal hearing. This includes the right to
legal protection before the responsible national court against all actions
that violate ones fundamental rights under agreements, laws, regulations
and customary law. Furthermore, everybody is entitled to be considered
innocent until ones guilt has been proven by a responsible court. This pro-
cedural guarantee also entails the right of defense. This includes the right
to be defended by a defense attorney of one’s choice. Lastly, this guarantee
gives the individual the right to a judgment within an appropriate period
of time and by an impartial court.
II.
62 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. Etat du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11
(07/10/2011), par. 53, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on
16/07/2015).
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The Court of Justice further pointed out that the constitutional judg-
ment also represents a breach of Art. 10 of the United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948.
After the declaration of the breach of the relevant regulations in the
Charta (Art. 7 paragr. 1 of the African Charta) as well as the United Na-
tions Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 10), the plaintiffs ex-
pected to be automatically reinstated in parliament but the Togolese state
rejected their application of reinstatement.
A detailed presentation of the facts until the judgment was rendered by
the ECOWAS Court of Justice on 7 October 2011 and can be found in
chapter 2 of the present paper.
Interpretation of the Declaratory Judgment by the ECOWAS Court of
Justice
There is a possibility to initiate interpretation proceedings after a declarato-
ry judgment. Such a process means that a judgment has been rendered on
a particular object of dispute. However, various points of the decision are
obviously unclear. Therefore, an application for clarification of the open
points is admissible before the Court of Justice. Consequently, the plain-
tiffs initiated such interpretative proceedings with the Court of Justice.
These proceedings are admissible According to Art. 64 of the rules of pro-
cedure of the Court of Justice. Therefore, the Togolese relevant parliamen-
tarians again turned to the Court of Justice on 16 November 2011 within
the framework of this process. The Court of Justice declared this applica-
tion admissible.63
The question the Court of Justice had to answer was whether the decla-
ration of this breach also constituted an annulment of the decision by the
Togolese Constitutional Court64, which would constitute a violation of hu-
man rights.
After extensive examination, the ECOWAS Court of Justice was how-
ever not in favour of this. The purpose of the first decision, According to
III.
63 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. Etat du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/12
(13/03/2012), par. 11, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on
16/07/2015).
64 Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, Entscheidung N°E-018/2010 vom 22. November
2010, available at : http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/ (last accessed on
22/06/2015).
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the Court of Justice, was to declare a breach of Art. 7 of the Charta. The
Court of Justice however does not have the power to go over and above
that and order a reinstatement of the plaintiffs. This would constitute an
underestimation or annulment of the decision by the Togolese Constitu-
tional Court. The ECOWAS Court of Justice does not possess such a com-
petence. This decision is to be criticised in many respects (for this purpose,
a detailed criticism in chapter 5).
Indeed, it is understandable when the Court of Justice states that it does
not have the competence to set aside a binding constitutional decision.
However, the opinion of the Court of Justice regarding the legal conse-
quences of the declaration of the breach is to be criticised.
With its findings of 7 October 2011, the ECOWAS Court of Justice de-
clared that the decision by the Togolese Constitutional Court, which led to
the loss of mandate by the parliamentarians in the Togolese parliament,
constitutes a breach of Art. 7 paragr. 1 of the African Charta for Human
Rights and Peoples’ Rights.65 This declaratory judgment by the ECOWAS
Court of Justice entails a number of consequences. Insofar as the Court of
Justice qualified the proceedings that led to the loss of mandate in parlia-
ment by the plaintiffs, as being in violation of human rights, the logical
consequence would have been to reinstate the status prior to that. This is
the application of the principle Restitutio in Integro. Restitutio in Integro is a
legal principle recognised in international law and by international courts.
According to this principle, countries are bound to meet their obligations
stemming from judgments by international courts. Therefore, the coun-
tries are obligated to withdraw the legal action that caused the breach once
it has been declared to be a violation of human rights by the international
court.
Based on the principle of Restitutio in Integro, countries are also obligat-
ed to grant the victim of the violation appropriate damages.The reference
to the principle of Restitutio in Integro is important because the ECOWAS
Court of Justice neglected significant aspects of this principle in its inter-
pretation judgment of 13 March 2012.66
65 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. Etat du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11
(07/10/2011), par. 66, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on
16/07/2015).
66 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. Etat du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/12
(13/03/2012), available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on 16/07/2015).
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This declaratory judgment of 7 October 2011 by the ECOWAS Court of
Justice, should invoke a number of consequences regarding the national
judgment (this will be discussed in more detail in chapter 3).
Until the Case Ameganvi was submitted to the ECOWAS Court of Jus-
tice, the relationship between the ECOWAS Court of Justice and national
constitutional courts was not viewed as a possible institutional source of
conflict within the ECOWAS Community. However, a scientific study of
this relationship seems obligatory after the judgment by the ECOWAS
Court of Justice and the hesitation of the national court in this conflict sce-
nario.
Binding Force of the Decision by the ECOWAS Court of Justice
The system introduced in Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 (19/01/2005) can be com-
pared to constitutional complaints in Benin because the system allows for
an individual complaint to be submitted directly to the ECOWAS Court of
Justice. Moreover, attention must be drawn to the fact that the protection
system allows for ECOWAS to be more lenient with admissibility require-
ments. In fact, an individual complaint before the Court of Justice is per-
missible without the prior exhaustion of legal remedies. This special fea-
ture is protected by many reasons (this will be discussed in more detail in
chapter 3). However, the protection system, provided by the Protocol,
presents a certain predictable danger. Due to the existence of the protec-
tion of human rights on several levels with different effects, one must reck-
on with different, even contradictory judgments.67 How to resolve this ac-
tual and potential problem is the object of the present study.
In contrast to Benin, a direct complaint by an individual against the
state is foreign to the Togolese constitutional process. For this very reason,
the admissibility of individual complaints causes difficulties regarding the
constitutional process for many of the Member States from a constitution-
al point of view. Therefore, they are struggling to give the judgment of the
ECOWAS Court of Justice national validity.
E.
67 Lindner, Grundrechtschutz in Europa – System einer Kollisionsdogmatik [Pro-
tection of Constitutional Rights in Europe – a System of Collision-Dogmatism],
in: EuR (2007), 160 (161); Rohleder, Grundrechtsschutz im europäischen
Mehrebenensystem [Protection of Constitutional Rights in the European Multi-
level System], 30.
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This Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 (19/01/2005) enhances the territorial scope
of application of the Charta by supporting the effectiveness of the Charta
in the Community system by allowing individual complaints before the
ECOWAS Court of Justice.
Contractual Foundations
According to Art. 15 paragr. 4 of the Amendment Agreement:
« Les arrèts de la Cour de Justice ont force obligatoire à l’égard des
Etats Membres, des Institutions de la Communauté, et des personnes
physiques et morales ».
“Judgments of the Court of Justice shall be binding on the Member
States, the Institutions of the Community and on individuals and cor-
porate bodies”.
Due to the lack of a precise definition of the scope of the legal force of this
regulation, the development of the law through case law is particularly
called upon. In this sense, the famous quote by a British Tribunal is partic-
ularly relevant:
“International law, as well as domestic law, may not contain, and gen-
erally does not contain express rules decisive of particular cases but the
function of jurisprudence is to resolve the conflict of opposing rights
and interests by applying, in default of any specific provision of law,
the corollaries of general principles and so to find – exactly as in the
mathematical science – the solution of the problem. This is the
method of jurisprudence; it is the method by which the law has been
gradually evolved in every country resulting in the definition and set-
tlement of legal relations as well as between States as between private
individuals”.68
Teleological Interpretation
The wording of the text of the agreement clearly does not allow for an easy
understanding of the binding effect of the decisions within the national le-
gal systems of the Signatories. Without determining the scope of the bind-
I.
II.
68 Cassesse, International Law, 2nd éd, 188.
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ing effect, the national implementation of the declaratory judgments by
the Court of Justice is difficult. It is therefore necessary to interpret the
agreement by the ratio of the norms.According to this method of interpre-
tation, the terms in an international treaty are to be interpreted in regard
to their object and purpose, thereby giving the agreement the greatest pos-
sible effectiveness. However, with the proviso that the object and purpose
can be deduced from the treaty text itself.69
The Problem of National Implementation
Which role does the ECOWAS Court of Justice play according to the two
Additional Protocols?70 In the reticence of the texts, the rules of interpreta-
tion of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is methodically
pointed out. This question will find particular attention in the present
study. It is necessary to clarify this question because the consequences are
legally relevant to the implementation of the declaratory judgments of the
ECOWAS Court of Justice. Even if the ECOWAS Court of Justice were to
receive the authority to decide on individual human rights complaints
through Protocol A/SP.1/01/05, it is still dependent on the national court
regarding the implementation of its decision. Precisely because of this
there should be a dual relationship, namely, in a legally institutional re-
spect, regarding a hierarchical relationship in favour of the ECOWAS
Court of Justice and, in a legally material respect, regarding a cooperative
relationship. In view of this, the question of enforceability of the African
Charta as well as the decisions by the ECOWAS Court of Justice within
the order of the Community must be posed.71 It may be true that a sepa-
rate meaning is reserved in the constitutional orders of the Member States
III.
69 Ipsen, Völkerrecht [International Law], 6. edition., § 12, Rn. 10.
70 Protocole A/P1/7/91 (06/07/1991), relatif à la Cour de Justice de la Communauté;
Protocole Additionnel A/SP.1/01/05 (19/01/2005) Portant Amendement du Pro-
tocole (A/P.1/7/91) Relatif à la Cour de Justice de la Communauté.
71 Kilian, Die Bindungswirkung der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs
für Men- schenrechte auf die nationalen Gerichte der Mitgliedstaaten der Kon-
vention zum Schutze der Men- schenrechte und Grundfreiheiten vom 4. Novem-
ber 1950, 68. [The Binding Effect of Decisions taken by the European Court of
Law for Human Rights with regards to the National Court of the Member States
regarding the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Constitution-
al Freedoms of 4 November 1950, 68].
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for the African Charta for Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights.72 However,
various court instances are assigned to the Constitutions at national, trans-
national and international level, so that scholars in Europe tend to speak of
a constitutional “Multi-level System” in Europe.73 This reality is transfer-
able to the African continent and in particular to ECOWAS Community.
In order to realise the African Charta on a national level, ECOWAS
Member States have formally acknowledged the Charta as a binding legal
instrument in their respective constitutional systems. Apart from this theo-
retical incorporation of the Charta into the national constitutional system
of the respective Member State, the question may be posed whether and to
what extent the judicial institutions of Member States view the ECOWAS
Court of Justice as the authentic interpreter of the Charta, based on its hu-
man rights mandate. The national constitutional courts primarily watch
over the compliance with the human rights set out in the Charta. Knowing
that the state governed by the rule of law through the actions of state or-
gans can be questioned by the judiciary74 the signatories have provided
ECOWAS legal remedies at a regional level. This primarily involves the
guarantee for citizens in the region of an impartial and independent in-
stance at international level.75 The regulation of the relationship between
the regional organ of ECOWAS and the national constitutional courts
must still be clarified.
Hence, the task of the ECOWAS Court of Justice is particularly impor-
tant for the full compliance with the guarantees of the Charta. Especially
with regards to its task, the question arises of how the enforceability of the
Charta and the corresponding declaratory judgments by the Court of Jus-
tice can be guaranteed. Once the ECOWAS Court of Justice has adjudicat-
ed in a concrete case, how should the decision be implemented in the na-
tional legal system of the concerned Member State? In order to effectively
implement the declaratory judgment in the national legal system, the is-
sued declaratory judgment would have to activate a standard of implemen-
72 Kamto, Charte africaine, instruments internationaux de protection des droits de
lʼhomme, constitutions nationales: Articulation respectives, in: Flauss/Lambert-
Abdelgawad (Publ.), L’application nationale de la Charte africaine des droits de
l’homme et des peuples, 11 (30).
73 Rohleder, Grundrechtsschutz im europäischen Mehrebenensystem, 30. [Protec-
tion of Constitutional Rights in the European Multi-level System, 30].
74 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (73).
75 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (73).
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tation for the individual plaintiff. This primarily means that a conflicting
judgment by the national constitutional court or another exercise of public
power would have to be set aside. The question which constitutional prin-
ciples would allow for an action of annulment to be lodged thus arises
here. These are all questions that concern the enforceability of the declara-
tory judgment in the national legal system of the convicted Member State.
In this respect, the question concerning which legal action should be taken
must also be posed in order to effectively enforce the declaratory judg-
ment. Are legal remedies against the concerned Member State available in
the case that it fails to implement?
These problems of the “Multi-level human rights protection“76 entail
dogmatic questions.77 Following a precise examination of the regulations
as well as the Amendment Agreement and the Additional Protocols, a
need for regulation regarding these questions becomes apparent. To date,
clear rules concerning the implementation of declaratory judgments nei-
ther exist at Community-level nor at national level of the Member States.
Limitation of Question and Structure
The Protocol on Good Governance, contains substantive and procedural
constitutional elements. The countries do not disagree on the substantive
constitutional elements, i.e. the factual competence of the Court of justice
with regards to interpreting the Charta which establishes and justifies the
basis of the decision-making authority of the court. However, they are di-
vided when it comes to the resulting consequences for the national consti-
tutional courts. The human rights mandate of the ECOWAS Court of Jus-
tice relates explicitly to the African Charta for Human Rights and Peoples’
Rights. Therefore, the present study mainly concerns itself with the scope
of the judgments by the Court of justice in relation to the interpretation of
the Charta. This excludes the reference to the Protocol on Good Gover-
nance as a supra-national Constitution, even if the Court of justice usually
refers to this Protocol. The observations in this paper focus fundamentally
F.
76 Lindner, Grundrechtsschutz in Europa – System einer Kollisionsdogmatik [Pro-
tection of Constitutional Rights in Europe System of Collision Dogmatics...], in:
EuR (2007), 160, (161).
77 Lindner, Grundrechtsschutz in Europa – System einer Kollisionsdogmatik [Pro-
tection of Constitutional Rights in Europe System of Collision Dogmatics...], in:
EuR (2007), 160, (160).
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on the human rights mandate of the Court of justice . This work limits it-
self primarily to the relationship between the jurisdiction of a constitution-
al court in the signatory states and the human rights jurisdiction of the
ECOWAS Court of Justice. This is basically about the task of the Court of
justice with regards to the upholding of the joint constitutional system and
the resulting possible conflicts of jurisdiction with the constitutional
courts of Member States.
In order to avoid the risk of confusions in this thesis a further differenti-
ation is necessary. The jurisdiction of the Court of justice regarding pro-
ceedings following after a breach of contract78 and the annulment proceed-
ings79 brought by a Member State, the Council or an executive secretary,
are not dealt with here. The jurisdiction regarding the preliminary ruling
procedure is also not taken into consideration.80 The excluded areas of
competence may be referred to insofar as the jurisdiction on such serves
the purpose of this paper.
The following problems represent the main questions in the present
study: based on its characterisation as a Constitutional Court: what is the
binding force that decisions by the ECOWAS Court of Justice unfold in
the Member States and, in particular, for the constitutional courts of the
Member States? Which consequences arise from differing verdicts of the
national constitutionals court and the ECOWAS Court of Justice concern-
ing, from a substantive law viewpoint, the concurrent human rights? What
are the obligations of the signatories derive out of the judgments by the
Court of Justice? In particular, the question whether the Court of justice
represents a supra-national constitutional court will be dealt with.81
In addition to these main questions, accessory, yet no less significant
questions will also be covered. How far should the obligation of a convict-
ed Member State extend to a payment of damages or how can it be justi-
fied with regards to international law? This will be discussed with respec-
tive arguments. With the ratification of Protocol A/SP.1/01/05, the ECOW-
AS Member States, and therefore their sovereign acts, have unconditional-
ly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court of Jus-
tice for review of the conformity of the exercising of state authority in con-
78 Art. 10 a) in c. w. Art. 9 d) of the Protocol.
79 Art. 9 c) in c. w. Art. 10 b) of the Protocol.
80 Art. 10 f) of the Protocol.
81 Vgl. Wildhaber, Eine verfassungsrechtliche Zukunft für den Europäischen
Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte? [A constitutional future for the European
Court of Law for Human Rights?...], in: EuGRZ (2002), 569 (570).
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formity with the Charta. Can an individual deduce a claim from a declara-
tory judgment to recognize a ECOWAS Court of Justice judgment in the
national legal system? The present paper concerns itself moreover with the
question, whether and to what extent, the decisions by the ECOWAS
Court of Justice should be legally binding especially for the constitutional
courts in the area of their human rights jurisdiction. Should there a legal
obligation arise for the constitutional courts? If yes, what does this obliga-
tion entail? In other words: which substantive and procedural obligations
arise for the constitutional courts regarding the implementation of the de-
cisions by the ECOWAS.Court of Justice?82 Furthermore, the question
must be answered, whether the individual plaintiff is entitled to legal rem-
edy in case such an obligation to implement, deriving from the declaratory
judgment by ECOWAS, is breached. Finally, the question on how the vari-
ous competences of the ECOWAS Court of Justice and the constitutional
jurisdictions of the Member States can be meaningfully coordinated so
that they can be made fruitful for one another, must be answered.83 It can
be particularly noted that the network of relationships of national, region-
al and continental human rights jurisdiction is barely regulated. Due to
the admissibility of the individual complaints’ procedure without prior ex-
haustion of other legal remedies the further question of whether the Mem-
ber States want to withdraw the primary competence of the application
and interpretation of the Charta from the national constitutional courts,
arises.
It is thus clear that there is a need for regulation within the ECOWAS
system of justice. Scholars have unanimously recognized and agreed to the
need for such regulation.84 Yet, nobody has shown the way on how to
close this gap within the legal order of the Community.
The aim of the present study is to draw attention to the problem area of
actual and potential tension within the ECOWAS legal order regarding the
human rights mandate of the ECOWAS Court of Justice. The African
Charta for Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights is part of the constitutions
of the Member States and the national constitutional courts must guaran-
tee the human rights set out in the Charta to the persons subject to the re-
82 Oppong/Niro, Enforcing Judgment of International Court in National Court, in:
Journal of International Dispute Settlement (2014), 1 (4).
83 Rohleder, Grundrechtsschutz im europäischen Mehrebenensystem[Protection of
Constitutional Rights in the European Multi-level System], 31.
84 Oppong/Niro, Enforcing Judgment of International Court in National Court, in:
Journal of International Dispute Settlement (2014), 1 (5).
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spective sovereign power. From a constitutional law point of view, there is
a mixture of normative frames of reference for the constitutional review of
sovereign acts in the light of the Charta. This is due to the fact that from
the perspective of the national constitutional law, the constitutional courts
act under the constitution and, at the same time, under the Charta (inter-
national law). As a servant of two masters, the constitutional court must
always take care to protect the individual human rights and constitutional
freedoms according to the standards of the Charta in its decisions. From
an international point of reference, the competence of the ECOWAS
Court of Justice includes the review of the compatibility of sovereign acts
by the Member States with the Charta through the means of individual
claims. Hence, there are two levels of judicial guarantees of human rights:
the national level and the ECOWAS-level. This results in a tense relation-
ship between the two, due to a divergence in the jurisdiction.85 After closer
inspection, it is a confrontation of res iudicata and restitutio in integrum. It is
the goal of this study, to find internationally acceptable possibilities which
can close a gap within the joint protective system of the ECOWAS legal
system. The current reticence of the texts does not offer a good basis for
effective legal protection for the individual plaintiff. It is in fact a matter of
the actual and the potential conflict of jurisdiction between the ECOWAS
Court of Justice and the constitutional courts and Supreme Courts as well
as the constitutional regulations of the Member States. It is regrettable that
the ECOWAS Court of Justice currently contents itself solely with the pay-
ment of damages after a violation has been determined. The restrictive in-
terpretation of its judicial authority should be overhauled with acceptable
arguments under international law.
There may be voices that do not necessarily agree with these proposed
solutions or who remain skeptical about them. Perhaps the proposed solu-
tions seem unenforceable in the region or unrealistic, especially since there
is already, according to the current legal situation, resistance against the
implementation of the declaratory ECOWAS-judgments.86 This possible
objection would be understandable: however, one should not forget that it
85 Mückl, Kooperation oder Konfrontation? – Das Verhältnis zwischen Bundesver-
fassungsge- richt und europäischem Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte, in: Der
Staat 44 (2005), 403 (405). [Cooperation or Confrontation? – The Relationship
between the Federal Constitutional Court and the Court of Law for Human
Rights, in: The State 44...].
86 Alter/Helfer/McAllister, A new international human right court for West Africa:
the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, in: The American Journal of Interna-
tional Law (2013), 737 (739); nach Austausch mit den Justizbeamten des Gericht-
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is the task of scientific consideration to identify problems and to raise
questions. Therefore, solutions should be proposed. Whether these will be
successful in reality is then a question of practice. The proposed solutions
in the present study may appear unrealistic in the near future but theory
and practice may meet at a future point in time.
There are two theoretical contributions in this study: for one thing, this
work does not aspire to resolve all problems regarding the relationship be-
tween the ECOWAS Court of Justice and Constitutional Courts of Mem-
ber States. It only has the goal of comprehensibly examining the diver-
gence of jurisdiction on both levels, i.e. national and ECOWAS-level. This
thesis should contribute tothe resolution of this conflict by means of inter-
national legal requirements and the practice by a comparable regional
court, such as the ECtHR. Therefore, it will be referred to the decision-tak-
ing practice by the ECtHR and the legal practice of European Member
States regarding the resumption as a source of inspiration in order to close
the regulations-gap in the ECOWAS Community. Moreover, further reme-
dies will be shown, which are supposed to simplify the execution of the
judgment by the ECOWAS Court of Justice at a national level. However,
the proposed solutions are based on agreements within the ECOWAS
Community. On the other hand, the study serves to remove a supposed
collision87 between the national legal systems of the signatory states and
that of the ECOWAS at community level.According to Art. 15 paragr. 4 of
the Amendment Agreement, the Member States are bound by the deci-
sions of the ECOWAS Court of Justice and due to the fact that constitu-
tional courts represent the organs of the Member States, they too are
bound by the judgments of the ECOWAS Court of Justice. Therefore, the
question whether and to what extent the national organs and, in particu-
lar, the Constitutional Courts are bound by decisions of the ECOWAS
Court of Justice will be answered in the present study. According to
shofs, lässt sich folgender Umsetzungs- stand feststellen: Niger, Senegal und
Liberia haben die gegen sie ergangenen Urteile umgesetzt. Dagegen haben die
Republik Togo, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Nigeria und Ghana ihre Urteile immer
noch nicht vollumfangreich umgesetzt. [After the exchange with the Judicial Of-
ficers of the Court of Law, the follwing Status of Implementation may be noted:
Niger, Senegal and Liberia have implemented the judgments against them. On
the other hand, The Republic of Togo, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Nigeria and
Ghana still have not implemented their Judgments to their full Extent.].
87 Lindner, Grundrechtsschutz in Europa – System einer Kollisionsdogmatik, EuR
(2007), 160 (160). [Protection of Constitutional Rights in Europe – a System of
Collision-Dogmatism...]
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Art. 19 paragr. 1 of the Protocol A/P1/7/91, the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations, as stipulated in Art. 38 of the IGH-statute
can be applied to the modus operandi of the ECOWAS Court of Justice.
Based on this reference, the present paper expressly refers to the general
rules of International Law and jurisdiction of the IGH.
Moreover, in order to justify some of the following opinions, reference
will be made to the jurisdiction of the ECtHR. There is a reason for this:
The ECOWAS Court of Justice itself often refers to the jurisdiction of the
ECtHR.88 This approach by the ECOWAS Court of Justice is justified be-
cause most human rights as inherent to the African Charta are essentially
the same as those of the ECHR. The Inter-American Court of Law also
mainly refers to thejurisdiction of the ECtHR because of the long-time ex-
perience of the ECtHR.89
The present study is the result of a comparative analysis. Regarding the
methodology, the study primarily uses the regulations of the Founding
Treaty and the Additional Protocols pertaining to it. Furthermore, the ana-
lysis of the jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court of Law, the IGH, the EC-
tHR and other comparable regional courts of law plays a significant role.
Thereby, the study often refers to the current practice of the EACJ and
SADC Tribunal in the area of human rights jurisdiction. Not least, the
constitutional regulations of the ECOWAS Member States are used from a
comparative legal perspective. Furthermore, the study uses official legal de-
terminations of ECOWAS-institutions. Finally, a personal visit to the
ECOWAS Court of Justice, informal discussions with staff members as
well as judges at the Court of Law was very useful. This involved inter-
88 CJ CEDEAO, Koraou c. Republique du Niger, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08
(27/10/2010), par. 85, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on
24/07/2015); CC CEDEAO, Mamadou Tandja c. République du Niger, Arrêt, N
°ECW/CCJ/JUD/05/10 (08.11.2010), available at: www. courtecowas.org (last ac-
cessed on 16/07/2015); CC CEDEAO, Hissein Habré c. République du Sénégal,
Arrêt, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/10 (18/11/2010), available at: www.courtecowas.org
(last accessed on 16/07/2015); CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. Etat du To-
go, N°ECW/CCJ/ JUD/09/11 (07/10/2011), par. 66, available at: www.courtecowa
s.org (last accessed on 16/07/2015); CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Gbagbo c. République
de la Côte d’Ivoire, N°ECW/CCJ/ JUD/03/13 (22/02/2013), available at: www.cou
rtecowas.org (last accessed on 16/07/2015); CC CEDEAO, Manneh c. République
de la Gambie, Arrêt, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/3/08 (05/06/2008), par. 21, available at:
www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on 16/07/2015).
89 Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, in: European Journal of International Law (2008), 101 (104, 111,
114 und 116).
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views being conducted in the form of questionnaires. Further meetings
with representatives of the Member States during regional conferences rep-
resented a considerable contribution as the present study orientates itself
on the actual implementation problems and the mentality of the highest
instance of the signatories regarding the jurisdiction of the Court of jus-
tice . With regards to the ECtHR, a personal visit to the Court of Justice
and an informal discussion with staff members and a judge was a notewor-
thy contribution.
Further justification for the reference to the ECtHR case law lies in the
jurisdiction of the ECtHR and the practice of implementation by the
Member States of the European Council that serves as a model for deeper
analysis and resolution of the tension between res judicata and restitutio in
integrum. Because of the significant influence the judicature of the ECtHR
has on the jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court of Justice, the jurisdiction
of the ECtHR is referred to for the purpose of supporting the arguments of
this examination.
In the second chapter of the present study, the impact of rulings by the
national Constitutional Court will be demonstrated. In the third chapter
of the study, the supra-national overcoming of national legal force will also
be addressed. This is followed by the reception of the legal force through
the national rule of law in the fourth chapter. Finally, the result of the
study will be presented in chapter five.
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The Legal Effect of Rulings by National
Constitutional Courts
In all of the constitutions of the ECOWAS Member States which were cre-
ated in the course of the third vague de démocratisation (The third wave1),
the respective Constitutional Court has its own chapter dedicated to it.2
Therefore, the Constitutional Court is separate from the various stages of
court proceedings. Also, from a systematic viewpoint, Togo’s Constitution
confirms the highest weighting of the Constitutional Court by rendering
respective regulations, (Titel VI: De la Cour Constitutionnelle) even before
the regulations regarding the Judiciary (Titel VIII: Du Pouvoir Judiciaire).
Therefore, the Constitutional Court is placed above the Judiciary.3 This
marks the special constitutional role that is assigned to the Constitutional
Court within this novel process of democratisation. With regard to the
substantive jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, the Constitutional
Court of Togo exercises, for example, both an advisory and a judicial com-
petence. The judicial competence of the Constitutional Court essentially
includes the examination of the constitutionality of laws, the delimitation
Chapter 2
1 Huntington, The Third Wave. Democratization in the late twentieth century, 41.
2 Art. 152 Constitution of Burkina Faso of 02 June 1991; Art. 99 Constitution of
Togo of 14 Oc- tober 1992; Art. 114 Constitution of Benin of 11 December 1991;
Art. 88 Constitution of Ivory Coast of 23 July 2000; Art. 93 Constitution of Guinea
of 07 May 2010; Art. 120 Constitution of Niger of 25 November 2010; Art. 85
Constitution of Mali of 25 February 1992.
3 Please see: § 129 paragr. 2 Constitution of Ghana of 1992; Art. 106 Constitution of
Togo of 14. October 1992; Art. 124 Constitution of Benin of 11 December 1991;
Art. 94 Constitution of Mali of February 1992; Art. 134 Constitution of Niger of
25 November 2010; Art. 99 Constitution of Guinea of 07 May 2010, Art. 98 Con-
stitution of Ivory Coast of 23 July 2000; Art. 159 Constitution of Burkina Faso of 
02 June 1991; Art. 92 paragr. 2 Constitution of Senegal of 22 January 2001; Sect.
230, 232, 233, 235 Constitution of Nigeria of 29 May 1999; Art. 65 Constitution of
Liberia of 06. January 1984; Art. 92 Constitution of Bissau Guinea of 16 January
1984; Sect. 126, 127 Constitution of Gambia of 16. January 1997; Art. 229 para-
gr. 1 Constitution of Cape Verde of 23 November 1999; Art. 122 paragr. 1 Consti-
tution of Sierra Leone of 03 September 1991; Bado, Constitutional Jurisdiction and
Democratisation in francophone West Africa, Study of countries/Benin, 18, avail-
able at: http:// intlaw-sgiessen.de/fileadmin/user_upload/bilder_und_dokumente/
forschung/westafrikaprojekt/ workingpapers/Draft_WP_2014_benin.pdf (last ac-
cessed on 02/07/ 2015).
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of competences of constitutional state organs and the amendment of the
constitution. In general, the respective Constitutional or Supreme Court,
as guardian of the Constitution, watches over the constitutional interpreta-
tion of any state acts.4
According to the constitutions of the ECOWAS Member States, the
Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court represents the highest judicial
power in the respective Member State. As such, a special binding force is
attributed to the decisions of the Constitutional Courts or the Supreme
Courts 5. Therefore, this chapter will primarily address the question of ju-
dicial power in its various forms (B). Meanwhile, the case which partially
forms the grounds for this study will be preemptively presented (A). Subse-
quently, a few opinions by Constitutional Courts will be critically exam-
ined (C). Lastly, the reasoned positions will be correlated to the initial case
(D).
The Initial Case under Municipal Law
The predominant initial case regarding municipal (national) law is the de-
cision N° N°E018/10 of 22. November 2010 by the Constitutional Court of
Togo and resulting from it, the dispute over imperative of a parliamentari-
an mandate (as opposed to a free mandate of parliamentarians). Before the
question of the effect of the decision can be dealt with at a deeper level it
A.
4 Art. 104 Constitution of Togo of 14 October 1992; Art. 114, 117, 118 Constitution
of Benin of 11 December 1991; Art. 152 Constitution of Burkina Faso of 02 June
1991; Art. 88, 94, 95 Constitution of Ivory Coast of 23 July 2000; Art. 94 Constitu-
tion of Guinea of 07 May 2010; Art. 120 Constitution of Niger of 25. November
2010; Art. 85, 86, 87, Constitution of Mali of 25 February 1992; Art. 92 Constitu-
tion of Senegal of 22 January 2001; Art. 237 Constitution of Cape Verde of
23. November 1999); Art. 124 Sierra Leone Constitution of Sierra Leone of 03
September 1991.
5 See also: § 129 paragr. 2 Constitution of Ghana of 1992; Art. 106 Constitution of
Togo of 14 October 1992; Art. 124 Constitution of Benin of 11 December 1991;
Art. 94 Constitution of Mali of February 1992; Art. 134 Constitution of Niger of
25 November 2010; Art. 99 Constitution of Guinea of 07. May 2010; Art. 98 Con-
stitution of Ivory Coast of 23 July 2000; Art. 159 Constitution of Burkina Faso of
02 June 1991; Art. 92 Abs. 2 Constitution of Senegal of 22. January 2001; Sect.
230, 232, 233, 235 Constitution of Nigeria of 29 May 1999; Art. 65 Constitution of
Liberia of 06 January 1984; Art. 92 Constitution of Guinea-Bissau of 16 January
1984; Sect. 126, 127 Constitution of Gambia of 16 January 1997; Art. 229 paragr. 1
Constitution of Cape Verde of 23 November 1999; Art. 122 paragr. 1 Constitution
of Sierra Leone of 03 September 1991.
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seems recommendable, from a methodical point of view, to summarily de-
scribe the decision by the Constitutional Court of Togo6 which is the ob-
ject of this study.
Nine parliamentarians of the opposition party UFC left the party and
founded a new party, the ANC. On 18 November 2010, the President of
the Parliament submitted a list of these members of parliament to the
Constitutional Court with the request to find successors or substitutes for
them. However, the concerned parliamentarians had already informed the
Constitutional Court on 17 November 2010 that they did not intend to re-
sign from Parliament.7 Notwithstanding this irregularity, the Constitu-
tional Court implemented the substitution of the parliamentarians.8 They,
in turn, brought a complaint before the Constitutional Court. At the cen-
tre of the discussion were the letters of resignation that the parliamentari-
ans had signed as candidates during the legislative election campaign in
2007. The content of these letters read: “I commit myself to the party.
Should I deviate from the orientation of the party, I resign as a member
of parliament.“ Such disclaimers are fundamentally unconstitutional. In ef-
fect, such a promise contravenes Art. 52 of the Constitution, which ex-
pressly emphasises that Members of Parliament are representatives of the
entire people. Despite this, the Constitutional Court rejected the com-
plaint and replaced the parliamentarians respectively with their substi-
tutes.9
For a deeper insight into the presented decision, a detailed description
of all of the elements in the Constitutional Court judgment is required.
On closer inspection, three basic elements can be determined from the ex-
ternal division of the judgment transcript: the facts of the case, the main
reasons for the decision and the verdict. Not least, a legal judgment gener-
ally also consists of non-abstract elements: These are the counterpart to the
external division of the decision. However, the decision of the Constitu-
tional Court must, before it can be called such, become res judicata. Last
but not least, the decision has a binding effect. After all these questions, an
analysis now follows.
6 Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, Decision N°E-018/2010 of 22 November 2010,
available at: http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/ (last accessed on 22/06/2015).
7 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Isabelle Ameganvi v. Republique Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/
09/11 (07/10/2011), par. 65.
8 Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, Decision N°E-018/2010 of 22 November 2010,
available at: http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/ (last accessed on 22/06/2015).
9 Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, Decision N°E-018/2010 of 22 November 2010,
available at: http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/ (last accessed on 22/06/2015).
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The Legal Force of Decisions by National Constitutional Courts
Object of the present study is the comparison of the Togolese Constitu-
tional Court with the ECOWAS Court of Justice. For this reason, the ef-
fects of procedural law regarding the judicial review proceedings according
to Art. 104 of the Constitution of Togo, which concerns solely national
law, will not be included in the examination. Instead, the constitutional
complaint against a breach of a constitutional right by the state as the ob-
ject of dispute will be mainly analysed. The decisions by the Constitutional
Court in this regard and their legal consequences will be presented to their
full extent.
The legal force has a date of effect (formal legal force), a subject mat-
ter(material legal force), Addressees, a scope(key-reasons for decisions and
tenor) as well as a limit.
Formal Legal Force
The legal force has two fundamental directions of effect. On one hand, it
has an inwards effect (irrevocability), and on the other hand, an outward
effect (non-appealability). Before the effect concerning the outward legal
force is explained (2) the binding of the court itself will be discussed (1).
The Binding Force of Internal Proceedings of the Constitutional Court
The inward effect of the decision means the internal procedural self-com-
mitment of the Constitutional Court to the content of its own decision.
Irrevocability of the Decision in Principle
It must be noted upfront that the institute of legal force, in a constitution-
al-procedural sense, is rarely regulated or mentioned. Is this a legislative er-
ror? The question cannot be conclusively answered here. In almost all con-
stitutions there is, however, a separate regulation regarding the binding ef-
fect res judicata of constitutional decisions. The internal procedural effect
results directly out of the decisions entry into force. Therefore, out of the
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was already decided upon.10 It is thus clear that the formal legal force is
constitutional plays a significant role for the Constitutional Court in that
it must observe the rule of irrevocability. The risk of endlessly pursued pro-
ceedings is thus resolved.11 Due to the formal legal force for the Constitu-
tional Court a judgment can no longer be randomly amended once it has
been issued. All these consequences are not expressly regulated in the con-
stitution but result out of the principle of the rule of law.12 In this sense,
the principle of the rule of law is understood, in an African context, as the
self-limiting authority of the state through ones own legislation.13 This
means that the state is obligated to comply with the regulations that itself
has stipulated.14
Furthermore, the legal force of a Constitutional Court judgment ex-
presses the authority of the Constitution.15 Therefore, the sovereignty of
the Constitution is linked to the sovereignty of the decision by the Consti-
tutional Court.16 This, The Constitutional Court of Benin has recently em-
phasised this irrevocability and finality of its legal decision with the follow-
ing words:
« Qu’en conséquence, en application des dispositions de l’article 124
[…] de la Constitution, il y a autorité de chose jugée; que, dès lors, la
requête […] doit être déclarée irrecevable».17
Art. 106 of Togo’s Constitution follows the same principle and ascribes the
decision of the Constitutional Court the highest possible effect that a court
10 Diop, La justice constitutionnelle au Sénégal. Éssai sur l’evolution, les enjeux et
les réformes d’un contre pouvoir juridictionnel, 162.
11 Yebisi, The constitutional power of review of Supreme Court of Ghana: Lesson
for Nigeria, in: International Journal of Humanities and Social Science (2014), 39 
(40).
12 Detterbeck, Streitgegenstand und Entscheidungswirkungen im öffentlichen
Recht, 328. [Object of Dispute and Legal Effects in Public Law, 328].
13 Cabanis/Martin, Les constitutions d’Afrique francophone. Évolutions récentes,
64.
14 Cabanis/Martin, Les constitutions d’Afrique francophone. Évolutions récentes,
65.
15 Renoux, Autorité de la chose jugée ou autorité de la Constitution? A propos de
l’effet des décisions du conseil constitutionnel, 817 (834); Adeloui, L’autorité de
la chose jugée par les juri- dictions constitutionnelles en Afrique, in: Revue Togo-
laise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (56).
16 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (59).
17 Décision DCC 15–027 (12/02/2015), p. 6, available at: www.cour-constitutionnell
e-benin. org (last accessed on 25/04/2015).
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decision can have. Therefore, the decisions of the Constitutional Court
have at first the effect that is generally attributed to court decisions.18 How-
ever, the face that the Constitutional Court is itself bound not only affirms
the prohibition of amendment but also of deviation.19
Interdiction of deviation
The substantive res judicata does not oppose the admissibility of the object
of dispute from a new point of view.20 Therefore, the irrevocability is to be
seen separately from the interdiction of deviation. The irrevocability has al-
ready been mentioned. 21The interdiction of deviation also prohibits the
Constitutional Court to distance itself from its previous legal opinion
when deciding on a case involving different aspects of the same subject.
The admissibility of an application with new factual and legal aspects is an
exception of the ne bis in idem principle. However, because of the intent
and purpose of the substantive res judicata, the decision must be left un-
touched. It serves to ensure legal certainty and legal order. In the case that
new factual and legal circumstances which give rise to new causes of action
exist, the application should be declared admissible. Intent and purpose of
the legal force prohibit, in such a case, a renewed examination, yet allow
for a renewed decision.22 A deviation from the previous decision by the
Constitutional Court would only be justified if the new facts represent a
radical change of the object of the dispute.23
b.
18 Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht, 2. edition, § 38, Rn. 1289.
19 Kpodar, Commentaire des grands avis et décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle
togolaise, 102.
20 Kpodar, Commentaire des grands avis et décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle
togolaise, 105.
21 See irrevocability in principle of the decision on page 38.
22 Detterbeck, Streitgegenstand und Entscheidungswirkungen im öffentlichen
Recht, 343. [Object of Dispute and Effects of Decisions in Public Law, 343].
23 Detterbeck, Streitgegenstand und Entscheidungswirkungen im öffentlichen
Recht, 344.
[Object of Dispute and Effects of Decisions in Public Law, 344].
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Possibility of a Rectification of Material Errors
The legal force neither opposes a rectification of errors in drafting nor a
mere supplementation. According to Art. 27 and 28 of the rules of proce-
dure of the Constitutional Court of Togo, the Constitutional Court may
rectify factual errors in its decision.24 This includes typing errors, confu-
sions and drafting errors. The fact that these factual mistakes represent an
acceptable reason regarding the relativisation of the legal force is recog-
nised amongst academics as well as in case law.25 Such legally flawed judg-
ments by the Constitutional Court are based on a mistake that does not
lead to consequences relevant to the decision.In other words, actual errors
are not grave mistakes which are able to significantly change the content
of decision of the Constitutional Court.26 The Constitutional Court of
Benin defines these material errors as follows:
« Considérant que, selon une jurisprudence constante de la Cour, l’er-
reur matérielle se définit comme une simple erreur de plume ou de
dactylographie, d’orthographe d’un nom, de termi nologie ou d’une
omission dans la décision ».27
Moreover, the rectification of the facts of the case is permissible. This
would be the case if the court pointed out a fact in the tenor of its judg-
ment that does not appear at all in the facts of the case.28
Even additions to a ruling are permissible, if the court simply by mistake
did not decide on an application ascertained in the facts. In this case, there
is the possibility to adjudicate on this application in hindsight to its full
c.
24 Also see the Rules of Procedure of the ECtHR (Art. 81 Rules of Procedure EC-
tHR).
25 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (68); Yebisi, The
constitutional power of review of Supreme Court of Ghana: Lesson for Nigeria,
in: International Journal of Humanities and Social Science (2014), 39 (39); Déci-
sion DCC 96–010 du 24 janvier 1996 de la Cour constitutionnel- le du Bénin; Dé-
cisions DCC 03–166 du 11 novembre 2003 de la Cour constitutionnelle du Bé-
nin; Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht[Constitutional Process Law]., 2. edi-
tion, § 16, Rn. 331.
26 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (68).
27 Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin, Décision DCC 03–166 (11.11.2003), available
at: www. cour-constitutionnelle-benin.org (last accessed on 25/04/2015).
28 Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law], 2. edition,
§ 16, Rn. 331.
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extent without intervention of the legal force. This would be possible
through supplementing the decision.29 However, the legal force prohibits
a rectification of the decision at a later date. This means that the possibility
of an addition depends on the modus operandi of the Constitutional
Court. In case that the Constitutional Court would like to retract a wrong
decision under the pretext of an addition, the principle of non-appealabili-
ty would oppose such an approach.30 It can no longer deviate from the
original decision during the same proceedings. This means that the legal
consequences, resulting from the originally rendered judgment, must be
considered in the further course of the same object of dispute.31
Concerning the prerequisites for approaching the Constitutional Court
with regards to the material errors, Art. 27 and 28 of the rules of procedure
of the Constitutional Court of Togo stipulate:
« Toute personne intéressée peut saisir la Cour d’une demande en rec-
tification d’erreur maté rielle d’une de ses décisions. La Cour peut rec-
tifier d’office une erreur matérielle dûment constatée par elle-
même. »32
Contrary to the rectification of the factual error, the possibility of resump-
tion or the amendment of the legal assessment on the grounds of gross
procedural errors represent a special scenario.
Resumption due to gross miscarriage of justice
The question must be asked whether a misjudgment by the Constitutional
Court, because of its legal force, will be untouchable or if it can be
changed by rectifying the legal assessment of the misjudgment?33 In princi-
ple, the reexamination of its own legal assessment is not possible under the
d.
29 Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law], 2. edition,
§ 16, Rn. 331.
30 Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht[Constitutional Process Law], 2. edition,
§ 16, Rn. 331.
31 Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht[Constitutional Process Law], 2. edition,
§ 38, Rn. 1291.
32 Art. 27 und 28 der Geschäftsordnung des Verfassungsgerichts Togo: Reglement
intérieur du
26.01.2005. [Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court of Togo...].
33 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (57).
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principle of irrevocability. Therefore, this is a rather rare case. Neverthe-
less, the constitutional system of Ghana, for example,. provides the possi-
bility of a reexamination of the legal assessment. According to § 133 para-
gr. 1 of the Constitution (Ghana):
“The Supreme Court may review any decision made or given by it on
such grounds and sub-ject to such conditions as may be prescribed by
rules of the Court”.34
At first glance, this regulation seems to contradict the principle of non-ap-
pealability of a Supreme Court decision which has acquired the status of
res judicata. However, the revision is not made automatically and is not un-
conditional. There must be special circumstances in order for the judg-
ment to be brought before the Supreme Court again. This regulation takes
the principle of the assumption of truth into account. The reasons for a
possible examination of the judgment are listed in detail in Art. 54 of the
rules of procedure of the Supreme Court of Ghana:
“The Court may review any decision made or given by it on the fol-
lowing grounds –
(a) exceptional circumstances which have resulted in miscarriage of
justice;
(b) the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, af-
ter the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant’s
knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the
decision was given.”35
It is in the interest of the judiciary, in case of a gross miscarriage of jus-
tice36 that the court amends the decision that is already entered into
force37. In this exceptional procedure, the composition of the Supreme
Court is, According to § 133 section 2 of the Constitution, different com-
pared to normal circumstances:
34 § 133 section 1 Constitution of Ghana of 1992.
35 Ghana’s Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (C.I 16), Art. 54.
36 See also erreur de droit bei Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridic-
tions cons- titutionnelles en Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques
(2012), 54 (68).
37 Yebisi, The constitutional power of review of Supreme Court of Ghana: Lesson
for Nigeria, in: International Journal of Humanities and Social Science (2014), 39
(44).
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“The Supreme Court, when reviewing its decisions under this article,
shall be constituted by not less than seven Justices of the Supreme
Court”.
The signifigance of the exceptional review of a decision already in force ac-
counts for this raised number of judges according to stipulations in § 133
section 2.The resumption of the judgment already in force has the advan-
tage of granting better legal protection to persons seeking justice. Under
exceptional circumstances, especially if there is an obvious factual error or
mistake in the assessment of the relevant prerequisites for admissibility, an
application38already declared inadmissible can be declared as partially ad-
missible.39 The Supreme Court also points out that the applicant has to
prove the violation of his fundamental rights.40 It is also not in the interest
of legal certainty that a miscarriage of justice remains non-appealable with-
in a legal order. In particular because a miscarriage of justice causes, in
some cases, further injustice which in turn is not in the interest of legal
certainty.41 Therefore, it should be recommended that the Constitutional
Court quickly rectifies, within a reasonable period of time, its own error
by resuming its consideration of the object of dispute.42 An error-free, con-
stitutional decision has priority over legal force and takes the idea of the
principle of fairness into account.43 However, the question must be asked
what the meaning of “exceptional circumstances“ in Art. 54 of the rules of
procedure (Supreme Court Ghana) is. Neither voices in literature nor case
law can offer well-established criteria.44 According to some authors, how-
ever, an error in law seems to be considered a special circumstance in the
38 CEDH, Nr. 61603/00, Arrêt (16/06/2005), Affaire Storck c. Allemagne, par. 4.
39 CEDH, Nr. 61603/00, Arrêt (16/06/2005), Affaire Storck c. Allemagne, par. 7.
40 Bimpong-Buta, The role of the Supreme Court in the development of constitu-
tional law in Ghana, 70.
41 Yebisi, The constitutional power of review of Supreme Court of Ghana: Lesson
for Nigeria, in: International Journal of Humanities and Social Science (2014), 39 
(49).
42 Yebisi, The constitutional power of review of Supreme Court of Ghana: Lesson
for Nigeria, in: International Journal of Humanities and Social Science (2014), 39 
(49).
43 Yebisi, The constitutional power of review of Supreme Court of Ghana: Lesson
for Nigeria, in: International Journal of Humanities and Social Science (2014), 39
(40); Bimpong-Buta, The role of the Supreme Court in the development of con-
stitutional law in Ghana, 355.
44 Yebisi, The constitutional power of review of Supreme Court of Ghana: Lesson
for Nigeria, in: International Journal of Humanities and Social Science (2014), 39 
(43).
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adjudication of the object of dispute.45 It therefore concerns a severe legal
error in the assessment of the facts of the case. 46
There is no exclusive list of facts under the current Supreme Court case
law that constitute grounds for an exceptional revision of an already decid-
ed case.47 In particular, legal force may be deviated from if a gross mistake
has been made regarding an already taken decision. In such a case the Con-
stitutional Court would not be prevented from revisiting the same object
of dispute as long as an application is made.48 It is predominantly assumed
amongst scholars that if gross procedural injustice has been committed, an
exception of non-appealability can be made.49 However, a new assessment
is only done if new causes of action exist under the German Constitutional
Court.50 The Federal Supreme Court of Germany recognised that it can
never be completely ruled out that objectively wrong judgments are made
because of the natural limitations of human ability.51 In view of the rele-
vance of this point, it is recommended to quote the following statement:
„Die rechtsprechende Gewalt, die den Richtern anvertraut ist, hat zum
Inhalt, im Rahmen des dem Gericht unterbreiteten Sachverhalts einen
bestimmten Lebenstatbestand festzustellen, den Tatbestand unter Ge-
setz und Recht zu subsumieren und die sich danach aus diesem Tatbe-
stand ergebenden Rechtsfolgen verbindlich auszusprechen. Dass hier-
bei auch objektiv unrichtige Richtersprüche ergehen können, ist nie-
mals völlig auszuschließen, da dem menschlichen Erkenntnisvermögen
von der Natur her Grenzen gesetzt sind“.52
45 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (62); Yebisi, The
constitutional power of re- view of Supreme Court of Ghana: Lesson for Nigeria,
in: International Journal of Humanities and Social Science (2014), 39 (43).
46 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (67).
47 Bimpong-Buta, The role of the Supreme Court in the development of constitu-
tional law in Ghana, 71.
48 Yebisi, The constitutional power of review of Supreme Court of Ghana: Lesson
for Nigeria, in: International Journal of Humanities and Social Science (2014), 39
(43); Benda/Klein, Verfas- sungsprozeßrecht[Constitutional Process Law...],
2. edition, § 16, Rn. 332.
49 Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law...], 2. edition,
§ 16, Rn. 332; dazu BVerfGE 72, 84 (84).
50 BVerfGE 72, 84 (91); vgl. Bimpong-Buta, The role of the Supreme Court in the
development of constitutional law in Ghana, 71.
51 BGHZ 36, 379 (393).
52 BGHZ 36, 379 (393), (emphasis added by author).
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There is no regulation comparable to § 133 (Constitution of Ghana) in the
Benin constitution. Indeed, Art. 23 of the rules of procedure of the Consti-
tutional Court of Benin allows the rectification of constitutional judg-
ments which are already in force. However, this rectification of actual er-
rors does not represent a breach of the legal force. Hence, the Constitu-
tional Court decided in 2002 that the legal force is not opposed to the rec-
tification of the actual error in the judgment draft.53 In contrast to the rec-
tification of actual errors, the review of the legal grounds of the decision
represents a breach of the legal force. Despite the fact that there is no con-
stitutional regulation regarding this scenario, the Constitutional Court al-
lowed the review of legal errors through case law.54 In this manner, the
Constitutional Court of Benin decided in one of its first judgments that
the arrest and containment of a plaintiff (Loko M. Maurice) by police for
more than 48 hours as constitutional.55 However, the Court found in a
new assessment of the same case that this was unconstitutional.56 There-
fore, the second decision nullifies the legal force of the first judgment. It is
questionable which effect a resumption of the proceedings will have on
the legal force. One can assume this will result in a suspension of the legal
effect. At the very least, the resumption of the proceedings should have a
suspensory effect57 on the first judgment, because on resuming the proceed-
ings, the result is not predictable. Therefore, the execution of the judgment
should be postponed until the court has made its judgment.
As a result, it is certain that the perpetuation of a misjudgement by the
Constitutional Court would forcibly harm legal certainty even more than
the breaching of the legal force.58 Therefore, the institution of legal force is
not absolute but may be breached under justified circumstances, such as
misjudgements, by a renewed assessment of the case. It is recommended
53 Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin, Décision DCC 02–134 (18/12/2002), available
at: www. cour-constitutionnelle-benin.org (last accessed on 25/04/2015).
54 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (68).
55 Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin, Décision DCC 98–24 (12/03/1998), available at:
www. cour-constitutionnelle-benin.org (last accessed on 25/04/2015); Kommen-
tar dazu bei Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitution-
nelles en Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (68).
56 Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin, Décision DCC 98–098 (11/12/1998), available
at: www. cour-constitutionnelle-benin.org (last accessed on 25/04/2015).
57 Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law...], 2. edition,
§ 36, Rn. 1234.
58 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (57).
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that the procedure of a renewed assessment of the judgment, if obvious
miscarriages of justice are present, should be included in a constitutional
code of procedure of West African states.59This would contribute to an ef-
fective implementation of judgments by Constitutional Courts and at the
same time enforce the confidence in the rule of law. Overall, the possibili-
ty of a later, revision of the object of dispute displays the double nature of
the legal force.60 It is absolute if there are no special circumstances. It is,
however, relative if special and relevant circumstances were not taken suffi-
ciently into consideration when the case was first assessed.
Delimitation with regard to future disputes
The internal procedural commitment of the Constitutional Court pre-
cludes a renewed opinion by the court regarding the same object of dis-
pute. This follows, as shown, from the principles of the rule of law and
serves legal certainty. However, the legal force of decisions by the Consti-
tutional Court is limited in time (see also below: limits of legal force). The
temporary element in the legal force allows for a new decision to be based
on reasons if new facts arise after the decision has been made. New facts
are, in this sense, actual changes.61 Primarily, a new fact can be understood
as a fundamental change of the life circumstance.62 These actual changes
include, amongst others, amendments to the law and the general legal
opinion.63 The relevance of this change is measured by the core elements
of the legal force. At this point, it is important to note that new facts must
relate to the object of dispute and the same parties to the dispute. Without
an identity of the object of the dispute and the parties to the dispute, there
is no legal force.64Whether a legal force is ascribed to the decision by Con-
e.
59 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (75).
60 Kpodar, Commentaire des grands avis et décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle
togolaise, 103.
61 Pestalozza, Verfassungsprozeßrecht. [Constitutional Process Law...], 3. edition,
§ 20, Rn. 69.
62 Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law...], 2. edition,
§ 13, Rn. 245.
63 Pestalozza, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law...], 3. edition,
§ 20, Rn. 69; Benda/Klein, Verfassungspro- zeßrecht, 2. edition, § 13, Rn. 245.
64 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (54); Pestalozza,
Verfassungsrozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law...], 3. edition, § 20, Rn. 69.
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stitutional Court65, According to Art. 106 of the Togolese Constitution is
insignificant with regard to the judgment of the legal force of such future
changes in legal opinion. A prerequisite for this remains the fundamental
change of the object of the dispute. The possibility of future changes in le-
gal opinion of the Constitutional Court is expressly stipulated in the
Ghanaian Constitution. With this in mind, § 129 section 3 of the Consti-
tution of Ghana stipulates as follows:
“(3) The Supreme Court may, while treating its own previous deci-
sions as normally binding, depart from a previous decision when it ap-
pears to it right to do so; and all other courts shall be bound to follow
the decisions of the Supreme Court on questions of law.”66
This regulation clearly shows that some degree of development of the Con-
stitutional Court jurisdiction should be possible. It is solely questionable
who can kick-start this change in legal reasoning. According to the literal
interpretation of § 129 section 3, the change in legal reasoning happens at
the discretion of the Supreme Court itself. It is also left to the discretion of
the court whether it should deviate from its previous opinion.67 This regu-
lation cannot be interpreted in the sense that the legal force of previous de-
cisions by the court is principally no longer binding. Rather, the creator of
the Constitution does not wish to exclude future changes of the legal force
just by having the above criteria present.68 This represents a reasonable
stance by the creator of the Constitution to prevent rigidity of the legal
force. It is, however, difficult to imagine that the court will change its legal
opinion ex officio without an application to do so because, as it is com-
monly known, parties to the dispute drive the proceedings and are there-
fore able to influence the decision by the Constitutional Court in many
ways. Consequently, one must assume that the change in legal opinion can
also take place at the request of the parties to the dispute through due pro-
cess.
65 According to the expression on the website of the Constitutional Court of Togo:
„Lex est quod notamus“, available at: http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/ (last
accessed on 22/06/2015).
66 See also sect.126 paragr. 2 Constitution of Gambia of 16 January 1997; Art. 122
paragr. 2 Constitution of Sierra Leone of 03 September 1991.
67 Yebisi, The constitutional power of review of Supreme Court of Ghana: Lesson
for Nigeria, in: International Journal of Humanities and Social Science (2014), 39 
(43).
68 Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law...], 2. edition,
§ 38, Rn. 1334.
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As a result, a renewed complaint before the Constitutional Court or
Supreme Court may be permitted if there are significant changes in life cir-
cumstances. Nevertheless, the resumption of the proceedings represents a
special exception. Apart from this case the judgment may not be appealed
by the parties to the dispute. It is not at their disposal.
The Non-appealability of the Decision
The formal legal force, excluding its irrevocability, follows the principle of
non-appealability of the decision. This means that the decision by the
court is neither subject of negotiation by the Constitutional Court nor by
the parties to the dispute. It is final and binding. This principle of non-ap-
pealability (a) can be justified (b) in such a manner that the judgment of a
Constitutional Court isdeterminant for all participants. However, an ex-
ception to the principle of non-appealability exists (c).
The principle of non-appealability
The decision by the Constitutional Court, according to the judgment, fa-
cilitates an assumption of truth according to the principle: „res judicata pro
veritate habetur“. This legal assumption of truth prevents the participants to
the proceedings from questioning the judgment by the Constitutional
Court again.69 The principle of non-appealability does justice to the funda-
mental principle of interest republicae ut sit finis litium because it is not in
the interest of the public that proceedings before the Constitutional Court
are endlessly continued. Hence, the non-appealability of the judgment de-
velops its effect, first and foremost, for the benefit of the parties to the dis-
pute. More than anything, this has practical reasons because the proceed-
ings must ultimately reach an end. This can be seen as a direct result from
the requirement for legal certainty. On the one hand, the non-appealability
of the Constitutional Court decision is therefore addressed to the parties to
the proceedings. They may not question the authority of the decision and
therefore that of the Constitutional Court. On the other hand, non-appeal-
ability means that there are no legal remedies against decisions by the Con-
2.
a.
69 Kpodar, Commentaire des grands avis et décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle
togolaise, 100; Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitu-
tionnelles en Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (54).
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stitutional Court. As the judgment has been delivered, it cannot be ap-
pealed. Therefore, the formal legal force confirms the nature of the deci-
sion-making authority of the Constitutional Court as a last instance. There
are no other higher-ranking instances above the Constitutional Court. Es-
pecially for this reason, its decisions immediately develops formal legal
force with it’s delivery or notification.70 In terms of external legal effect,
the formal legal force expresses the authority of the constitutional court (s.
a.). Jurisdiction and doctrine also unanimously assume that the function of
the substantive res judicata, with regard to the decision by the constitu-
tional court, is indispensable.71
Justification of non-appealability
There are many reasons that speak for the non-appealability of a Constitu-
tional Court decision. There is simply no higher instance above the Consti-
tutional Court that is responsible for the review of Constitutional Court
decisions. Moreover, the Constitutional Court represents the only legiti-
mate interpreter of the Constitution. With this in mind, it can be assumed
that it avails of the monopoly to interpret the Constitution. Especially
since the legally effective decision has been given by the Constitutional
Court itself, there is no reason why its decision should be appealed before
it. Seeing as the object of dispute and the parties to the dispute are identi-
cal, the Constitutional Court would not take a different point of view
when interpreting the constitutional regulations.72 Furthermore, it can be
observed that the respective Member State’s Constitutions express its out-
ward and internal sovereignty and authority. Therefore, the jurisdiction of
the Constitutional Court also represents the judicial confirmation of this
national sovereignty.
b.
70 Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht[Constitutional process law], 2. edition,
§ 38, Rn. 1291.
71 Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, Décision N°E-002/2011 vom 22 June 2011, avai-
lable at: http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/ (last accessed on 22/06/2015);
Décision DCC 15–027 (12/02/2015), available at: www.cour-constitutionnelle-ben
in.org (last accessed on 25/04/2015); Kpodar, Commentaire des grands avis et dé-
cisions de la Cour constitutionnelle togolaise, 105.
72 Kpodar, Commentaire des grands avis et décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle
togolaise, 101.
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Need for legal protection as an exception
It cannot, however, be underestimated that reasons may exist in exception-
al cases that could challenge the legal force. There is consensus amongst
scholars that the legal force represents a negative prerequisite for proceed-
ings. Nevertheless, there is a possibility to modify the sanctity of the legal
force to a certain degree. This is because there are factors that, in excep-
tional circumstances, can allow a breach of the legal force. E.g., the legal
force can be breached if there is a particular need for legal protection.73
Should there be a particular interest in legal protection, a complaint with
regard to the same object of dispute would be admissible.74This should not
be seen as a violation against the ne bis in idem doctrine but as a special
case regarding the generally valid non-appealability of the legal force. The
latter scenario addresses a different level (see chapter 3: Derogation of Le-
gal Force). For example, in case of a sustained human rights complaint be-
fore the ECOWAS Court of Justice, one should come to the conclusion
that there is a need for legal protection, which should be reason for are-
sumption of proceedings regarding a constitutional complaint.75Whether
the plaintiff has a legally protected need in an individual case after the le-
gal force takes effect depends on the intensity of the Unconstitutionality of
the violation and the risk of its repetition.76 It does not matter whether the
violation took place in the past or not.77 This aspect of the exceptional
overriding of the principle was unfortunately overlooked by the Constitu-
tional Court of Togo as it proclaimed without differentiation an erga-
omnes-effect of its decisions without pointing out the possibility of an indi-
vidual complaint at an international level. Thus, the Constitutional Court
proclaimed the following words:
« Qu’aucune autorité civile ou militaire, qu’aucune institution, fut-elle
internationale, ne peut s’opposer à une décision de la Cour».78
c.
73 Hillgruber/Goos, Verfassungssprozeßrecht[Constitutional Process Law...], 4. edi-
tion, § 5, Rn. 469.
74 Koussoulis, Beiträge zur modernen Rechtskraftlehre[Contributions to modern
doctrine of legal force], 209.
75 See also the resumption of the proceedings (page 227).
76 Hillgruber/Goos, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law...], 4. edi-
tion, § 5, Rn. 475.
77 Hillgruber/Goos, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law...], 4. edi-
tion, § 5, Rn. 475.
78 Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, Décision N°E-002/2011 vom 22 June 2011, avai-
lable at: http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/ (last accessed on 22/06/2015).
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The difference between the renewed proceedings due to a special need of
legal protection and the rectification due to gross miscarriages of justice in-
cludes the fact that the former is launched by a complaint of the concerned
party after the declaratory judgment by an international instance79, while
the latter is supposed to be executed after the declaration by the judiciary
body itself (compare § 133 of the Constitution of Ghana).
A need for legal protection also exists, if a fact becomes known after the
judgment which would have been suitable for exercising a significant in-
fluence on the result of an already decided dispute. Therefore, the Consti-
tutional Court of Togo could have decided differently once it had realised
that the parliamentarians, who were excluded from parliament, had not
submitted a proper waiver.80 Unfortunately, the Constitutional Court
overlooked this aspect in its legal assessment.81 In this case, it would have
been plausible to assume an exceptional breach of the legal force, based on
the need for legal protection. Thus, Art. 80 of the rules of procedure of the
ECtHR, for example, allow under certain circumstances a resumption of
proceedings with regard a judgment that is already in legal force.82
Substantive Res Judicata
The practical significance of the differentiation between the formal and
substantive res judicata lies in the face that the substantive res judicata has
effect in a second trial. The formal legal force, on the other hand, binds the
court irrespective of a second trial.83 As already mentioned, the formal le-
gal force is the basis for the substantive res judicata.84 In the following, the
individual elements (1), the exact object (2) and the legal consequences (3)
of the substantive res judicata will be discussed.
II.
79 See also the declaratory judgment ECOWAS: CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Isabelle
Ameganvi v. Republique Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11 (07/10/2011), par. 66.
80 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Isabelle Ameganvi v. Republique Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/
09/11 (07/10/2011), par. 61, 62.
81 Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, decision N°E-018/2010 of 22 November 2010,
available at: http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/ (last accessed on 22/06/2015).
82 Art. 80 paragr. 1 of the Verfahrensordnung des EGMR [Rules of Procedure of
ECtHR].
83 Pestalozza, Verfassungsprozeßrecht. [Constitutional Process Law...], 3. edition,
§ 20, Rn. 49.
84 Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht, 2nd edition, § 38, Rn. 1295. [Constitution-
al Process Law...].
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Object of Substantive res judicata
Substantive res judicata means that a claim, raised in a complaint or
counter-complaint, has been decided upon.85 The substantive res judicata
therefore includes the decision regarding the disputed claim. With this in
mind, there is no difference between the object of the dispute and the ob-
ject of the decision, because what is being litigated during the trial by the
parties must also be decided on by the court.86The substantive res judicata
fixates the factual and temporal elements of the object of the decision. It
means that the decision by the Constitutional Court is significant for the
Constitutional Court as well as for those participants in the dispute seek-
ing adjudication. As such, the purpose of the substantive res judicata is to
ensure the content of a formal final judgment for a possible second trial.87
Elements of Substantive res judicata
Not everything contained in a decision by the Constitutional Court, is to
be included in the substantive res judicata. The substantive res judicata has
a specific scope (a) and has certain limits (b).
Extent of legal force
First of all, the question must be answered whether the tenor and the key
reasons for the decision make up the respective elements of the substantive
res judicata.88 In response, the French Conseil Constitutionnel has taken
the following position:
« Considérant, d’une part, qu’aux termes de l’article 62 in fine de la
Constitution les décisions du Conseil constitutionnel s’imposent aux




85 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (54).
86 Rosenberg/Schwab/Gottwald, Zivilprozessrecht [Rules of Civil Procedure], 13
th edition, § 153, Rn. 2.
87 Lechner/Zuck, Bundesverfassungsgesetz [Federal Constitutional Law...], § 31,
Rn. 11.
88 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (55).
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nelles; que l’autorité des décisions visées par cette disposition s’attache
non seulement à leur dispositif mais aussi aux motifs qui en sont le sou-
tien nécessaire et en constituent le fondement même».89
This suggests that the substantive res judicata fixates the content of the de-
cision. In this regard, the elements of the tenor are decisive. As a result, the
substantive res judicata in principle does not include the key reasons for
the decision. However, these key reasons for the decision help with the in-
terpretation of the verdict.90 They describe in more detail the grounds for
the verdict. In other words, the reasons for the decision are all those state-
ments from which the court comes to the answer of the claim by way of
logical conclusion.91 To this extent, the reasons for the decision partake in
the legal force92 and influence its effects. Moreover, the key reasons for the
decision are closely linked to the extent of the procedural claim, which
forms the basis for the object of the dispute. Especially when a claim is re-
jected or dismissed a recourse to the key reasons of the decision is essen-
tial 93because the Constitutional Court does not explain the rejection of
the claim in the formula of the judgment but solely in the key reasons for
the decision. In the formula of the judgment the Constitutional Court
gives an answer only to the pertinent legal issue raised regarding a certain
constitutional regulation. Thereby, the preliminary and incidentally dealt
with question by the Constitutional Court does not share the legal nature
of the material legal question.94
Furthermore, the substantive res judicata does not develop an unlimited
effect.
89 Conseil constitutionnel francais, Décision n°62–18 L (16/01/1962), available at:
www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr (last accessed on 08/07/2015).
90 Conseil constitutionnel francais, Décision n°62–18 L (16/01/1962), available at:
www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr (last accessed on 08/07/2015).
91 Zeuner, Die objektiven Grenzen der Rechtskraft im Rahmen rechtlicher
Sinnzusammenhän- ge, 5. [The objective limits of legal force within the frame-
work of legal contexts...].
92 Zeuner, Die objektiven Grenzen der Rechtskraft im Rahmen rechtlicher
Sinnzusammenhän- ge, 6. [The objective limits of legal force within the frame-
work of legal contexts...].
93 Detterbeck, Streitgegenstand und Entscheidungswirkungen im öffentlichen
Recht [Object of dispute and effects of decisions in public law...], 333; Ben- da/
Klein, Verfassungssprozeßrecht, 2. edition, § 38, Rn. 1298. [Constitutional Pro-
cess Law...].
94 Detterbeck, Streitgegenstand und Entscheidungswirkungen im öffentlichen
Recht, 332. [Object of dispute and effects of decisions in public law...].
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Limits of legal force
First of all, it should be mentioned that the question of the objective scope
of the substantive res judicata is hardly regulated in the Constitutions of
the ECOWAS. For this very reason, the question regarding the limits of
the legal force of decisions by the Constitutional Court is especially diffi-
cult. Due to the lack of legal remedies against decisions by the Constitu-
tional Courts, the decisions initially have an unlimited effect. However,
there are opinions in literature that allege an objective limit to the substan-
tive res judicata.95 These opinions are supported by the rule of law. The
general effect of the decisions can, According to Art. 106 (Constitution of
Togo), not take effect absolutely because there are constitutional obliga-
tions of the state at international level which may question the legal force
of the decisions by the Constitutional Court. This may be the case within
the ECOWAS legal order, where individual complaints are admissible at
the ECOWAS Court of Justice (discussed in detail in chapter 3). The ad-
missibility of such complaint proceedings against the decision of national
Constitutional Courts represents, from a procedural viewpoint, an objective
limit of the legal force of the judgment by the national Constitutional
Courts.
The legal force of the decision by the Constitutional Court is also limi-
ted in time. This means that the substantive res judicata only refers to the
circumstances that occurred before the judgment was rendered. The ele-
ment of time represents, according to prevailing opinion within the doc-
trine, a barrier to the substantive res judicata.96 The point in time at which
the legal force takes effect plays an important role in its preclusive effect.
This means that actual and legal circumstances which were present before
the legal force took effect and which refer to the object of the dispute are
precluded regarding the same object of dispute.97 For the assessment of the
decisiveness of this point in time, the formal legal force should be applied.
There are two exceptions that should be paid attention to when it comes to
the preclusive effect. Firstly, circumstances that were not included in the
initial assessment by the Constitutional Court are not affected. Because of
b.
95 Kpodar, Commentaire des grands avis et décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle
togolaise, 105 f.
96 Detterbeck, Streitgegenstand und Entscheidungswirkungen im öffentlichen
Recht, 338. [Object of dispute and effects of decisions in public law...].
97 Detterbeck, Streitgegenstand und Entscheidungswirkungen im öffentlichen
Recht, 338. [Object of dispute and effects of decisions in public law...].
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the objective function of the constitutional jurisdiction, these circum-
stances would require a different object of dispute.98 Secondly, the actual
and legal circumstances that occurred before the legal force took effect are
not included in the preclusive effect. A transformation of the views and
values prevailing in the population, e.g. is seen as a circumstance of an ac-
tual nature that is opposed to the preclusive effect of the legal force.99
Regarding the addressees of the effects of the legal force, it is established
in general procedural law that the substantive res judicata only concerns
the parties directly involved in the dispute.100 However, the constitutional
procedural law has a special nature which justifies a general erga-omnes-ef-
fect (also see C below).
Consequences of Substantive res judicata
The substantive res judicata must be strictly separated from the substantive
legal effects of the judgment. As shown, substantive res judicata concerns
the core elements of the decision. In contrast, the substantive legal effects
of the judgment concern the legal consequences which are caused by the
decision of the Constitutional Court. In this regard, the substantive res judi-
cata represents an obstacle to proceedings (a). Meanwhile, there is the pos-
sibility of the admissibility of a new complaint despite the enforcement of
substantive res judicata. This situation is possible, if there are new reasons
for a complaint (b).
Substantive res judicata as an obstacle to proceedings
One of the most important consequences of substantive res judicata from a
procedural-legal viewpoint is the possible inadmissibility of further law
suits. Therefore, the legal force serves as an obstacle to proceedings. The
3.
a.
98 Detterbeck, Streitgegenstand und Entscheidungswirkungen im öffentlichen
Recht, 339. [Object of dispute and effects of decisions in public law...].
99 Detterbeck, Streitgegenstand und Entscheidungswirkungen im öffentlichen
Recht, 339.
100 Koussoulis, Beiträge zur modernen Rechtskraftlehre, 22 f. [Object of dispute
and effects of decisions in public law...].
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doctrine therefore rightfully qualifies the substantive res judicata as a nega-
tive prerequisite for a decision in the matter.101
In general, the finality of the legal force takes effect, once all possible le-
gal remedies have been exhausted.102 Since there are no legal remedies
available against the decisions by the Constitutional Court, the finality of
decisions by the Constitutional Court take immediate effect once the judg-
ment is announced.103Therefore, the judgment by the Constitutional
Court is also immediately enforceable.104
Since most of the proceedings at the Constitutional Court do not in-
volve disputes between parties, the effect is usually enforced for the overall
constitutional order. In case of disputes between parties, there are specifics
regarding the effect of the decision. In this case, the substantive res judicata
presents an obstacle to proceedings that interferes if there is the same ob-
ject of dispute between the same parties in a two-party case.105 This is logi-
cal, because a renewed assessment of the same case would contravene the
principle of ne bis in idem. The Constitutional Court of Togo has just re-
ferred to exactly this principle in order to reject the application of the par-
liamentarians of the Togolese parliament in the initial case. In this regard,
the court said the following:
« Considérant par ailleurs que par décision n°E-018 du 22 novembre
2010, la Cour a constaté la vacance des sièges occupés par le requérant
et huit (08) autres personnes, précédemment députés inscrits de
l’Union des Forces de Changement (UFC) à l’Assemblée nationale, et a
procédé à leur remplacement conformément aux dispositions du Code
électoral; […] qu’ainsi les décisions de a Cour constitutionnelle ont un
101 Kpodar, Commentaire des grands avis et décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle
togolaise, 100; Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrech t[Constitutional Process
Law...], 2. edition, § 38, Rn. 1296.
102 Kpodar, Commentaire des grands avis et décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle
togolaise, 100.
103 Kpodar, Commentaire des grands avis et décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle
togolaise, 100.
104 Kpodar, Commentaire des grands avis et décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle
togolaise, 100.
105 Kpodar, Commentaire des grands avis et décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle
togolaise, 100; Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process
Law...], 2. edition, § 38, Rn. 242.
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caractère impératif; qu’il en résulte qu’une obéissance absolue est due
aux décisions de la Cour […]».106
With this statement, the Constitutional Court clearly confirms the scope
of substantive res judicata as a negative prerequisite for a decision. How-
ever, substantive res judicata does not oppose a new application with re-
gards to the same object of dispute if it is based on other causes of action.
Admissibility in the presence of new causes of action
First of all, it must be pointed out that the legal force does not have an ab-
solute effect on the object of dispute. Rather, the effect of the legal force is
essentially enforced with regard to the non-appealability of the causes of
action, because with regards to the same dispute, different reasons could
still justify another action regarding the same object of dispute.
This would be admissible from a constitutional-procedural point of
view.107At first glance, this opinion seems difficult to justify but on closer
inspection it becomes clear that the admissibility of a renewed application
with regards to the same legal dispute does not violate the principle of ne
bis in idem. In this context, the French Conseil Constitutionnel has reject-
ed the opinion that the legal force conflicts with a law already declared un-
constitutional by the Conseil, if the Parliament resubmits the disputed law
to the Constitutional Court under new aspects. Based on the significance
of this judgment, the respective opinion by the Conseil Constitutionnel is
herewith repeated:
« Considérant que l’autorité de chose jugée attachée à la décision du
Conseil constitutionnel du 22 octobre 1982 est limitée à la déclaration
d’inconstitutionnalité visant certaines disposi- tions de la loi qui lui
était alors soumise; qu’elle ne peut être utilement invoquée à l’en-
contre d’une autre loi conçue, d’ailleurs, en termes différents ».108
b.
106 Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, Décision N°E-002/2011 of 22 June 2011, avai-
lable at: http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/ (last accessed on 22/06/2015).
107 Kpodar, Commentaire des grands avis et décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle
togolaise, 105.
108 Conseil constitutionnel français, Décision n°88–244 DC (20/07/1988), 18ème
Considérant, available at: www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr (last accessed on
08/07/2015).
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This point of view by the French Conseil Constitutionnel expresses that
the legal force only then develops a relative binding effect if the Constitu-
tional Court is presented with the same object of dispute with different
reasons for legal action for review.109 The admissibility of new reasons for
legal action regarding the same object of dispute contributes to the devel-
opment of the Constitutional Courts’ case law and must be welcomed for
this reason.110
A further important argument in support of this view is that the Consti-
tutional Court gives an answer in its tenor specifically to questions posed
in the reasons for legal action. This means that the opinion by the court in
its tenor does not necessarily refer to the object of dispute but instead to
the legal issues raised.111
In conclusion, the legal force and the associated principle of non-appeal-
ability do not conflict in every case with a subsequent application regard-
ing the same object of dispute. There are exceptions when the reasons for
legal action, on which the new application is based, give rise to a different
legal assessment of the object of dispute.112Over and above the legal force
of the decision, decisions by the Constitutional Court develop further par-
ticular effects.
The Binding Effect of the Decision
Generally, the decisions by the Constitutional Court have an erga-omnes-ef-
fect (I). However, there are in exceptional cases also some decisions that
only develop an inter-omnes-effect (II).
Erga-omnes-Effect
The decisions by the Constitutional Court result in final legal force not on-
ly in a formal and material respect but also have a binding effect with re-
C.
I.
109 Kpodar, Commentaire des grands avis et décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle
togolaise, 104.
110 Kpodar, Commentaire des grands avis et décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle
togolaise, 106.
111 Kpodar, Commentaire des grands avis et décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle
togolaise, 106.
112 Kpodar, Commentaire des grands avis et décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle
togolaise, 105.
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gard to all state powers. Procedural principles of the erga-omnes-effect113 are
constitutionally entrenched in Art. 106 of the Constitution of Togo,114
which in turn expands the circle of the target group the binding effect ap-
plies to. The civil and military authorities as well as the judiciary are
bound to the decisions by the Constitutional Court.115 Thereby, it must be
noted that the legal force develops a binding effect not only externally but
also internally because the Constitutional Court itself is, like the men-
tioned target group, also bound by its decision.116 The decision may, there-
fore, not be arbitrarily changed, as long as there is no circumstantial
change.117
It is correct that, in the interest of legal certainty, all actors are subject to
the binding effect of decisions by the Constitutional Court.118 Logically,
the Constitutions of ECOWAS Member States do not provide legal reme-
113 Kpodar, Commentaire des grands avis et décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle
togolaise, 103.
114 See also: § 129 section 2 Constitution of Ghana of 1992; Art. 124 Constitution
of Benin of 11 December 1991; Art. 94 Constitution of Mali of 25 February
1992; Art. 134 Constitution of Niger of 25 November 2010; Art. 99 Constitu-
tion of Guinea of 07 May 2010; Art. 98 Constitution of Ivory Coast of 23 July
2000; Art. 159 Constitution of Burkina Faso of 02 June 1991; Art. 92 Abs. 2
Constitution of Senegal of 22 January 2001; Sect. 230, 232, 233, 235 Constitu-
tion of Nigeria of 29 May 1999; Art. 65 Constitution of Liberia of 06 January
1984; Art. 92 Constitution of Guinea-Bissau of 16 January 1984; Sect. 126, 127
Constitution of Gambia of 16 January 1997; Art. 229 Abs. 1 Constitution of
Cape Verde of 23 November 1999; Art. 122 Abs. 1 Constitution of Sierra Leone
of 03 September 1991.
115 Bado, Verfassungsrechtliche Gerichtsbarkeit und Demokratisierung im franko-
phonen Westafrika, Länderstudie/Benin [Constitutional Jurisdiction and
democratisation in Francophone West Africa], 14, available at: http://intlaw-sgie
ssen.de/fileadmin/user_upload/bilder_ und_dokumente/forschung/west-
afrikaprojekt/workingpapers/Draft_WP_2014_benin.pdf (last accessed on
02/07/2015).
116 Kpodar, Commentaire des grands avis et décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle
togolaise, 102.
117 Kpodar, Commentaire des grands avis et décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle
togolaise, 103.
118 Jeze, De la vérité de la force légale attachée par la loi à l’acte juridictionnel, in:
RDP 1913, 439 (440); Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions
constitutionnelles en Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques
(2012), 54 (54).
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dies against the jurisdiction of the court.119 The Constitutional Courts
within the region emphasise repeatedly the erga-omnes-effect of their deci-
sions and declare all complaints regarding their previous decisions as inad-
missible.120In this regard, the legal force of decisions by Constitutional
Courts are to be differentiated from decisions by specialised courts. Re-
garding the courts of general jurisdiction, only the parties to the dispute in
the proceedings are bound to its decision.121 The proceedings before the
Constitutional Court, however, are usually objective proceedings.122 They
usually do not comprise of two-party proceedings. Even though the possi-
bility of individual constitutional complaints exists, these mainly serve the
interpretation of the Constitution. As a result, the legal force of decisions
by the Constitutional Court has the same legal nature as this objective type
of legal action. A violation of the legal force of decisions by the Constitu-
tional Court thereby represents a violation of the Constitution.123 This is
an expression of the significance of the jurisdiction of the Constitutional
Court. The erga-omnes-effect also demands that the authorities, as well as
119 Siehe dazu: § 129 Abs. 2 Constitution of Ghana of 1992; Art. 106 Constitution
of Togo of 14 October 1992; Art. 124 Constitution of Benin of 11 December
1991; Art. 94 Constitution of Mali of 25 February 1992; Art. 134 Constitution
of Niger of 25 November 2010; Art. 99 Constitution of Guinea of 07 May 2010;
Art. 98 Constitution of Ivory Coast of 23 July 2000; Art. 159 Constitution of
Burkina Faso of 02 June 1991; Art. 92 Abs. 2 Constitution of Senegal of 22 Jan-
uary 2001; Sect. 230, 232, 233, 235 Constitution of Nigeria of 29 May 1999;
Art. 65 Constitution of Liberia of 06 January 1984; Art. 92 Constitution of
Guinea-Bissau of 16 January 1984; Sect. 126, 127 Constitution of Gambia of 16
January 1997; Art. 229 Abs. 1 Constitution of Cape Verde of 23 November
1999; Art. 122 Abs. 1 Constitution of Sierra Leone of 0. September 1991.
120 Décision de la Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin DCC 15–027 (12/02/2015),
available at: www.cour -const i tut ionnel le -benin.org  (last accessed on
25/04/2015); Décision de la Cour cons- titutionnelle du Bénin N°DCC 14–038
of 20 February 2014, available at: www.cour-constitutionnelle-benin.org (last
accessed on 25/04/2015); Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, Décision N
°E-002/2011 of 22 June 2011, available at: http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/
(last accessed on 22/06/2015); see also Yebisi, The constitutional power of review
of Supreme Court of Ghana: Lesson for Nigeria, in: International Journal and
Social Science Invention (2014), 39 (42).
121 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (55).
122 Detterbeck, Streitgegenstand und Entscheidungswirkungen im öffentlichen
Recht [object of Dispute and the Effect of Legal Decisions in Public Law], 333.
123 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (55).
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other courts, participate in the implementation of Constitutional Court’s
judgments. 124
Thereby, one must pay attention to two characteristics of the binding ef-
fect. The binding effect results in a duty of omission as well as a positive
obligation. With this in mind, the Constitutional Court of Benin states:
« Selon une jurisprudence constante de la Cour, l’autorité de chose ju-
gée ainsi attachée à ses décisions impose à l’Administration une double
obligation à savoir d’une part, l’obligation de prendre toutes les me-
sures pour exécuter la décision juridictionnelle et d’autre part, l’obliga-
tion de ne rien faire qui soit en contradiction avec ladite décision».125
The binding effect demands that the addressees of the judgment, mainly
the state organs, must refrain from doing anything that could impede the
effectivity of the binding judgment by the Constitutional Court.126 On the
other hand, the binding effect causes a positive obligation, whereby the re-
cipients of the binding decision must take all necessary steps to ensure the
effective impact of the judgment.127
Moreover, the binding effect of the judgments by the Constitutional
Court has an ex-tunc-effect. Accordingly, all sovereign measures declared as
unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court are null and void from the
outset. For this reason, the Constitutional Court of Benin stipulates that
the refusal of the demand by the Constitutional Court to the Minister of
Justice to reinstate the candidates to their former status represents a viola-
tion against the legal force of its first decision.128 With this judgment, the
Constitutional Court implicitly refers to the ex-tunc-effect of its first judg-
ment of 12 July 2005.129 The Constitutional Court of Benin demands that
the unconstitutional measures taken by the administration before the judg-
124 Yebisi, The constitutional power of review of Supreme Court of Ghana: Lesson
for Nigeria, in: International Journal of Humanities and Social Science (2014),
39 (40).
125 Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin, Décision DCC 06–016 (31/01/2006), available
at: www. cour-constitutionnelle-benin.org (last accessed on 25/04/2015).
126 Ould Bouboutt, Les Juridictions constitutionnelles en Afrique, évolutions et En-
jeux, in: Annuaire international de justice constitutionnelle (1997), 38 (45).
127 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (65).
128 Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin, Décision DCC 06–016 (31/01/2006), available
at: www. cour-constitutionnelle-benin.org (last accessed on 25/04/2015).
129 Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin, Décision DCC 05–067 (12/07/2005), available
at: www. cour-constitutionnelle-benin.org (last accessed on 25/04/2015).
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ment was made,130 should be regarded as null and void from the begin-
ning.131 Overall, the measures declared as unconstitutional by the Consti-
tutional Court, may not be applied at all.
The legal ineffectiveness132 of the measure demands that the possible
consequences must be removed.
Inter-omnes-Effect
As shown, the formal legal force constitutes the basis for substantive res ju-
dicata. The formal legal force gives rise to an inter-omnes-effect in special
types of proceedings and especially in proceedings regarding parties, as in
the initial case. This inter-omnes-effect in turn results in a binding effect re-
garding the facts of the case (1) as well as a direct effect (2).133
The impact of the decision on the facts of the case
The impact of the facts of the case usually occurs when an authority is
bound by law to facts established by the court and to the subsequent con-
sequences.134In case of a Constitutional Court decision, the impact of the
facts comes to bear, when legal norms are linked to the decisions. The
court links its decision to the legal norms and subsequently established
facts. This consists of substantive legal effects of the decision. A typical ex-
ample is the loss of a mandate in parliament as a result of the finding of
the unconstitutionality of the corresponding political party.135 In the ini-
tial case, the ANC members of parliament gave up their mandates in the
Togolese Parliament. The Constitutional Court established this as fact.
This determination by the court causes a so-called determination-impact.
II.
1.
130 Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin, Décision DCC 05–067 (12/07/2005), available
at: www. cour-constitutionnelle-benin.org (last accessed 25/04/2015).
131 Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin, Décision DCC 06–016 (31/01/2006), available
at: www. cour-constitutionnelle-benin.org (last accessed on 25/04/2015).
132 Schlaich/Korioth, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht [The Federal Constitutional
Court], 8. edition, Rn. 379.
133 Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law...], 2. edi-
tion, § 38, Rn. 1295.
134 Creifelds, Rechtswörterbuch [Legal Dictionary], 19. edition, 1138.
135 Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law...] available
at, 2. edition, § 38, Rn. 1295.
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The declaration of renunciation According to Art. 192 of the Togolese
electoral law and the substitution of the members of parliament by the
Constitutional Court of Togo therefore represents results in a binding ef-
fect regarding the facts of the case. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court
stated in the tenor:
« La Cour constate la vacance des sièges préalablement occupés ».136
Based on the use of the word “constate”, one can speak of the impact of the
facts of the case. Equally, the determination of the unconstitutionality of a
political party by the Constitutional Court and its legal consequences rep-
resent an impact of the facts of the case. The direct effect of the substantive
res judicata is closely linked to the binding force concerning the facts of
the case. The decision by the court actually creates a new situation for the
new members of parliament137 and at the same time determines the loss of
the seats in parliament for the members of parliament who stepped
down.138 This double effect is a special feature of subjective decisions by
the Constitutional Court.
The material impact of the decision
Scholars understand the impact that the design will have, as an intended
change of the substantive res judicata which is attained by the inter omnes
effective decision. It can be said that the decision by the Constitutional
Court realises this effect.139 In the subjective litigation of constitutional
proceedings, it may occur that the decision by the Constitutional Court
causes such design impacts. This scenario occurs when the Constitutional
Court renders a positive judgment and, from the plaintiffs viewpoint, posi-
tive effects follow. Through the effective judgment, the legal situation is di-
2.
136 Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, Decision N°E-018/2010 of 22 November 2010,
available at: http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/ (last accessed on 22/06/2015),
Hervorhebung durch den Verfasser [emphasis by the author].
137 Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, Decision N°E-018/2010 of 22 November 2010,
available at: http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/ (last accessed on 22/06/2015).
138 Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, Decision N°E-018/2010 of 22 November 2010,
available at : http: / /www.courconst i tut ionnel le . tg/  ( last accessed on
22/06/2015).
139 Pestalozza, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law...], 3. edition,
§ 20, Rn. 71.
C. The Binding Effect of the Decision
85
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748901808, am 26.10.2021, 13:00:44
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
rectly altered according to the decision.140 In the tenor of the decision in
the initial case in this examination, the Constitutional Court clarifies this
as the impact of the design and the effect of the determination. The Togo-
lese Court stated in particular:
« La Cour constate la vacance des sièges préalablement occupés; dit
que les sièges devenus vacants doivent être occupés […] »141
In this tenor, the Constitutional Court determined not only the loss of the
mandate by the allegedly resigned members of parliament but designs at
the same time a new legal situation for the new appointment of Members
of Parliament.142
Appreciation and Criticism of the Decision in the Initial Case
In the initial case in this thesis,143 the Constitutional Court was ap-
proached mainly in order to decide on the substitution of the parliamen-
tarians. However, before the main question could be fully clarified, the
loss of mandate for the parliamentarians who had resigned, had to be as-
sessed as a preliminary question (I). The primary discussion of this
question alone can make it possible for the Constitutional Court to discov-
er a possible violation against the substantive res judicata as well as consti-
tutional regulations with regard to the loss of mandate and the declaration
of renunciation (II).
D.
140 Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law...], 2. edi-
tion, § 37, Rn. 1243.
141 Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, Decision N°E-018/2010 of 22 November 2010,
available at : http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/ (last accessed on 22/06/2015).
142 Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, Decision N°E-018/2010 of 22 November 2010,
available at : http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/ (last accessed on 22/06/2015).
143 Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, Decision N°E-018/2010 vom 22 November
2010, available at : http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/ (last accessed on
22/06/2015).
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Preliminary Question regarding the Object of the Dispute
The content of the preliminary question is defined as follows:
« Question que le juge doit examiner pour vérifier si certaines des
conditions requises pour l’existence de la question principale sont
réunies.»144
A preliminary question therefore represents a prejudicial legal relation-
ship. The impact of the facts of the case, triggered by the substantive res
judicata, raises the question whether during the decision-making process
regarding the substitution of the resigned parliamentarians the Constitu-
tional Court of Togo should have examined the constitutional aspect of
the resignation beforehand. Could the fear of the constitutional court re-
garding a violation against the principle of ne ultra petita justify the silence
of the constitutional court? All this concerns the question of prejudicial le-
gal relationships in Constitutional Procedural Law. Accordingly, the con-
stitutional court must first decide on the constitutionality of the resigna-
tions by the previous parliamentarians, before it can decide on the applica-
tion by the president of the Togolese National Assembly.145
This decisive question must be clarified before the main question in the
main proceedings is addressed. In contrast to the scenario of the proceed-
ings for preliminary decisions in the European judicial area,146 a transfer to
another instance is not required. Rather, the preliminary question must be
decided on by the constitutional court itself. In the initial case, the consti-
tutional court was approached, in order to decide on the substitution of
the resigned parliamentarians. This was the main question. It is question-
able, whether the question of the constitutionality of the resignation must
be assessed before the assessment of this main question. This question is
justified, because the answer to the main question of the substitution of
the parliamentarians depends on the constitutionality of this resignation.
In other words, the question of the legality of the resignation poses a pre-
liminary question of significant importance, which needs to be answered
before the main question can be assessed. Therefore, the answer to the pre-
liminary question has a resounding effect on the main question.
I.
144 Guinchard/Debard, Lexique des termes juridiques, 18 éd., 660.
145 Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, Decision N°E-018/2010 of 22 November 2010,
available at: http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/ (last accessed on 22/06/2015).
146 Hillgruber/Goos, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law...],
4. edition, § 13, Rn. 963d.
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However, the question, whether the court should be approached in in-
dependent proceedings in order to decide on this preliminary question,
seems problematic. From a constitutional point of view, the question arises
whether the preliminary question should be linked independently or de-
pendently to the main question. This question is legally significant regard-
ing the prerequisites for the admissibility, especially since there are restric-
tions in the Togolese constitutional system for approaching the Constitu-
tional Court. This concerns the locus standi which must be primarily con-
sidered here as a prerequisite to admissibility. With regard to these restric-
tions, a dependent connection would be, from a procedural point of view,
advantageous to the concerned parties Especially, since the parties to the
dispute are confronted with the legal effect of the decision regarding the
main question. This is consistent: No objection may be brought against
the legal effect of the decision by the Constitutional Court. As the decision
by the Constitutional Court of Togo demonstrates in the initial case, the
application of review of the constitutionality was rejected with the argu-
ment that the plaintiffs were not entitled to bring a complaint.147 Over and
above its influence on the participants to the proceedings the preliminary
question also raises questions of competence. The question must be asked,
whether the Constitutional Court must, of its own accord, ask this prelimi-
nary question in order to be able to better assess the main question as the
principle that the Constitutional Court may only decide within the frame-
work of the application applies. The ex officio rule found in the constitu-
tional system of Benin is not customary in all Constitutional Procedural
Laws of the region. Indeed the Constitutional Court of Benin may decide
on its own initiative, i.e. ex officio, on the proper proceedings of the presi-
dential elections (Art. 117 VerfB). This article is an appropriation of the ex
officio principle in Benin’s constitution.148 Moreover, it may, on its own ini-
tiative, decide on human rights violations which it has determined without
a prior complaint. Furthermore, the court established a „procedure de sai-
sine dʼoffice“. This type of proceedings represents a creation of the judiciary
and is, at the same time, an expression of the principle of constitutionality.
This relates to a situation where the court declares an application as inad-
147 Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, Décision N°E-002/2011 of 22 June 2011, avail-
able at: http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/ (last accessed on 22/06/2015).
148 See comparison with German public law: ex officio access, official principle of
ex proprio motu investigation, inquisitorial principle; Leibholz/Rupprecht, Fed-
eral Constitutional Court Act, § 90, Rn. 6; Pestalozza, Verfassungsprozeßrecht
[Constitutional Process Law...], 3. edition, § 23, Rn. 21.
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missible but, at the same time, assesses the constitutionality of the law in
question. The assumption of a violation of the human rights rooted in the
Constitution is a requirement.149
Even if the Togolese constitutional system is not aware of the proceed-
ings of the ex-officio- access, the dependent linkage of the preliminary
question still simplifies the assessment of the main question. Therefore,
the Constitutional Court may, in my opinion, assess the preliminary
question as a dependent matter without being afraid of acting outside of
its competence. This primary special treatment of the preliminary question
triggers the intervention150 of third parties in the proceedings. French law
defines this so-called accession as:
« Introduction volontaire ou forcée d’un tiers dans un procès déjà ou-
vert. »151
As it will be shown, the parties to the preliminary question are not always
identical to those in the proceedings regarding the main question. There is
an accession if at first parties, who are not concerned in the initial proceed-
ings, join the current proceedings based on an own concern.152 Moreover,
the accession is admissible, if the answer to the main question is decisive
for the parties with the intention to accede. This aspect clarifies our initial
case: the substitution of the parliamentarians in the Togolese parliament
has significant meaning to the resigned parliamentarians. Lastly, the deci-
sion by the Constitutional Court has the same importance for the parties
to the dispute in the main proceedings as for those willing to join the as-
sessment of the preliminary question.
In conclusion, it is established that the non-assessment of the prelimi-
nary question in the initial proceedings represents a severe mistake by the
Constitutional Court of Togo because this question was legally decisive to
the resigned parliamentarians. It is therefore not comprehensible why the
149 Kangnikoé Bado, Constitutional Jurisdiction and Democratiation in franco-
phone West Africa, country study/Benin, 18, available at: http://intlaw-sgiessen.
de/fileadmin/user_ upload/bilder_und_dokumente/forschung/westafrikapro-
jekt/workingpapers/Draft_WP_2014_ benin.pdf (last accessed on 02.07.2015).
150 Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law...], 2. edi-
tion, § 23, Rn. 852.
151 Guinchard/Debard, Lexique des termes juridiques, 18 éd., 452; Abebe/Vijoen,
Amicus Cu- riae Participation Before Regional Human Rights Bodies in Africa,
in: Journal of African Law (2014), 22 (25).
152 Hillgruber/Goos, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law...],
4. edition, § 4, Rn. 353.
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Constitutional Court of Togo did not observe this decisive feature of pro-
cedural law. In this regard, the decision by the Constitutional Court thus
represents a violation of procedural guarantees. Even the ECOWAS Court
of Justice confirmed this opinion153 (explained in detail in chapter 3).
A further aspect that should have been given special attention in the ini-
tial proceedings of the legal assessment of the Constitutional Court of To-
go was the question of the imperative mandate.
The prohibition of the imperative mandate and declaration of
renunciation
Two fundamental aspects were misjudged in the case Ameganvi et al. in
the initial proceedings by the Constitutional Court of Togo. In the parlia-
mentarian system, the imperative mandate differs from the free mandate.
An imperatives mandate means that the parliamentarian is bound by in-
structions of his party as well as his voters. In other words, a legal bond
exists between parliamentarians and the will of the voters as well as in-
structions by his party.154 Such a mandate is prohibited under Art. 52 of
the Togolese Constitution. According to Art. 52 paragraph. 1 clause 2 of
the Togolese Constitution:
« Chaque député est le représentant de la Nation tout entière. Tout
mandat impératif est nul.»
Thereby, the principle of the free mandate is entrenched in the constitu-
tion. The invalidity of the imperative mandate in Art. 52 prescribed in the
Constitution of Togo aims at ensuring the independence of the parliamen-
tarians. Voices in literature see this as a protective regulation.155 It is sur-
prising that the Constitutional Court confirmed the exclusion of the par-
liamentarians and their substitution, despite this constitutional guarantee
of the free mandate and express prohibition of the imperative mandate as
II.
153 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Isabelle Ameganvi v. Republique Togo, N
°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11 (07/10/2011).
154 Marsch/Vilain/Wendel (Publ.), Französisches und Deutsches Verfassungsrecht
[French and German Constitutional Law], 139.
155 Cabanis/Martin, Les constitutions d’Afrique francophone. Évolutions récentes,
126; Kou pokpa, La perte du mandat par un parlementaire pour cause de démis-
sion ou d’exclusion de son parti en cours de législature en Afrique noire franco-
phone, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juri diques (2013), 65 (75).
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in the initial event.156 Indeed, the prohibition of a bond with a party is
questionable in this context as the political parties are mainly conduits of
decision-making for the people.On the other hand, the parliamentarian is
a representative of the entire population and not the mere representative
of his party in parliament.157 Based on the tense relationship resulting
from this double-status, the parliamentarians are, as representatives of the
entire people in parliament, solely amenable to their conscience. The con-
stitutional status of the parliamentarian as a representative of the entire
people with a free mandate grants him a number of rights and obligations.
He exercises a right to speak and his right to vote.158 He may participate in
the parliament’s right to question and information. Furthermore, he may
take parliamentary initiatives. He for example has the possibility to join to-
gether with other parliamentarians to form a parliamentary group.159 Exer-
cising these competences contributes to the realisation of the legislative
task given to parliament. The representatives of the people thus fulfill their
official obligations.160 This results in additional consequences for the status
of the member of parliament. He is neither accountable to his party nor
the voter.161 His political accountability only bears relevance at the end of
his current mandate and a subsequent electoral campaign. The highest pri-
ority is the principle that the party may not unlimitedly influence the par-
liamentarian. There are clear limits whereby one must differentiate be-
tween party discipline and line whip. Every time a measure by the parlia-
mentary group threatens the direct freedom of choice of a representative of
the people, one can assume an unlawful transgression. Such influences are
156 See also the Criticism Koupokpa, La perte du mandat par un parlementaire
pour cause de démission ou d’exclusion de son parti en cours de législature en
Afrique noire francophone, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2013),
65 (75).
157 Marsch/Vilain/Wendel (Publ.), Französisches und Deutsches Verfassungsrecht
[French and German Constitutional Law], 139.
158 Koupokpa, La perte du mandat par un parlementaire pour cause de démission
ou d’exclusion de son parti en cours de législature en Afrique noire franco-
phone, in: Revue Togolaise des Scien- ces Juridiques (2013), 65 (65).
159 The parliamentarians, who resigned, exercised this right in the Togolese Parlia-
ment: CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Isabelle Ameganvi v. Republique Togo, N
°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11 (07/10/2011), par. 63.
160 Marsch/Vilain/Wendel (Publ.), Französisches und Deutsches Verfassungsrecht
[French and German Constitutional Law], 140;BVerfGE 80, 188 (218).
161 . Koupokpa, La perte du mandat par un parlementaire pour cause de démission
ou d’exclusion de son parti en cours de législature en Afrique noire franco-
phone, in: Revue Togolaise des Scien- ces Juridiques (2013), 65 (66).
D. Appreciation and Criticism of the Decision in the Initial Case
91
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748901808, am 26.10.2021, 13:00:44
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
fundamentally prohibited. In addition, there is the important rule that the
parliamentarian will keep his mandate even if he resigns from the party.162
This reflects a confirmation of the high priority of the freedom of opinion
in a liberal democracy.163 The ECtHR therefore rightfully rated the disso-
lution of the DEP, a Turkish political party, as a violation of human
rights.164 Based on his status as a representative of the whole people, every
parliamentarian is, in this respect, untouchable. 165
The only possibilities of a forced discharge from office are therefore
death, incompatibility 166, resignation and forfeiture.167 These barriers to a
free mandate serve to ensure the functionality of the parliament in a free
democracy.168
Except in the aforementioned cases, neither the Constitution nor the
supplementary laws provide for further ways to lose a parliamentary man-
date. Especially for this reason it is inconceivable why the Constitutional
Court was unable to prevent such a serious infringement of the constitu-
tion. With its decision, the Constitutional Court deprives Art. 52 paragr. 1
clause 2 of the Constitution of Togo of its essence.169 Luckily, the legal dis-
pute did not end before the national Constitutional Court. The case was
later submitted to the ECOWAS Court of Justice in Abuja for assessment.
The ECOWAS Court of Justice rightfully assumed a serious infringement
of principles of the rule of law (more in detail in chapter 3).
Although several voices in literature consider the prohibition to resign
from one’s party to be a certain “therapy“ of the phenomenon of “transhu-
162 Marsch/Vilain/Wendel (Publ.), Französisches und Deutsches Verfassungsrecht
[French and German Constitutional Law], 140.
163 Hillgruber, Parteienfreiheit, in: Handbuch der Grundrechte [Manual of Funda-
mental Rights](HGR) V, § 118, Rn. 108.
164 CEDH, Nr. 25.144/94, Arrêt (11/06/2002), Affaire Selim Sadak et.al c. Turquie,
par. 38, 40.
165 Koupokpa, La perte du mandat par un parlementaire pour cause de démission
ou d’exclusion de son parti en cours de législature en Afrique noire franco-
phone, in: Revue Togolaise des Scien- ces Juridiques (2013), 65 (66).
166 Art. 211 of the Togolese electoral law N°2012–002.
167 Koupokpa, La perte du mandat par un parlementaire pour cause de démission
ou d’exclusion de son parti en cours de législature en Afrique noire franco-
phone, in: Revue Togolaise des Scien- ces Juridiques (2013), 65 (66).
168 Hillgruber/Goos, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law...],
4. edition, § 9, Rn. 721.
169 Koupokpa, La perte du mandat par un parlementaire pour cause de démission
ou d’exclusion de son parti en cours de législature en Afrique noire franco-
phone, in: Revue Togolaise des Scien- ces Juridiques (2013), 65 (75).
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mance politique“170, the fear of a constant change of party cannot justify the
assumption of an infringement of the free mandate entrenched in Art. 52.
What would the legal situation be if the Constitutional Court would as-
sume the loss of mandate based not on a resignation from the party, but
because of the unconstitutionality of a newly founded party? This question
comes to mind because the determination of unconstitutionality of a party
triggers the loss of mandate as a substantive effect and consequence of the
decision. In this sense, the decision has a constitutive meaning.171
For instance, in the SRP and KPD-proceedings, the Constitutional
Court of Germany recognised the loss of a mandate as a legal consequence
of the banning of a party.172 The loss of the mandate would follow from
the finding that the respective party would now be considered to be un-
constitutional.173 The mandate of the concerned parliamentarian would
only be lost by way of this declaration.174
It is primarily intended that proceedings on banning political parties
should themselves also suffice substantial principles of the rule of law. Na-
tional security or the safeguarding of stability are in some cases the back-
ground of possible restrictions.175 This range of topics deserves a separate
and individual assessment since the new parliamentarians in the initial
case immediately founded a new party (ANC)176 after the resignations.
Even in this case, a loss of mandate would have been a possibility due to
the unconstitutionality of the newly founded party because the parliamen-
tarians were entrusted with their parliamentary mandate as members of a
constitutional and recognised political party. A declaratory judgment
170 Koupokpa, La perte du mandat par un parlementaire pour cause de démission
ou d’exclusion de son parti en cours de législature en Afrique noire franco-
phone, in: Revue Togolaise des Scien- ces Juridiques (2013), 65 (67); Boumaka-
ni, La prohibition de la « transhumance politique » des parlementaires. Étude de
cas africains, in: Revue française de Droit constitutionnel, (2008), 499- 512.
171 Hillgruber/Goos, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law...],
4. edition, § 9, Rn. 715.
172 Hillgruber/Goos, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law...],
4. edition, § 9, Rn. 721.
173 Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law...], 2. edi-
tion, § 38, Rn. 1295.
174 Hillgruber/Goos, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law...],
4. edition, § 9, Rn. 715.
175 Hillgruber, in: Handbuch der Grundrechte [Manual of Fundamental Rights]
(HGR) V, § 118, Rn. 111.
176 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Isabelle Ameganvi v. Republique Togo, N
°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11 (7/10/2011), par. 63.
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would, quite rightly, not develop a retrospective effect.177 A loss of man-
date on the grounds of a later finding of a partys unconstitutionality
would be a non-acceptable infringement of the sovereign right of the vot-
er, who gave the parliamentarians their parliamentary assignment.178 Nev-
ertheless, the ECtHR has, in similar cases, decided that an automatic loss
of mandate due to the banning of a party represented a disproportionate
infringement of the guaranteed right to free elections as per Art. 3 of the
1st Additional Protocol.179 It explained in detail:
« La Cour conclut que la sanction infligée aux requérants par la Cour
constitutionnelle ne saurait passer pour proportionnée à tout but légitime
invoqué par le Gouvernement. Dès lors, la Cour considère que la mesure
litigieuse était incompatible avec la substance même du droit d’être élus et
d’exercer leur mandat, reconnu aux requérants par l’article 3 du Protocole
no 1, et a porté atteinte au pouvoir souverain de l’électorat qui les a élus
députés. Il s’ensuit que l’article 3 du Protocole no 1 a été violé en l’es-
pèce».180The decision by the Constitutional Court regarding the validity of
the declaration of renunciation does not seem justified. Regarding the facts
of the initial case, it follows that the plaintiffs, the rejected parliamentari-
ans, submitted a declaration of renunciation before their election. In this
declaration of renunciation, they committed to relinquish their seat in par-
liament in case of resignation from their party. Such blank declarations of
renunciation or agreements regarding the exercising of the mandate are
null and void because they are directed against the freedom of expression
of the will of the parliamentarian.181 The nullity of the general declaration
of renunciation can also be justified by the fact that the parliamentarians
were ordinary citizens when the signing of such blank declarations of re-
nunciation took place.182 Only after their election did they receive their
177 Hillgruber/Goos, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law...],
4. edition, § 9, Rn. 715.
178 CEDH, Nr. 25.144/94, Arrêt (11.06.2002), Affaire Selim Sadak et al. c. Turquie,
par. 40.
179 CEDH, Nr. 25.144/94, Arrêt (11.06.2002), Affaire Selim Sadak et al. c. Turquie,
par. 37; vgl. Hillgruber, in: Handbuch der Grundrechte[Manual of Fundamen-
tal Rights] (HGR) V, § 118, Rn. 114.
180 CEDH, Nr. 25.144/94, Arrêt (11/06/2002), Affaire Selim Sadak et al. c. Turquie,
par. 40.
181 Marsch/Vilain/Wendel (Publ.), Französisches und Deutsches Verfassungsrecht
[French and German Constitutional Law], 140.
182 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Isabelle Ameganvi v. Republique Togo, N
°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11 (07.10.2011), par. 62; Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose ju-
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status as members of parliament.183 Therefore, all obligations they agreed
to before being elected as parliamentarians are legally invalid.184
It follows that the loss of mandate of the Togolese parliamentarians can-
not be justified in any way whatsoever. Therefore, the contrary decision by
the Togolese Constitutional Court must be seen as a serious miscarriage of
justice. It is therefore not surprising that the ECOWAS Court of Justice re-
garded the loss of mandate and therefore the decision by the Togolese
Constitutional Court as a serious infringement against Art. 7 paragr. 1 of
the African Charta for Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights.185
It may be concluded: legal force does not, dogmatically, represent an ab-
solute legal concept. Many actual and legal grounds can trigger a deroga-
tion or can supersede legal force.186 The need for legal protection is for ex-
ample the typical case which triggers an exception to legal force. On closer
inspection, the Togolese Constitutional Court, however, gives the impres-
sion that the legal force is an absolute institution of constitutional process-
es.187 Such an understanding is, however, misguided. Consequently, the
Constitutional Court rid itself of its task as the guardian of the Constitu-
tion in the present matter,188 by not recognising explicit infringements
against procedural and substantive constitutional guarantees in the present
case. This can and should be addressed before the ECOWAS Court of Jus-
tice by way of an individual human rights complaint.
Moreover, a regulation such as § 133 in the Constitution of Ghana
seems necessary for the constitutional jurisdiction of every ECOWAS
Member State. Although Constitutional Courts are, without a doubt, faced
gée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des
Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (75).
183 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Isabelle Ameganvi v. Republique Togo, N
°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11 (07.10.2011), par. 62.
184 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (75).
185 Darauf wird ausführlich im dritten Kapitel eingegangen. Siehe dazu Adeloui,
L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en Afrique, in:
Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (74).
186 Kpodar, Commentaire des grands avis et décisions de la Cour constitutionnelle
togolaise, 105.
187 Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, Décision N°E-002/2011 vom 22 June 2011,
available at: http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/ (last accessed on 22/06/2015).
188 Tchapnga, Le juge constitutionnel, juge administratif au Bénin et au Gabon?, in:
Revue française de Droit constitutionnel (2008), 551 (583).
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with a dilemma regarding legally-flawed decisions with legal effect189 ei-
ther to rectify the error through a renewed assessment of the case, which
would comply with a breach of the legal force, or to insist on the retention
of the legal force. However, as a few voices in the literature emphasise, a
correction of its own miscarriages of justice would, in the end, be better
for the Constitutional Court than to insist on the retention of errors.190190
Last but not least, it is even in the interest of justice itself that the Constitu-
tional Courts or Supreme Court has the opportunity to rectify misjudge-
ments. All this justifies a derogation of the legal force at an international
level.
189 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (68).
190 Yebisi, The constitutional power of review of Supreme Court of Ghana: Lesson
for Nigeria, in: International Journal of Humanities and Social Science (2014),
39 (41); Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitution-
nelles en Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (68).
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Supranational Derogation of the Legal Force in
Municipal Law
A number of questions should be posed, namely: Is the res judicata deci-
sion by the national constitutional court insurmountable? Is the legal force
opposed to the review competence of the international court (ECOWAS
Court of Justice)? Under which circumstances can the legal force possibly
be surmounted? Why should the legal force be surmountable? What
should be comprised in the differentiation between conquest and breach?
These questions will be discussed in this chapter.
Upfront, the use of the term “derogation” instead of “breach” should be
explained. A breach of the legal force is given whenever a decision regard-
ing the object of a res judicata judgment is to be made anew. The admissi-
bility of a resumption of the proceedings and the respective decision trig-
gers an automatic annulment of the judgment already in legal force. How-
ever, decisions by constitutional courts in the light of the aforementioned
(in chapter 2) regulations, regarding the constitutional process by the
ECOWAS Member States is non-appealable and irrevocable. There is no le-
gal remedy available against them. Therefore, the decision of the Constitu-
tional Courts is unchangeable. Subsequently, there is no court instance
that can revoke the judgment by a Constitutional Court. Further, the
breach can be defined as a legal revocation of a judgment by a higher in-
stance. The legal revocation in a new, complete fact-finding trial by the
Constitutional Court itself, does not apply here. The presented legal nature
of the decision is opposed to the breach of the legal force. In terms of legal
consequences, the breach of the legal force triggers the resumption of the
proceedings.1
For these reasons, the term “derogation” is used in the present paper. To
explain the term, the definition by the Federal Constitutional Court of
Germany is referred to. With this in mind, the Federal Constitutional
Court of Germany explained:
„Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte,
die neue Aspekte für die Auslegung des Grundgesetzes enthalten, ste-
Chapter 3
1 Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law...], 2. edition,
§ 38, Rn. 1304 f.
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hen rechtserheblichen Änderungengleich, die zu einer Überwindung
der Rechtskraft einer Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts führen
können“.2
The preference of this term can be justified by the fact that the legal force
is not breached by the declaratory judgment of the international court of
law. It rather remains untouched because the essential nature of Constitu-
tional Court judgments is, as shown, its non-appealability as well as its irre-
vocability. However, it can be derogated or surmounted based on an inter-
national verdict. Indeed, the legal force does not represent an untouchable,
dogmatic legal form. The erga-omnes-legal effect of constitutional decisions
is not opposed to the national effectivity of obligations of the convicted
Member State under international law. Consequently, the creators of the
constitution restricted the erga-omnes-legal effect, for example, in Art. 106
of the Togolese Constitution only to the national rule of law. Subsequent-
ly, the legal force does not develop its effect outwardly but only internally.
This chapter contemplates the question whether final judgments by a
constitutional court represent an unassailable obstacle which might be
standing in the way of the jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court of Justice
under international law. The opening of an international legal process rep-
resents the limitation of the objective legal force.3 A human right dispute
before the ECOWAS Court of Justice requires the international unlawful-
ness or at least the assumption of a violation against human rights by the
national constitutional courts. In other words: The decisions by the nation-
al Constitutional Court could become the object of an international hu-
man rights dispute in the ECOWAS legal system. The assumption is based
on the general idea that the necessity of legal control should also include
the third force in a constitutional state which aims at the moderation and
legal bond of all public exercise of power.4 Is a new regulation of the rela-
tionship between the subregional Court of Law and the national constitu-
tional courts necessary according to the concession of a human rights juris-
2 BVerfGE, 326 (326) (Hervorhebung durch den Verfasser [Emphasis by the au-
thor]); Pettiti, Le réexamen d’une déci- sion pénale française après un arrêt de la
Cour Européenne des Droits de L’Homme: La loi fran- çaise du 15 juin 2000, in:
Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de l’Homme (2001), 3 (12).
3 Pettiti, Le réexamen d’une décision pénale française après un arrêt de la Cour Eu-
ropéenne des Droits de L’Homme: La loi française du 15 juin 2000, in: Revue Tri-
mestrielle des Droits de l’Homme (2001), 3 (12).
4 Breuer, Staatshaftung für judikatives Unrecht [Government liability for judicative
injustice], 1.
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diction to the ECOWAS Court of Justice? The lodging of a human rights
complaint at regional level against possible decisions by the constitutional
courts has direct procedural effects on the national legal force.
In order to answer these complex questions regarding the relationships
between the ECOWAS Court of Justice and the highest courts of the Mem-
ber States, a precedence-case before the ECOWAS Court of Justice offers a
good starting point for the investigation. Following the extensive demon-
stration of this case (A), the primary features of the ECOWAS Court of Jus-
tice as a constitutional court will be discussed (B). Furthermore, the proce-
dure of an individual complaint before the ECOWAS Court of Justice (C)
as well as the forms of decision-making by the Court of Law (D) will be
given special attention. Subsequent to this, the interpretation of Art. 15
paragr. 4 of the amendment agreement will be explained according to the
rules of interpretation in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(E). For the purpose of a better understanding regarding the forms of deci-
sion-making, the expression of the effect of the legal force will be demon-
strated (F). Lastly, the understanding of the concept of jurisdiction in the
present work requires a justification (G).
The Initial Case before the ECOWAS Court of Justice
The object of dispute before the ECOWAS Court of Justice is the continua-
tion of the national legal dispute before the Togolese Constitutional Court
as demonstrated in chapter 2. For the purpose of assessing the legal dispute
before the ECOWAS Court of Justice it is advisable to recall the judgment
by the ECOWAS Court of Justice.
The judgment by the ECOWAS Court of Justice was issued on 7 Octo-
ber 2011 in French. The individual complaint N°ECW/APP/12/10 was sub-
mitted to the Court of Law on 30 November 2010. The legal dispute was
based on an individual complaint N°ECW/APP/12/10 brought by Mrs
Ameganvi, among others, against the Republic of Togo. She had been ex-
cluded from parliament as a plaintiff based on the decision by the Consti-
tutional Court. This individual complaint by Mrs Ameganvi is thereby di-
rectly targeted at the Republic of Togo and indirectly against the decision
N° N°E018/10 of 22 November 2010 by the Constitutional Court of Togo.
The Togolese state was represented by the government. After an exchange
of written pleadings between the individual plaintiff and the government,
the ECOWAS Court of Justice considered the legal dispute on 7 October
2011.
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It was concluded from the facts that the new parliamentarians in the To-
golese Parliament had lost their mandate in parliament based on the deci-
sion by the Togolese Constitutional Court.5 They presented the following
facts before the Court of Law: They were members of the Togolese parlia-
ment until 22 November 2010, this being the date of their exclusion due to
the decision by the Togolese Constitutional Court.6 They were members of
the political party UFC (Union des Forces du Changement). They resigned
from this party on 12 August and 12 October 2010 respectively. They
added: Before their acceptance as candidates of their party during the elec-
toral campaign for parliamentary elections, they were presented with three
documents. Among these was a confidentiality agreement (contrat de con-
fiance de l‘UFC) between the candidates and a letter of resignation for
their signature. It stated the following declaration of resignation:
« Je vous informe qu’à compter de ce jour, et pour des raisons de
convenance politique, je démissionne de mes fonctions de Député à
l’Assemblée Nationale».
However, these letters of resignation were supposedly a blank declaration
of renunciation, because the declarations of renunciation were allegedly
neither dated nor composed by the concerned candidates themselves.7 Af-
ter the elections the UFC party received 27 seats in parliament. All 27
members of parliament joined a parliamentarian faction. However, during
the time of their mandate, an irreconcilable disagreement arose within the
faction. This led to a resignation of 20 parliamentarians on 20 October
2010. Thereafter, they founded their own party (Alliance Nationale pour le
Chan- gement, so-called ANC). The leader of their previous party nominat-
ed a new president of the UFC faction in parliament on 27 September
2010. The new president of the faction subsequently requested that the
president of the parliament should undertake the substitutions for the re-
signed parliamentarians. On 18 November 2010, the president of the par-
liament submitted the list of these members of parliament to the Constitu-
tional Court of Togo with the request to name their successors. However,
the concerned parliamentarians had allegedly already announced to the
5 Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, Decision N°E-018/2010 vom 22 November 2010,
available at: http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/ (last accessed on 22/06/2015).
6 Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, Decision N°E-018/2010 vom 22 November 2010,
available at: http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/ (last accessed on 22/06/2015).
7 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. Etat du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11
(07/10/2011), par. 13, available at: www.courtecowas .org  (last accessed on
16/07/2015).
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Constitutional Court on 17 November 2010 that they did not intend to re-
sign from parliament.8 Nevertheless, despite this irregularity, the Constitu-
tional Court announced the substitution of the parliamentarians with
their decision N° N°E018/10 of 22 November 2010.9 The decision by the
Constitutional Court was based on the parliamentarians’ declarations of
renunciation. The individual plaintiffs reminded the Court that these dec-
larations of renunciation had been ineffective blank declarations of renun-
ciation. They thereafter emphasised that a declaration of renunciation
must be signed by the concerned parliamentarian with the date and speci-
fication of his name in order to have any legal effect. This had not been the
case. Furthermore, they had not submitted any declarations of renuncia-
tion to the new president of the faction. They referred to the declaration of
renunciation by Mr Lawson, who had not been elected as a member of
parliament, as evidence. He confirmed that the declarations of renuncia-
tion in question had been blank declarations.
The government alleged that the dispute involves circumstances under
which the plaintiffs were substituted, i.e. that the Constitutional Court of
Togo decided on the resignation of the plaintiffs on application by the
president of the National Assembly. According to the government, certain
internal problems within the UFC party had led to the split of the party
and the founding of a new party. Furthermore, it assumed that the individ-
ual plaintiffs submitted the declarations of renunciation of their own free
will According to regulation in Art. 6 of the rules of procedure of the par-
liament. Subsequently, the Constitutional Court legally decided in a legal-
ly binding manner on the substitution of the concerned parliamentarians
According to Art. 192 of the Electoral Act.
The individual plaintiffs alleged: A parliamentarian is a representative of
the whole people and not only a representative of his party in parliament.
Based on the tension resulting from this dual role, the parliamentarians are
representatives of the whole people in parliament and as such are only
bound by their own conscience. The constitutional status of the parliamen-
tarian as a representative of the whole people based on a free mandate
gives him a number of rights whereby any obligation he has towards his
8 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. Etat du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11
(07/10/2011), par. 65, available at: www.courtecowas .org  (last accessed on
16/07/2015).
9 Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, Entscheidung N°E-018/2010 vom 22 November
2010, available at: http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/  (last accessed on
22/06/2015).
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party before his election as a parliamentarian is not binding. They base the
admissibility of their individual complaint on Art. 9.4 and 10 d of the Pro-
tocol A/SP.1/01/05. The wording of both regulations stipulates:
« La Cour est compétente pour connaitre des cas de violation des
droits de l’homme dans tout Etat Membre; peut saisir la Cour […]
toute personne victime de violation des droits de l’homme ».
Regarding the merits of the claim the individual plaintiffs argued, in par-
ticular, that their right to fair proceedings was violated by the Togolese
Parliament as well as the decision N°E018/10 of 22 November 2010 by the
Constitutional Court of Togo. It therefore followed that the guaranteed
right to fair court proceedings according to Art. 7 Abs. 1; Art. 7 Abs. 1.c
and Art. 10 Abs. 2 of the African Charta for Human Rights and Peoples’
Rights was violated. Moreover, they alleged that through the actions of the
Republic of Togo, the rights guaranteed in Art. 1, Art. 1.a Abs. 2 and 33 of
the Protocol for Good Governance were also violated. To further argue the
merits of their complaint, they also referred to the relevant national regula-
tions namely Art. 52 of the Constitution of Togo and Art. 6 of the rules of
procedure of the Togolese Parliament. They expressly repeated the regu-
lation in Art. 52 of the Constitution of Togo:
« Chaque député est le représentant de la nation toute entière, tout
mandat impératif est nul».
Subsequently, they referred to Art. 10 of the General Declaration of Hu-
man Rights of 10 December 1948. The government rejected this view of
the plaintiffs and made the following statement: it first rejected the juris-
diction of the Court of justice on the grounds that there was no violation
of human rights with regard to the proceedings that had led to the substi-
tution of the concerned parliamentarians. According to the government,
the Constitutional Court had observed all constitutional regulations when
it decided on the substitution of the parliamentarians. The regulations of
the Electoral Act had also been observed during the proceedings. To sup-
port their view, the government referred to a judgment by the ECOWAS
Court, Decision N°ECW/CCJ/APP/05/06 of 22 May 2007. The government
further stated that the declarations of renunciation had been undisputed
because each of the concerned parliamentarians had personally declared
their resignation before the President of the National Assembly. They were
therebyno longer members of the National Assembly. The founding of a
new party could not heal the resignation retroactively. In this regard, the
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government expressly referred to Art. 6 of the Rules of Procedure of the
Parliament:
« Tout député régulièrement élu peut démettre de ses fonctions. Les
démissions sont adres- sées au Président qui en donne connaissance à
l’Assemblée Nationale dans la plus prochaine séance et les notifie à La
Cour constitutionnelle».
The government further alleged that, according to Art. 6 of the Rules of
Procedure of the Parliaments, the president of the National Assembly had
been informed of the declarations of renunciation in the course of the
third legislative period in 2010 because of this, the President of the Nation-
al Assembly approached the Constitutional Court in order to carry out the
substitution. Subsequently, the entire proceedings regarding the substitu-
tion of the parliamentarians had been constitutional and did not represent
an infringement of the individual and civil rights of the plaintiffs. There-
fore, the legal dispute did not fall in the jurisdiction of the ECOWAS
Court of Justice. The government thus referred to Art. 106 of the Constitu-
tion of Togo. Art. 106 of the Constitution of Togo states:
« Les décisions de le Cour constitutionnelles ne sont pas susceptibles
de recours. Elles s’im- posent aux pouvoirs publics et à toutes les auto-
rités civiles, militaires et juridictionnelles ».
In this sense, the government referred to a judgment by the ECOWAS
Court of Justice, namely the Decision N°ECW/CCJ/APP/02/05 of 7 Octo-
ber 2005, in which the ECOWAS Court of Justice expressly rejected its
competence with regards to assessing decisions by national courts of the
Member States. Moreover, the government emphasised that the plaintiffs
had purposefully signed the declarations of renunciation. The declarations
of renunciation give the basis of an obligation of the concerned parliamen-
tarians toward their party which must be fulfilled. The declarations of re-
nunciation were not to be viewed as blank declarations of renunciation as
they had been signed.
Regarding the violation of Art. 33 of the Protocol for Good Governance,
the government alleged that the decision, with regard to the authenticity
of a declaration of renunciation, had to be evaluated at the discretion of
the Constitutional Court of Togo.
Regarding the violation of the Fairness Principle, the government dis-
puted that Art. 7 paragr. 1, Art. 7 paragr. 1.c of the African Charta for Hu-
man Rights and Peoples’ Rights had been violated. According to the gov-
ernment, these regulations refer to court proceedings and not proceedings
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within a national assembly. Regarding the violation of Art. 10 of the
African Charta for Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights, the government
highlighted that the individual plaintiffs had made use of their right to
freedom of association and thus had founded a new party. Therefore,
Art. 10 of the African Charta for Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights had
been adhered to. Consequently, the government applied before the
ECOWAS Court of Justice for the assessment of the lawfulness of the par-
liamentarian’s declarations of renunciation as well as the lawfulness of the
decision of the Constitutional Court of Togo The government further
asked the Court of Law to reject the application by the plaintiffs. It also
asked the Court of Law to order the plaintiffs to pay the legal fees for the
proceedings.The Court of justice declared the application by the plaintiffs
to be admissible according to Art. 9 Abs. 4 and Art. 10 d of the Additional
Protocol A/SP.1/01/05.The Court of Law rejected the plaintiffs’ application
for urgent proceedings with the reason that there was no requirement for
urgency according to Art. 59 of the rule of procedure of the Court of jus-
tice .
Primarily, the Court of Law was not convinced that the declarations of
renunciation had been lawfully submitted. The Court of justice stated:
« Toutefois ces documents ne peuvent être considérés comme étant
une lettre de démission au sens de l’Article 6 du règlement de l’Assem-
blée Nationale. En effet, selon cet article une lettre de démission doit
être signée par le Député régulièrement élu, statut juridique que les si-
gna- taires n’avaient pas acquis au moment de la signature par eux des
dites lettres; ce qui n’est pas contesté par le Défendeur ».10
Regarding the alleged violation of Art. 7 of the Charta and Art. 10 of the
General Declaration of Human Rights, the Court of Law was confronted
by the following legal issue:
« Les questions soumises à l’appréciation de la Cour, à savoir la trans-
mission par le Président de l’Assemblée Nationale à la Cour Constitu-
tionnelle de lettres de démission attribuées aux requérants et contes-
tées par ceux-ci, et la décision n°E18/10 du 22 novembre 2010 de la
Cour constitutionnelle prise à la suite de cette transmission, relèvent-
elles de la compétence de la Cour comme étant susceptible de consti-
10 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. Etat du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11
(07/10/2011), par. 62, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on
16/07/2015).
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tuer des violations de droits de l’homme des requé- rants comme ils le
soutiennent? »11
After extensive assessment of the object of dispute, the Court of Law was
of the opinion that the provisions of Art. 6 of the rules of procedure of the
National Assembly had not been observed. The president of parliament
should especially not have submitted an application for substitution of the
concerned parliamentarians. This lack of observation of the provisions of
Art. 6 of the rules of procedure of Parliament led to the announcement of
the substitution of the plaintiffs by the Constitutional Court of Togo with-
out a prior hearing. In the opinion of the Court of Law, such an approach
by the Constitutional Court constitutes a violation of Art. 7 paragr. 1 of
the African Charta for Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights and Art. 10 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Court of Law further
confirmed that, according to provisions of Art. 1(h) of the Protocol for
Good Governance, all of these pertinent instruments of human rights are
part of the standards of review by the Court of justice .
The Court of justice had to, in particular, ascertain that the requirement
for fair proceedings as per Art. 7 paragr. 1 of the African Charta during the
entire national proceedings had been sufficiently observed. In this context,
the Court of justice called special attention to the fact that it was its task to
ensure that the signatory states complied with their international legal
obligations. The Court of Law further pointed out that the judgment by
the Constitutional Court also represented a violation of Art. 10 of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations of 1948.
In the tenor, the Court of Law rejected the objection regarding its lack
of competence. It declared itself competent. In light of the above explana-
tions, the Court found that the Republic of Togo had violated the individ-
ual plaintiffs’ right of a Fair Hearing. This violation at the same time repre-
sents an infringement of the provisions in Art. 7/1, 7/1c of the African
Charta on Human Rights and of Art. 10 of the General Declaration of Hu-
man Rights. The Court of justice ordered the Republic of Togo to pay
three million (3,000,000) FCFA to the respective individual plaintiffs. The
defendant state had to bear the costs and expenses. After the determination
of the infringement of pertinent regulations in the Charta (Art. 7 paragr. 1
of the African Charta) as well as the General Declaration of Human Rights
11 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. Etat du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11
(07/10/2011), par. 53, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on
16/07/2015).
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(Art. 10), the plaintiffs expected to be automatically reinstated in Parlia-
ment. The Togolese state, however, rejected their application for reinstate-
ment.
There is, however, the possibility to initiate review proceedings follow-
ing a declaratory judgment. This process means that a judgment regarding
a certain object of dispute has been rendered. However, several points in
the decision are unclear. Therefore, an application before the Court of Law
to clarify these yet unanswered questions is admissible.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs in the above presented main proceed-
ings.12submitted an application for review to the Court of Law. These pro-
ceedings are admissible according to Art. 64 of the Rules of Procedure of
the Court of justice . The concerned Togolese parliamentarians therefore
re-approached the Court of justice on 16 November 2011 within the
framework of these proceedings.
According to the facts, the plaintiffs asked the Court of Law in the re-
view proceedings to take a clear position regarding the consequence of its
declaratory judgment, i.e. their reinstatement in the Togolese parliament.
According to the reason for the complaint by the plaintiffs in this separate
trial, the parliamentarians sought their reinstatement in parliament. This
can be justified by the fact that their loss of mandate in parliament was
based on the unfair proceedings. These proceedings were qualified by the
ECOWAS Court of Justice rightfully as being in violation to human
rights.13 Therefore, they have a claim to re-obtain their seats in parliament.
The individual plaintiffs argued that the Court of justice had rendered
the declaratory judgment N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09 between them and the Re-
public of Togo on 7 October 2011. The Court of Law had, however, over-
looked one of their causes of action. Namely: the Court of Law expressly
confirmed in its declaratory judgment that they had not submitted lawful
declarations of renunciation.
Object of their application for review was the explicit order of reinstate-
ment by the Court of Law in the Togolese Parliament. In their opinion,
this was the logical consequence of the first declaratory judgment. The
government alleged that they had fulfilled all obligations arising out of the
12 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. Etat du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11
(07/10/2011), par. 65, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on
16/07/2015).
13 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. Etat du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11
(07/10/2011), par. 62, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on
16/07/2015).
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declaratory judgment N°ECW/ CCJ/JUD/09 on 7 October 2011. Further,
the government reiterated the fact that, according to the provisions in
Art. 106 of the Constitution of Togo, the decisions by the Constitutional
Court are final. There is no legal remedy available against the decision of
the Constitutional Court. The individual plaintiffs could not be reinstated
in Parliament because their resignation occurred by way of the decision N
°018/10 of 22 November 2010 by the Constitutional Court of Togo. Ac-
cording to the government, this decision developed an erga-omnes-effect
and could not be questioned in any way whatsoever.14
The Court of justice declared this application admissible.15
The question to be answered by the Court of justice was whether the
finding of a violation at the same time amounted to an annulment of the
decision in violation of human rights by the Togolese Constitutional
Court.16 In the key reasoning of the decision, the Court of justice failed to
draw extensive conclusions in the review proceedings.17In its key state-
ment, the Court of justice said: despite the Court of Laws finding of in its
first decision, it could not order the reinstatement of the parliamentarians.
According to settled case law, the ECOWAS Court of Justice was neither a
court of appeal nor a court of cassation for judgments in Member States. It
did not avail of such a competence. A reinstatement by the Court of justice
of the parliamentarians in parliament would equate to an annulment or
disregard of the decision by the Togolese Constitutional Court, which does
not lie in the competence of the Court of Law.18
The Court of justice once again highlighted the fact that the reinstate-
ment of the plaintiffs to their previous position, i.e. the reinstatement in
the Togolese parliament, represented a possible consequence of a violation
14 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. Etat du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/12
(13/03/2012), par. 8, available at: www.courtecowas .org (last accessed on
16/07/2015).
15 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. Etat du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/12
(13/03/2012), par. 11, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on
16/07/2015).
16 Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, Entscheidung N°E-018/2010 vom 22 November
2010, ab- rufbar unter: http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/ (last accessed on
22/06/2015).
17 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. Etat du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/12
(13/03/2012), par. 18, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on
16/07/2015).
18 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. Etat du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/12
(13/03/2012), par. 66, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on
16/07/2015).
A. The Initial Case before the ECOWAS Court of Justice
107
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748901808, am 26.10.2021, 13:00:44
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
of human rights by the Republic of Togo.19 The Court of justice was not
authorised to order this reinstatement. Furthermore, it was not the Court
of Laws responsibility to determine whether the respondent state had vio-
lated the relevant human rights. The Court of Law had thus fully fulfilled
its function in its first declaratory judgment.20 Essentially, the Court of
Law stated:
« La Cour estime que la demande en réintégration s’apparente à un
recours contre la Décision N°018/10 du 22 Novembre 2010 de la Cour
constitutionnelle de la République du Togo qui est une juridiction na-
tionale d’un Etat Membre, juridiction pour laquelle la Cour, suivant sa
ju- risprudence constante, n’est ni une juridiction d’appel, ni de cassa-
tion et dont la décision par conséquent ne peut être révoquée par elle.
La Cour n’avait donc pas à aller au-delà de sa compétence pour se pro-
noncer sur la demande de réintégration, qui, si elle était ordonnée,
équivaudrait à l’annulation de la décision de la Cour Constitutionnelle
pour laquelle la Cour de Justice de la Communauté n’a pas de compé-
tence.»21
The Court of justice declared the formal admissibility of the plaintiff’s ap-
plication for review. The allegation that causes of action had been omitted
in the main proceedings was dismissed by the Court of Law.This conjec-
ture is true to a certain extent, because as the Court of justice indicated, it
is not a super appellate court. Therefore, it does not have the competence
to examine misjudgments of national institutions in a factual or legal re-
spect. However, the determination of a violation represents an exception
to the general lack of competence regarding the examination of judgments
by national courts at a regional level.22 Moreover, a number of important
principles with regard to the human rights complaint should be men-
tioned at international law level. It must be pointed out that there are nu-
19 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. Etat du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/12
(13/03/2012), par. 14, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on
16/07/2015).
20 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. Etat du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/12
(13/03/2012), par. 16, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on
16/07/2015).
21 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. Etat du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/12
(13/03/2012), par. 17 et suivant, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed
on 16/07/2015).
22 Peukert, in: Frowein/Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [Euro-
pean Human Rights Convention]. EMRK-commentary, 3. edition, Art. 6, p. 214,
Rdn. 185.
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merous differences between the national and the regional legal dispute.
The parties, the object of dispute, the applicable legal principles (principles
in international law) and the addressee of the decision (the State and the
Plaintiff) differ significantly from those of that had been seized in the con-
stitutional procedure on the national level. With regard to the object of
dispute, the parties do not seek the derogation of the national judgment.
They rather move to determine the violation of the human rights, to
which they are entitled.23
Role of the ECOWAS Court of Justice as a Constitutional Court
Which function does the ECOWAS Court of Justice have within the frame-
work of its competences as an international and human rights court? In or-
der to ensure the adherence to the community-specific obligations as well
as the obligations deriving from the Charta, the high contracting parties
established a Court of Law. The operating principle as well as the statute of
this Court of justice resemble, in some respects, those of a Constitutional
Court (Art. 15 paragr. 1 of the Amendment Agreement, 9 and 10 d of the
Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05).24 Hereby, the elements of the role of
the Constitutional Court are discussed (I). It is however questionable
whether the sovereignty of the contracting states is opposed to this percep-
tion of competence of the Court of Law (II).
Articulations of the Constitutional Role of the ECOWAS Court of
Justice
Through the jurisdiction regarding the human rights monitoring within
the rule of law of the entire Community, the question must be posed
whether the Court of Law’s jurisdiction extends to that of a supranational
B.
I.
23 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. Etat du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11
(07/10/2011), par. 53, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on
16/07/2015).
24 See also regarding the ECtHR: Cohen-Jonathan, La fonction quasi constitution-
nelle de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, in: Renouveau du Droit
constitutionnel. Mélanges en l’hon- neur de Louis Favoreu, 1127 (1128).
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Constitutional Court.25 In answering this question, the main features of a
Constitutional Court are addressed, namely:
– the independence of a Constitutional Court in the constitutional order
of the state;
– the adjudication of a last decision-making competence above all state
organs;
– the binding effect of the decisions by the Constitutional Court.
The role of a Constitutional Court comprises the monitoring of the entire
constitutional order and to enforce the individual and civil rights embed-
ded in the constitution. It examines the constitutionality of the actions of
all other state organs according to the constitution. The decisions of a Con-
stitutional Court bind all state organs. Therefore, there are no legal reme-
dies available against these decisions. They are final court orders and there-
fore unappealable.
Within the framework of the competences assigned to it, the Court of
Law exercises its jurisdiction autonomously and independently of the
Member states and the institutions of the Community (Art. 15 paragr. 3 of
the Amendment Agreement of 1993). Just as a Constitutional Court, the
ECOWAS Court of Justice has the function to guarantee the enforcement
of human rights of the Community. The Court of Law is, so to speak, the
guardian of the human rights embedded in the African Charta in favour of
the citizens of the Community. Especially for this reason, the Court of jus-
tice can and should, when exercising its function, define the guaranteed
human rights in more detail in favour of the individual plaintiff. In order
for this goal to be reached, a last decision-making competence is conferred
to the Court of Law According to Art. 19 paragr. 2 of the Protocol A/
P1/7/91 (2). Before the question of the final decision-making authority of
the Court of Law is discussed, the status of the Court of justice should be
addressed (1).
Status of the ECOWAS Court of Justice, in particular, its independence
The question of the statute refers first of all to the facilities of the Court of
justice and its position toward the other organs of the Community. There-
fore the status of the judges, on one hand, and the status of the Court of
Law, on the other hand, will be addressed. With regards to the judges, the
1.
25 Ebobrah, Legitimacy and feasibility of human rights realisation through regional
economic communities in Africa: the case of ECOWAS (200), 16.
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office of the judge will also be addressed. Regarding the Court of Law, the
regulations regarding the independence of the Court of Law is addressed.
The status of the judge refers to the requirements for the office, the term
of office and the end to a term of office. According to Art. 3 paragr. 1 of
Protocol A/P1/7/91 (06/07/1991) signatory states citizens who enjoy a high
moral reputation and who avail of the prerequisites necessary to exercise a
high judicial office can be elected as judges. Moreover, legal scholars who
can prove special knowledge in international law may be appointed as
judges. The number of judges at the Court of Law does not correspond to
those of the signatories because regarding the composition of the Court of
justice, it is comprised of seven judges (Art. 3 paragr. 3 of Protocol A/
P1/7/91). A candidate for the judicial office must have completed their for-
tieth year of age (Art. 3 paragr. 7 of Protocol A/P1/ 7/91). The question re-
garding the election of the judges is at the discretion of the state presidents
of the Community (Art. 3 paragr. 4 of Protocol A/P1/7/91).26 In Art. 3
paragr. 4 of Protocol A/P1/7/91 it is stated:
« Les membres de la Cour sont nommés par la Conférence et choisis
sur une liste de per- sonnes désignées par les Etats Membres. Aucun
Etat Membre ne peut désigner plus de deux personnes ».
“The member of the Court shall be appointed by the authority and se-
lected from a list of persons nominated by Member states. No Member
State nominates more than two persons.”
After the Member States have drawn up a list of fourteen candidates who
meet the requirements of Art. 3 paragr. 1 and 7 of Protocol A/P1/7/91 the
decision falls to the Conference of Heads of State, as the judges are ap-
pointed by the heads of state during the Conference of Heads of State
(Art. 3 paragr. 6 of Protocol A/P1/7/91). It may be concluded from this
that, in contrast to the case of the ECtHR (Art. 22 ECHR) where they are
voted into their office through an electoral process, the judges are chosen
and appointed by the high heads of state. Thereby, a large responsibility by
the heads of state of the ECOWAS Community must be noted. During the
selectionof the judges, it is especially important to pay attention to their
qualifications as the quality of the Court of Law and therefore the protec-
tion of human rights within ECOWAS closely corresponds to the quality
26 Tikonimbé, Indépendance de la Cour de Justice de la CEDEAO, Communication
donnée au colloque international de Lomé organisée par le Centre de Droit pu-
blic de Lomé et le Département de Droit administratif de la faculté de droit de
l’Université de Gand (02/03/2012), 5.
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of the judges. Furthermore, the candidates are put forward for election by
every high signatory party (Art. 3 paragr. 6 of Protocol A/P1/7/91). The
election procedure was strongly criticised because the candidates proposed
by the signatory state, might be biased in favour of their home country,
which could threaten the independence of the judges.27 There was also no
guarantee that the candidates of a signatory party met the necessary re-
quirements, in particular, knowledge of international law.28 Last but not
least, there was no interstate public procedure with regards to the candi-
dates. All of this did not provide good conditions for an independent
Court of Law.29
The Conference of Heads of State has taken note of this criticism and
has reacted positively to it. During the Conference of State Presidents the
heads of state passed a resolution on 14 June 2006, regarding the election
of judges.30 In Art. 1 and 2 paragr. 2 of the resolution of the heads of state
it is stated:
« Il est créé un Conseil judiciaire de la Communauté pour gérer le pro-
cessus de recrutement des juges de la Cour de Justice de la Commu-
nauté et les questions disciplinaires. Lorsqu’il gère le recrutement des
juges de la Cour de Justice de la Communauté, le Conseil Judiciaire de
la Communauté est composé des Président des juridictions suprêmes
de l’ordre judiciaire ou de leurs représentants, des Etats auxquels les
postes de juges n’ont pas été attribués ».31
Through this decision, a Conseil Judiciaire was created by the ECOWAS
Community. The Conseil Judiciaire is comprised of the presidents of the
27 Tikonimbé, Indépendance de la Cour de Justice de la CEDEAO, Communication
donnée au colloque international de Lomé organisée par le Centre de Droit pu-
blic de Lomé et le Département de Droit administratif de la faculté de droit de
l’Université de Gand (02/03/2012), 6.
28 Tikonimbé, Indépendance de la Cour de Justice de la CEDEAO, Communication
donnée au colloque international de Lomé organisée par le Centre de Droit pu-
blic de Lomé et le Département de Droit administratif de la faculté de droit de
l’Université de Gand (02/03/2012), 6.
29 Tikonimbé, Indépendance de la Cour de Justice de la CEDEAO, Communication
donnée au colloque international de Lomé organisée par le Centre de Droit pu-
blic de Lomé et le Département de Droit administratif de la faculté de droit de
l’Université de Gand (02/03/2012), 6.
30 Décision A/DEC.2/6/06 de la Conférence des Chefs d’Etat et de Gouvernement
portant créa- tion du Conseil Judiciaire (14 juin 2006).
31 Art. 1 et 2 Al.1 de la Décision A/DEC.2/6/06 de la Conférence des Chefs d’Etat et
de Gou- vernement portant création du Conseil Judiciaire (14 juin 2006).
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highest courts of the highest signatory parties (Art. 2 paragr. 1 of Resolu-
tion A/DEC.2/6/06). Henceforth, the election of candidates into the judi-
cial office is the responsibility of this Conseil Judiciaire (Art. 2 paragr. 1 of
the Resolution A/ DEC.2/6/06). Moreover, the judges are elected for a du-
ration of five years.
Their re-election is permitted only once (Art. 4 paragr. 1 of Protocol A/
P1/7/91). The judges remain in office until the inauguration of their suc-
cessors. However, they will continue working on the disputes they were al-
ready involved in (Art. 4 paragr. 3 of Protocol A/P1/7/91).
Regarding the independence of the Court of Law, Art. 2 of Protocol A/
P1/7/91 shows that the ECOWAS Court of Justice is a permanent and inde-
pendent court of justice of the Community. The independence of the
Court of Law is expressly confirmed in Art. 15 paragr. 3 of the Amend-
ment Agreement. In order to guarantee the independence of the Court of
Law towards the signatory states and the other institutions of the Commu-
nity,32 the signatories decided, after the Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05
(19/01/2005) came into force, to underpin the regulations regarding the in-
dependence of the Court of Law. This took place with the creation of the
above mentioned Conseil Judiciaire through the decision taken by the
heads of state.33 The fact that the selection of the judges was taken away
from the power of the heads of state with the creation of this Conseil Judi-
ciaire shows the first step for independence of the Court of Law.34 Mem-
bers of the Conseil Judiciaire may not come from the same signatory state
as the judges to be elected (Art. 2 paragr. 2 of Decision A/DEC. 2/6/06).
Moreover, Art. 1 and 2 of the Protocol A/P1/7/91 clarify that the judges of
the ECOWAS Court of Justice do not belong to the signatory state for
which they were elected. The judges rather belong to the ECOWAS Court
of Justice in their personal capacity.
During their term of office, the judges are not allowed to carry out activ-
ities that are incompatible with their independence, their impartiality or
32 Ebobrah, Legitimacy and feasibility of human rights realisation through regional
economic communities in Africa: the case of ECOWAS (200), 4 (16).
33 Décision A/DEC.2/6/06 de la Conférence des Chefs d’Etat et de Gouvernement
portant créa- tion du Conseil Judiciaire (14 juin 2006).
34 Sall, La Justice d’Intégration, 53; Tikonimbé, Indépendance de la Cour de Justice
de la CEDEAO, Communication donnée au colloque international de Lomé or-
ganisée par le Centre de Droit public de Lomé et le Département de Droit admi-
nistratif de la faculté de droit de l’Université de Gand (02.03.2012), 7; Kane, « La
Cour de Justice de la CEDEAO, à l’épreuve de la protection des droits de
l’homme», Université Gaston Berger, Maitrise en Sciences Juridiques 2012, 36.
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with the requirements of a full-time occupation in that position. Art. 4
paragr. 11 of Protocol A/P1/7/91 therefore prohibits the judges to carry out
political, administrative or any other professional activities. This regulation
takes the fact into account that the ECOWAS Court of Justice is a perma-
nent court of law. Especially for this reason, the judges must guarantee
their own independence and impartiality. In particular, the guarantee of
independence represents an important element of justice for those seeking
justice.35 In orderto strengthen the independence even further, the judges
enjoy the immunities and privileges recognised for diplomatic corps ac-
cording to Art. 6 of Protocol A/P1/7/91. In this context, the question of in-
dependence should be separated from that of impartiality. A removal from
the position as a judge during their term of office is not possible. The only
possibility for a removal from office is the determination of gross miscon-
duct, inability to carry out one’s office or physical or mental inability (Art.
4 paragr. 7 and Art. 6 paragr. 2 of Protocol A/P1/7/91).36 The competence
to decide on the disciplinary question is not that of the heads of state but is
allocated to a committee of independent judges.37While the independence
of the judges concerns an institutional bond of the judges and thus of the
Court of Law in relation to other organs within the Community, the im-
partiality of the judges represents a purely individual, even psychological
element. This difference explains why the status of the Court of Law, the
electoral process of the judges as well as the privileges and the immunity
(Art. 6 of Protocol A/P1/7/91) of the judges are decisive when measuring
the independence of the Court of justice .38 With respect to the impartiali-
ty, carrying out political, administrative or professional activities threaten
the impartiality of the judges. Due to this, the prohibition of carrying out
sideline activities in Art. 4 paragr. 11 of Protocol A/P1/7/91 is justified.
35 Tikonimbé, Indépendance de la Cour de Justice de la CEDEAO, Communication
donnée au colloque international de Lomé organisée par le Centre de Droit pu-
blic de Lomé et le Département de Droit administratif de la faculté de droit de
l’Université de Gand (02/03/2012), 2; Kane, « La Cour de Justice de la CEDEAO,
à l’épreuve de la protection des droits de l’homme», Université Gaston Berger,
Maitrise en Sciences Juridiques 2012, 67.
36 Siehe dazu auch Gans, Die ECOWAS. Wirtschaftsintegration in Westafrika, 70.
37 Art. 2 Abs. 2, Décision A/DEC.2/6/06 de la Conférence des Chefs d’Etat et de
Gouvernement portant création du Conseil Judiciaire (14 juin 2006).
38 Tikonimbé, Indépendance de la Cour de Justice de la CEDEAO, Communication
donnée au colloque international de Lomé organisée par le Centre de Droit pu-
blic de Lomé et le Département de Droit administratif de la faculté de droit de
l’Université de Gand (02/03/2012), 4.
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The Court of justice itself elects its president and vice president (Art. 6
of the rules of procedure of the Court of Law). The internal organisation
of the court derives from Protocol A/P1/7/91 and the rules of procedure, in
the version of 2 June 2002, the Court of Law set for itself According to
Art. 32 of Protocol A/P1/7/91. Regarding the composition of the Court of
Law in case of a decision in a legal matter, a quorum of at least two judges
and the president of the Court of Law is necessary (Art. 15 paragr. 2 of the
Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 and Art. 22 paragr. 2 of the rules of pro-
cedure of the Court of Law). Furthermore, According to Art. 15 paragr. 2
of the Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05, an uneven number of judges is
necessary to make a decision in a legal matter (see also Art. 22 paragr. 3of
the rules of procedure of the Court of Law). The Court of Law is based in
Abuja (Nigeria). It can, however, also hold external sessions if the circum-
stances of a case so require (Art. 26 of Protocol A/P1/7/91 and Art. 21 para-
gr. 2 of the rules of procedure of the Court of Law).
Exclusive and ultimate power of decision-making competence
The ECOWAS Court of Justice avails of an exclusive competence regarding
the legal instruments of the Community. Art. 23 paragr. 1 and 2 of the
Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/0539 attribute to the Court of Law an exclu-
sive competence regarding the interpretation and application of the
Amendment Agreement and the associated Protocols:
« Aucun différend relatif à l’interprétation ou à l’application des dispo-
sitions du présent Trai- té ne peut être soumis à un autre règlement
que celui prévu par le Traité ou le présent Proto- cole. Lorsque la Cour
est saisie d’un différent, les Etats Membres ou les Institutions de la
Communauté doivent s’abstenir de toute action susceptible de l’aggra-
ver ou d’en entraver le règlement. Les Etats Membres et les Institutions
de la Communauté sont tenus de prendre sans délai toutes les mesures
nécessaires de nature à assurer l’exécution de la décision. »
“No dispute regarding interpretation or application of Treaty may be
referred to any other form of settlement except that which is provided
for by the Treaty or this Protocol. When a dispute is brought before
the Court, Member States or Institutions of the Community shall re-
2.
39 A.F of Art. 22 of Protocol (A/P1/7/91) regarding the Court of Law of the Com-
munity.
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frain from any action likely to aggravate or militate against its settle-
ment.”
Furthermore, Art. 34 paragr. 3 of Protocol A/P1/7/91 clarifies that Proto-
col A/P1/7/91 must be seen as a fixed component of the Amendment
Agreement. However, the question must be asked, whether the ECOWAS
Court of Justice avails itself of an exclusive competence regarding human
rights violations. Art. 10 d of Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 namely confers the
right to the individual to directly submit an individual complaint to the
ECOWAS Court of Justice without prior exhaustion of legal remedies. Can
it be deduced from this that the ECOWAS Court of Justice has an exclu-
sive competence regarding the interpretation and application of the
African Charta within the ECOWAS Community? Is the competence to
decide on human rights an exclusive competence of the ECOWAS Court
of Justice? This question is important, because the competence is mainly at-
tributed to the African Court on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights. The
Member States know the last word in favour of their own national Consti-
tutional Courts regarding the interpretation and application of their re-
spective constitution (as shown in Chapter 2 of the present examination).
Moreover, the human rights accepted by the African Charta were in-
corporated in the respective constitutions of the Member States. Because of
this, the Constitutional Courts of the Member States have the competence
to monitor the rights of the Charta. The jurisdictions and the relationship
between the ECOWAS Court of Justice and the national courts is difficult
to define ratione materiae. Verbatim and following Art. 23 paragr. 1 and 2
of the Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05, one must assume an exclusive
competence of the Court of Justice regarding the interpretation and appli-
cation of the African Charta. However, based on the possibility to bring a
claim within national law regarding the scope of competence of the Con-
stitutional Courts, one must refer to a teleological interpretation of the
regulation in Art. 23 paragr. 1 and 2 of the Additional Protocol A/
SP.1/01/05. Therefore, the competence to monitor the rights of the African
Charta is attributed primarily to the courts of the Member States and, in
particular, the Constitutional jurisdictions . The admissibility of a direct
individual complaint before the ECOWAS Court of Justice should not be
evaluated as the denial of the primary obligation by the signatory states. To
allow direct individual complaints without requiring the prior exhaustion
of national legal remedies only corrects a certain deficit in legal protection
and problems in some Member States (this will be discussed in detail be-
low in chapter 4).
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The regulation in Art. 9 paragr. 4 of the Additional Protocol A/
SP.1/01/05 highlights the fact that it is the task of the ECOWAS Court of
Justice to guard over the adherence to the obligations by the high contract
parties embedded in the African Charta. This means that the Court of Jus-
tice neither monitors the adherence to national law nor other internation-
al instruments. It decides basically on the obligation of the signatory states
regarding the African Charta on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights. In its
latest declaratory judgment, the Court of Law has confirmed its rejection
in principle of the competence to interpret national law of the signatory
states. Here, the Court of Law states:
« La Cour, en effet, toujours rappelé qu’elle n’était pas une instance
chargée de trancher des procès dont l’enjeu est l’interprétation de la
Constitution des Etats de la CEDEAO. […] qu’il s’agisse de la Consti-
tution du Burkina Faso, ou de normes infra-constitutionnelles quelles
qu’elles soient. Dans leurs écritures, les requérants se sont en effet réfé-
rés aussi bien à la Constitution nationale, qu’à la Charte de la Transi-
tion. La Cour doit considérer de telles réfé- rences comme inappro-
priées dans son prétoire. Juridiction internationale, elle n’a vocation à
sanctionner que la méconnaisse d’obligations résultant de textes inter-
nationaux opposables aux Etats ».40
In the end, Art. 23 Abs. 1 and 2 of the Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05
does not attribute an exclusive competence to the ECOWAS Court of Jus-
tice regarding its authority to decide on human rights disputes. The
ECOWAS Court of Justice is not to be seen as the only decision-making
organ regarding the violation of the human rights embedded in the Char-
ta. The individual complaints are ratione materiae directly admissible to the
Court of Justice because structural shortcomings in several ECOWAS sig-
natory states were known to the parties to the agreement. Even though the
Court of Justice does not avail of an exclusive competence to monitor the
Charta, it does have a final decision-making competence. Two elements
meet and strengthen this ultimate decision-making competence of the
ECOWAS Court of Justice in the area of human rights.
On one hand, the erga-omnes binding effect of the national constitution-
al judgment is restricted to the national rule of law. There is no reference
whatsoever in the constitutional regulations of the Member States claim-
40 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Congrès pour la démocratie et le Progrès (CDP) & Autres c.
Etat Bur kina Faso, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/16/15 (13.07.2015), par. 24 et 26, available
at:www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on 16/07/2015).
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ing an extension of the erga-omnes binding legal effect in an international
legal system. On the other hand, the ECOWAS laws acknowledge the last
decision-making competence of the Court of Justice in the area of human
rights. Another justification for the ECOWAS Court of Justice’s compe-
tence to review is based on the erga-omnes binding effect, intended by the
constitutions of Member States to limit such on the national constitutional
order. The binding effect of the decisions of the Constitutional Court in-
cludes, erga omnes effect at a national level. As the creator of the constitu-
tion purposefully did not create a binding effect of international court in-
stances, one can draw the conclusion that the creator of the constitution
did not exclude the possibility of challenging the legal force of decisions
by the Constitutional Court at an international level. The creator of the
constitution thus intends for an implicit supremacy of the ECOWAS
Court of Justice in terms of the significance of its interpretation and appli-
cation of the Charta.
On closer inspection of the legal provisions of the ECOWAS Communi-
ty, a certain implicit relativisation of the final judgment by the Constitu-
tional Court must be noted. According to Art 9.4 and Art 10 d of Protocol
A/SP.1/01/05, the ECOWAS Court of Justice is authorised to decide in
matters of individual human rights complaints against Member States.
Both regulations include references to the possibility of controlling the ac-
tions of states by the Court of Justice. According tothis regulation, all ac-
tions of governmental authority can be the object of a complaint. In this
respect, court decisions are per se actions of state authority. Therefore, it
can be deduced that the possibility of relativisation of the legal force of fi-
nal decisions by the Constitutional Court are also to be included according
to Art. 9 paragr. 4 of Protocol A/SP.1/01/05. Consequently, the ECOWAS
Court of Justice has the last decision-making competence regarding the in-
terpretation and application of the Charta within the Member States.
Regarding the procedure, the decisions of the Court of Justice take legal
effect following their notification (Art. 62 of the Rules of Procedure of the
Court of Law). There are namely no legal remedies, such as appeal against
or revision of the decisions of the ECOWAS Court of Justice. In this re-
spect, Art. 19 paragr. 2 of Protocol A/P1/7/91 stipulates:
« Les décisions de la Cour sont lues en séances publiques et doivent
être motivées. Elles sont, sous réserve des dispositions du présent pro-
tocole relatives à la révision, immédiatement exécutoires et ne sont pas
susceptibles d’appel ».
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“Decisions of the Court shall be read in open court and shall state the
reasons on which they are based. Subject to the provisions on review
contained in this Protocol, such decisions shall be final and immedi-
ately enforceable.”
The regulation in Art. 19 paragr. 2 of Protocol A/P1/7/91 clearly shows
that, in the framework of its jurisdiction, the ultimate decision-making
competence lies with the ECOWAS Court of Justice. Furthermore, Art. 15
of the Amendment Agreement confirms that the Member States are bound
by the final declaratory judgment by the Court of Justice. There is no ex-
clusive list of actions which may fall within the scope of competence of the
Court of Justice. The Member States, therefore, do not provide for an ex-
ception concerning which state organ must carry out the state action in vi-
olation of human rights in order to establish the legal competence of the
Court of Justice. The Member States would have made express provision
for this exception if the last and final judgment by the highest state organ,
such as the Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court, should be exempt-
ed from the scope of competence of the ECOWAS Court of Law. This
would, in turn, only cause astonishment. Based on this, the conclusion
must be drawn that a decision by the Constitutional Courts or the
Supreme Court in violation of human rights falls within the scope of com-
petence of the ECOWAS Court of Justice. There is therefore no exception
regarding the scope of application of Art. 9.4 and Art 10 d of Protocol A/
SP.1/01/05. Therefore, the Member States have confirmed the supremacy
of the jurisdiction with regards to human rights of the ECOWAS Court of
Justice in terms of international law.
The Court of Law is supreme in comparison to the other institutions of
the community. Even the Conference of Heads of State is subject to the de-
cisions by the Court of Justice. Should it address a decision that at the
same time falls within the scope of competence of the Court of Justice, the
conference must leave the last decision to the Court of Justice . The com-
petence of the Court of Justice replaces the competence of the conference
in all legal matters with regards to the interpretation and application of the
Amendment Agreement and the Additional Protocol. After the Court of
Justice has decided in a legal matter, all Member States must comply with
the decision of the Court of Law. This is not opposed by the sovereignty of
the signatory states.
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Objections with regard to sovereignty
The judiciary represents an essential component of national sovereignty.
Therefore, exercising its jurisdiction expresses the sovereignty of the states.
One of the basic principles under international law is the principle of
sovereign equality. This basic principle of sovereign equality is codified in
Art. 2 No. 1 of the Charta of the United Nations. This emphasises that the
principle of sovereign equality of states is in closest relationship to the
principle of sovereignty.41 The principle of sovereign equality of all states,
in turn, is one of the oldest rights because international law has always
been a right among equals even though the states are not, in fact, anything
but equal.42 The sovereignty of a state also means that the state is the high-
est autonomous entity to its subjects on its territory and that an appeal to a
higher instance against its orders and decisions is not possible.43 To make
it even clearer: The sovereignty resembles the independence of a state to is-
sue orders.44 Consequently, the only law which applies nationally is law
which either originates there or was incorporated there by the national
constitution.45 The Constitutional Court of the State monitors the adher-
ence to constitutional regulations. Therefore, sovereignty means „Exclusiv-
ity and Imperviousness” of the legal order of the state.46The exclusive com-
petence of states can be deduced from Art. 2 clause 7 of the Charta of the
United Nations,. This includes the legislative, judiciary and executive
sovereignty. Consequently, the state doesn’t seem to be subject to any oth-
er law but the state law.47 Therefore, in case of a conflict between interna-
tional law and national law, legal practitioners tend to prefer the latter.48
The judicial prerogative of a sovereign state can be organised in
whichever way the state pleases because the state is free to do so.. This re-
quires due consideration of matters that inherently belong to the national
II.
41 Ipsen, Völkerrecht [International Law], 6. edition, § 5, Rn. 254.
42 Ipsen, Völkerrecht [International Law], 6. edition, § 5, Rn. 254.
43 Verdross/Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht [Universal International Law], 3. edi-
tion, § 35, 29.
44 Bertele, Souveränität und Verfahrensrecht [Soverignty and Procedural Law], 64.
45 Verdross/Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht [Universal International Law], 3. edi-
tion, § 35, 30.
46 Verdross/Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht [Universal International Law], 3. edi-
tion, § 35, 30.
47 Ebobrah, Legitimacy and feasibility of human rights realisation through regional
economic communities in Africa: the case of ECOWAS (200), 28.
48 Oppong, Legal Aspects of Economic Integration in Africa, 192.
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competence of a state. This, in turn, follows from the principle of equal
sovereignty of states.49
However, the question must be posed whether human rights issues are
„solely within the domestic jurisdiction“.50From this follows that the
sovereign authority of a state is in principle indivisible. International law
itself guarantees this principle. However, there are possibilities to delegate
this exclusive authority of a sovereign state. Indeed, states seem to comply
with international law when they observe mutual goals. These can only be
reached if states cooperate and thus share their sovereign authority.51 The
delegating signatory state exercises its „freedom of contract” through its
delegation.52
Therefore, we must differentiate between two questions: whether a fac-
tual situation falls within the internal scope of competence or whether a
matter shall remain within that national scope of competence. This differ-
entiation is important because the judicial authority belongs to the funda-
mental rights of a state. However, the state is able to transfer, within the
framework of its freedom of contract, this judicial authority to internation-
al organisations. This approach is completely comprehensible in the light
of Art. 2 clause 7 of the Charta. The signatory states already agreed in the
preamble of the Amendment Agreement of 1993 to relinquish their
sovereignty of state step by step in favour of the Community in the areas
stipulated in theagreement and the associated protocols. The goal of trans-
ferring sovereignty is to enable a collectivisation or a common autorisation
of sovereign power. The wording of clause 5 in the preamble of the
Amendment Agreement provides for the following obligation by the
ECOWAS signatory states:
« Convaincus que l’intégration des Etats Membres en une Communau-
té régionale viable peut requérir la mise en commun partielle et pro-
49 Kokott, Souveräne Gleichheit und Demokratie im Völkerrecht [Sovereign Equali-
ty and Democracy in International Law], in: ZaöRV (2004), 517 (519).
50 Ress, Supranationaler Menschenrechtsschutz und der Wandel der Staatlichkeit
[Supranational Protection of Human Rights and the Change in Statehood], in:
ZaöRV (2004), 621 (621); Nolte, in:Simma/Khan/Nolte/Paulus, The Charter of
the United Nations. A Commentary, 3rd ed., Art. 2 (7), par. 38.
51 Ebobrah, Legitimacy and feasibility of human rights realisation through regional
economic communities in Africa: the case of ECOWAS (200), 29.
52 Kelsen, Die Einheit von Völkerrecht und staatlichem Recht [The Unity of Inter-
national Law and State Law], in: ZaöRV 19 (1958), 234 (237).
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gressive de leur souveraineté nationale au profit de la Communauté
dans le cadre d’une volonté politique collective […]».53
“Convinced that the integration of the Member States into a viable re-
gional Community may demand the partial and gradual pooling of na-
tional sovereignties to the Community within the context of a collective
political will […]”
The political sovereignty of a state can therefore be limited by its integra-
tion into an international Community such as the ECOWAS Community.
This thought arises from clause 5 of the preamble of the Amendment
Agreement. The limitation of the political sovereignty of a state goes hand
in hand with the adoption of obligations under international law54 be-
cause the ECOWAS Member States have exercised their sovereignty
through the ratification of the African Charta. Moreover, all states of the
Community legally confirmed their affiliation to a value system by signing
the Protocol of Dakar 2001 and thereby accepted a limitation of their
sovereignty.55 The protection of these rights is guaranteed by the Court of
Justice. As a result, the Member States have acknowledged the human
rights competence of the ECOWAS Court of Justice and at the same time
transferred onto it the corresponding sovereign power. The transfer of
sovereignty is expressed through the acknowledgement of the last decision-
making competence of the Court of Justice in all its areas of competence.
In this regard, the protection of human rights under international law can
be reconciled with state sovereignty if there is a provision that an individu-
al complaint may be submitted against an alleged violation before an inter-
national organ such as the ECOWAS Court of Justice.56
The sovereignty of a state cannot be understood in such a way that an
international Court of Law, established by the state within the framework
of its freedom of contract, may not exercise its competence.57On the con-
trary, the signatory states are obligated to observe the competences of the
53 Emphasised by the author.
54 Schaffarzik, Europäische Menschenrechte unter der Ägide des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts [European Human Rights under the Aegis of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court], DÖV (2005), 860 (867).
55 Ebobrah, Legitimacy and feasibility of human rights realisation through regional
economic communities in Africa: the case of ECOWAS (200), 107.
56 Verdross/Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht [Universal International Law], 3. edi-
tion, § 36, 31.
57 Hopkins, The effect of an African Court on the domestic legal orders of African
states, in: Human Rights Law Journal (2002), 234 (235).
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established international court according to the principle of good faith.
Thereby, Art. 22 paragr. 2 and 3 of Protocol A/P1/7/91 stipulates:
« 2. Lorsque la Cour est saisie d’un différend, les Etats Membres ou les
Institutions de la Communauté doivent s’abstenir de toute action sus-
ceptible d’en aggraver le règlement.
3. Les Etats Membres et les Institutions de la Communauté sont tenus
de prendre sans délai toutes les mesures nécessaires de nature à assurer
l’exécution de la décision de la Cour ».
“2. When a dispute is brought before the Court, Member States or In-
stitutions of the Commu- nity shall refrain from any action likely to
aggravate or militates against its settlement.
3. Member States and Institutions of the Community shall take imme-
diately all necessary measure to ensure execution of the decision of the
Court”.
From the aforementioned, it is certain: There is no conflict between the
Constitutional Courts of the Member States and the ECOWAS Court of
Justice. Similarly, there is no conflict between international law and state
law. The reason for this is clear: The national law as well as the internation-
al law are rooted in the will of the same state.58 As the result of this section
it can be summarised:
The question of the transfer of judicial competence to international
courts, such as the ECOWAS Court of Justice, does not constitute a viola-
tion of the prohibition of intervention in internal affairs of states accord-
ing to Art. 2 clause 7 of the Charta of the United Nations. It must rather
be seen as the state exercising its freedom of contract. The prohibition of
intervention therefore depends on the extent of regulation of a factual situ-
ation by international or state law. This requires examination in individual
cases.59
Individual Complaints Procedure before the ECOWAS Court of Justice
The African Charta and the Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 are agree-
ments under international law that are binding for the signatory states af-
C.
58 Kelsen, Die Einheit von Völkerrecht und staatlichem Recht [The unity of interna-
tional and state law], in: ZaöRV 19 (1958), 234 (238).
59 Simma, Charta der Vereinten Nationen [Charta of the United Nations]. com-
mentary, Art. 2 clause 7, Rn. 37.
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ter their ratification. Both agreements directly establish the obligation of
persons subject to the jurisdiction of the high parties to the agreement to
ensure thehuman rights stipulated in the African Charta. These rights are
created directly under international law in such a manner that an individu-
al in the territory of the signatory states is entitled to protection under in-
ternational law against the signatory states. This right is made more con-
crete by the possibility of a direct individual complaint before the ECOW-
AS Court of Justice. Therefore, the admissibility of the individual com-
plaint before the ECOWAS Court of Justice should be addressed at this
point (I). Thereafter, the aspects of procedural law, in particular the object
of the complaint and those entitled to complain, will be demonstrated (II).
Admissibility of the Individual Complaint before the ECOWAS Court
of Justice
Since the inception of the Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 regarding the
Court of Justice individual complaints became admissible before the Court
of Justice . The prerequisites for admissibility of the individual complaint
are stipulated in Art. 10. d of Additional Protocol A/ SP.1/01/05. Thereby,
the Court of Justice may be approached by any person who is a victim of
human rights violations. For this, the application may according to Art. 10
d Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05:
« Peuvent saisis la Cour: […] Toute personne victime de violations des
droits de l’homme; la demande soumise à cet effet: i) ne sera pas ano-
nyme; ne sera pas portée devant la Cour de Justice de la Communauté
lorsqu’elle a déjà été portée devant une autre Cour internationale com-
pétente ».
„Access to the Court is open to the following: […] Individuals on ap-
plication for relief for violation of their human rights; the submission
of application for which shall: i) not be anon- ymous; nor ii) be made
when the same matter has been instituted before another internation-
al Court for the adjudication.”
Should the application satisfy both requirements, the Court of Justice will
declare the application admissible. Apart from these two requirements, the
Protocol does not require any more criteria for admissibility. This repre-
sents a significant simplification of the legal process at the Court of Justice
because in other legal systems, individual complaints before international
courts are only admissible if all national legal remedies have been exhaust-
I.
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ed.60 Art. 10 d of Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 does not demand any
further admissibility requirements. The abolishment of the prerequisite of
a prior exhaustion of legal remedies can be justified in the ECOWAS legal
order (this will be address later).
Based on the principle of subsidiarity regarding international courts, the
prerequisite of prior exhaustion of the legal process represents a procedural
principle generally accepted before international courts. In this context,
the IGH has emphasised:
« La règle selon laquelle les recours internes doivent être épuisés Avant
qu’une procédure internationale puisse être engagée est une Règle
bien établie du droit international coutumier; elle a été généralement
Observée dans les cas où un Etat prend fait et cause pour son ressor-
tissant dont les droits auraient été lésés dans un autre Etat en violation
du droit international. Avant de recourir à la juridiction internatio-
nale, il a été considéré en pareil cas nécessaire que 1’Etat où la lésion a
été commise puisse y remédier par ses propres moyens, dans le cadre
de son ordre juridique interne ».61
An historical case regarding the admissibility of a complaint without the
prerequisite of prior of the national legal process from the jurisdiction of
the ECOWAS Court of Justice is reflected in there following:
The factual situation is as follows: In the year 1984, Ms Hadijatou Mani
was born as the daughter of a female slave. When she was twelve years old,
she was sold by the owner of her mother for 240 000 FCFA62. Mr El Hadj
Souleymane Naroua, her new master, already had four wives and seven fe-
male slaves. According to the tradition of the “Wahiya“ in Niger, these sev-
en girls are generally purchased from poor circumstances and are simulta-
neously servants in the house of the master and fifth wife “sadaka” because
the Muslim religion only permits four wives. Therefore, Mr El Hadj
Souleymane Naroua raped Ms Hadijatou Mani regularly from the age of
thirteen. This resulted in the birth of three children. One of these children
died. The master decided in the year 2005 to set her free and therefore gave
her an “exemption certificate”. After the receipt of the certificate, Hadija-
tou Mani left the house and rejected the offer of marriage by her former
master. Mr El Hadj Souleymane Naroua, however, insisted on marrying
her.
60 Art. 1 paragr. 1 EMRK.
61 Art. 1 paragr. 1 EMRK.
62 Converted to Euro = 365 €.
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Regarding the legal proceedings: She approached a national court in or-
der to confirm her freedom. The court declared the marriage to be invalid
due to her lack of consent.63 Her former master was angry and took her to
court at a higher instance for bigamy. The Tribunal de Grande Instance
Konnis rejected the first judgment with the reason that Ms Mani was al-
ready married due to her status as a slave. The proceedings continued be-
fore the Cour Supreme. The Cour Supreme annulled the judgment of the
Tribunal de Grande Instance Konnis. Unfortunately, the judgment was
quashed by the Tribunal de Grande Instance Konnis in its verdict, not be-
cause of the exercise of slavery, but because of procedural errors.64 There-
fore, the matter was referred back to the Tribunal de Grande Instance Kon-
nis for renewed assessment. In the meantime, Hadijatou Mani had married
a man of her own choice. Due to the renewed assessment, the Tribunal de
Grande Instance Konnis sentenced Ms Mani and her husband to a six
months prison-term for bigamy. She had to serve two months before the
proceedings were suspended.65 With the help of an NGO, Ms Mani sub-
mitted an individual complaint to the ECOWAS Court of Justice against
the Republic of Niger.
After giving extensive reasoning regarding the factual area of compe-
tence, the Court of Justice declared in the tenor of the judgment that there
was a violation of the Charta with the following words:
« que dame Hadijatou Mani Koraou a été victime d’esclavage et que la
République du Niger en est responsable par l’inaction de ses autorités
administratives et judiciaires ».
The Court of Justice requested the state to act in order to change this legal
situation according to the convention. Voices in literature welcomed this
order of specific corrective measures in order to stop the violation by
Niger.66 However, the question still remains unanswered whether the
ECOWAS Court of Justice now represents a court of law in the first and
63 Arrêt N°06 du 20 mars 2006 du tribunal civil et coutumier de Konni.
64 Cour Suprême de Niamey, Chambre judiciaire, Arrêt N°06/06/du 28 décembre
2006.
65 See for greater detail on the national procedures: Badet, Commentaire de l’arrêt
dame Ha- dijatou Mani Korauou contre la République du Niger, in: Revue Béni-
noise des Sciences Juridiques et Administratives (2010), 153 (157).
66 Hamuli-Kabumba, La répression internationale de l’esclavage. Les leçons de l’ar-
rêt de la cour de justice de la Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de
l’ouest dans l’Affaire Hadijatou Mani Koraou c. Niger, in: Revue québécoise de
droit international (2008), 25 (52).
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last instance. Whereby the national Constitutional Court and the ECOW-
AS Court of Justice should simultaneously observe the adherence to the
Charta. This possibility of direct submission of a complaint before the
ECOWAS Court of Justice without prior exhaustion of legal procedures al-
ready causes tension between the national constitutional courts and the
ECOWAS Court of Justice.67 The danger of “forum shopping“ is certainly
unavoidable under such circumstances.68
In the proceedings described above, the plaintiff had not exhausted all
of the nationally available legal remedies before submitting a human rights
complaint with the Court of Justice . The government, as the respondent,
was of the opinion that the plaintiff had not make use of all legal remedies
available.
Furthermore, the proceedings regarding the factual situation had not
been fully clarified by national courts. Based on the non-exhaustion of le-
gal remedies, the government could not be blamed for the violation of
Art. 5 of the African Charta as well as other human rights instruments rati-
fied by Niger. Moreover, the government stated that the admissibility of an
individual complaint without prior exhaustion of the legal remedies was
an error in the protection system of human rights in the Community and
the Court of Justice should rectify this error.
The Court of Justice did not follow this argument. The objections made
in limine litis by the respondent were rejected with the reasoning that no
higher prerequisites regarding the legal procedure may be requested than
the prerequisites for admissibility provided in Art. 10 d. ii. In the reason-
ing for this decision, Court of Justice expressly referred to the prior case
law by the ECtHR from the year 1971.69 The Court of Law assumed that
the practice of requiring the exhaustion of the legal remedies before sub-
mitting a complaint to international courts only had the purpose of avoid-
67 Etim Moses Essien v. Gambia & Anor, Judgment N° ECW/CCJ/JUD/05/07, para
27; dazu: Community Court of Justice, ECOWAS, Law Report (2004–2009), 113
(119).
68 Helfer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, in: University of Pennsylvania Law
Review (1999), 285 (289).
69 Legal matter N° ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08- Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. Republic of
Niger of 27 October 2008, clause 39. Gilles Badet sees this differently to the
Court of Law. According to him, the direct accessibility of the Court of Law in
terms of individual complaints without prior exhaustion of national legal proce-
dures, may cause certain repressive measures by signatory states. See also Badet,
Commentaire de l’arrêt Dame Hadijatou Mani Koraou contre la République du
Niger, in: R.B.S.J.A N° 23, Année 2010, p. 153 (191).
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ing parallel proceedings at the level of international law. According to the
Court of Law, this practice should not jeopardise the effective legal protec-
tion of the plaintiffs. Regarding the question of effective legal protection, a
recent decision by the ECtHR must be quoted. In the legal matter Sürmeli
against the Federal Republic of Germany, the Federal Government raised
the objection of inadmissibility due to non-exhaustion of the nationally
available legal remedies. This objection was rejected by the ECtHR. In its
reasoning, the court was of the opinion that the existence of a constitution-
al complaint does not necessarily offer effective legal protection against the
extensive duration of civil proceedings. Therefore, the individual com-
plaint was admitted for adjudication.70 After this jurisdiction, the plaintiff
is not obliged to make use of the legal remedy if it is in reality ineffective.71
By the way, it does not fall within the scope of competence of the Court
of Justice to establish additional prerequisites besides the prerequisites giv-
en by the signatory states. 72 Therefore, the Court of Justice declared the
complaint admissible.
Object of the complaint and those entitled to complain
Within this section, the object of the complaint represents the violation of
the primary obligation by the signatory states (2). From a procedural point
of view, the assessment of the party-respective requirements comes before
the decision in the matter. Therefore, the right to complain before the
Court of Justice will be addressed first (1).
Those entitled to complain
For the purpose of clarifying this difference, it is recommended to reflect




70 ECtHR (Great Chamber), judgment of 08/06/2006–75529/01 Sürmeli/Germany.
71 Peukert, in: Frowein/Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [Euro-
pean Human Rights Convention]. EMRK commentary, 3. edition, Art. 35,
p. 505, Rdn. 25.
72 Legal matter N° ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08- Hadijatou Mani Koraou v. Republic of
Niger of 27 October 2008, clause 53.
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« Peuvent saisir la Cour: […] toute personne victime des violations de
droits de l’homme».
“Access to the Court is open to the following: […] individuals on ap-
plication for relief for violation of their human rights”.
Art. 34 ECHR:
« La Cour peut être saisie d’une requête par toute personne physique,
toute organisation non gouvernementale ou tout groupe de particu-
liers qui se prétend victime d’une violation par l’une des Hautes Par-
ties contractantes des droits reconnus dans la Convention ou ses proto-
coles. Les Hautes Parties contractantes s’engagent à n’entraver par au-
cune mesure l’exercice efficace de ce droit. »
“The Court may receive applications from any person, nongovernmen-
tal organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a
violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth
in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High Contract- ing
Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this
right”.
The essential difference between both systems (ECtHR and ECOWAS
Court of Justice) consists of the capacity to sue . Not only natural persons
have the capacity to sue before the ECtHR according to Art. 34 ECHR, but
also associations of persons and non-governmental organisations.73 This
regulation expressly specifies the persons who are entitled to appeal as indi-
viduals.In contrast, the wording of Art. 10 d of Additional Protocol A/
SP.1/01/05 limits the capacity to sue and be sued for human rights com-
plaints directly before the ECOWAS Court of Justice to every person. The
question must be posed, whether every “Person” also includes groups of
persons. Limiting it to natural persons would not be justified as the
African Charta guarantees human rights that can also establish claims for
legal persons and political parties. Therefore, Art. 10 d of Additional Pro-
tocol A/SP.1/01/05 requires further specification through case law. Indeed,
the Court of Justice will need to address the objection of the opposing par-
ty in the legal matter CDP vs Burkina Faso, regarding the capacity to sue
73 Meyer-Ladewig, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [European Human
Rights Convention]. Hand commentary, 2. edition, Art. 34, Rn. 7f; Frowein, in:
Frowein/Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [European Human
Rights Convention]. ECHR commen- tary, 3. edition, Art. 34, Rn. 12 f.
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and be sued by the political party before the Court of Justice.74 The gov-
ernment regards the complaint by the political party (CDP) as inadmissi-
ble and states:
« Au titre de l’irrecevabilité du recours, l’Etat du Burkina Faso estime
que le droit en cause, qui est la participation à la gestion des affaires
publiques, est un droit individuel et subjectif et non un droit collectif.
Devrait alors être déclarée irrecevable au moins la partie de la re quête
présentée par des partis politiques ».75
The Court of Justice did, however, not follow this opinion by the govern-
ment. In essence, it explained:
« La Cour doit d’abord rappeler qu’elle n’est pas saisie que par des par-
tis politiques, elle l’est également par des citoyens. Mais même si elle
n’était saisie que par des associations de type politique, la Cour estime
que rien ne l’empêcherait d’en connaitre, pour la raison qu’une res-
triction d’un tel droit peut parfaitement léser une formation politique,
structure dont la voca- tion consiste justement à solliciter le suffrage
des citoyens et à participer à la gestion des af- faires publiques. Non
seulement les textes qui régissent la Cour n’excluent pas que celle-ci
puisse être saisie par des personnes morales, à la condition qu’elles soient
cependant vic- times ».76
From this clause, fundamental requirements regarding the party to pro-
ceedings before the ECOWAS Court of Justice can be derived. Every per-
son may directly approach the Court of Justice . They must allege that the
human and civil rights guaranteed in the African Charta have been violat-
ed. “Directly" in this sense means that the person concerned must person-
ally be affected.
Through this requirement, the Court of Justice can prevent a collective
action. Besides the right to complain of natural persons, such a right also
exists for legal persons. In particular because of the specific nature of politi-
74 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Congrès pour la démocratie et le Progrès (CDP) & Autres c.
Etat Bur- kina Faso, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/16/15 (13/07/2015), par. 31, available at:
www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on 16/07/2015).
75 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Congrès pour la démocratie et le Progrès (CDP) & Autres c.
Etat Bur- kina Faso, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/16/15 (13/07/2015), par. 11, available at:
www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on 16/07/2015).
76 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Congrès pour la démocratie et le Progrès (CDP) & Autres c.
Etat Bur- kina Faso, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/16/15 (13/07/2015), par. 20, available at:
www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on 16/07/2015). emphasis by the author.
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cal rights, natural as well as legal persons can complain. It is therefore suf-
ficient that the individual plaintiff claims that the infringement of the par-
ty’s rights will likely lead to a measure that will affect him personally.77 It
can be further derived from this judgment that the ECOWAS Court of Jus-
tice would now declare individual complaints by associations of persons
but not state organisations as entitled to appeal. This is because asso-
ciations of persons especially include political parties. Therefore, the Court
of Justice clearly states that nothing opposes the admissibility of an appeal
of an individual complaint by a political party. At any rate, the respective
association of persons must claim to be impaired in their own rights by an
action or omission of the signatory state.
Object of the complaint (breach of primary duty, compare Art. 1
ECHR)
A reason for exclusion must first be mentioned. In Art. 10. d. ii of Addi-
tional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 a complaint is inadmissible if the legal dis-
pute is already the object of proceedings before other international courts.
The reference to “other international competent courts” is legally relevant
because the individual complaint may be declared inadmissible if an inter-
national court has already decided on the matter. It would be a different
constellation if the same individual complaint was the object of a lis-
tispendens at another international court. Otherwise, the complaint is ad-
missible without further requirements. The consequences of this are as fol-
lows:
– The reprimanded violation may be an action of the executive power;
– or the complaint may be based on the action of the judiciary in a
broader sense;
– The individual complaint may reprimand the judicial act.
In conclusion, complaints are admissible if the violation is caused by the
actions of sovereign organs. This means that all actions in violation of hu-
man rights by state powers are appealable before the Court of Law. This, in
turn, means that the courts decisions in violation of human rights can rep-
resent the object of anindividual complaint in terms of Art. 10. d. ii i. V.
m. Art. 9 paragr. 4 of Additional Protocol regarding the Court of Law. It is
irrelevant, whether the court, whose decision is reprimanded, is a Consti-
2.
77 Meyer-Ladewig, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [European Human
Rights Convention]. Hand commentary, 2. edition, Art. 34, Rn. 11a.
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tutional Court or a specialised court. Moreover, an individual complaint
can be directed at legislative acts as well as administrative measures in
terms of this regulation.
The proceedings before the ECOWAS Court of Justice consider other le-
gal questions and is not to be regarded as an extension of the national pro-
ceedings.78 Should the Court of Justice not have competence to assess a fi-
nal judgment by Constitutional Courts of Member States, this would have
been included as an impediment to an appeal in the admissibility require-
ments under Art. 10 d ii. of the Additional Protocol. As long as the signa-
tory states did not provide for this obstacle to proceedings, it can be as-
sumed that the Court of Justice has the competence to review final deci-
sions by Constitutional Courts. It is questionable, which consequences are
drawn from this authority to review. In other words: Which decisions can
the Court of Justice make when it declares a complaint against a final judg-
ment by Constitutional Courts of Member States as admissible?
Types of Judgments by the ECOWAS Court of Justice
An overview of the extent of the binding effect requires a demonstration of
the different types of decisions by the ECOWAS Court of Justice. This pri-
marily means that the decisions that concern only the organisation of the
Court of Law79 will not be analysed in this section. Rather, the decision on
merits by the Court of Law regarding the binding effect is mainly taken
into account. The decision on merits by the ECOWAS Court of Justice
generally includes the declaratory judgment (I) and the sentence regarding
compensation in terms of remuneration (II). There is also a special form of
decision by the Court of Law regarding the interpretation of its declaratory
judgment: the interpretative judgment (III). According to case law, it is
certain that the decisions of the Court of Law do not have an effect of cas-
sation. This aspect must therefore be addressed (IV). According to the cur-
rent legal situation, the possibility of an appeal decision already exists,
which should be expanded on de lege ferenda (V).
D.
78 Sall, La Justice de l’intégration, 322.
79 .That internal judicial decision concerns, in principle, the election of the Presi-
dent of the Court of Justice, the composition of the Court of Law and the power
to establish the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.
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Declaratory Judgment
Within the framework of its judicial power, the Court of Justice must ren-
der a judgment after receiving an admissible individual complaint. The na-
ture of the judgment is not expressly regulated in the text of the Conven-
tion. According to the preamble of the Additional Protocol the Court of
Justice has the task to ensure that the signatory states fulfill their obliga-
tions. Moreover,the extension of competence of the Court of Justice re-
garding human rights aims at controlling sovereign actions by the Mem-
ber States in accordance with the accepted human rights. As the previous
practice by the Court of Justice shows, it will render a declaratory judg-
ment in the case of an individual complaint. The declaratory judgment can
be defined as a judgment which possesses a declaratory content. When sub-
mitting an individual complaint, the plaintiff desires the declaration of a
violation of human rights. Therefore, the Court of Justice must render a
declaratory judgment. This means that the plaintiff asks the Court of Jus-
tice to give a legally binding statement regarding a violation of his guaran-
teed human rights by a signatory state. The legal action by the plaintiff
can, in this respect, be called a declaratory legal action against the respon-
dent Member State. Whether the plaintiff seeks an annulment of the act of
law causing the violation is unclear at this point. The declaratory judgment
is not generally enforceable. The judgment can therefore not be enforced
because it is in the prerogative of the sentenced Member State to choose
the remedies by which the violation will be removed.
The big difference between the declaratory judgment and the design
judgment is that, in the case of a declaratory judgment, the decision by the
Court of Justice only indirectly influences the rectification of the national
judgment which violates human rights. The design judgment would en-
able the Court of Justice to directly annul the action in violation of human
rights. Whether the Court of Law has this authority will be addressed at a
later stage. However, all of this is irrelevant for the sentenced Member
State because sentenced state is bound by the declaratory judgment by the
Court of Justice in any case. It carries the obligation under international
law to implement the decision by the Court of Justice.
Judgment granting Reparation (Compensation)
Before a decision can become res judicata, a court must be approached.
The court must, in turn, justify its decision based on legal principles.
I.
II.
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Therefore, the legal standards of the declaratory judgment will be demon-
strated first (1). Subsequently, the enforcement procedure of the judgment
regarding the compensation will be addressed (2).
Standards of a Judgment granting Reparation
The judgment granting satisfaction in a broader sense is based on a law
suit aimed at receiving future satisfaction together with the sentencing of
the respondent (to do, omit or tolerate something).80 In this context, such
a law suit, if successful, will lead to a corresponding judgment granting sat-
isfaction. Here, the judgment granting satisfaction can be understood in its
own terms. This involves a demand of the Court of Law, in the tenor of
the judgment, of payment of a sum of money to the individual plaintiffs.81
After an individual complaint has been granted, the Court of Law may, in-
deed, sentence the respondent to pay justified damages alongside the decla-
ration of an infringement.82 When calculating the damages as a sum of
money to be paid to the plaintiff, the Court of Law bases its decision on
equity. This is due to the fact that neither the protocol regarding the Court
of Law nor the rules of procedure include an established basis to calculate
the incurred damage. It cannot be determined from the Amendment
Agreement nor the Additional Protocol which legal basis the Court of Jus-
tice must apply regarding the question of compensation. This is because,
according to Art. 9.4, the Court of Justice decides on human rights viola-
tions. It is, however, not mentioned whether the Court of Law may order
compensations based on violations of human rights. Therefore, the general
principles of international law regarding monetary compensation follow-
ing a violation of international law must be used. Indeed, the Court of Jus-
tice may apply the principles based on international law as per Art. 38 of
the IGH statute.83 In practice, the Court of Justice’s application of the ubi
jus ibi remedium principle can be ascertained, because in almost all deci-
1.
80 Creifelds, Rechtswörterbuch, 19. edition, 741.
81 Cohen-Jonathan, Quelques considérations sur la réparation accordée aux victimes
d’une violation de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, in: Les
Droits de l’Homme au seuil du troisième millénaire. Mélanges en hommage à
Pierre Lambert, 109 (116).
82 Arangio-Ruiz, Second Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc.A/CN.4/425
(09.06.1989),
§ 137.
83 Art. 19. Abs. 1 des Protocol (A/P1/7/91) über den Court of Law von 1991.
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sions in which the Court of Justice determined a violation of human
rights, it simultaneously ordered compensation in the form of a monetary
sum in favour of the plaintiff.84 This is consequential because, in any case,
the violation of the convention represents a conditio sine qua non of the
damages. As such, the compensation requires a certain causal link.85 It is
therefore surprising why the Court of Justice , in some cases, also grants
compensation regarding the contravention of the African Charta. In any
case, a contravention of the African Charta itself represents the basis of a
claim for compensation for immaterial damages, at least in a symbolic
amount.86
Subsequently, the declaratory judgment and the decision regarding the
compensation usually go hand in hand with the judgment on merits. It is
established that the determination of the compensation is at the reasonable
discretion of the Court of Justice in respect of the special circumstances in
each respective case. A sufficient satisfaction is thus granted to the plaintiff.
In every trial based on an individual complaint, material as well as immate-
rial damages which were caused by a violation of human rights are consid-
ered.
The requirements regarding the costs of the proceedings are stipulated
in Art. 66 to Art. 71 in the rules of procedure of the Court of Justice. A
refund of incurred expenses during the complaints procedure is granted to
the successful plaintiff according to Art. 66 paragr. 2. It is questionable
whether, when calculating the incurred expenses during the procedure,
the Court of Justice also considers the expenses incurred before national
instances. This should be conceivable87 because these expenses would not
84 CJ CEDEAO, Koraou c. Republique du Niger, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08
(27/10/2010), available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on 24/07/2015);
CC CEDEAO, Manneh c. Répu- blique de la Gambie, Arrêt, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/
3/08 (05/06/2008), available at: www.courteco -  was.org (last accessed on
16/07/2015); CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. Etat du Togo, N
°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11 (07/10/2011), available at: www.courtecowas.org (last ac-
cessed on 16/07/2015).
85 Dannemann, Schadensersatz bei Verletzung der Europäischen Menschenrecht-
skonvention [Compensation in Case of a Violation of the European Convention
on Human Rights], 115.
86 Dannemann, Schadensersatz bei Verletzung der Europäischen Menschenrecht-
skonvention [Compensation in Case of a Violation of the European Convention
on Human Rights], 362.
87 Peukert, in: Frowein/Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights]. ECHR commentary, 3. edition, Art. 41,
Rn. 4.
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have been incurred had it not been for the violation of human rights. Be-
cause of this, the inclusion of the incurred expenses during the procedure
in the end calculation would be consequential.
Enforcement Procedure
Now the question must be asked of how the final decision of the Court of
Law is enforced. At the same time, the question of the execution of the de-
cisions by the ECOWAS Court arises. There are two regulations in this re-
spect. The rules regarding the judgments of the Court of Justice which im-
pose a payment obligation on the sentenced Member State are stipulated
in Art. 24 of the Protocol (A/SP.1/01/05) in conjunction with Art. 15 of
the Amendment Agreement. In Art. 24 of the Protocol (A/SP.1/01/05) it
states:
« Les arrêts de la Cour qui comportent à la charge des personnes ou
des Etats, une obligation pécuniaire, constituent un titre exécutoire.
L’exécution forcée, qui sera soumise par le Gref- fier du Tribunal de
l’Etat membre concerné, est régie par les règles de procédure civile en
vigueur dans ledit Etat membre. La formule exécutoire est apposée,
sans autre contrôle que celui de la vérification de l’authenticité du
titre, par l’autorité nationale que le Gouvernement de chacun des Etats
membres désignera à cet effet. Les Etats membres désigneront l’autori-
té nationale compétente pour recevoir ou exécuter la décision de la
Cour et notifieront cette désignation à la Cour. L’exécution forcée ne
peut être suspendue qu’en vertu d’une décision de la Cour de Justice
de la Communauté».
“Judgments of the Court that have financial implications for nationals
of Member States are binding. Execution of any decision of the Court
shall be in the form of a writ of execution, which shall be submitted by
the Registrar of the Court to the relevant Member State for exe- cution
according to rules of civil procedure of that Member State. Upon the
verification by appointed authority of the recipient Member State that
the writ is from the Court, the writ shall be enforced. All Member
States shall determine the competent national authority for the pur-
pose of receipt and processing of execution and notify the Court ac-
cordingly. The writ of execution issued by the Community Court may
be suspended only by a decision of the Com- munity Court of Justice.”
2.
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Five important consequences can be deduced from this regulation:
– First of all, the judgment by the Court of Justice is per se an enforce-
ment instrument according to paragraph 1 of this regulation (section 1).
– The enforcement is carried out according to the enforcement rule of
the sued state (section 2).
– The sued state may not give a separate writ of execution, before the set-
tlement verdict can be executed at national level (section 3).
– It is the responsibility of the Member State to decide which national in-
stance of execution should monitor the implementation of the pay-
ment obligations (section 4).
– All measures regarding the potential suspension of the enforcement
procedure are directly decided on and are possibly ordered by the
ECOWAS Court of Justice itself.Art. 24 of the Protocol (A/SP.1/01/05)
can be compared with Art. 244 EG (today Art. 267 TFEU) in many re-
spects. On the one hand, both regulations enable international law to
have a direct effect on the legal order in the Member States. The direct
national enforceability of the obligation to pay confirms the direct legal
effect of the final decision by the ECOWAS Court of Justice. In Art. 24
of the Protocol (A/ SP.1/01/05), the Member States have regulated the
priority of judgments ordering payment by the Court of Justice under
international law. By granting the direct national enforceability of the
judgments ordering payment, the plaintiff has an enforceable claim un-
der international law 88which must be implemented according to the
Protocol at national level.
Now the question arises of who should guarantee the implementation of
the judgment. It is regrettable that no specific organ in the Community is
responsible for following up on the implementation of the judgments and
for informing the Court of Justice on how the sentenced state attends to its
obligations as per the judgment. Only a general responsibility of all Mem-
ber States and institutions of the Member State, regarding the implementa-
tion of the judgments by the Court of Justice can be deduced from Art. 22
paragr. 3 of the Protocol (A/P1/7/91). According to Art. 22 paragr. 3:
« Les Etats membres et les Institutions de la Communauté sont tenus
de prendre sans délai toutes les mesures nécessaires de nature à assurer
les décisions de la Cour ».
88 Vgl. Rohleder, Grundrechtsschutz im europäischen Mehrebenen-System, 156.
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“Member States and Institutions of the Community shall take immedi-
ately all necessary measures to ensure execution of the decision of the
Court”.
From this, a collective responsibility regarding the monitoring of the judg-
ments by the Court of Justice is established. Unfortunately, a regulation,
such as Art. 46 paragr. 2 ECHR does not exist. With regard to judgments
that grant a just compensation to the plaintiff, it is the responsibility of the
plaintiff himself to inform the institutions of the Community that the sen-
tenced state did not meet its payment obligation. Moreover, it is hard to
imagine, how the Court of Justice should ensure that individual measures
arising from its judgments are implemented. Here, a loophole in the exe-
cution procedure regarding the judgments by the Court of Justice can be
found which can lead to a delay of the actual implementation of final deci-
sions. Furthermore, it must be noted that the signatory states have no
choice regarding the implementation of the obligation of payment. They
must take measures to enable the enforcement of the claim of compensa-
tion under international law. The signatory states want to prevent manoeu-
vers which delay implementation (manæuvre dilatoire) by a sentence Mem-
ber State. The regulation is to be welcomed insofar as it may occur that a
possible reference regarding national law, with respect to the enforceabili-
ty of the judgment, would delay the implementation of the obligation of
payment. In this context, one can only recall the opinion of the Gambian
government in the Manneh case. In this case, the government tried, with
reference to national law, to delay their obligation of payment. However,
it is regrettable that there is no monitoring body, such as the Committee
of Ministers in the ECtHR protection system, within the Community
which regularly informs the Court of Law on the execution of the imple-
mentation because the plaintiff is equal to the sued Member State before
the ECOWAS Court of Justice during the complaint proceedings. How-
ever, the situation changes after the sentencing of the state. After the
declaratory judgment, the plaintiff stands alone against the sentenced state
and its enforcement organs, whereby the international attention in nation-
al law is not nearly as much as it is in cases before the ECOWAS Court of
Justice. This can lead to a delayed implementation of the judgment. In or-
der to improve the mechanisms of implementation of the judgments by
the Court of Justice, the establishment of a monitoring body or transfer of
such monitoring roles to already existing organs is desirable.
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Interpretative Judgments
Art. 23 of the Protocol (A/P1/7/91) prescribes a procedure of interpreting a
judgment. It is questionable, whether the interpretative judgment may af-
fect the irrevocability of a decision. In other words: May the Court of Jus-
tice change its own decision on application by the parties to the dispute
without the presentation of new facts?
The interpretation of a judgment has two fundamental requirements.
Firstly, the application for interpretation of the judgment is open to every
party to the dispute and the institutions of the Community. A particular
interest in legal protection is required. Regarding the effect of this proce-
dure, it should be pointed out that the admissibility of the application
does not suspend the already rendered judgment in the main proceedings.
Therefore, the interpretative proceedings do not represent an obstacle to
its enforcement.
Not a Court of Cassation
The question posed here is whether the ECOWAS Court of Justice avails of
a possible direct cassatory decision-making authority. In other words: it is
questionable whether the Court of Law, like the Federal Constitutional
Court of Germany, may set aside the unconstitutional decisions of spe-
cialised courts within the framework of a constitutional complaint (§ 95
section 2 and 3 BVerfGG) or declare parliamentary acts null and void.89
The cassatory authority of a court resembles the possibility for the Court of
Justice to directly set aside decisions made by courts of prior instances. In
the legal matter Ameganvi et. al. vs. Togo, the ECOWAS Court of Justice
stated:
« la Cour estime que la demande de réintégration s’apparente à un re-
cours contre la Décision n° E018/10 du 22 novembre 2010 de la Cour
Constitutionnelle de la République Togolaise qui est une juridiction
nationale d’un Etat Membre, juridiction pour laquelle la Cour, suivant
sa jurisprudence constante, n’est ni une juridiction d’appel, ni de cassa-
III.
IV.
89 Mückl, Kooperation oder Konfrontation? – Das Verhältnis zwischen Bundesver-
fassungsge- richt und europäischem Court of Law für Menschenrechte, in: Der
Staat 44 (2005), 403 (414) [Cooperation or Confrontation? – The Relationship be-
tween the Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Law for Hu-
man Rights, in: The State 44 (2005), 403 (414)].
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tion et dont la décision par conséquent ne peut être révoquée par
elle ».90
This reasoning is partially correct as the Court of Justice does not avail of a
cassatory authority for two reasons. Firstly, the signatory states did not pro-
vide for this possibility when they expanded the decision-making authority
although all international courts generally move within the framework
provided for by the state parties. Secondly, a cassatory authority touches on
the principle of observance of the sovereignty of the state. However, in
contrast to satellites which only move within their orbit, international
courts can move out of their orbit if it serves the concretisation of their
tasks. This occurs by way of appropriate interpretation of international
law. After an appropriate interpretation the Court of Justice must be re-
garded as a indirect cassatory court because the Court of Justice does not
have the authority to set aside court decisions by Member States that are in
violation of human rights and to refer the matter back to another national
court. The same goal is however reached by the obligation of the sentenced
state to comply.
There is in fact no breach of state sovereignty when a Member State
Constitutional Court in a legal dispute negates a human rights violation,
as in the present case of the Togolese parliamentarians, and the ECOWAS
Court of Justice affirms this in the same matter. There are reasons that jus-
tify the different legal opinions by both courts. These reasons are of a pro-
cedural and substantive nature. Regarding the procedural reason the object
of the dispute, the cause of action and the claim differ at national, constitu-
tional-procedural and at regional level. Moreover, the parties to the dispute
are not always the same depending on the type of procedure. The ECJ has
confirmed this point of view with the following words:
« Il y a lieu de considérer cependant que la reconnaissance du principe
de la responsabilité de l’État du fait de la décision d’une juridiction sta-
tuant en dernier ressort n’a pas en soi pour conséquence de remettre
en cause l’autorité de la chose définitivement jugée d’une telle déci-
sion. Une procédure visant à engager la responsabilité de l’État n’a pas
le même objet et n’implique pas nécessairement les mêmes parties que
la procédure ayant donné lieu à la dé- cision ayant acquis l’autorité de
la chose définitivement jugée. En effet, le requérant dans une action en
responsabilité contre l’État obtient, en cas de succès, la condamnation
90 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Mme Isabelle Ameganvi et al. c. l’Etat Togolais, Arrêt N°
ECW/CCJ/ JUG/06/12, du 13 mars 2012.
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de celui-ci à réparer le dommage subi, mais pas nécessairement la re-
mise en cause de l’autorité de la chose définitivement jugée de la déci-
sion juridictionnelle ayant causé le dommage. En tout état de cause, le
principe de la responsabilité de l’État inhérent à l’ordre juridique com-
munautaire exige une telle réparation, mais non la révision de la déci-
sion juridictionnelle ayant causé le dommage ».91
The statement by the ECJ is completely correct regarding the formal legal
force because the decision by the ECOWAS Court of Justice does not de-
mand the reversal of the decision by the court giving rise to the damage.92
The formal legal force of the national court therefore remains un-
touched.93 Regarding the substantive reason, the applicable law at national
level is the national constitutional law and at regional level (ECOWAS),
the international law. The ECOWAS Court of Justice therefore monitors
the adherence to the African Charta and the principles of international law
(Art. 38 of the Amendment Agreement). The plaintiffs in fact desire the
compliance to national constitutional law and the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed in the constitution by the respective state organ before the
Constitutional Court. The applicants or plaintiffs additionally desire the
declaration of a violation by the signatory state at international level
through the ECOWAS Court of Justice.
This preliminary remark means that both instances decide according to
different standards and apply relatively different legal regulations. In this
regard, it is not surprising if a regional Court of Justice, established by the
Member States in order to monitor the Charta, reaches a wholly different
conclusion than the national Constitutional Court of a Member State.
It is the task of the international court to close possible loopholes that
may arise when national courts misinterpret and incorrectly apply the hu-
man rights found in the national constitutional order. In this respect, in-
ternational law has a different function compared to national law of the
signatory states.94 The task of the ECOWAS Court of Justice to close such
91 CJUE, N°C-224/01, Arrêt (20/09/2003), Affaire Köbler v. Republik Österreich
[Republic of Austria], par. 39.
92 Breuer, Staatshaftung für judikatives Unrecht [State liability in case of judicial in-
justice], 400.
93 Breuer, Staatshaftung für judikatives Unrecht [State liability in case of judicial in-
justice], 401.
94 Kamto, Charte africaine, instruments internationaux de protection des droits de
lʼhomme, Constitutions nationales: Articulation respectives, in: Flauss/Lambert-
Abdelgawad (Publ.), L’application nationale de la Charte africaine des droits de
l’homme et des peuples, 11 (31).
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loopholes can be justified by an interpretation of the African Charta ac-
cording to international law (further explanations regarding this point in
“Justification of the Derogation of the Legal Force“ in chapter 4). The
Court of Justice rightly decided in its decision of 22 November 2010 re-
garding the case of Togo that the Togolese Constitutional Court did not
adhere to the standards of Art. 7 in the Charta and Art. 10 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
This occurs based on the national and law-shaping effects of declaratory
judgments by the Court of Justice. In conclusion, the ECOWAS Court of
Justice is not a court of cassation. As a result, its declaratory judgment does
not invalidate the formal legal force of national judgments. The decision
of how the declaratory judgment should be implemented without derogat-
ing from the legal force remains with the sentenced Member State. How-
ever, its verdict has a cassatory effect on national level resulting from inter-
national responsibility of the sentenced state
Appeal proceedings (de lege ferenda)
Art. 25 paragr. 1 of the Protocol (A/P1/7/91) states:
« La demande en révision d’une décision n’est ouverte devant la Cour
que lorsqu’elle est fon- dée sur la découverte d’un fait de nature à exer-
cer une influence décisive et qui, au moment du prononcé de la déci-
sion, était inconnu de la Cour et du demandeur, à condition toutefois
qu’une telle ignorance ne soit pas le fait d’une négligence».
“An application for revision for a decision may be made only when it
is based upon the dis- covery of some fact of such a nature as to be a
decision factor, which fact was, when the de- cision was given, un-
known to the Court and also to the party claiming revision, provided
always that such ignorance was not due to negligence”.
Furthermore, the application to resume must contain prescribed reference
points. For example, Art. 93 paragr. 2 of the rules of procedure of the
Court of Justice stipulates that the application to resume must meet the
following requirements:
« La demande doit en outre:
a) spécifier l’arrêt attaqué;
b) indiquer les points sur lesquels la demande est basée;
V.
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c) indiquer les moyens de preuve tendant à démontrer qu’il existe des
faits justifiant la révision et à établir que le délai prévu à l’article
précédent a été respecté;
d) indiquer les moyens de preuve tendant à démontrer qu’il existe des
faits justifiant la ré vision et à établir que le délai prévu à l’article
précédent a été respecté».
“In addition such application shall:
a) specify the judgment consteded;
b) indicate the points on which the judgment is contested;
c) set out the fact on which the application is based;
d) indicate the nature of evidence to show that there are facts justify-
ing revision of the judgment, and that the time limit laid down in
Art. 92 has been observed”.
The judgment actually develops legal force in a formal and substantive re-
gard after official notification of the ruling. However, if a decisive fact is
discovered in hindsight which was neither known to the Court of Justice
nor to the parties to the dispute an application to resume may be submit-
ted to the Court of Justice. The conditions for the resumption of the pro-
ceedings are provided in Art. 25 paragr. 1 of the Protocol (A/P1/7/91) and
Art. 93 paragr. 2 of the rules of procedure of the Court of Justice . Thus,
the application to resume is admissible if it is submitted within a period of
three months after gaining knowledge of the facts that were not taken into
account by the Court of Justice during its decision-making process.
Regarding the procedure, one must differentiate between the decision
regarding the admissibility of the application and the substantive decision
of appeal. In the admissibility phase, the Court of Justice must first deter-
mine whether the application to resume is, indeed, introducing new
points that were not taken into account in the decision following the main
proceedings (Art. 25 paragr. 2. of Protocol A/P1/7/91). If the application is
admissible a special meeting of the Court of Justice ensues during which it
decides on the points that are still open after hearing the parties to the dis-
pute in a private session. The admissibility of the review application does
not postpone the execution of the main decision according to Art. 27 Pro-
tocol (A/SP.1/01.05) (alter Art. 25 of Protocol A/P1/7/91) and Art. 94 of
the rules of procedure of the Court of Law.
The resumption contemplated so far only refers to facts that were not
taken into account in the decision by the Court of Law (Art. 25 paragr. 2.
of Protocol A/P1/7/91). However, the regulation in Art. 25 paragr. 2. of
the Protocol (A/P1/7/91) does not provide for a possibility to resume based
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on gross injustice by the ECOWAS Court of Justice. This legal situation
may in future jeopardise the system for the protection of human rights be-
cause, unlike in the ECtHR system there are no legal remedies against the
declaratory judgment by the ECOWAS Court of Justice available to the
plaintiff. Moreover, there is no commission, according to the current pro-
visions of the Court of Justice, which would be responsible for reviewing
the decision in the first instance. It is recommended to provide a possibili-
ty de lege ferenda for the resumption of the proceedings due to gross proce-
dural errors. This, however, should be limited to especially difficult and ex-
ceptional cases. The possibility should serve to remove gross procedural in-
justice in the declaratory decision. Furthermore, the possibility to resume
the proceedings should be admissible if the legal matter concerns a serious
question with respect to the interpretation or application of the Charta.
The system of the ECtHR already offers some criteria according to Art. 43
in conjunction with Art. 44 ECHR.
The modification of a final decision is not unknown in the legal system
of the Member States.§ 133 section 1 of the Constitution of Ghana allows
for this possibility. Thus, Art. 54 of the Rules of Procedure of the Supreme
Court in Ghana defines the reason for a resumption more precisely as fol-
lows:
“The Court may review any decision made or given by it on the fol-
lowing grounds –
(a) exceptional circumstances which have resulted in miscarriage of
justice;
(b) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after
the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant’s
knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the
decision was given.”95
As impermeable as the final decision by the Court of Justice may be, it is
quite imaginable to make provision for an appeal mechanism before the
ECOWAS Court of Justice. This would be an instrument which the Court
of Justice as well as the parties to the dispute can take advantage of in order
to allow for a subsequent correction of gross procedural injustice. The
ECOWAS Court of Justice is not only a human rights court.96 Especially
for this reason review procedures should be provided for. With the possi-
95 Ghana’s Supreme Court Rules, 1996 (C. I 16), Art. 54.
96 Extensive presentation regarding the original jurisdictions of the Court of Law
can be found in the introduction of the present paper.
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bility of a resumption of the proceedings due to gross procedural errors the
basic problem of judicial injustice97 will also be removed at the level of in-
ternational law. Like national legal systems, the regional legal order should
also consider the possibility of resuming proceedings in case of judicial in-
justice. The proposition is based on the assumption that international
courts also represent bearers of sovereign power. They therefore exercise a
sovereign power of jurisdiction. Logically, the injustices caused by their ac-
tions should be removed by recourse to legal action.98
Moreover, it is advisable to establish a chamber, similar to the one at the
ECtHR, which has the competence to adjudicate on a complaint against a
judgment of the first formation of the Court of justice, if it is determined
that legally significant questions which are of crucial importance for the
entire legal system arise in a dispute. The establishment of such a chamber
logically requires judges with sufficient knowledge in human rights litiga-
tion. Judgments made by this chamber should be seen as guiding judg-
ments for the entire legal order. They should, therefore, be considered to
be leading or pilot decisions (see also the section regarding leading deci-
sions or pilot decisions). Therefore, the material prerequisites with respect
to monitoring should be strictly regulated in the Grand Chamber. The re-
newed assessment is granted by the Grand Chamber if the legal matter
causes a serious question of interpretation or application of the African
Charta or the respective Protocols or a serious question of general signifi-
cance.99 It is also recommended that in legal matters including questions
of general significance the ECOWAS Court of Justice should be composed
differently with regard to the number of judges. Indeed, the number of
judges at the ECtHR regarding the composition of the Grand Chamber is
increased to 17 judges According to Art. 24 paragr. 1 of the Rules of Proce-
dure of the ECtHR.
Legal Force According to Art. 15 of the Amendment Agreement
Upfront, one question must be asked: Why should the interpretation of
Art. 15 paragr. 4 of the amendment agreement be presented in a separate
E.
97 Breuer, Staatshaftung für judikatives Unrecht [State liability in case of judicial in-
justice], 1.
98 Breuer, Staatshaftung für judikatives Unrecht [State liability in case of judicial in-
justice], 3.
99 Schaffrin, in: Karpenstein/Mayer, ECHR-commentary, 2. edition, Art. 44, Rn. 6.
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section? This can be justified on the grounds that interpretation belongs to
the most difficult tasks of a judge at international law level. Especially be-
cause of the sovereignty of the signatory states the will of the state parties
must always be determined.100 Furthermore, the question of res judicata as
the decisive element regarding the finality of a judgment. Consequently,
research of the interpretation in terms of Art. 15 paragr. 4 of the Amend-
ment Agreement is required because the aim of the interpretation is to es-
tablish the true intention of the signatory states with regard to every term
that is used.101
Regarding the interpretation of Art. 15 of the Amendment Agreement,
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (in the following referred
to as VCLT) is quoted. One must note the rules of interpretation in Art. 31
and 32 of the VCLT in the interpretation of international treaties. Regard-
ing the point in time, there is a prohibition of retroactivity according to
Art. 4 VCLT. In this context, the VCLT applies in ECOWAS Community
instruments because the ECOWAS Founding Treaty of 1975 represents a
concluded agreement under international law, after the VCLT. Moreover,
the ECOWAS Amendment Agreement of 1993 falls within the material
scope of application of the VCLT since it represents an intergovernmental
agreement (Art. 1 VCLT). It is questionable whether all ECOWAS Mem-
ber States ratified the VCLT. This question remains unimportant for the
prohibition of non-retroactivity in Art. 4, because the rules stipulated in
Art. 31 and 32 embody the general rules under customary international
law. Therefore, both regulations regarding the interpretation of the
ECOWAS-judicial instruments are applicable under customary interna-
tional law.
After this preliminary observation, we will now examine the meaning of
Art. 15 paragr. 4 of the Amendment Agreement regarding the require-
ments as per Art. 31 and 32 VCLT. This is because in the legal matter
Ameganvi vs the Republic of Togo102 the question arose whether and to
what extent the signatory states are bound by the declaratory judgment of
the ECOWAS Court of Justice. The signatory states made no respective
changes with regard to the binding effect of the decision by the Court of
100 McNair, The Law of Treaties, 364, 366.
101 De Visscher, Problèmes d’interprétation des judicaires en Droit International
Public, 50; McNair, The Law of Treaties, 366.
102 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Isabelle Ameganvi v. Republique Togo, N
°ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/12 (13/03/2012), available at: www.courtecowas.org (last
accessed on 20/04/2015).
Chapter 3 Supranational Derogation of the Legal Force in Municipal Law
146
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748901808, am 26.10.2021, 13:00:44
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
justice in the reform of 2005 which enabled the access to the Court
through direct individual complaints. Hence, the interpretation of Art. 15.
paragr. 4 of the Amendment Agreement of 1993 must be referred to. In
the following, the rule of interpretation in Art. 31 and 32 VCLT will be
discussed.
Rule of Interpretation of Art. 31 VCLT
The rules of interpretation regarding an agreement under international
law are laid out in Art. 31 VCLT. According to this, a convention should
first be interpreted according to its usual wording (1). Should there still be
uncertainties after this step, a systematic (2), historical (3) and teleological
(4) interpretation of the agreement come alternatively into effect. Insofar
as the international law is perceived as non-static law, an effective ap-
proach to interpreting the convention is needed. The agreement should
thus be interpreted in an evolutionary and dynamic manner (5).
Literal Interpretation
The interpretation of Art. 15 of the Amendment Agreement should first
be done according to the wording. The first general rule of interpretation
of Art. 31 VCLT is the literal interpretation. In this respect, Art. 31 para-
gr. 1 stipulates:
« Un traité doit être interprété de bonne foi suivant le sens ordinaire à
attribuer aux termes du traité dans leur contexte ».
“A treaty shall be interpreted in good fair in accordance with the ordi-
nary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context
and in the light of its object and purpose”.
The fundamental rule of interpretation is mainly the adherence to the re-
quirement of good faith (pacta sunt servanda) which concerns a moral obli-
gation of the parties to the agreement.103 Moreover, the literal interpreta-
tion of the wording of the agreement under international law has the func-
tion to maintain the rule of law by protecting the true will of the signatory
I.
1.
103 De Visscher, Problèmes d’interprétation des judicaires en Droit International
Public, 50.
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states. However, it must be pointed out that the VCLT has opted for the
objective interpretation of agreements under international law.104 Literal
interpretation means: the interpretation of the original text of the agree-
ment. In order to better understand the meaning of binding force, it is rec-
ommended to quote the original text of Art. 15 paragr. 4 of the Amend-
ment Agreement. The original version in French of Art. 15 paragr. 4 of the
Amendment Agreement read as follows:
« Les arrêts de la Cour de Justice ont force obligatoire à l’égard des
Etats Membres, des Institutions de la Communauté, et des personnes
physiques et morales. »
In the original English version:
“Judgments of the Court of Justice shall be binding on the Member
States, the Institutions of the Community and on individual and cor-
porate bodies”.
The meaning of the text seems to immediately be comprehensible. It says
that the decisions of the Court of Law are legally binding to the Member
States, the institutions of the Member States and to natural and legal per-
sons. However, legal regulations are often not as easy to comprehend as
they seem at first. A peculiar example can be seen in the first judgment by
the ECOWAS Court of Justice in 2004.105
Thereby, the Court of justice focused extensively on the word “peut“ or
“may“, which is to be found in Art. 9 paragr. 3 of Protocol A/P1/7/91
(06/07/1991).106 As McNair discussed, it can happen that the word “Mut-
ter“ for the purpose of a testator has a completely different meaning than
the meaning a judge would attribute to it according to habitual linguistic
usage.107 Therefore, all possible interpretations regarding the binding
forces provided in this provision, must be analysed, because after closer in-
spection of this regulation, only a paraphrase of the binding effect can be
104 Bleckmann, Völkerrecht [International Law], Rn. 367.
105 CCJ ECOWAS, Afolabi v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, Judgment N°
ECW/CCJ/ JUD/01/04/04 (27/04/2004), in: Community Court of Justice,
ECOWAS, Law Report (2004–2009), 1 ff.
106 CCJ ECOWAS, Afolabi v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, Judgment N°
ECW/CCJ/ JUD/01/04/04 (27/04/2004), par. 18, in: Community Court of Jus-
tice, ECOWAS, Law Report (2004–2009), 1 ff.
107 McNair, The Law of Treaties, 367.
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determined.108 However, this regulation does not inform on which con-
crete consequences follow from a declaratory judgment for the sentenced
Member State. What is to be understood needs to be interpreted and ex-
plained by those applying the law.
On closer inspection of the provision, one may assume that the signato-
ry states wish to establish an abstract and general regulation regarding the
legal effect for this provision. When stated in such general terms, it must
then be further clarified by the judges of the Court of justice. The process
of specifying such abstract-general norms in turn requires constant creativi-
ty by those applying the law.109 The advantage in this case is that the judge
receives further scope for interpretation.110 When determining the mean-
ing of this provision, one can assume that an obligation is created follow-
ing a judgment by the Court of justice for the Member States and the Insti-
tutions of the Community as well as natural and legal persons to adhere to
the final decision by the Court of justice. It is questionable, whether a posi-
tive obligation can be deduced from the provision because, as already men-
tioned, one can see at first glance that the addressees of the decision are
subject to a negative obligation to comply.
Furthermore, many questions with respect to Art. 15 paragr. 4 of the
Amendment Agreement remain unanswered. E.g. the question whether
the signatory states not participating in the individual complaints’ proce-
dure should also be bound by the declaratory judgment. Unlike Art. 32
paragr. 3 of the SADC-Tribunal Protocol, the provision in Art. 15 paragr.
4 of the ECOWAS Amendment Agreement does not give any information
regarding who exactly and to which extent is bound by the legal decision
of the ECOWAS Court of Justice. There is a certain danger that the limita-
tion to the wording could lead to completely different results than origi-
nally intended and that are undesirable for the parties (compared to
Art. 31 paragr. 2 VCLT).111 Since an interpretation of the wording cannot
help us here any further, it must also be referred to the other rules of inter-
pretation according to Art. 31 VCLT because, despite the top position of
108 Heckötter, Die Bedeutung der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention und
der Rechtspre- chung des EGMR für die deutschen Gerichte [The importance of
the European Convention for Human Rights and the jurisdiction of the ECtHR
for the German courts], 45.
109 Cremer, Entscheidung und Entscheidungswirkung [Decision and the Effect of
the Decision], in: Grote/Marauhn, ECHR/GG, consociational commentary,
chapter 4, Rn. 118.
110 Bleckmann, Völkerrecht [International Law], Rn. 370.
111 McNair, The Law of Treaties, 367.
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the literal interpretation in Art. 31 paragr. 1, it should not be deduced that
this method of interpretation (literal) is superordinate compared to other
rules of interpretation.112 Quite the opposite: the equality of the rules stip-
ulated in Art. 31 VCLT is expressed in the heading of this article. This
point of view was confirmed by the International Law Commission when
it did not provide a hierarchy between the rules of interpretation. The
commission rather stated:
« En mettant le titre de l’article (règle générale d’interprétation) au sin-
gulier, et en soulignant la relation, d’une part, entre les paragraphes 1
et 2 et, d’autre part, entre le paragraphe 3 et les deux paragraphes qui
le précèdent, la Commission a voulu indiquer que l’application des
moyens d’interprétation prévus dans l’article constituait une seule opé-
ration complexe. »113
Therefore, the other methods of interpretation will be discussed in the fol-
lowing sections.
Systematic Interpretation
In the term “systematic interpretation“ the word “system” is of decisive im-
portance. Therefore, the basis that every rule of law represents a system is
addressed. According to the rule of interpretation stipulated in Art. 31
paragr. 2 VCLT, there is inter alia the reference to a systematic interpreta-
tion in the following words:
« Aux fins de l’interprétation d’un traité, le contexte comprend, outre
le texte, préambule et annexes inclus:
a) Tout accord ayant rapport au traité et qui est intervenu entre toutes
les parties à l’occa- sion de la conclusion du traité;
b) Tout instrument établi par une ou plusieurs parties à l’occasion de
la conclusion du trai- té et accepté par les autres parties en tant
qu’instrument ayant rapport au traité ».
2.
112 Ipsen, Völkerrecht [International law], 6. edition, § 12, Rn. 12.
113 Annuaire de la Commission du Droit international (1966), Volume II, 245; and
also De Visscher, Problèmes d’interprétation des judicaires en Droit Internatio-
nal Public, 51.
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This fundamental rule of systematic interpretation has been confirmed by
the International Court of Justice in its well-known opinion regarding the
case of Namibia:
« De plus, tout instrument international doit être interprété et appli-
qué dans le cadre de l’ensemble du système juridique en vigueur au
moment où l’interprétation a lieu».114
The ECOWAS Amendment Agreement of 24 July 1993 and the associated
Additional Protocol form a system.115 When interpreting individual regu-
lations, the interpreter should not lose sight of the entire system. The indi-
vidual term must rather be interpreted in conjunction with the entire text
of the evolved system. In graphical terms: The entire rule of law is like a
chain. Every single norm represents a link in this closed chain. As soon as
one of the links in this chain fails, the entire system collapses. It is there-
fore recommended to carefully interpret the meaning of each individual
norm.
It follows from the aforementioned that the interpretation of an agree-
ment under international law requires the adherence to the principle of
unity and to avoid contradictions.116 The regulations in the entire legal sys-
tem are coordinated in such a way that the meaning of one of the regula-
tions can only be recognised by taking the meaning of the others into con-
sideration. More specifically, the judges of the ECOWAS Court of Justice
must pay attention that contradictions between Art. 15 paragr. 4 of the
Amendment Agreement and the legal consequences desired in Art. 9.4 (in
conjunction with Art. 10 d) of Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05
(19/01/2005) are avoided when interpreting: This is the purpose of the sys-
tematic interpretation. One must differentiate in this respect between logi-
cal contradictions and discrepancies in the assessment.117 Logical contra-
dictions occur whenever certain behaviour is allowed by norm A in the ju-
risdiction and is prohibited by norm B in the same jurisdiction. Discrepan-
cies in the assessment, however, concern the question of a different assess-
ment of the legal consequences of norm A and those of norm B. Therefore,
114 Conséquences Juridiques pour les Etats de la présence continue de l’Afrique du
Sud en Na- mibie nonobstant la Résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de Sécurité,
Avis Consultatif, CIJ, Recueil des Arrêts (1971), 16 (35), par. 53.
115 Ebobrah, A critical Analysis of the human rights mandate of the ECOWAS
Community Court of Justice, 12, available at: http://docs.escr-net.org/usr_doc/S
_Ebobrah.pdf (letzter Zu- griff am 16.05.2015).
116 Bleckmann, Völkerrecht, Rn. 354.
117 Bleckmann, Völkerrecht, Rn. 354.
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those applying the law must always take care to assess the legal conse-
quences of different norms in the same way.118 All this requires the inter-
preter to sufficiently acknowledge the inner connection between the indi-
vidual legal principles of the rule of law.
Historical Interpretation
It should be pointed out that there is no mention of human rights in the
original founding agreement of 1975. The original goals of the Communi-
ty were of a commercial nature. Especially for this reason, the Court of jus-
tice was in 1991 intended to settle disputes of a commercial nature. Only
in the Amendment Agreement of 1993 did the signatory states decide that
they had to employ the adherence to human rights as a fundamental pre-
requisite in order to reach their economic goals. This is taken into account
in the preamble of the Amendment Agreement.119 Despite this reference,
there was no possibility to submit individual complaints before the
ECOWAS Court of Justice. Only after the complaint of Afolabi vs Nigeria
was declared admissible in 2004 120 did the signatory states decide to
amend the Protocol of 1991 of the Court of justice by introducing the Pro-
tocol of 2005. The Court of Law should include this development as a ba-
sis for the historical interpretation of the agreement.121
However, it must be stated that the interpretative task regarding the hu-
man rights disputes is not all that easy. The difficulties are such that the
Court of justice had been originally established to settle disputes of an eco-
nomic nature. Therefore, the personal as well as factual areas of responsi-
bility of the Court of justice were only meant to settle disputes of an eco-
nomic nature and only for the signatory states (Art. 9 of Protocol A/P.I/
7/91). The rules of procedure were issued with this in mind in 2002. When
the signatory states decided to confer a human rights competence to the
3.
118 Bleckmann, Völkerrecht, Rn. 354.
119 Clause 4 of the preamble of the Amendment Agreement (of 24/07/1993 in
Cotonou).
120 Afolabi v. Nigeria, Case N°ECW/CCJ/APP/01/03 (27/04/2004), in: Community
Court of Jus- tice, ECOWAS, Law Report (2004–2009), 1 ff.
121 Ebobrah, A critical Analysis of the human rights mandate of the ECOWAS
Community Court of Justice, 13, available at: http://docs.escr-net.org/usr_doc/S
_Ebobrah.pdf (last accessed on 16/05/2015).
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Court with the Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05122, they did not suffi-
ciently consider all legal consequences. There is in particular the question
of obligations on the side of the signatory states after a declaratory judg-
ment by the Court of justice with regards to a human rights violation. Nei-
ther the Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 (2005) nor the rules of proce-
dure of the Court of justice (2002) define the scope of the decision-making
competence of the Court and subsequently the obligation of the signatory
parties. Therefore, the historical interpretation is especially important. It
must be referred to the historical events in the region – such as described
in the introduction of the present study.
In 2001, with the Protocol on Good Governance, human rights and the
adherence to the rule of law finally take centre stage in the legal order of
the Community and were set as a benchmark for the assessment by the sig-
natory states of their will to integrate. As a central actor regarding the en-
forcement of human rights as stipulated in the Charta, the role of the
Court of justice is very much in demand. The historical background of this
development must therefore be paid more attention when interpreting a
norm. Step by step, the Court should steer the actions of the signatory
states according to this interpretation technique because the West African
states have given the Court of justice the responsibility to decide in human
rights disputes, in order to accompany the process of democratisation in
the region by a court.123 The ECOWAS Court of Justice rightly referred to
the historical context in the legal matter Afolabi vs Nigeria124 as an inter-
pretation aid by stating:
“The court is to collect from the nature of subject, from the words and
from the context of the protocol, the true intent of the contracting par-
ties, when the provisions of a statute are apt and clear.”125
With the reference to “context of the protocol” the historical aspect of the
interpretation is referred to in this passage of the judgment. Granting the
ECOWAS Court of Justice with the competence to adjudicate in human
122 Protocole Additionnel A/SP.1/01/05 (19/01/2005) Portant Amendement du Pro-
tocole (A/P.1/7/91) Relatif à la Cour de Justice de la Communauté.
123 Alter/Helfer/McAllister, A new international human right court for West Africa:
the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, in: The American Journal of Inter-
national Law (2013), 737 (777).
124 Afolabi v. Nigeria, case N°ECW/CCJ/APP/01/03 (27/04/2004), in: Community
Court of Jus- tice, ECOWAS, Law Report (2004–2009), 1 ff.
125 Afolabi v. Nigeria, case N°ECW/CCJ/APP/01/03 (27/04/2004), par. 52, in: Com-
munity Court of Justice, ECOWAS, Law Report (2004–2009), 1 ff.
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rights disputes is in fact based on a deficit of legal protection at national
and continental level. Indeed, it can be determined that, despite the estab-
lishment of constitutional courts since the third wave of democratisation,
there has been no tangible development in the human rights situation in
the signatory states. At continental level, the individual complaint before
the African Court for Human Rights remains conditional.126 It follows
from these historical events that the regional courts of justice on the conti-
nent fulfill a particular task with regards to the protection of human
rights.127
All this speaks for a constructive interpretation of the enabling provision
of the ECOWAS Court of Justice, in order to reach the goal set out in Ad-
ditional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 (19/01/2005).
Teleological Interpretation
Every agreement represents an answer to a certain problem.128 Teleological
interpretation means that every term of the agreement must be interpreted
with regards to its object and purpose. Regarding the teleological interpre-
tation, the question arises of how Art. 15 paragr. 4 of the Amendment
Agreement is to be interpreted in order to take account of the object and
purpose of Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 (19/01/2005). According to Art. 31 para-
gr. 1 VCLT, object and purpose of the agreement has a special meaning
besides the wording of the agreement:
« Un traité doit être interprété de bonne foi suivant […] et à la lumière
de son objet et de son but ».
In order to determine object and purpose of the agreement the operative
text of the agreement, the preamble as well possible addenda are available.
Therefore, it must be stated that the teleological interpretation only refers
to the written norm and follows the objective approach of interpreting a
contract.129 This view is correct because the purpose alone gives informa-
4.
126 Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa, 2nd éd, 487.
127 Ebobrah, Litigating Human Rights before Sub-Regional Court in Africa:
Prospects and challenges, in: African Journal of International and Comparative
Law (2009) 17, 79 (86).
128 Bleckmann, Völkerrecht [International Law], Rn. 362; Cross/Bell, Statutory In-
terpretation, 22.
129 Ipsen, Völkerrecht [International Law], 6. edition, § 12, Rn. 15.
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tion regarding the more specific meaning which can be assigned to every
term or article in the agreement.130
It is regrettable in this regard that the ECOWAS Court of Justice orient-
ed itself according to the rules of interpretation of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice
in the key reasoning of the decision.131 According to a study carried out by
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice regarding the decisions of the International Court
of Justice, there are five rule of interpretation:
“I. Actuality (or textual interpretation);
II.Natural or Ordinary Meaning;
III.Integration (or interpretation of the treaty as whole);
IV.Effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat);
a. Subsequent Practice; Contemporaneity (interpretation of texts and
terms in the light of their normal meaning at the date of the conclu-
sion)”.132
However, there were problems with this rule of interpretation during the
preparatory work at the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. In-
deed, the International Legal Commission highlighted the fact that, due to
the divergence at the forum, these rules by Sir Fitzmaurice could not be
codified.133133 Voices in literature as well as the practice of international
courts show that the rules of interpretation as stipulated in Art. 31 VCLT
have reached a character of customary international law. According to Mc-
Nair, the parties to disputes may advocate different opinions regarding the
rule of interpretation. One of the parties might demand a liberal interpre-
tation while the other party might demand a more restrictive interpreta-
tion.134 In order to avoid such disputes, it is necessary to orient oneself to
the rules of interpretation in Art. 31 VCLT as these rules have an undisput-
ed statute under international customary law.
It is therefore regrettable that the ECOWAS Court of Justice limits the
question of legal force and its competence solely to Art. 15 paragr. 4 of the
Amendment Agreement. The Amendment Agreement only contains gen-
eral rules and principles. These rules were concretised by the subsequent
protocols to the Amendment Agreement. The subsequent protocols de-
130 De Visscher, Problèmes d’interprétation des judicaires en Droit International
Public, 62.
131 CCJ ECOWAS, Afolabi v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, Judgment N°
ECW/CCJ/ JUD/01/04/04 (27/04/2004), par. 35.
132 McNair, The Law of Treaties, 364; Sall, La Justice de l’intégration, 276.
133 Annuaire de la Commission du Droit international (1966), Volume II, 244.
134 McNair, The Law of Treaties, 365.
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scribe the competence of the Court of justice clearer and more extensively
than the Amendment Agreement.135 The teleological interpretation aims
to give the agreement an effective impact.
Principle of effectiveness and evolutive/dynamic interpretation
With regards to the interpretation of an agreement under international
law, Art. 31 paragr. 3.c VCLT also refers to generally accepted principles
in international law. Indeed, Art. 31 paragr. 3.c VCLT stipulates:
« Il sera tenu compte, en même temps que du contexte: […] c) De
toute règle pertinente de droit international applicable dans les rela-
tions entre les parties ».
“There shall be taken into account, together with the context […] c)
any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations be-
tween the parties”.
By interpreting according to object and purpose, other principles of inter-
pretation have taken shape at an international law level and have become
general rules of interpretation.136 In this regard, the principles of effectivity
and dynamic interpretation as in Art. 15 paragr. 4 of the Amendment
Agreement (1993) must be taken into consideration. With reference to the
Principle of Effectivity, the ECtHR insists that the rights guaranteed by the
Convention are not illusory and theoretical, but that it is the object and
purpose of the convention to protect rights that are practical and effect-
ive.137
The judgment by the ECOWAS Court of Justice develops a binding ef-
fect towards the Member States according to Art. 15 Abs. 4 of the Amend-
ment Agreement. In the case of an individual complaint procedure, an in-
ter-parte binding effect can be deduced from this. This means that the sen-
5.
135 Sall, La Justice de l’intégration, 282.
136 Ipsen, Völkerrecht [International Law], 6. edition, § 12, Rn. 16.
137 Frowein, in: Frowein/Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [Euro-
pean Human Rights Convention]. EMRK commentary, 3. edition, introduc-
tion, Rn. 8; Meyer-Ladewig, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention[European
Human Rights Convention], hand commentary, 2. edition, Note, Rn. 36; Alter/
Helfer/McAllister, A new international human right court for West Africa: the
ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, in: The American Journal of Interna-
tional Law (2013), 737 (750).
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tenced state and the plaintiff must acknowledge the final judgment. As al-
ready explained,138 the participating parties to the procedure are bound by
the formal legal force of the declaratory judgment. Here, the question
must be asked what is included in the binding effect for the sentenced
state as well as what should be understood regarding the scope of the bind-
ing effect provided for in Art. 15 of the Amendment Agreement. Thus, an
interpretation of the legal force regulation, which takes the principle of ef-
fectivity into account, is needed. According to the effective interpretation
requirement under international law, an agreement under international
law is to be interpreted in such a way that the goal as well as the purpose of
regulation is reached as best as possible. This includes that the intended ef-
ficiency is achieved139. The intention of the signatory states can be deduced
from the special meaning they attribute to a term. To this effect, Art. 31
paragr. 4 VCLT states:
« Un terme sera entendu dans un sens particulier s’il est établi que telle
était l’intention des parties. »
“special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the
parties so intended”
Moreover, the principle of „necessary implication“ should be considered
during interpretation because with the adoption of an Additional Protocol
and the concomitant admissibility of individual human rights complaints
before the Court of justice, all Member States must reckon with the fact
that the legal effect must go over and above what the signatory states had
originally intended. Subsequently, one should also anticipate an extended
authority of the Court of justice . With the adoption of Protocol A/
SP.1/01/05 of 2005 the necessary implications for the interpretation of
Art. 15 of the Amendment Agreement are to be included.140 This means
that in order to explore the meaning of thisregulation, it should not be re-
ferred only to this regulation but to all contractual agreements between
the parties to the agreement, which are referred to at the time of the inter-
pretation and which best serve the desired purpose of the regulation. Sub-
sequent changes of the legal opinion regarding the legal system are to be
considered by way of evolutionary interpretation.
138 See also the section regarding formal legal force (s. p. 38).
139 Ipsen, Völkerrecht [International Law], 6. edition, § 12, Rn. 16.
140 Ipsen, Völkerrecht [International Law], 6. edition, § 12, Rn. 16.
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Moreover, it must be noted that the dispute between “dynamic interpre-
tation” and “evolutionary interpretation” will not be discussed. The reason
being that a Court of justice does not have the authority to modify the
content of the norm. The interpreter, i.e. the judge, rather takes changes in
societal opinions into account through evolutionary interpretation of the
norm.141 Therefore, the term “evolutionary interpretation” is preferable.
The question concerning evolutionary interpretation is whether the origi-
nal understanding of the term under international law is to be taken into
account or whether one should rather orient oneself more closely to the
changed legal opinion of the signatory states.142 In Art. 31 paragr. 3 the
time factor in the rule of interpretation has already been discussed:
« Il sera tenu compte, en même temps que du contexte:
a) De tout accord ultérieur intervenu entre les parties au sujet de l’in-
terprétation du traitéou de l’application de ses dispositions;
b) De toute pratique ultérieurement suivie dans l’application du traité
par laquelle est établi l’accord des parties à l’égard de l’interpréta-
tion du traité ».
“There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the inter-
pretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which es-
tablishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation
In order to fully understand the contemporary meaning of Art. 15 paragr.
4, the internal context of the Amendment Agreement together with Proto-
col A/SP.1/01.05 of 2005 must be consulted. The reference to this Protocol
is significant for the interpretation of the binding effect because the regu-
lation in Art. 15 paragr. 4 was provided for at a point in time when indi-
vidual complaints were not admissible before the Court of justice . Fur-
thermore, many regulations in Protocol A/P1/7/91 of 1991 were amended
by the Protocol A/ SP.1/01.05 of 2005. However, the content of Art. 15
141 Matscher, Die Methoden der Auslegung der EMRK in der Rechtsprechung ihrer
Organe, in: Schwind (Publ.), Aktuelle Fragen zum Europarecht aus der Sicht in-
und ausländischer Gelehrter, 102 (108). [The methods of interpretation by the
ECHR in the jurisdiction of its organs,..., Current questions regarding the Euro-
pean law from the viewpoint of domestic and foreign scholars.].
142 Wildhaber, De l’évolution des idées sur les missions de la Cour Européenne des
Droits de l’Homme, in: Promoting Justice, Human Rights and Conflict Resolu-
tion through International Law (2007), 639 (645).
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paragr. 4 of the Amendment Agreement has remained untouched. This
status quo represents an inevitable source of conflict because the binding
effect of a decision regarding an individual complaint is not necessarily the
same as in a decision by the states regarding a complaint. It must be noted
that the Member States have not ignored a limitation of the binding effect
in a personal respect when working on Protocol (A/ P1/7/91) in 1991. A
limitation of the legal effect on the parties and on the object of dispute was
not entirely unknown to the Member States at this point in time. Quite
the opposite, they made express provision for this regarding the review
procedure according to Art. 27 paragr. 5 A/SP.1/01.05 (old Art. 25 para-
gr. 5 of Protocol A/P1/7/91). Even according to the current status of the
development in international law regarding human rights disputes within
the rule of law of the Community, many questions remain unanswered
with regard to the interpretation of Art. 15 paragr. 4 of the Amendment
Agreement. The question is therefore whether all Member States are con-
cerned bound by the legal force of a declaratory judgment finding a viola-
tion of human rights between a signatory state and an individual plaintiff.
This is a question of the subjective and objective limits of the legal effect
(this aspect is extensively discussed in chapter 2). The subjective limit con-
cerns the parties to the dispute and the objective limit concerns the scope
of the legal effect over and above the case that was decided on. This is the
question of the cross-case legal force. The legal question that the individual
plaintiff raises in a human rights dispute is the question of his personal sit-
uation in regards to the respondent (the concerned Member State). There-
fore, the legal effect concerns both parties to the procedure. However, the
answer by the Court of justice regarding the raised legal question has an
effect over and above the case, which must be taken into account in the
entire legal order in the Community.143
Moreover, the rules of procedure of the ECOWAS Court of Justice were
determined in 2002. Despite the fact that Protocol A/SP.1/01.05 of 2005
approved the admissibility of the individual complaint three years later,
the rules of procedure (2002) of the Court of justice has not been amend-
ed. There is no answer to the question of why there is no respective regu-
lation neither in Art. 15 paragr. 4 of the Amendment Agreement (1993)
nor in the Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01.05 (2005). Therefore, the applica-
tion of evolutionary interpretation is very helpful in this respect. As the In-
ternational Court of justice said in its statement regarding the case of
143 Klein, Should the binding effect of the judgments of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights be extended?, in: Mahoney/Matscher/Petzold/Wildhaber, 705 (706).
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Namibia, regulations in agreements under international law and the devel-
opment of legal opinions play an important role in the interpretation of
the terminology. The IGH stated in this regard:
« [L]a Cour doit prendre en considération les transformations surve-
nues dans le demi-siècle qui a suivi et son interprétation ne peut man-
quer de tenir compte de l’évolution que le droit a ultérieurement connue
grâce à la Charte des Nations Unies et à la coutume ».144
The temporal element in interpretation has been acknowledged for a long
time by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) as a rule of interpretation.
Following the evolutionary interpretation invented by the ICJ, these regu-
lations concerning agreements under international law are to be interpret-
ed together with the international law in force at the time of the interpre-
tation and their respective understanding.145 Therefore, the time factor
plays an important role regarding the scope of the binding effect of Art. 15
paragr. 4, regarding individual complaints. In the legal matter of Costa Ri-
ca vs Nicaragua, the ICJ has confirmed its case law regarding the interpre-
tation with the following words:
« Cela ne signifie pas qu’il ne faille jamais tenir compte du sens que
possède un terme au moment où le traité doit être interprété en vue
d’être appliqué, lorsque ce sens n’est plus le même que celui qu’il pos-
sédait à la date de la conclusion. D’une part, la prise en compte de la
pratique ultérieure des parties, au sens de l’article 31 3-b) de la conven-
tion de Vienne, peut conduire à s’écarter de l’intention originaire sur
la base d’un accord tacite entre les parties. D’autre part, il existe des cas
où l’intention des parties au moment même de la conclusion du traité
a été, ou peut être présumée avoir été, de conférer aux termes employés
– ou à certains d’entre eux – un sens ou un contenu évolutif et non pas
intangible, pour tenir compte notam- ment de l’évolution du droit in-
ternational. En pareil cas, c’est précisément pour se conformer à la
commune intention des parties lors de la conclusion du traité, et non
pas pour s’en écarter, qu’il conviendra de tenir compte du sens que les
144 Conséquences Juridiques pour les Etats de la présence continue de l’Afrique du
Sud en Namibie nonobstant la Résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de Sécurité,
Avis Consultatif, CIJ, Recu- eil des Arrêts (1971), 16 (35), par. 53 (emphasis by
the Author).
145 Ipsen, Völkerrecht, 6. edition, § 12, Rn. 21.
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termes en question ont pu acquérir à chacun des moments où l’appli-
cation du traité doit avoir lieu ».146
The difficulty in interpreting Art. 15 paragr. 4 of the Amendment Agree-
ment is that the ECOWAS Court of Justice itself combines the compe-
tences of the ECJ and ECtHR. Has the extent of an obligation arising from
a judgment been extended through the admissibility of individual com-
plaints before the Court of justice ? Through the adoption of both compe-
tences, the signatory states could have adjusted the limitation of the regula-
tions regarding legal force. Unfortunately, this was not the case. Due to a
lack of adjustment of contractual regulations regarding the weight of the
legal force on the decision by municipal courts in general and constitu-
tional courts of Member States in particular, one must rely on the specifi-
cation by the judges. The interpretation of the regulations of the Amend-
ment Agreement of 1993 in general and Art. 15 paragr. 4 Amendment
Agreement in particular should be made according to the basic rules of
evolutionaryinterpretation by the International Court of Justice .147 Such a
regulation should not be interpreted statically but must be interpreted in
an evolutionary manner. Thus, the following practice between states plays
an important role. As a result, the original intention of the signatory states
is of secondary importance.148 What the signatory states will express in fu-
ture rather corresponds with their contemporary intent. Thus, the Amend-
ment Agreement and its respective normative regulations should be under-
stood as a “living instrument”.149
Future behaviour of the signatory states serves as an interpretation aid
within the framework of the rules of interpretation as per Art. 31 VCLT. It
should be mentioned in this context that the requirement to respect hu-
man rights has, step by step, taken on new dimensions. The ECOWAS rule
of law for example expresses their supremacy through the guidelines in the
Protocol of Good Governance. This prohibits any reform of the constitu-
tional order or reform of the electoral law six months before elections.
146 CIJ, differend relatif à des droits de navigations et des droits connexes, Costa Ri-
ca c. Nica ragua, Recueil des Arrêts (13.08.2009), par. 64.
147 Conséquences Juridiques pour les Etats de la présence continue de l’Afrique du
Sud en Namibie nonobstant la Résolution 276 (1970) du Conseil de Sécurité,
Avis Consultatif, CIJ, Recu- eil des Arrêts (1971), 16 (35), par. 53.
148 Payandeh, Internationales Gemeinschaftsrecht [International Community Law],
322.
149 Payandeh, Internationales Gemeinschaftsrecht [International Community Law],
322.
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This temporal development of the requirement of the respect for the rule
of law and human rights should be considered when interpreting any legal
regulation regarding the individual complaint and its consequences.
Effects of Legal Force of other Regional Human Rights Courts
Other regional organisations, such as the East African Community, SADC
and CEMAC, exist on the African continent. Regarding a legal comparison
of the human rights jurisdiction, only those of the East African Court of
justice and the SADC Tribunal are to be examined. Therefore, the legal
force of the East African Court of justice will be discussed upfront (1). Sub-
sequently, the SADC Tribunal will be introduced in this regard (2). Be-
yond the African continent, the ECtHR (3) and the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights (4) represent interesting objects for comparison.
East African Court of Justice
The start of the effort regarding a regional organisation in East Africa can
be dated to the period after the signatory states received independence. At
first, three states participated in the project of a mutual regional market. In
1967, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda founded an economic community by
the name of EAC (East African Community).150 This project crumbled in
the year 1977 due to political differences and allegations of mutual inter-
ference between the concerned signatory states. Officially, the failure of
the Community was due to a lack of political will by the signatory
states.151 In 1999 there was a revival of the efforts to establish an economic
community. Subsequently, the agreement for the creation of the EAC was
signed on 30 November 1999. At first only the states of Tanzania, Uganda
and Kenya were again parties to the agreement. It came into force on 7 Ju-
ly 2000. Burundi and Ruanda are also among the members of the EAC
II.
1.
150 Also see § 3 of the preamble of the founding treaty (Treaty for the establishment
of the East African Community, as amended on 14th December, 2006 and 20th
August, 2007).
151 As in paragraph 4 of the preamble of the founding treaty (Treaty for the estab-
lishment of the East African Community, as amended on 14th December, 2006
and 20th August, 2007).
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since 1 July 2007 and South Sudan recently (March 2016) became party to
the agreement according to Art. 3 of the founding treaty.
The organs of the Community are listed in Article 9 of the founding
treaty. Among these organs of the Community is the East African Court of
Law (East African Court of Justice). It is responsible for the interpretation
and application and for monitoring the implementation of the guidelines
in the founding treaty (Art. 23 of the founding treaty). The organisation,
competence of the Court of justice as well as the obligations of the signato-
ry states regarding the decisions of the Court of justice will be briefly ad-
dressed in the following.
Regarding the organisation of the Court of justice , it consists of two
chambers.
In this respect, Art. 23 paragr. 2 of the founding treaty stipulates:
“The Court shall consist of a First Instance Division and an Appellate
Division. 2. The First Instance Division shall have jurisdiction to hear
and determine, at first instance, subject to a right of appeal to the Ap-
pellate Division under Art. 35 A, any matter before the Court in ac
cordance with the Treaty”.
This regulation is supplemented by Art. 24 paragr. 2 of the founding
treaty. Thereby, the first chamber (First Instance Division) consists of ten
judges. In contrast, the second chamber (Appellate Division) consists of no
more than five judges. The heads of state elect the president and the vice-
president of the Court of justice from the second chamber (Appellate Div-
ision).
It must be mentioned at this point that the appointment of the mem-
bers of the Court of justice and the president and the vice-president of the
Court of justice in particular could lead to an impairment of the indepen-
dence of the Court of Law. As experience within the West African Com-
munity (ECOWAS) has already shown, the appointment of the judges by
the heads of state may lead to an impairment of the independence of the
ECOWAS Court of Justice. Therefore, an independent institution was es-
tablished with the purpose of selecting judges of the ECOWAS Court of
Justice (see above).
Regarding the authority of the Court of justice, the Court has a consul-
tative as well as a contentious jurisdiction. In its contentious jurisdiction,
the factual and the personal areas of competence of the Court of justice are
regulated contractually. Regarding the factual and the personal compe-
tence of the Court of justice it has the competence to interpret the found-
ing treaty. Moreover, the factual area of competence of the Court of Law
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also includes the monitoring of the application of the founding treaty (Art.
27 paragr. 1 of the founding treaty). Interestingly, it was established that
the Court of Law would, in future, receive other competences including,
among others, the human rights competence (Art. 27 paragr. 2 of the
founding treaty). Concerning the personal competence, the signatory
states may approach the Court of Law by way of an infringement proce-
dure (Art. 28 paragr. 1 of the founding treaty). Similarly, Art. 29 of the
founding treaty stipulates that the general secretary may approach the
Court of Law on the grounds of a breach of contract by a Member State.
Furthermore, complaints by natural and legal persons are admissible be-
fore the Court of Law. Moreover, Art. 30 paragr. 1 of the founding treaty
stipulates:
“1. Subject to the provisions of Article 27 of this Treaty, any person
who is resident in a Part ner State may refer for determination by the
Court, the legality of any Act, regulation, direc tive, decision or action
of a Partner State or an institution of the Community on the grounds
that such Act, regulation, directive, decision or action is unlawful or is
an infringement of the provision of this Treaty”.
On closer inspection of this regulation, it is clear that no particular prereq-
uisite regarding citizenship of the authorized persons is required. Conse-
quently, every natural person and not only citizens of the respondent sig-
natory state, has the capacity to sue . Thus, expatriates or stateless persons
are also authorised to bring a claim before the East African Court of Law.
The only prerequisite is the lawful residence in one of the Member States
of the Community.
Moreover, Art. 34 of the founding treaty provides that a preliminary
procedure based on the model of Art. 267 TFEU. According to 34 of the
founding treaty, national courts are authorised to submit to the Court of
Law, in a concrete legal dispute, a legal question regarding the interpreta-
tion or application of the instruments of the Community if they deem this
to be necessary. This possibility is to be welcomed as it prevents diverging
interpretations and applications of the founding treaty depending on a
particular signatory state.
A certain problem with interpretation can be seein in paragraph 3 of
Art. 30 of the founding treaty. This regulation grants the Court of Law a
negative competence. Art. 30 paragr. 3 of the founding treaty reads verba-
tim as follows:
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„The Court shall have no jurisdiction under this Article where an Act,
regulation, directive, decision or action has been reserved under this
Treaty to an institution of a Partner State”.
The question of which concrete matter is referred to the national instance
could arise. Disputes may occur due to the fact that a signatory state, ac-
cording to its interpretation of the founding treaty, claims the competence
regarding the matter that may at the same time fall in the area of compe-
tence of the Court of Law. Regarding its consultative competence, every
contracting party can, according to Art. 28 paragr. 2 of the founding
treaty, approach the Court of Law if there are doubts whether their actions
infringed an act of the Community. Furthermore, the other organs of the
Community, such as the Conference of the Heads of States, seek the advice
of the Court of Law regarding legal questions with regard to the founding
treaty (Art. 36 of the founding treaty).
Regarding the obligations of the signatory states with respect to the
judgments of the Court of Law, two regulations should be pointed out.
The founding treaty stipulates a general obligation to comply in Art. 38
paragr. 3:
„A Partner State or the Council shall take, without delay, the measures
required to implement a judgment of the Court”.
This general obligation to comply refers to an obligation to omit as well as
an obligation to act. However, a special regulation is provided for regard-
ing the obligation to perform. Art. 44 of the founding treaty stipulates in
this context that the implementation of an order to pay a sum of money
should be executed according to the regulations of the respective Member
State. Art. 44 of the founding treaty (EAC) can be compared to Art. 24 of
Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 (ECOWAS). However, in Art. 44 of the
founding treaty (EAC)the reference of whether it is also to be applied re-
garding the signatory states’ obligation to pay is missing. The regulation
only mentions a “pecuniary obligation on a person”. It may be deduced by
means of interpretation that the general obligation to comply in Art. 38
paragr. 3 of the founding treaty (EAC) regarding the signatory states also
applies to the obligation to pay. This is different from Art. 24 of Addi-
tional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 (ECOWAS) in conjunction with Art. 15 of
the Amendment Agreement (ECOWAS), where the signatory states are ex-
plicitly named with regard to the general obligation to comply as well as
for the special obligation to pay in both regulations.
In the following, the human rights competence will be discussed in
more detail. Indeed, the East African Court of Law clearly does not avail of
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a human rights competence. From a substantive legal point of view, how-
ever, the African Charta on Human and Peoples’ Rights is to be applied.152
According to Art. 27 paragr. 2 of the founding treaty (EAC):
“The Court shall have such other original, appellate, human rights and
other jurisdiction as will be determined by the Council at a suitable
subsequent date. To this end, the Partner States shall conclude a proto-
col to operationalise the extended jurisdiction.”
However, the preparatory work for the drafting of a Protocol has not yet
been concluded. Regarding the question whether the East African Court of
Law avails of a human rights competence, the following has been phrased
in the legal matter Katabazi:
“Does this Court have jurisdiction to deal with human rights issues?
The quick answer is: No it does not have.”153
Nonetheless, the Court of Law elaborated on its arguments:
“[T]hen Article 6 sets out the fundamental principles of the Communi-
ty which governs the achievement of the objectives of the Community,
of course as provided in Article 5 (1)”.154
In the end, the EACJ deduced its competence from the purpose of Art. 6, 5
and 27 of the founding treaty. This purposeful method of interpretation re-
garding the justification of the individual jurisdiction is welcomed by
some authors.155 The EACJ’s assumption is based on the principle of Pacta
Sunt Servanda because the interpretation by the Court of Law is part of the
founding treaty of the East African Community.156
152 Ebobrah, Litigating Human Rights before Sub-Regional Court in Africa:
Prospects and challenges, in: African Journal of International and Comparative
Law (2009) 79 (88); Viljoen, In- ternational Human Rights Law in Africa, 2nd
éd., 491 and 494.
153 Katabazi and other v. Secretary General of the East African Community and the
Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda, Reference No.1 of 2007 (1st
November 2007), 14, available at: www.eacj.org (last accessed on 08/04/2015).
154 Katabazi and other v. Secretary General of the East African Community and the
Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda, Reference No.1 of 2007 (1st
November 2007), 15, available at: www.eacj.org (last accessed on 08/04/2015).
155 Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa, 2nd éd., 490.
156 Kamanga, ‘Fast-Tracking’ East African Integration and Treaty Law: Pacta Sunt
Servanda,
Betrayed?, in: Journal of African and International Law (2010), 697 (697).
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SADC Tribunal
SADC represents the development community in Southern Africa (South-
ern African Development Community). The first corner stones of a region-
al organisation in Southern Africa were established in July 1979 in Arusha
(Tanzania). However, we can only speak about a regional community in its
actual sense after the adoption of the founding treaty in 1992. This treaty
has been amended several times. The last amendment of the founding
treaty took place in 2009 in Kinshasa (Democratic Republic of Congo).
With the joining of the Democratic Republic of Congo (28/02/2004) and
the Republic of Madagascar (21/02/2006), there are currently fifteen signa-
tory states in the region.
One of the permanent institutions of the community, according to
Art. 9 of the founding treaty, is the Court of justice of the community (in
the following referred to as the SADC Tribunal). The establishment of the
SADC Tribunal took place in 2000 by the adoption of the Protocol on the
Court of Law (07/08/2000) in Windhoek.157 It also has its seat in Wind-
hoek. However, the SADC Tribunal may hold external sessions according
to Art. 13 of the Protocol, if special circumstances so require. According to
the provisions in Art. 16 of the founding treaty, the SADC Tribunal is an
independent court meant to settle all disputes submitted to it. To this ef-
fect, Art. 16 of the founding treaty states:
“The Tribunal shall be constituted to ensure adherence to and the
proper interpretation of the provisions of this Treaty and subsidiary in-
struments and to adjudicate upon such disputes as may be referred to
it”.
In the following, the organisation, competence, and the impact of rulings
by the SADC Tribunal are briefly presented.
Regarding the organisation of the Court , it is composed of ten judges
(Art. 3 of the Protocol). Five of these judges are permanently in office
(Art. 3 paragr. 2 of the Protocol). The appointment of the judges is done
by each Member State according to Art. 4 paragr. 1 of the Protocol, where-
by the last decision of the final assumption of office is taken according to
the proposal by the Conference of the Heads of State (Art. 4 Abs. 4 des
Protocol). As a permanent court, the judges enjoy immunity also after re-
tiring from office according to Art. 10 of the Protocol.
2.
157 Protocol on Tribunal and Rules of Procedure thereof (Windhoek, 07/08/2000).
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The authority of the political organs to appoint the judges presents a
danger to the independence of the judges. As shown in the case of the
ECOWAS Court of Justice, it is recommended that an independent organ
is established, which is responsible for appointing the judges. This would
guarantee the right to an impartial court, as can be learned from Art. 7 of
the African Charta on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
With regard to the rationae materiae and personal competences of the
SADC Tribunal, the Court of Law represents an international court. Re-
garding the substantive competence, according to Art. 14 of the Protocol,
it is competent to settle disputes regarding the interpretation and applica-
tion of the founding treaty and the associated Additional Protocol. The ap-
plicable law before the SADC Tribunal is the international law, principles
under international law and its own jurisdiction (Art. 21.b of the Proto-
col).
In the personal area of competence, the signatory states as well as natu-
ral and legal persons are eligible to apply (Art. 15 of the Protocol). With
regards to natural and legal persons it must, however, be stated that the ad-
missibility of the application requires the prior exhaustion of the national
legal process. In this sense, Art. 15 paragr. 2 stipulates:
“No natural or legal person shall bring an action against a Member
State unless he or she has exhausted all available remedies or is unable
to proceed under the domestic jurisdiction”.
This regulation shows a significant difference between the SADC Tribunal
and the ECOWAS Court of Justice because, as analysed above, the individ-
ual complaints are admissible before the ECOWAS Court of Justice with-
out prior exhaustion of all possible legal remedies.
In this regard, the unifying function by way of the preliminary ruling
procedure afther the modell of Art. 267 TFEU plays an important role for
the SADC-Tribunal. The SADC Tribunal also exercises a consultative func-
tion. In this context, either the Conference of the Heads of State or the
Council may ask the Court of Law for advice (Art. 20 of the Protocol in
conjunction with Art. 16 of the founding treaty).
Regarding the obligations of the signatory states stemming from the de-
cision of the SADC Tribunals, the brief formulation of Art. 16 paragr. 5 of
the founding treaty must be referred to. It must be pointed out that all of
the mentioned areas fall into the exclusive jurisdiction of the SADC Tri-
bunal. This can be deduced from Art. 17, 18 and 19.
Regarding its human rights competence, it must be pointed out that the
authorisation of the SADC-Tribunal regarding an individual human rights
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complaint has already caused a fierce debate within the commission dur-
ing preparatory work on the Protocol regarding the court.158 Eventually,
the possibility was rejected in the adopted protocol.159 Logically, there is
no catalogue of human rights that needs to be observed by the signatory
states. However, the African Charta is applied as the acknowledged and
mutual human rights instrument on the continent.160 Despite the lack of
an explicit authorisation, the SADC Tribunal has deduced and affirmed its
competence in three cases against Zimbabwe, just like the EACJ, out of the
express authorisation by the founding treaty.161 Art. 4 paragr. 3 of the
founding treaty states:
“SADC and its member States shall act in accordance with the follow-
ing principles […] (c) human rights, democracy, and the rule of law”.
Moreover, the SADC Tribunal may develop its case law on the basis of
Art. 21 paragr. 2 of the SADC Tribunal’s Protocol which reads:
“The Tribunal shall develop its own Community jurisprudence having
regard to applicable treaties, general principles and rules of public in-
ternational law and any rules and principles of the law of States.”
Further proceedings are regulated in Art. 6 paragr. 1 of the founding
treaty:
“Member States undertake to adopt adequate measure to promote the
achievement of the objectives of SADC and shall refrain from taking
any measure likely to jeopardise the sus- tenance of its principles, the
achievement of its objectives and the implementation of the provision
of this Treaty.”
The binding force and the binding effect of the judgments of the SADC-
Tribunal are formulated even more briefly. Art. 16 paragr. 5 of the found-
ing treaty namely reads:
“The decisions of the Tribunal shall be final and binding.”162
158 Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa, 2nd éd., 492; Ebobrah, Hu-
man rights developments in sub-regional court in Africa during 2008, in:
African Human Rights Law Jour- nal (2009), 312 (334).
159 Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa, 2nd éd., 492.
160 Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa, 2nd éd., 494.
161 Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa, 2nd éd., 492.
162 The binding effect of the legal decision by the Tribunal is complemented by
Art. 24 paragr. 3 and Art. 32 paragr. 3 of the SADC Tribunal Protocol.
E. Legal Force According to Art.  15 of the Amendment Agreement
169
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748901808, am 26.10.2021, 13:00:44
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
According to the wording, there is no possibility for the SADC Tribunal to
order concrete corrective measures in case of the finding of a violation.
However, in the case Campbell vs. the state of Zimbabwe it ordered to
take all necessary measures that serve to make amends regarding the situa-
tion of the plaintiff and possibly pay compensation.163 More specifically,
the SADC Tribunal ordered the Republic of Zimbabwe, on the mutual ap-
plication of Flick and Campbell, to implement the first judgment in the
Campbell case by granting the plaintiff payment.164 A difficult relationship
between the regional Court of Law and the national courts developed in
the jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal.165 This led to a situation where the
activities of the SADC Tribunal were suspended in August 2010.
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has more decision-making
powers than courts of equal standing on the European and African conti-
nents.
ECtHR
The European Court of Human Rights became one of the most efficient
protection systems for human rights after the Second World War. Before
the organisation and the competence of the ECtHR are presented, it seems
necessary to briefly summarise the historical background. The history of
the ECtHR is logically tied to the adoption of the European Convention
on Human Rights. The states of the European Council realised that the
prevention of serious violations of human rights requires the establish-
ment of an efficient human rights system within the European Council.
The ECHR is an agreement under international law developed by the
member states of the European Council. According to Art. 1 of the statute
of the European Council it is the obligation of the European Council to
ensure the protection of human rights and fundamental rights. The inter-
national protection of human rights was a basic concern of the United Na-
3.
163 Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa, 2nd éd., 493.
164 Judgment available at: http://www.sadc-tribunal.org/?cases=louis-karel-flick-othe
rs-v-the- republic-of-zimbabwe (last accessed on 16/05/2015); see also Cowell,
The Death of the Southern African Development Community Tribunal’s Hu-
man Rights Jurisdiction, in: Human Rights Law Review (2013), 153 (161).
165 Nkhata/Ebobrah, Is the SADC Tribunal under judicial siege in Zimbabwe? Re-
flections on Etheredge v Minister of State for National Security Responsible for
Lands, Land Reform and Re- settlement and Another, in: The Comparative and
International Law Journal of Southern Africa (2010), 81 (90).
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tions after the Second World War. Therefore, the fundamental idea behind
the ECHR was to transform the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
of 1948 into a document under international law at a European level.166 In
order to end the terrible human rights violations, thestates of the Euro-
pean Council developed a human rights instrument in a relatively short
time.167 As a result, the ECHR was adopted on 04/11/1950 in Rome and
came into force on 03/09/1953 through ratification by the first 10 member
states of the European Council. However, the first version of the conven-
tion designed the monitoring system in such a cautious manner that the
human rights protection was not even efficient within the European
Council. The original system can be compared entirely with the current
American human rights protection system and the African Court on Hu-
man and People´s Rights.168 The European Commission for Human
Rights even then received the competence to decide in individual com-
plaints. This, however, required a respective declaration of submission by
the member states of the European Council. Only after the inception of
the 11th Additional Protocol169 was the ECtHR established.
Regarding the organisation of the ECtHR: According to Art. 19 of the
ECHR it is a permanent Court of Law. There are four different composi-
tions of the ECtHR depending on the weight and the significance of each
case to be decided. It can be constituted by a single judge, or sit in commit-
tees of three judges, in chambers of seven judges or in a Grand Chamber
with seventeen judges (Art. 26 of the ECHR). Special rules regulate the sit-
ting of the Grand Chamber and the sitting is of an exceptional nature be-
cause it can only deal with a case if a party requests the presentation of
documents and a commission of five judges declares the referral to be ad-
missible (Art. 43 paragr. 2 ECHR). The referral means that the legal mat-
ter refers to a serious question of interpretation or application of the con-
vention. Regarding the election of judges, one has to refer to the highly
democratic legitimation of the judges because the judges are elected ac-
cording to the provisions in Art. 22 of the ECHR by the parliamentary as-
166 Meyer-Ladewig, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [European Conven-
tion on Human Rights], hand commentary, 3. edition, Einl.[introduction],
Rn. 1 f.
167 Meyer-Ladewig, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [European Conven-
tion on Human Rights], hand commentary, 3. edition, introduction, Rn. 1 f.
168 Comparison: Art. 8 paragr. 3 (Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of
Justice and Human Rights) with Art. 62 paragr. 1 (American Convention on
Human Rights).
169 This Protocol came into force on 1 November 1998.
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sembly of the European Council. This, in turn, guarantees a certain inde-
pendence from the member states and from the executive organs of the
European Council. This is a special feature of the ECtHR in comparison to
other international courts of justice.170
Regarding the personal competence of the ECtHR: Here, every signato-
ry party may approach the Court of justice with regards to an alleged hu-
man rights violation according to the convention or the associated Addi-
tional Protocols. This counterfactual scenario represents the inter-state
complaint (Art. 33 of the ECHR).
This must be distinguished from the individual complaint. Art. 34
ECHR stipulates:
« La Cour peut être saisie d’une requête par toute personne physique,
toute organisation non gouvernementale ou tout groupe de particu-
liers qui se prétend victime d’une violation par l’une des Hautes Par-
ties contractantes des droits reconnus dans la Convention ou ses proto-
coles. Les Hautes Parties contractantes s’engagent à n’entraver par au-
cune mesure l’exercice efficace de ce droit. »
“The Court may receive applications from any person, nongovernmen-
tal or group of individ- uals claiming to be the victim of violation by
one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Con-
vention or Protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake
not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right”.
It can be ascertained from this regulation that the circle of those entitled to
apply before the ECtHR is as broad as possible. Its objective is not only to
include the citizens of the respondent signatory state, but also every natu-
ral or legal person. Therefore, expatriates and stateless persons also have
the capacity to sue before the ECtHR. The decisive prerequisite for admis-
sion is laid out in Art. 35 paragr. 1 of the ECHR. According to this article,
the ECtHR can declare an application admissible after all national legal
remedies have been exhausted. Furthermore, a period of six months after
the final national decision must have passed.
In a factual regard, the ECtHR has the authority to interpret and apply
the ECHR and the associated Additional Protocols according to Art. 32 of
the ECHR. A complaint can, in this sense, be rejected rationae materiae as
inadmissible if the case does not fall within the scope of the Convention or
170 Meyer-Ladewig, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [European Conven-
tion on Human Rights], hand commentary, 3. edition, Art. 22, Rn. 2.
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one of the Protocols. Should a dispute regarding the competence of the
Court arise, it will itself decide on possible conflicts of competence
(Art. 32 paragr. 2).
The obligations of signatory states arising from the judgments of the EC-
tHR can be ascertained from Art. 46 paragr. 1. According to Art. 46 para-
gr. 1 of the ECHR:
« Les Hautes Parties contractantes s’engagent à se conformer aux arrêts
de la Cour dans les litiges auxquels elles sont parties. »
“The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judg-
ment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.”
The reference to the phrase “in case to which they are parties“ is important
because it clearly expresses the personal limit or the subjective aspect 171 of
res judicata regarding the declaratory judgement by the ECtHR. This refer-
ence is unfortunately, absent in the regulation of Art. 15 paragraph 4 ofthe
ECOWAS Amendment Agreement of 1993. This absence results in the fact
that a certain confusion must be noted regarding the interpretation of the
binding effect res judicata in the human rights jurisdiction of the ECOW-
AS Court of Justice. However, Art. 46 paragraph 1 ECHR also causes a few
problems with regard to the legal effect of the decision on merits by the
ECtHR.172 After more detailed examination of this regulation, it can be
noted: Art. 46 paragraph1 describes the duty of compliance or the obliga-
tion of implementation of the judgements by the ECtHR. This regulation
does not clarify which concrete measures the signatory states must take re-
garding the implementation.173 This complies with the peculiar nature of
the judgements by the ECtHR because they only have a declaratory charac-
ter. For this reason, there is no immediate obligation to act, tolerate or
171 Mückl, Kooperation oder Konfrontation? – Das Verhältnis zwischen Bundesver-
fassungsge-richt und europäischem Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte, in: Der
Staat 44 (2005), 403 (420).
[Cooperation or Confrontation? – The Relationship between the Federal Con-
stitutional Court and the Court of Law for Human Rights, in: The State 44.].
172 Cremer, Zur Bindungswirkung von EGMR-Urteilen [Regarding the Binding Ef-
fect of ECtHR judgements]. Comment regarding the Görgülü-ruling by the
Federal Constitutional Court of 14/10/2004, in: EuGRZ (2004), 683 (690).
173 Rohleder, Grundrechtschutz im europäischen Mehrebenensystem, 44 [The pro-
tection of fundamental rights in the European multi-level system, 44].
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omit in a certain way based on the declaratory judgement.174 In no way
does the declaratory judgement possess a design effect. The ECtHR clearly
confirms this in its judgement in the legal matter Pakelli vs Germany:
« [E]lle constate, à propos de la première demande, que la Convention
ne lui attribue compé- tence ni pour annuler l’arrêt de la Cour fédérale
ni pour ordonner au gouvernement de dé- savouer les extraits incrimi-
nés ».175
Despite this lack of specification of the content of the obligation set out in
Art. 46 paragraph 1, there is at least an obligation to implement the
declaratory judgement. Consequently, a signatory state may, after a
declaratory judgement, no longer allege that its conduct had been in com-
pliance with the convention.176 An obligation to cease and desist follows,
as a direct result that is. if the violation of the convention persists.177
Moreover, Art. 41 ECHR provides further references to the content of
the obligations resulting from the declaratory judgement. In this respect,
the right to order adequate compensation is conferred to the ECtHR in the
case that the national law is directed against a comprehensive reparation of
the violation of the convention. Acc. to Art. 41 ECHR:
« Si la Cour déclare qu’il y eu violation de la Convention ou de ses pro-
tocoles, et si le droit interne de la Haute Partie contractante ne permet
d’effectuer qu’imparfaitement les conséquences de cette violation, la
Cour accorde à la Partie lésée, s’il y a lieu, une satisfaction équitable. »
“If the court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or
the protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting
174 Cremer, Zur Bindungswirkung von EGMR-Urteilen [Regarding the Binding Ef-
fect of ECtHR judgements]. Comment regarding the Görgülü-ruling by the
Federal Constitutional Court of 14/10/2004, in: EuGRZ (2004), 683 (690).
175 CEDH, No. 8398/78, Arrêt (25/04/1983), Affaire Pakelli c. Allemagne, par. 45.
176 Klein, Should the binding effect of the judgements of the European Court of
Human Rights be extended? in: Mahoney/Matscher/Petzold/Wildhaber, 705
(707).
177 Frowein, in: Frowein/Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention. EMRK-
Handkom- mentar, 3. edition, Art. 46, Rn. 6ff; Polakiewicz, Die Verpflichtun-
gen der Staaten aus den Urteilen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschen-
rechte, 1993, 251. [European Human Rights Convention. ECHR hand com-
mentary 3rd edition, Art. 46, Rn. 6ff; Polakiewicz, The obligations by countries
resulting from the judgements by the European Court of Human Rights, 1993,
251.].
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Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court
shall if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
Due to the lack of a more detailed specification regarding the specific con-
tent of the obligation as per the declaratory judgement, the ECtHR has at
least cautiously pointed out that it is left up to the signatory states to de-
cide how they prefer to implement the obligations as per declaratory
judgement on a national basis.178 Polakiewicz rightly regrets that the EC-
tHR did not take the case Marckx as an opportunity to further specify the
content of the obligations as per the judgement.179 Depending on the na-
ture or urgency of the individual case, the ECtHR has made a welcome
step forward through the evolutive interpretation by the ECHR to order
concrete measures in order to facilitate the implementation of the declara-
tory judgement. In light of the wording adopted by the ECtHR, the order-
ing of concrete corrective measures takes place either in the salient reasons
for the decision180 or in the binding tenor of the judgement.181 According
to the prevailing scholarly opinions, only the tenor of the judgement is,
however, relevant and binding.182 Judge Malinverni, especially for this rea-
son, regrets, in his concurring opinion of the legal matter Kudac, that the
178 ECtHR (GK), Marckx v. Belgien (13.06.1979), Ziffer 58 = EuGRZ 1979, 454
[Marckx vs Belgium(13/06/1979), clause 58 = EuGRZ 1979, 454]; Polakiewicz,
Die Verpflichtungen der Staaten aus den Urteilen des Europäischen Gericht-
shofs für Menschenrechte, 1993, 251. [The obligations of countries resulting
from judgements by the European Court of Human Rights, 1993, 251].
179 Polakiewicz, Die Verpflichtungen der Staaten aus den Urteilen des Europä-
ischen Gerichts- hofs für Menschenrechte, 1993, 250. [The obligations of coun-
tries resulting from judgements by the European Court of Human Rights, 1993,
250].
180 CEDH, Nr. 56581/00, Arrêt (01/03/2006), Affaire Sejdovic c. Italie, par. 126;
CEDH, Nr. 15869/02, Arrêt (23/03/2010), Affaire Cudac c. Lituanie, par. 79;
CEDH, Nr. 2555/03, Arrêt (18/01/2011), Affaire Guadagnino c. Italie et France,
par. 81; ECtHR, Nr. 74969/01, Urteil (26.02.2004), Rechtssache G. v. Deutsch-
land, Ziff. 64.[Judgement (26/02/2004) legal matter G. vs Germany, clause 64.].
181 CEDH, Nr. 71503/01, Arrêt (08/04/2004), Affaire Assanidzé c. Géorgie, par. 14
(dispositif), par. 202 et 203 (motif); CEDH, Nr. 14556/89, Arrêt (31/10/1995),
Affaire Papamichalopoulos et autres c. Grèce, par. 2 (dispositif); CEDH,
Nr. 28342/95, Arrêt (23/01/2001), Affaire Brumàrescu c. Roumanie, par. 22
(motif), par. 1 (dispositif).
182 Cremer, Zur Bindungswirkung von EGMR-Urteilen [Regarding the Binding Ef-
fect of ECtHR judgements]. Anmerkung zum Görgülü-Beschluß des BVerfG
vom 14/10/2004, in: EuGRZ (2004), 683 (690), [Comment regarding the
Görgülü-ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court of 14/10/2004, in: EuGRZ
(2004), 683 (690)] thus also the judge Malinverni regarding the case Kudak:
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ECtHR does not express such specifically intended results in the tenor of
the judgement.183
Ordering specific measures does not compare with the direct repeal of
national court judgements which violate human rights. By ordering con-
crete measures, the Court of only shows which consequences under inter-
national law are to be drawn from the declaratory judgement.184 A direct
repeal does not matter at this point. Rem restitution is a mechanism of
restitution of criminal conduct by a signatory state, recognised under inter-
national law. The consequences of a breach of international law are not
just limited to the payment of a sum of money. Rather, this payment is in
most cases an accessory to the obligation of restitution.185 The ECtHR has
rightly referred to the judgement of the permanent International Court of
justice in order to apply rem restitution to its full extent.186
The Inter-American Court
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (in the following: the Court
of Law) nowadays represents the central control body in the American sys-
tem of human rights protection. Before we touch on the effects of its rul-
ings, it is advisable to take a quick glance at the history and the compe-
tence of the Court of Law.
The founding of the Inter-American organisation in its contemporary
form has its origin in the Bogotá Pact of 1948. With this pact, the Organi-
zation of American States (OAS) was founded. The starting point of a re-
4.
CEDH, Nr. 15869/02, Arrêt (23/03/2010), Affaire Cudac c. Lituanie, opi- nion
concordante du juge Malinverni, à laquelle se rallient les juges Casadevall, Ca-
bral Barreto, Zagreberlsky et Popovic, par. 4.
183 CEDH, Nr. 15869/02, Arrêt (23/03/2010), Affaire Cudac c. Lituanie, opinion
concordante du juge Malinverni, à laquelle se rallient les juges Casadevall, Ca-
bral Barreto, Zagreberlsky et Popo- vic, par. 2.
184 Breuer, Zur Anordnung konkreter Abhilfemaßnahmen durch den EGMR [Re-
garding the order of concrete corrective measures by the ECtHR], in: EuGRZ
(2004), 257 (261); Heckötter, Die Bedeutung der Europäischen Menschenrechts-
konvention und der Recht- sprechung des EGMR für die deutschen Gerichte
[The meaning of the European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisdic-
tion of the ECtHR regarding German courts], 64.
185 Arangio-Ruiz, Second Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/425
(09.06.1989), § 137.
186 CEDH, Nr. 14556/89, Arrêt (31.10.1995), Affaire Papamichalopoulos et autres c.
Grèce, par. 36 et 38.
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gional system of human rights protection within the OAS is the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man that was issued on the 2nd of
May 1948 within the framework of the founding of the OAS. This declara-
tion, however, was not legally binding. It can therefore only be viewed as a
political document (because the Court of Law only later in a legal opinion
attributed the legal nature to this declaration). Subsequent to this declara-
tion, the American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention
on Human Rights, 22/05/1969) was adopted more than twenty years later
in San José (Costa Rica). This Convention became effective with the
eleventh ratification instrument on the 18th of July 1978. The Convention
makes provision for the Court of Law and the Commission. This means
that the basis of the Inter -American Court of Human Rights must be tak-
en from theAmerican Convention on Human Rights.
The competence and the effect of rulings by the Court of Law can thus
be presented. In order to better explain the competence of the Court of
Law, most of the following references regard its competence. But based on
the admissibility requirements of a complaint before the Court of Law, the
Commission will also be discussed (see explanation below). In order to
monitor the human rights granted in the Convention, the Convention cre-
ated two important organs. According to the wording in Art. 33:
“The following organs shall have competence with respect to matters
relating to the fulfil- ment of the commitments made by the States Par-
ties to this Convention: the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights […]; and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights”.
Both the Inter-American Court and the Commission are comprised of sev-
en judges (Art. 34 and Art. 52 of the Convention). The judges are chosen
from a list of candidates proposed by the signatory states of the OAS. This
means that not only the parties to the pact may propose a candidate for the
position as a judge, but also every member state of the OAS (Art. 53 para-
graph 2 of the Convention). The general assembly of the OAS has the last
word in the decision of who may hold the office of judge. Therefore, the
election of the judges takes place with the majority of votes by the Member
States in the general assembly of the OAS (Art. 53 paragraph 1 of the Con-
vention). There is a peculiarity regarding the organisation of the Inter
-American Court of Human Rights compared to the other regional courts
of justice, such as the ECOWAS Court of Justice: the Inter-American Court
sits at regular meeting periods which are necessary to fulfil its function
(Art. 11 in the Rules of Procedure). The majority of the judges may decide,
on the president judge’s initiative, that an extraordinary meeting should be
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held (Art. 12 in the Rules of Procedure). Therefore, the Court of Law is
not a permanent court187 like the ECtHR. According to Art. 3 of the
statute, its current seat is in San José, Costa Rica.188
However, the Court of Law is not automatically competent for all Mem-
ber States of the OAS. This requires a separate declaration of competence.
Acc. to Art. 62 paragraph 1 of the Convention:
“A State Party may, upon depositing its instrument of ratification or
adherence to this Convention, or at any subsequent time, declare that
it recognises as binding, ipso facto, and not requiring special agree-
ment, the jurisdiction of the Court on all matters relating to the inter-
pretation or application of this Convention”.
This regulation limits the scope of the Convention as a regional human
rights instrument. It cannot be expected that all Member States of the OAS
will readily submit the declaration of submission. This makes the Ameri-
can human rights system comparable to the system of the African Court of
Justice because even within the framework of the African human rights
system, a separate declaration of submission by the Member States regard-
ing the competence of the African Court of Justice is required.189 It must
be noted that the declaration of competence can be viewed in two ways. It
constitutes a negative as well as a positive authority of competence regard-
ing the jurisdiction of the Court of Law toward the Member States of the
OAS. However, the Commission acts on behalf of all the Member States of
the OAS (Art. 35 of the Convention).
With regard to the personal competence, those persons who are entitled
to apply before the Court of Law are, acc. to Art. 61 paragraph 1, rather
restricted. Accordingly, only the Commission and the signatory states have
the capacity to sue and be sued through the submission of a complaint be-
fore the Court of Law. Therefore, direct individual human rights com-
plaints before the Court of Law are inadmissible. Here, a close collabora-
tion between the Commission and the Court of Law must be noted. Re-
187 Figari Layus, Überblick über das interamerikanische Menschenrechtssystem
[Overview of the Inter-American Human Rights System, in: MenschenRechts-
Magazin (2008), 56 (60), [in: HumanRightsMagazine (2008), 56 (60)].
188 Art. 3 of the Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (Adopted by
the General Assembly of the OAS at its Ninth Regular Session, held in La Paz
Bolivia, October 1979 according to Resolution N°448).
189 Vergleich: Art. 8 Abs. 3 (Protocol on the Statute of the African Court on Hu-
man and Peoples' Rights) mit Art. 62 Abs. 1 (American Convention on Human
Rights).
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garding the admissibility of individual human rights complaints, the Com-
mission has the competence to assess whether the admissibility require-
ments in Art. 46 of the Convention have been met. This competence of
the Commission to rule with regard to individual human rights com-
plaints was one of the successes of the second extraordinary Inter-Ameri-
can Conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1965. During this summit the Com-
mission’s mandate was extended by a corresponding amendment of its
statute.190 According to Art. 46 paragraph 1.a of the Convention, individu-
al human rights complaints are only admissible when the national legal
remedies have been exhausted. The Commission can declare individual hu-
man rights complaints inadmissible if the aforementioned admissibility
prerequisites set out in Art. 46 of the Convention are not fulfilled. The pri-
or control procedure of the Commission before the Court of Law in turn
shows the limited effect of the Inter-American Commission onHuman
Rights for the citizens in this region.
Regarding the substantive jurisdiction of the Court of Law, the Inter-
American Court on Human Rights rules on the interpretation and applica-
tion of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights. Strictly speak-
ing, the Court of Law rules on human rights violations. However, one
must differentiate between advisory competence and contentious jurisdic-
tion. The signatory states may request, according to the regulations in
Art. 64, the opinion of the Court of Law regarding the interpretation of
the Convention and of other human rights instruments (Art. 64 para-
graph 1 of the Convention). In this case, the Court of Law issues a legal
assessment of the national act of law and the regional human rights con-
vention (Art. 64 paragraph 2 of the Convention). Within the framework
of this consultative competence, the Court of Law has specified the signifi-
cance of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man as the le-
gal source of obligations under international law by the OAS Member
States.191 The contentious jurisdiction follows the procedure laid out in
Art. 61 in conjunction with Art. 48 and 50 of the Convention.
190 Figari Layus, Überblick über das interamerikanische Menschenrechtssystem, in:
MenschensRechtsMagazin (2008), 56 (59). [Overview of the Inter-American Hu-
man Rights System, in: MenschenRechtsMagazin [in: HumanRightsMagazine].
(2008), 56 (59).
191 Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human
Rights, Advisory Opinion OC- 10/89, July 14, 1989, Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (Ser. A) N
°. 10 (1989).
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Regarding the obligations of the signatory states that ensue from the
judgements of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights acc. to Art. 68
of the Convention and Art. 31 paragraph 1 of the Rules of Procedure, the
judgements of the Court of Law are final and incontestable. Therefore,
there are no legal remedies available against this legal process. The signato-
ry states are subject to the following obligations acc. to Art. 68 of the Ame-
rican Convention on Human Rights:
« 1. Les Etats parties à la présente Convention s’engagent à se confor-
mer aux décisions ren- dues par la Cour dans tout litige où elles sont
en cause.
2. Le dispositif de l’arrêt accordant une indemnité pourra être exécuté
dans le pays intéressé conformément à la procédure interne tracée
pour l’exécution des jugements rendus contre l’Etat. »192
“1. The States Parties to the Convention undertake to comply with the
judgement of the Court in any case to which they are parties.
2. The part of a judgement that stipulates compensatory damages may
be executed in the coun- try concerned in accordance with domestic
procedure governing the execution of judgements against the state.”
Here, the same problem emerges as in Art. 46 paragraph 1 of the ECHR.
Because of the manner in which Art. 68 paragraph 1 of the Inter-American
Convention on Human Rights is worded, it does not provide any informa-
tion regarding the reach of the declaratory judgement’s binding effect.
Thus, our opinions regarding the scope of the binding effect acc. to Art. 46
paragraph 1 of the ECHR are applicable mutatis mutandis. A special dis-
pensation can be noted when looking at Art. 68 paragraph 2 of the Inter-
American Convention on Human Rights.193 Namely, that the enforcement
of the claim for damagses as the part of the declaratory judgment which
192 Übersetzung der originalen Fassung durch [translation of the original version
by] Bourgorgue-Larsen/Úbeda de Torres, in: Les Grandes Décisions de la Cour
Interamericaine des Droits de l’Homme, 792.
193 Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, in: European Journal of International Law (2008), 101 (102);
Rota, Chronique de jurispru- dence de la Cour interaméricaine des Droits de
l’Homme, in: Centre de Recherche pour les Droits Fondamentaux (CDRF)
(2009), 189 (191 und 194); Gialdino, Le Nouveau Règlement de la Cour Inter-
américaine des Droits de l’Homme, in: Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de
l’Homme (2005), 981 (980); Mazzuoli, The Inter-American human rights pro-
tection system: Structure, functioning and effectiveness in Brazilian law, in:
African Human Rights Law Journal (2011), 194 (203).
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grants monetary damages, is left to the national enforcement procedure
law of the signatory State concerned. Kokott rightly points out that the ef-
fectiveness of Art. 68 paragraph 2 depends on the manner in which the
state liability law is implemented in the individual signatory states.194 Inso-
far, paragraph 2 of Art. 68 of the Inter-American Convention is compara-
ble to Art. 24 paragraph [sic] of the ECOWAS-Protocol A/P1/7/91
(06/07/1991)195. However, there is an important peculiarity within the sys-
tem of the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights.196 This peculiar-
ity is found in Art. 63 paragraph 1 of this Convention. In fact, Art. 63
paragraph 1 expressly provides the Inter-American Court with the authori-
ty to order concrete corrective measures if it is determined that it is in the
sense of the implementation of the judgement. It is helpful in this respect
to understand the gist of the regulation. Art. 63 paragraph 1 of the Inter-
American Convention on Human Rights197 reads as follows:
« Lorsqu’elle reconnait qu’un droit ou une liberté protégés par la pré-
sente Convention ont été violés, La Cour ordonnera que soit garantie à
la partie lésée la jouissance du droit ou de la liberté enfreints. Elle or-
donnera également, le cas échéant, la réparation des conséquences de
la mesure ou de la situation à laquelle a donné lieu la violation de ces
droits et le paiement d’une indemnité juste à la partie lésée. »198
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom
protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured Par-
ty be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated.
It shall also rule if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure
or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be
remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party”.
194 Kokott, Der Interamerikanische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte und seine
bisherige Pra- xis, in: ZAöRV (1984), 806 (819). [The Inter-American Court for
Human Rights and its present practice, in: ZAöRV (1984), 806 (819). This regu-
lation can be compared to Art. 44 of the founding treaty of the East African
Community Scheme.
195 See also: Art. 6 of Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 (19/01/2005).
196 Hilling, Le système interaméricain de protection des droits de l’homme: le mo-
dèle européen adapté aux réalités latino-américaines, in: Revue Québécoise de
Droit International (1991–1992), 210 (214).
197 Signed in San José, Costa Rica, on 22/11/1969.
198 Translation of the original version by Burgorgue-Larsen/Úbeda de Torres, in:
Les Grandes Décisions de la Cour Interaméricaine des Droits de l’Homme, 791.
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In light of this regulation, the Inter-American Court has ordered concrete
corrective measures to convicted Member States in many of its decided cas-
es.199 The comparative considerations can now be summarized:
The ECtHR and the Inter-American Court for Human Rights have inter-
preted the Human Rights Conventions in their respective areas of applica-
tion in such an evolutive manner that they made a great contribution to
the development of the protection of human rights.200 Moreover, a mutual
influence of the systems can be observed due to the reciprocal reference to
jurisdiction in similar cases.201 This reciprocal reference can be justified
based on the commonality of human rights instruments.202
After a comparative observation on a continental level in Africa, the fol-
lowing results can be noted: The African Charter represents the general
standard for review regarding the competence on human rights for all
three regional courts on the continent.203 Other than the East African
Court of Law and the SADC-Tribunal who must find their own way with
regard to its competence in human rights disputes,204 the ECOWAS Court
199 Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, in: European Journal of International Law (2008), 101 (104);
Kokott, Der Interamerikani- sche Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte und seine
bisherige Praxis, in: ZAöRV (1984), 806 (816) [The Inter-American Court for
Human Rights and its present practice, in: ZAöRV (1984), 806 (816); Huneeus,
Court resisting Court, in: Cornell International Law Journal (2011), 101 (114).
200 Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, in: European Journal of International Law (2008), 101 (106).
201 Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, in: European Journal of International Law (2008), 101 (104,
111, 114, 116); Olinga, Les Emprunts normatifs de la Commission Africaine
Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples aux systèmes européen et Interaméricain de
Garantie des Droits de l’Homme, in: Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de
l’Homme (2005), 499 (500).
202 Padilla, An African Human Rights Court: Reflections from the perspective of
the In- ter-American system, in: African Human Rights Law Journal (2002), 185
(186); Murray, A compa- rison between the African and European Court of Hu-
man Rights, in: African Human Rights Journal (2002), 195 (215, 216).
203 Enabulele, Reflections on the ECOWAS-Community Court Protocol and the
Constitutions of Member States, in: International Community Law Review
(2010), 111 (138).
204 Viljoen, International Human Rights Law in Africa, 2nd éd., 490; Alter/Helfer/
McAllister, A new international human rights court for West Africa: the
ECOWAS Community Court of Ju- stice, in: The American Journal of Interna-
tional Law (2013), 737 (739).
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of Justice has an express legal competence in human rights issues.205 Sur-
prisingly, the ECOWAS Court ofJustice has a restrictive self-understand-
ing. In contrast, the East African Court of justice and the SADC Tribunal
tend to interpret their respective bases of authority in a broad sense.206
One of the important consequences of the interpretation of the African
Charter by the new regional courts for the protection of human rights on
the continent is that the interpretation of the Charter by the courts devel-
ops a binding effect for the convicted signatory states and its organs
[sic].207
It must be pointed out that an excessively strong position of the regional
courts could, due to the loss of sovereignty, lead to a lack of acceptance. In
the worst case scenario, this could lead to a withdrawal of the authorisa-
tion by some of the signatory states. This was the case within the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) in 2010, where the activities of
the SADC Tribunal were suspended. Within the ECOWAS Community,
such intentions were observed with regard to the Republic of Gambia after
a conviction. This luckily did not lead to a withdrawal by the Republic of
Gambia. It must be pointed out that the withdrawal of the authorisation
or the suspension of the ECOWAS Court of Justice can hardly be imag-
ined because, unlike the other regional organisations in Africa, the ECOW-
AS Member States are obliged to observe the guidelines of the Protocol of
Good Governance. A withdrawal from the Additional Protocol A/
SP.1/01/05 would in turn constitute a violation of the Protocol of Good
Governance. Therefore, the events of August 2010 regarding the SADC-
Tribunal are not applicable to the ECOWAS Community. It also depends
on the historical development of the ECOWAS Community as described
in the introduction of the analysis.
205 Alter/Helfer/McAllister, A new international human right court for West Africa:
the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, in: the American Journal of Inter-
national Law (2013), 737 (739).
206 Ebobrah, Litigating Human Rights before sub-regional court in Africa:
Prospects and challenges, in: African Journal of International and Comparative
Law (2009), 79 (91).
207 Olinga, La première décision, au fond de la Cour africaine des droits de
l’homme et des peuples, in: La Revue des droits de l’Homme (2014), 2 (2);
Rousseau, Droit International Public, Tome I, p. 248.
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Manifestations of Legal Force of the Judgements of the ECOWAS Court of
Justice
The decision by the Court of justice is a purely declaratory judgement
which, as such, has a declaratory effect.208 However, the declaratory nature
of the judgement does not diminish the legal force of the decision. The
formal legal force thus takes effect once the decision by the Court of Law
has been issued. Nevertheless, the declaratory judgement has a constitutive
effect within the national legal system of the convicted Member State.209
In the following, the formal and substantive legal force of the decision by
the Court of justice will be discussed.
Here, the obligation of the convicted signatory state resulting from a
judgement by the Court of Law needs to be considered. Acc. to Art. 15
paragraph 4 of the Amendment Agreement, the decisions of the Court of
justice develop a binding effect on the Member States, the institutions of
the Community as well as all natural and legal persons. It is clear from this
provision that the signatory states must observe the judgements by
theECOWAS Court of Justice . This in turn results in an obligation to also
implement the judgements. For this reason, the legal force of the decision
will be discussed before the question of the binding effect is addressed.
The following questions are examined in this section: Does the declaratory
judgement have an effect on the initial proceeding violating human rights?
Does the declaratory judgement lead to an automatic break of the legal
force?
With regard to the binding effect: the starting point in establishing the
effect under international law of the declaratory judgement by the Court is
described in Art. 15 paragraph 4 of the Amendment Agreement. Since the
Court of Law has the final jurisdiction regarding the interpretation and ap-
plication of the founding treaty and the corresponding Additional Proto-
col, formal legal force takes effect after the judgement has been pro-
nounced (I). The content of a formal and final decision is decisive for the
parties to the proceedings. Therefore, the object of the legally binding deci-
sion is no longer available to the parties to the proceedings. Hence, a sub-
stantive legal force takes effect (II). Consequently, the legal force brings
F.
208 Schaffrin, Rechtskraft der Entscheidung[Legal Force of the Decision], in: Kar-
penstein/Mayer, EMRK, 2. edition, Art. 27 paragraph 2, Rn. 7.
209 Szymczak, La Convention européenne des droits de l’Homme et le juge consti-
tutionnel national, 266.
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about fundamental legal consequences for the convicted signatory state
(III).
Formal Legal Force
The binding effect requires a court decision. This is a legally binding sen-
tence by the Court of Law. Essentially, the binding effect represents a logi-
cal consequence of the legal force. After an admissible individual com-
plaint, the Court of Law decides whether or not the complaint is justified.
The complaint will be rejected if the application is unjustified in the Court
of Law’s opinion. This means that the national measure does not contra-
vene the provisions of the African Charter. On the other hand, the Court
of Law might declare the contested conduct by the Member State to be in-
compatible with the provisions of the Charter. The sentence by the Court
of Law in the operative part of the judgement is final and enters into for-
mal legal force with its pronouncement to the parties to the dispute. The
commencement of the formal legal force represents the irrevocability of
the judgement because there is no legal remedy regarding the judgement
by the Court of justice . The formal legal force therefore has two signifi-
cant consequences, namely: the non-appealability and the irreversibility of
the judgement. For this purpose, Art. 19 paragraph 2 of the Protocol (A/
P1/7/91) expressly stipulates that after their pronouncement, the decisions
by the Court of Law immediately enter into legal force. Furthermore,
there is no other legal action available against the judgements by the Court
of Law acc. to Art. 19. Paragraph 3 of the Protocol (A/P1/7/91). Moreover,
the Court of Law decides only once on each object of dispute. While the
non-appealability expresses the effect of the formal legal force towards the
parties to the dispute, the irreversibility concerns the effect towards the
Court of Law. This means that neither the parties are allowed to seek an-
other instance, nor may the Court of Law alter the judgement retrospec-
tively. Consequently, this can be regarded as the irrevocability of the
judgement.
Substantive res judicata
With regard to substantive res judicata, the question concerning the proce-
dural binding effect must be asked. The following aspects of the binding
effect of res judicata will be presented: the content of substantive res judi-
I.
II.
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cata, the extent of the legal force (1), the scope and approximate conse-
quence of substantive res judicata and finally, the limit of the legal force.
The limits of substantive res judicata are examined in the following regard-
ing their objective (2), subjective (3) and temporal (4) aspects.
Extent of the Legal Force
Substantive res judicata refers to the pronounced opinion in the operative
part of the judgement by the Court of Law. Regarding the procedural as-
pects, substantive res judicata hinders a renewed submission of a com-
plaint regarding the same object of dispute. Therefore, substantive res judi-
cata must be regarded as an obstacle to legal proceedings under interna-
tional law. The content of the judgement is decisive and binding for the
parties to the dispute.210 However, the question must be asked, whether
the principal reasons of the decision and the determination of facts are part
of the legal force. Some voices in literature are in favour of a unity between
the principal reasons of the decision and the operative part of the judge-
ment. The principal reasons of the decision in the declaratory judgement
are to be taken into account when implementing the judgement because
here the Court of Law shows the required action in order to remove the
violation. There is rarely a detailed “description of the criminal act”211 to
be found in the operative part of the judgement. Should the aforesaid be
left in place, one can assume that the ECOWAS Court of Justice has al-
ready found the judgement by the Togolese Constitutional Court in the le-
gal matter Ameganvi in the initial case to be expressly in violation of hu-
man rights in its principal reasons for the decision, when the Court of Law
made the point that:
« Il résulte des faits de la cause que les Requérants n’ont jamais expri-
mé leur volonté de dé- missionner ».212
1.
210 Cremer, Zur Bindungswirkung von EGMR -Urteilen [Regarding the binding ef-
fect of judgements by the ECtHR]. Anmerkung zum Görgülü-Beschluß des
BVerfG vom [Comment regarding the Görgülü judgement by the Federal
Constitutional Court of] 14/10/2004, in: EuGRZ (2004), 683 (690).
211 Okresek, Die Umsetzung der EGMR-Urteile und ihre Überwachung [The im-
plementation of judgements by the ECtHR and how they are monitored], in:
EuGRZ (2003), 168 (171).
212 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Isabelle Ameganvi v. Republique Togo, N
°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11s (07.10.2011), par. 63.
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Further, the Court of Law expressly confirms what the violation consists of
by pointing out:
« [L]a Cour constitutionnelle à statuer comme elle l’a fait, privant ainsi
les Requérants de leur mandat, sans qu’ils aient été entendus, et ce en
violation des dispositions pertinentes de la Déclaration Universelle des
Droits de L’Homme et de la Charte Africaine des Droits de l’Homme
et des Peuples ».213
By using these words in the principal reasons in the judgement, the Court
of Law is expressly drawing attention to the fact that it decides in the last
instance on the monitoring of the African Charter. At the same time, it ex-
presses therelativisation of the legal force of national constitutional courts
in human rights disputes.214
Objective limit of the legal force
The objective limit of the legal force refers to the legal issue raised in the
object of the dispute. The determination of the violation of this primary
duty is the basis for the validity of the object of the dispute. The answer to
the raised legal issue represents the objective limit of the legal force. Ac-
cordingly, the content of the statements by the Court of Law, expressed in
the operative part with regard to the specific object of the dispute, unfold.
The reasons for the judgement serve the interpretation and the communi-
cation of the operative part. It is possible that the Court of Law may refer
to one of its previous judgements. This reference only serves to give rea-
sons for the concrete legal dispute and is therefore not legally binding.215
Subjective limit of the legal force
The subjective limit of the legal force primarily regards the personal limit
of the declaratory judgement. First and foremost, a declaratory judgement
2.
3.
213 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Isabelle Ameganvi v. Republique Togo, N
°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11 (07.10.2011), par. 66.
214 Kane, La Cour de justice de la CEDEAO à l’épreuve de la protection des droits
de l’homme, Mémoire de Maitrise, Université Gaston Berger (2012–2013), 46.
215 Tsikrikas, Die Wirkungen der Urteile des Europäischen Gerichtshofs im Ver-
tragsverlet- zungsverfahren [The effects of judgements by the European Court of
Justice in infringement proceedings, 57.
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develops an inter-partes effect (a). This is not to say that the legal force is
without consequence for Member States, who are not part of the proceed-
ings (b).
Inter-partes-legal force
From a subjective legal perspective, the legal force refers to the parties to
the dispute who are involved in the individual complaint proceedings,
namely the plaintiff and the Member State, whose act of public authority
is invalidated by the Court of Law due to an incompatibility with the
Charter.216
Art. 15 of the Amendment Agreement, however, lacks the concept of
the party although the same regulation concerns the effects of the legal
force of an individual complaint, and thus concerns the party status217of
the individual in proceedings under international law. The question must
at least be asked, whether one should assume the regulation of an erga-
omnes relationship based on the unchanged wording.
Erga-omnes impact of the legal force in practice
The binding effect res judicata of a decision under international law must
always be differentiated from the impact of a judgement by a national con-
stitutional court. The res judicata acc. to Art. 106 of the Togolese Constitu-
tion comprises of the entire national legal system de jure. On the contrary,
the res judicata of the ECOWAS Court of Justice is limited to a particular
object of dispute and parties to a dispute. In principle, the decisions of the
Court of Law develop an inter-partes-effect. Since the given formal legal
force solely concerns the parties to the proceedings, other Member States
a.
b.
216 Mückl, Kooperation oder Konfrontation? – Das Verhältnis zwischen Bundesver-
fassungsge- richt und europäischem Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte [Coopera-
tion or confrontation? – the relationship between the Federal Constitutional
Court and the European Court of Human Rights], in: Der Staat [The State], 44
(2005), 403 (411).
217 Mückl, Kooperation oder Konfrontation? – Das Verhältnis zwischen Bundesver-
fassungsge- richt und europäischem Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte [Coopera-
tion or confrontation? – the relationship between the Federal Constitutional
Court and the European Court of Human Rights], in: Der Staat [The State], 44
(2005), 403 (420).
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are not affected by this. This means that every decision is binding for the
convicted signatory state and the plaintiff. However, the development of
regional law and the demand for respect of human rights at ECOWAS-lev-
el show that all signatory states should adjust their actions to comply with
the provision of ECOWAS-standards. An “adjustment” of the national le-
gal system is necessary in the light of the jurisdiction by the International
Human Rights Court.218
Hence the distinction in the literature between the binding effect res ju-
dicata (convicted Member State and individual plaintiff) and the persua-
sion effect (other Member States).219
Consequently, the question must be asked whether the judgements by
the ECOWAS Court of Justice can generate legal obligations for non-par-
ticipating member States.220 In the restrictive sense, and based on the sub-
jective limits of the legal force, the non-participating Member States are
not bound by the legal force. The legal force rather only extends to the
plaintiff and the Member State convicted in the proceedings (i.e. the re-
spondent). Furthermore, the Court of Law does not judge in the field of
human rights in abstracto221 but rather always on application by a plaintiff
against a Member State in a specific case. However, the judgements by the
Court of justice specify the standards and the claim of validity by the
African Charter within the constitutional community, toward which all
Member States should orientate their action. Due to the duty of realization
of theCharter by the Court of justice, the judgements by the Court have a
218 Cremer, Zur Bindungswirkung von EGMR-Urteilen. [Regarding the binding ef-
fect of judgements by the ECtHR]. Anmerkung zum Görgülü-Beschluß des
BVerfG vom 14.10.2004 [Comment regarding the Görgülü judgement by the
Federal Constitutional Court of] 14/10/2004, in: EuGRZ (2004), 683 (693); dazu
auch: Okresek, Die Umsetzung der EGMR-Urteile und ihre Überwachung, in:
EuGRZ (2003), 168 (174) [see also: Okresek, the implementation of ECtHR
judgements and their supervision, in: EuGRZ (2003), 168 (174)].
219 Ress, Wirkung und Beachtung der Urteile der Straßburger Konven- tionsor-
gane, in: EuGRZ (1996), 350 (351) [Effect of and Compliance with the judge-
ments of the Straßburg Convention organs in: EuGRZ (1996), 350 (351)]; Okre-
sek, Die Umsetzung der EGMR-Urteile und ihre Überwachung, in: EuGRZ
(2003), 168 (168) [see also: Okresek, the implementation of ECtHR judgements
and their supervision, in: EuGRZ (2003), 168 (168)].
220 Mellech, Die Rezeption der EMRK sowie der Urteile des EGMR in der franzö-
sischen und deutschen Rechtsprechung, 75 [The reception of the ECHR and the
judgements of the ECtHR in the French and German jurisdiction, 75].
221 Mellech, Die Rezeption der EMRK sowie der Urteile des EGMR in der franzö-
sischen und deutschen Rechtsprechung, 76. [The reception of the ECHR and
the judgements of the ECtHR in the French and German jurisdiction, 76].
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normative orientation function within the Community. The most impor-
tant advantage of the erga-omnes-effect is the avoidance of future com-
plaints against other Member States who are, in principle, not affected by
the legal force. The general effect of the judgements therefore disburden
the Court of justice and, at the same time, serve to avoid the conviction of
the other Member States.222
In the system of convergence of constitutional principles such as
ECOWAS’, one can assume that the jurisdiction by the Court of justice de-
velops an erga-omnes-effect toward all national courts of Member States.
The erga-omnes-binding effect has the advantage to avoid a divergent level
of protection through the Charter within the same legal system of the
Community.
This especially also applies to the Court of justice which represents a
pedagogic legal instrument within the overall legal system of the Commu-
nity. Thus, the decisions by the ECOWAS Court of Justice, in practice, act
as precedent for the courts of Member States and, in particular, for the
constitutional courts which play an exemplary role with regard to state
law. Therefore, a uniform human rights standard is established within the
constitutional order within the Community.223 It is the task of the Court
of Law to ensure a uniform West African standard for human rights. This
goal can only be reached if a uniform human rights development can be
achieved through its decisions. Just as at the European level (ECHR), the
Protocol on Good Governance promotes a common West African develop-
ment of human rights within the legal order of ECOWAS. At the Euro-
pean level, the German Federal Constitutional Court has rightly pointed
out that:
„[D]ie Heranziehung der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention
und der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Court of Law für Men-
schenrechte als Auslegungshilfe auf der Level des Verfassungsrechts
über den Einzelfall hinaus dient dazu, den Garantien der Menschen-
rechts- konvention in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland möglichst um-
222 Schilling, Deutscher Grundrechtsschutz zwischen staatlicher Souveränität und
menschen- rechtlicher Europäisierung [German constitutional protection be-
tween the sovereignty of the state and Europeanisation in terms of human
rights], 109.
223 Pache, Die europäische Menschenrechtskonvention und die deutsche Rechtsor-
dnung [The European Convention on Human Rights and the German legal sys-
tem], in: EuR (2004), 393 (409).
Chapter 3 Supranational Derogation of the Legal Force in Municipal Law
190
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748901808, am 26.10.2021, 13:00:44
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
fassend Geltung zu verschaf- fen, und kann darüber hinaus Verurtei-
lung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland vermeiden ver- helfen“.224
Furthermore, the orientation effect applies to the legislative, the judicial
and the executive powers. There are already examples of Member States
within theEuropean framework, who are not directly affected by a declara-
tory judgement by the ECtHR, but who have carried out precautionary le-
gal changes, in order to comply with the standard of the Convention
through jurisdiction by the ECtHR. Among these countries are the
Netherlands and Austria. Austria had namely, in the case Zimmermann
and Steiner vs Switzerland, taken action with the alleviation of the Consti-
tutional Court and the Supreme Administrative Court [sic].225 The Nether-
lands also reacted accordingly with the Act of 27/10/1982 to the effect of
the Marckx judgement vs Belgium on the discriminating regulations of the
Dutch legal system.226
The binding effect, however, goes beyond the individual case and gener-
ally takes effect on all national cases with the same criteria because, with
the conviction, the responding Member State carries three responsibilities
[sic], namely:
– The obligation of termination;
– The obligation of compensation and granting of just reparation;
– and the obligation to take measures to prevent further violations in the
future.
The two first obligations principally concern the decided case. The last
obligation refers to all further potential cases, which would lead to another
conviction of the Member State, should they end up before the ECOWAS
Court of Justice. It is precisely for this reason, that it is imperative that the
Member State concerned take measures to remove or, if necessary, put an
end to the offences which gave rise to the violation.227 The declaratory
judgements by the ECOWAS Court of Justice therefore serve as an inter-
224 BVerfGE [German Constitutional Court] 128, 326 (326).
225 Okresek, Die Umsetzung der EGMR-Urteile und ihre Überwachung [The im-
plementation of judgements by the ECtHR and their supervision], in: EuGRZ
(2003), 168 (170).
226 Zitiert nach: Okresek, Die Umsetzung der EGMR-Urteile und ihre
Überwachung [The implementation of judgements by the ECtHR and their su-
pervision], in: EuGRZ (2003), 168 (170).
227 Ress, Die Europäische Menschenrechtekonvention und die deutsche Rechtsord-
nung [The European Convention on Human Rights and the German legal sys-
tem], in: EuGRZ (1996), 337 (350).
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pretation aid for the affected Member State’s own national affairs. Hence,
the declaratory judgement develops a national multi-case legal effect.
Above all, the goal of the Amendment Agreement and the Protocol A/
SP.1/ 01/05 is to achieve a uniform adherence to the human rights as guar-
anteed by the Charter throughout the Community. After the case Koraou
e. g., no Member State would now allege that e.g. slavery is lawful in its
own legal system. This is because the ECOWAS Court of justice has al-
ready made a final decision that this conduct represents a serious violation
of the African Charter. Should there be similar conduct within a member
State that was not judicially reviewed, it should take national measures to
ensure that this violation is terminated. Therefore, this Member State has
the advantage of sparing itself of such a judicial review or to prevent it.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court of Justice creates the ba-
sis for a dialogue between the courts. The national legal practice of the
Member States is based on the case law of the Court of justice in order to
justify its own decisions. This dialogue can be implicit or explicit (dis-
cussed in more detailed in chapter 4).
Time-boundary of the legal force
The formal legal force takes effect at the time the judgement is announced.
This point in time is significant because it can only be measured by this
point in time whether any future complaint has already been covered by
the res judicata that took place. In other words: Should there be a future
plea relating to aspects of the object of the dispute, the Court of justice , in
order to assess a new individual complaint and to decide whether it con-
cerns the same case which it has already decided on, orientates itself on the
date of the announcement of the declaratory judgement.228 In this context,
the point in time is an important “repère“ regarding the assessment of the
legal force. Moreover, the point in time plays an important role with re-
gard to an application for review: in order to decide whether the points in
question in the application for review were already known to the individu-
al plaintiff at the point of the commencement of the res judicata. Should
this question be answered in the affirmative, then the application for re-
4.
228 Heckötter, Die Bedeutung der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention und
der Recht- sprechung des EGMR für die deutschen Gerichte [The meaning of
the European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisdiction of the ECtHR
for German courts], 43.
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view would be rejected as inadmissible (this has been dealt with in more
detail in chapter 2).
Legal consequences of the legal force for the convicted signatory state
Three types of obligations arise from the declaratory judgement with re-
gard to government liability principles under international law:
– The obligation to cease and desist;
– The obligation of reparation;
The obligation to accommodate reparation and the prevention of future vi-
olation through applicable preventive measures.229
This list means that the obligation to cease and desist (1) is to be differ-
entiated from the compensation obligation (2).230 The accommodation of
reparation or compensation and the prevention of future violation con-
form with the consequence in future time of the declaratory judgement (3)
The obligation to cease and desist
The obligation to cease and desist, or of “termination” regarding the viola-
tion of obligations under international law can be defined as the obliga-
tion by the Convention state to terminate a violation determined by an in-
stance under international law. This includes an obligation to remove or
stop a continuing unlawful offence under international law. The obliga-
tion to terminate, in a restrictive sense, can be deduced from Art. 1 of the
African Charter on Human Rights. Acc. to Art. 1 of the Charter:
« Les Etats Membres de L’Organisation de l’Unité Africaine, parties à
la présente Charte, reconnaissent les droits, devoirs et libertés énoncés
dans cette Charte et s’engagent à adopter des mesures législatives ou
autres pour les appliquer ».
III.
1.
229 Polakiewicz, Die Verpflichtungen der Staaten aus den Urteilen des Europä-
ischen Gerichts hofs für Menschenrechte [The obligations by the states arising
from the judgements by the European Court of Human Rights], 52 ff.
230 Polakiewicz, Die Verpflichtungen der Staaten aus den Urteilen des Europä-
ischen Gerichts- hofs für Menschenrechte [The obligations by the states arising
from the judgements by the European Court of Human Rights], 53.
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“The Member States of the Organisation of African Unity to the
present Charter shall recog- nize the rights, duties and freedoms en-
shrined in this Charter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or oth-
er measure to give effect to them”.
It can be deduced, by implication, that the Member States commit them-
selves to also refrain from all measures opposed to the rights within the
Charter.231 In case the ECOWAS Court of Justice determines a violation of
the Charter and the violation continues at the time of the declaration, the
Court of Law may order the convicted Member State to take measures at a
national level in order to terminate the violation. Along with this, the or-
der is to be seen as an appeal to the primary obligation of the Member
States stipulated in Art. 1 of the Charter.232 This is coherent: according to
the provision in Art. 1, the Member States are obliged to guarantee the hu-
man rights embedded in the Charter to all persons subject to their respec-
tive sovereign territory. Withholding the guaranteed human rights is a typ-
ical case of an ongoing violation.233 Should it be necessary for the decision
to establish that this obligation has been denied, the Court of justice is en-
titled to order the removal of the cause of the violation of the Conven-
tion.234 The obligation to terminate must hereby be regarded as the direct
consequence of the primary obligation.235
It can be noted from the aforementioned that the obligation to termi-
nate must be strictly differentiated from the obligation to compensate.
This distinction is important because, in terms of the legal consequences in
231 Heckötter, Die Bedeutung der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention und
der Rechtspre- chung des EGMR für die deutschen Gerichte [The meaning of
the European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisdiction of the ECtHR
for German courts], 49.
232 Vgl. Breuer, Zur Anordnung konkreter Abhilfemaßnahmen durch den EGMR
[Regarding the order of concrete corrective measure by the ECHR], in: EuGRZ
(2004), 257 (259); Verdross/Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht [Universal Interna-
tional law], 3rd edition, § 1294.
233 Polakiewicz, Die Verpflichtung der Staaten aus den Urteilen des Europäischen
Court of Law für Menschenrechte [The obligations by the states arising from
the judgements by the European Court of Human Rights], 64.
234 Heckötter, Die Bedeutung der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention und
der Rechtsprechung des EGMR für die deutschen Gerichte [The meaning of the
European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisdiction of the ECtHR for
German courts], 49.
235 Vgl. Breuer, Zur Anordnung konkreter Abhilfemaßnahmen durch den EGMR
[Regarding the order of concrete corrective measure by the ECHR], in: EuGRZ
(2004), 257 (260).
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the area of a state’s responsibility, additional measures may be required
from the responsible signatory state.236 The obligation of non-recurrence as
well as the obligation of termination may be considered.237 Ultimately, the
obligation of termination can be understood as the obligation to remove
the cause of the violation. The best way to terminate a violation of interna-
tional law is via legislative reforms of national law. In this regard, the ICJ
explains in its interpretation of the Avena-case:
« Un Etat qui a valablement contracté des obligations internationales
est tenu d’apporter à sa législation les modifications nécessaires pour
assurer l’exécution de des engagements pris ».238
Thus, the obligation of compensation is also included.
The obligation of compensation
In contrast to the obligation of termination, the obligation of compensa-
tion is the duty of the convicted Member State to reverse the activity of vi-
olation as much as possible. All measures should thus be taken in order to
reach a situation as if the violation had not occurred. In this sense, the
reparation could qualify as an obligation to eliminate the consequences of
this act and restore the orderly condition.239 The Permanent International
Court of Justice summarises the obligation to eliminate the consequences
as follows:
2.
236 Verdross/Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht, 3. edition, § 1294; so auch: Hecköt-
ter, Die Bedeu- tung der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention und der
Rechtsprechung des EGMR für die deutschen Gerichte [The meaning of the
European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisdiction of the ECtHR for
German courts], 50.
237 Breuer, Zur Anordnung konkreter Abhilfemaßnahmen durch den EGMR [Re-
garding the order of concrete corrective measure by the ECHR], in: EuGRZ
(2004), 257 (260).
238 CIJ, Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 31 mars 2004 en l’Affaire Avena et
autres res- sortissants mexicains (Mexique c. États-Unis d’Amérique), Arrêt du
19 janvier 2009, par 8.
239 Heckötter, Die Bedeutung der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention und
der Rechtsprechung des EGMR für die deutschen Gerichte [The meaning of the
European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisdiction of the ECtHR for
German courts], 50 f.
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« [L]e principe essentiel qui découle de la notion même d’acte illicite
et qui semble se dégager de la pratique internationale, notamment de
la jurisprudence des tribunaux arbitraux, est que la réparation doit, au-
tant que possible, effacer toutes les conséquences de l’acte illicite et ré-
tablir l’état qui aurait vraisemblablement existé si ledit acte n’avait pas
été commis».240
No easier escape route241 may be provided under international law that
would stand in the way of the obligation of compensation by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. Should such misconduct be present, yet another vi-
olation of International Law would exist because, after a declaration of un-
conventionality, the Member State in question carries an obligation to
reach results. Based on the declaratory judgement, all opposing national le-
gal acts must be set aside.242
Order to reinstate the initial proceedings in the operative part of the
judgement
As shown, the responsible signatory state carries a triple obligation of
transposition under international law: the obligation to terminate, to com-
pensate and to prevent comparable acts in the future. Thus, importance
must further be attached to the legal nature of the act by the state that vio-
lates international law. When it comes to judgements regarding the viola-
tion of international law, the resumption of the initial proceedings repre-
sents an appropriate remedy to implement the declaratory judgement on a
national level. This view can also be justified through the jurisdiction by
the ECtHR. In more recent decisions which involved violations of proce-
dural safeguards, the ECtHR always stresses the point that the appropriate
form of compensation is in principle the provision of new proceedings or
a.
240 Affaire relative à l’usine de CHORZÓW (demande en indemnité) (fond), CPJI,
Série A N° 17 (13/09/1928), 47.
241 Cremer, Zur Bindungswirkung von EGMR-Urteilen. Anmerkung zum
Görgülü-Beschluß des BVerfG vom 14.10.2004, in: EuGRZ (2004), 683 (692).
[Regarding the binding effect of judgements by the ECtHR. [Comment regard-
ing the Görgülü judgement by the Federal Constitutional Court of] 14/10/2004,
in: EuGRZ (2004), 683 (692);].
242 Okresek, Die Umsetzung der EGMR-Urteile und ihre Überwachung, in: Eu-
GRZ (2003),
168 (171) [see also: Okresek, the implementation of ECtHR judgements and
their supervision, in: EuGRZ (2003), 168 (171)].
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the resumption of the proceedings on application by the concerned party
under national law.243Thus, a renewed assessment of the object of the dis-
pute must take place with particular regard to the ECOWAS decision. This
is the logical way to do justice to the national obligation to terminate the
measure in violation of human rights. For the convicted state, the finding
of the violation means the existence of an offence under international law.
The existence of this offence under international law,244 arising from the
conviction, triggers the termination or the elimination obligation of the
offence that led to the conviction.
The judgement by the ECOWAS Court of Justice constitutes a perfor-
mance-triggering declaratory judgement. The decision by the ECOWAS
Court is, in principle, a declaratory judgement. However, this declaratory
judgement gives rise to an obligation of the responsible Member State.
Arising from the declaratory judgement, a duty to act is laid on the respon-
sible contracting state.
From this, the Court can or should indirectly make provision for the im-
plementation of its judgement. This is done by way of ordering concrete
measures in the tenor of the judgement. The Court of justice would make
an important contribution to the effective implementation of the judge-
ment by ordering the implementing measures in the tenor of the declara-
tory judgement in order to fully comply with the restoration obligation
(Cudak, Seydovic und Görgülü).245 Although the Court of Justice does not
avail of any competence to directly intervene in the national legal system,
there are numerous ways in which the ECOWAS Court of justice can ex-
plicitly point to a certain measure that may provide a remedy for the re-
moval of the national human rights violation. The ECtHR has sometimes
made use of this method of wording in its recent jurisdiction, in order to
243 Peukert, in: Frowein/Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention. EMRK-
Kommen tar, [European Human Rights Convention. ECHR commentary],
3rd edition, Art. 6, Rn. 140, 185; Breuer, Zur Anordnung konkreter Abhilfe-
maßnahmen durch den EGMR, in: EuGRZ (2004), 257 (263); Rohleder, Grun-
drechtsschutz im europäischen Mehrebenen- system [Protection of human
rights in the European multi-level system], 76; CEDH, N. 71503/01, Arrêt
(08.04.2004), Affaire Assanidzé c. Géorgie, par. 202; CEDH, Nr. 15869/02, Arrêt
(23/03/2010), Affaire Cudac c. Lituanie, par. 79; CEDH, Nr. 1620/03, Arrêt
(28.06.2012), Affaire Schütz c. Allemagne, par. 17.
244 Schilling, Deutscher Grundrechtsschutz zwischen staatlicher Souveränität und
menschen- rechtlicher Europäisierung [Protection of the German constitutional
law between state sovereignty and Europeanisation], 110.
245 Rohleder, Grundrechtsschutz im europäischen Mehrebenensystem [Protection
of constitutional law in the European multi-level system], 141.
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explain to the convicted Member State, which results the ECtHR expects
from the declaratory judgement. In its Görgülü-decision of 26 February
2004, the ECtHR pointed out that from the obligation in Art. 46 ECHR
“follows e.g. that a judgement in which the Court of justice observes a vio-
lation, obligates the responding state in legal terms not only to a just com-
pensation of the concerned parties, but also to possibly take individual
measures regarding its national legal system under the auspices of the min-
isterial committee, in order to stop the violation determined by the Court
of justice and to remedy the consequences as much as possible.“246 After
the establishment of an infringement, the convicted Member State must
do or refrain from doing something. The continuation of the situation
which existed before thedeclaratory judgement constitutes an ongoing of-
fence by the convicted signatory state. In this respect, and with regard to
the system of protection by the ECOWAS Court of Justice, these questions
may also be asked: How is the enforcement by way of the individual com-
plaint procedure before the ECOWAS Court of Justice useful if no repara-
tion is carried out at a national level after the finding of a violation of the
Charter? Thus, the question of the result-oriented binding legal effect of
the declaratory judgement arises. It follows that the tenor of the judge-
ment, as well as the salient reasons for the decision, should be regarded as
a unit because the salient reasons for the decision are signposts regarding
the implementation of the declaratory judgement: the main reasons for the
decision in the declaratory judgement already provide information regard-
ing the national conduct, in which the wrongdoing is rooted. The order,
especially in the tenor of the judgement, has the advantage of being able to
accelerate the implementation of the declaratory judgement.247
However, it should be clarified that the manner in which the state is ex-
pected to render compensation is left to the convicted state’s discretion.
However, the binding requirement and the efficiency of the declaratory
judgement by the Court of justice is to be observed. The logical way to
achieve an effective implementation of declaratory judgements, is to repeal
the legally binding national decision in violation of human rights. The law
246 ECtHR, Urteil vom 26.02.2004, G.v. Deutschland, Beschwerde Nr. 74969/01,
Ziff. 64.
[Judgement of 26/02/2004, G.v. Germany, complaint No. 74969/01, clause 64.
247 Schaffarzik, Europäische Menschenrechte unter der Ägide des Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht, in: Die öffentliche Verwaltung. Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht
und Verwaltungswissenschaft (2005), 860 (864). [European human rights under
the aegis of the Federal Constitutional Court, in: The Public Administration.
Magazine for Public Law and Administrative Science (2005), 860 (864).].
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of state responsibility represents the fundamental basis of this obligation
under international law. The obligation deriving from the compensation
means that the guarantee under procedural law as per Art. 7 paragraph 1
of the Charter must be included in formal and substantive terms. The safe-
guarding of the procedural guarantee (the admissibility of the individual
complaint and the associated declaratory judgement by the ECOWAS
Court of Justice) has the purpose of ensuring the exercise of the plaintiff’s
substantive human rights. This institution of legal force does not preclude
the obligation to repeal. The legal force is ensured in such a manner if the
underlying national judgement does not infringe on the obligation under
international law of the prosecuted Member State. The legally binding de-
cisions by national courts of law are not sacrosanct based on these obliga-
tions by the state under international law.
Justification of the order to reinstate
The resumption of the original national proceedings in violation of hu-
man rights is an effective means of reparation. There are many reasons in
favourof such an approach. First of all, the declaration by the Court of jus-
tice does not possess direct national executive power. As a result of the fact
that the decisions by the Court do not have a direct penetrative effect re-
garding the national judgements in violation of human rights, the Court
of justice does not have the competence to repeal the national judgement.
Secondly, the national courts have a greater degree of factual proximity
and can therefore better judge the concrete circumstances of the case
which should lead to the effective implementation of the declaratory
judgement. Moreover, the ECOWAS Court of Justice may not speculate
with regard to the result of the original national proceedings. In fact, it is
unthinkable that the judges in Abuja ask themselves the question: How
would the proceeding have ended if the national violation by the Constitu-
tional Court had not taken place? In other words: How would the national
constitutional complaint have proceeded if the Constitutional Court had
complied with the right to a fair trial provided for in Art. 7 Abs. 1 of the
Charter? The ECOWAS Court of Justice cannot consider such questions in
the declaratory judgement. It cannot therefore predict the answer.
The resumption of the original proceedings after the conviction of the
Member State also provides practical reasons for justification. The national
Constitutional Court is closer to the facts and can therefore judge the case
better, while considering the main arguments the ECOWAS Court of Jus-
b.
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tice made. The initiation of the possibility to resume also takes the
sovereignty of the sued Member State into consideration. Furthermore, the
ECOWAS Court of Justice is, as a general rule, not a trial judge. The initia-
tion of trial resumption in favour of the convicted plaintiff represents the
logical solution of the comparison between res judicata and restitutio in in-
tegrum. The answer to the question regarding the result of the original na-
tional proceedings in violation of human rights can only be comprehen-
sively answered by the Constitutional Court considering the salient points
made by the ECOWAS Court of Justice. The resumption of the national
complaint proceedings therefore offers the only way to fulfil the obligation
of the prosecuted Member State as per the convention in the case of con-
cluded violations.
Obligation to take preventative measures
This requires the convicted Member State to take all measures necessary to
prevent a repetition of the criminal misconduct in future cases. The pre-
ventive obligations of the convicted Member State are owed in certain cas-
es. Should the declaratory judgement e.g. show a structural deficit in the
national organisation of courts, the defendant signatory state is subject to
an obligation to take preventive measures.248 The guarantees of non-repeti-
tion of the wrongful act249 are seen by Arangio-Ruiz even as an obligation of
result.250 This view is accurate because the obligations under international
law, especially in the area of human rights, possess an objective character.
Beyond the case that was decided, the convicted member State is expected
to take measures to prevent a repetition. The causes that could give rise to
future offences are to be removed as a precautionary measure. In this con-
text, ECtHR correctly pointed out in the Deweer case 251:
3.
248 Polakiewicz, Die Verpflichtung der Staaten aus den Urteilen des Europäischen
Court of Law für Menschenrechte [The obligations by the states arising from
the judgements by the European Court of Human Rights], 155.
249 Arangio-Ruiz, Second Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/425
(09/06/1989), § 148 ff.
250 Arangio-Ruiz, Second Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc. A/CN.4/425
(09/06/1989), § 157.
251 ECtHR, Urteil vom 27.2.1980, Nr. 6903/75 [judgement of 27/2/1980, no.
6903/75] – Deweer v. Belgien [Belgium] = EuGRZ 1980, 667.
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« [A]u surplus, les paragraphes 1 et 2 de l’article 11 de la loi de 1945–
1971 restent en vigueur […], de sorte que qu’ils peuvent à chaque ins-
tant donner lieu à une application combinée comme dans le cas de M.
Deweer. Le principal problème soulevé par l’affaire demeure par conséquent
posé; il dépasse la personne et les intérêts du requérant et de ses héritiers. »252
A further reason for the obligation to take preventive measures is that the
individual legal situation of the plaintiff is paramount in the declaratory
judgement. The Court of justice rather postulates the misconduct of the
Member State in the declaratory judgement. Therefore, the convicted sig-
natory state must restore the legal situation of the plaintiff under interna-
tional law, but must also take measures to prevent similar cases in the fu-
ture. The Court of justice doesn’t have to stipulate such follow-up mea-
sures in the tenor of the judgement. Taking into account the finding in the
individual case, the obligation to take preventive general measures in fu-
ture is activated.253 The objective obligation stemming from the declarato-
ry judgement is thereby finally affirmed.254 In general, three types of pre-
ventive measures can be differentiated..255 They involve the publication of
the declaratory judgement and the announcement of the same to the na-
tional authorities. Moreover, the convicted Member State should intro-
duce reforms designed to prevent similar violations in the future. As a last
consequence of the declaratory judgement, it must be considered that in-
structions should be given to the enforcement authorities to take the
252 ECtHR, Urteil vom 27.2.1980, Nr. 6903/75, Ziff. 38[judgement of 27/2/1980,
no. 6903/75, clause 38], Deweer v. Belgien [Belgium] = EuGRZ 1980, 667
(Hervorhebung des Verfassers) [(emphasis by the author)].
253 Polakiewicz, Die Verpflichtung der Staaten aus den Urteilen des Europäischen
Court of Law für Menschenrechte [The obligations by the states arising from
the judgements by the European Court of Human Rights], 153.
254 Ress, „Die Einzelfallbezogenheit“ in der Rechtsprechung des Europäischen
Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte, in: Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung – Interna-
tionale Gerichtsbarkeit – Menschenrechte, FS für H. Mosler [The relatedness of
“the individual case” in the jurisdiction by the European Court of Human
Rights, in: International law as a legal system – international jurisprudence –
human rights, FS for H. Mosler] (1983), 719 (744).
255 Polakiewicz, Die Verpflichtung der Staaten aus den Urteilen des Europäischen
Court of Law für Menschenrechte [The obligations by the states arising from
the judgements by the European Court of Human Rights], 150 f.
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declaratory judgement into account with regards to their areas of compe-
tence.256
The Member States not participating in the individual proceedings are
excluded from the formal res judicata. Although the declaratory judge-
ment has no effect regarding the judgement towards the Member States
that are not part of the proceedings, the declaratory judgements by the
ECOWAS Court of Justice have a regulatory character of the African Char-
ter within the Community. The declaratory judgements raising fundamen-
tal normative questions of general importance, such as the prohibition of
slavery, should be implemented by all Member States within their respec-
tive sovereign territories.
In conclusion, other Member States are factually bound by declaratory
judgements. The Member States should be bound to the decisions by the
Court of justice in the same way that they are bound to the instruments of
the Community. Particularly because the regulation regarding the binding
effect (Art. 15 paragraph 4 of the Amendment Agreement) makes no
difference between the binding effect on the parties to the agreement par-
ticipating and not participating in the proceedings. Due to this silence of
the text, the legal effect must be deduced from general rules of internation-
al law. Moreover, the objective meaning of the regulation in Art. 15 para-
graph 4 of the Amendment Agreement should be taken into account in
the legal effect of the declaratory judgement. From the aforesaid it can
thus be established: the declaratory judgement by the Court of justice does
not establish a cross-case effect for the entire legal order of the Community
according to the analogous interpretation of Art. 15 paragraph 4 of the
Amendment Agreement.257 Therefore, in principle, no legal obligation to
implement the judgement arises for the signatory states that are not part of
the proceedings. However, a declaratory judgement represents the current
meaning of the African Charter for the entire legal order of the Communi-
ty. Therefore, a quasi erga-omnes-effect is ascribed to the declaratory judge-
ments.
256 Polakiewicz, Die Verpflichtung der Staaten aus den Urteilen des Europäischen
Court of Law für Menschenrechte [The obligations by the states arising from
the judgements by the European Court of Human Rights], 150.
257 Rohleder, Grundrechtsschutz im europäischen Mehrebenensystem [Protection
of constitutional law in the European multi-level system], 230.
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Justification for Breaching the Legal Force: Function to Close Loopholes
At this stage, the question must be asked of how the human rights compe-
tence of the ECOWAS Court of Justice can be explained. There are two
fundamental justifications, namely the structural problems within the na-
tional law of some of the Member States (I) as well as the bias of the na-
tional courts in some of the cases (II). However, the human rights compe-
tence of the Court of justice is accompanied with several problems (III).
Entry Barriers for individual complaints according to national law
It must be pointed out upfront that the constitutional acknowledgement
of the rule of law and the civil and human rights have become a reality in
the process of democratisation.258 Nevertheless, the rights and principles
have yet to be implemented by the Constitutional Court. The constitution-
al regulations are faced, in particular, with a certain resistance by the state
authorities.259 That is because there is a long tradition of authoritarian
regimes on the African continent with a concentration of state authorities
in favour of a single executive.260 The complete overview of the legal sys-
tem of the ECOWAS Member States paints a colourful picture of the possi-
bility of access to the constitutional complaint. On the one hand, there are
Member States which permit constitutional complaints. On the other
hand, there are Member States that impose strict access requirements. This,
in turn, constitutes a contravention of the right to an effective com-
G.
I.
258 Du Bois de Gaudusson, Défense et Illustration du constitutionnalisme en
Afrique après quinze ans de pratique du pouvoir, in: Renouveau du droit consti-
tutionnel. Mélanges en l’honneur de Louis Favoreu, 609 (611).
259 Du Bois de Gaudusson, Défense et Illustration du constitutionnalisme en
Afrique après quinze ans de pratique du pouvoir, in: Renouveau du droit consti-
tutionnel. Mélanges en l’honneur de Louis Favoreu, 609 (617); Diop, La Justice
constitutionnelle au Sénégal. Éssai sur l’evolution, les enjeux et les réformes
d’un contre-pouvoir juridictionnel, 263.
260 Gonidec, Constitutionnalismes Africains, in: African journal of international
and compara- tive Law (1996), 23 (43); Benedek, Durchsetzung von Rechten des
Menschen und der Völker in Afrika auf regionaler und nationaler Ebene [En-
forcing the rights of the individual and the peoples in Africa on a regional and
national level], in: ZaöRV (1994), 150 (151).
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plaint.261 Lastly, there are signatory states who make access to the Constitu-
tional Court or an equally legal instance possible but obstruct the actual
realisation of this possibility.
The principle of subsidiarity in international law is based on the funda-
mental idea that the obligation to adhere to agreements under internation-
al law is first and foremost the task of the signatory states. In order to en-
force the rights in the African Charter, the signatory states represent the
original addressees of such obligations.262 International law entrusts, so to
speak, the respective contracting party with the adherence to these obliga-
tions. Since the signatory states have a priority position regarding the ad-
herence to the obligations under international law, they must provide for
national measures and procedures that lead to the adherence of these obli-
gations. Only once it has been determined that a signatory state cannot ful-
fil or has violated its obligation is the international instance called upon, as
a subsidiary remedy, by which to enforce international law.
What does it mean when the signatory state cannot fulfil its obligation?
This means that the state has not taken measures to fulfil its obligations
under international law. Alternatively, the signatory state has taken such
measures but they turn out to be insufficient.
Within the ECOWAS legal system, the task of monitoring the adherence
to the African Charter falls directly on the ECOWAS Court of Justice with-
out the need for national legal remedies having to have been exhausted.263
How can the derogation of the general practice of international law be ex-
plained within the ECOWAS human rights protection? There are several
reasons for this: on the one hand, human rights complaints are either not
admissible before national courts or they are admissible, but the require-
ments for admissibility are strict.264 On the other hand, the direct admissi-
bility of the individual complaint is to be remedied by the principle of ef-
fective legal protection.
Among the signatory states that allow constitutional complaints without
such strict admissibility requirements is, first of all, Benin (Art. 122 of the
261 Nicaise, Jurisprudence constitutionnelle, in: Afrilex N°4, 353 (359), available at
http://  cerdradi.u-bordeaux4.fr/la-revue-afrilex.html (last accesses on
20/01/2015).
262 Breuer, Staatshaftung für judikatives Unrecht, 3.
263 Onoria, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the ex-
haustion of local remedies under the African Charter, in: African Human
Rights Law (2003), 1 (3).
264 Österdahl, Implementing Human Rights in Africa. The African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights and Individual Communications, 173.
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Constitution of Benin). With regard to such Member States, it can be pre-
sumed that they have theoretically fulfilled their procedural legal obliga-
tion to protect under Art. 7 paragraph 1 of the Charter. However, in many
other Member States, such as Togo for example, individual constitutional
complaints are strictly inadmissible. It will be discussed in the following
how the inadmissibility of the constitutional complaint (1) and the strict
requirements for the individual constitutional complaint (2) justify the di-
rect constitutional role of the ECOWAS Court of Justice. This legal situa-
tion forms the basis ofthe role of the ECOWAS Court of Justice as a guar-
antor of effective legal protection in West African States (3).
Inadmissibility of a national human rights complaint
First of all, we will look at the Member States that do not allow an individ-
ual constitutional complaint. The primary obligation to adhere to human
rights and fundamental freedoms is provided for by the Member States of
the ECOWAS Community. It is therefore necessary that the Member
States open up constitutional guarantees to their citizens in order to fulfil
this obligation. It is regrettable that many Member States do not allow in-
dividual constitutional complaints access to the Constitutional Court.
Art. 99 of the Togolese Constitution stipulates:
« La Cour constitutionnelle est la plus haute juridiction en matière
constitutionnelle. Elle est juge de la constitutionnalité de la loi et elle
garantit les droits fondamentaux de la personne humaine et les libertés
publiques. Elle est l’organe régulateur du fonctionnement des institu-
tions et de l’activité des pouvoirs publics ».
From a substantive point of view, this regulation sufficiently guarantees in-
dividual rights and fundamental freedoms. With this constitutional regu-
lation, it is certain that the Togolese Constitution guarantees human rights
and that the Constitutional Court monitors the fundamental rights and
freedoms of the people. However, neither in the constitution nor in the
supplementary constitutional act265 is there any reference to how citizens
can legally exercise the rights guaranteed under the constitution. In terms
of competence, the question must be asked as to whether constitutional
law allows constitutional complaints by natural and legal persons directly
before the constitutional court as the Constitutional Court represents the
1.
265 See Art. 27 to 32 of the Loi Organique (Togo) N°2004–004 of 01/03/2004.
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natural guardian of fundamental freedoms.266 However, a direct constitu-
tional complaint by natural and legal persons to the Constitutional Court
is, on closer inspection of the constitutional regulations and the rules of
procedure of the Constitutional Court, not admissible. This means that
whilst human rights are sufficiently guaranteed in the constitution, there
are no procedural guarantees to realise these rights. Therefore, the To-
golese Constitutional Court has declared a complaint by members of par-
liament in the initial proceedings to be inadmissible. Furthermore, the
court confirms that there are no legal remedies against its judgements:
« Qu’aucune autorité civile ou militaire, qu’aucune institution, fut-elle
internationale, ne peut s’opposer à une décision de la Cour».267
These findings already represent an infringement against the procedural
guarantee as per Art. 7 paragraph 1 of the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights.268 The only possibility to find a judicial guarantee of indi-
vidual human rights in the Togolese constitutional system is the co-called
procedure of Exception dʼinconstitutionnalité.269 This procedure only affects
the complaint with regard to the unconstitutionality of a law. Even in this
case, natural persons are not directly admissible before the Constitutional
Court with regard to a complaint. On the contrary, they must prove the
objection of unconstitutionality of the act before the national courts. The
national courts alone are directly entitled to make submissions for the pro-
cedure Exception dʼinconstitutionnalité before the Constitutional Court.
Moreover, another question arises concerning which constitutional guar-
antee applies if the act has entered into force in a constitutional manner
but is used by legal practitioners and authorities in an unconstitutional
manner. The constitution is quiet on this point. Therefore, citizens are
powerless against much injustice by the judiciary and against the unconsti-
266 Nicaise, Jurisprudence constitutionnelle, in: Afrilex N°4, 353 (359), Available at
http:// cerdradi.u-bordeaux4.fr/la-revue-afrilex.html (last accessed on
20/01/2015).
267 Cour constitutionnelle du Togo, Décision N°E-002/2011 vom 22. June 2011,
available at: http://www.courconstitutionnelle.tg/ (last accessed on 22/06/2015).
268 Germelmann, Das rechtliche Gehör vor Gericht im europäischen Recht, 29.
269 Art. 104 paragr. 6 Constitution of Togo of 14 October 1992; Art. 96 paragr. 4
Constitution of Guinea of 07 May 2010; Art. 96 Constitution of Ivory Coast of
23 July 2000. Vgl. Abebe, Towards more liberal standing rules to enforce consti-
tutional rights in Ethiopia, in: African Human Rights Law (2010), 407 (418).
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tutional behaviour of the executive.270 Thus, just to take the case of Togo,
in February 2005, once Faure Gnassingbé271 came to power, many human
rights violations and constitutional infractions were determined, but as a
constitutional judge wrote: the Constitutional Court could not take action
in this case, as there was no possibility in the constitutional system for the
Constitutional Court to make an official decision.272
Strict prerequisites for admissibility for the human rights complaint
There are also constitutional systems which provide for the possibility of a
constitutional complaint. The prerequisites are, however, so selective that
theyrarely lead to an effective constitutional guarantee.273 It is, however,
well-known that the Constitutional Court represents a „rampart“ of funda-
mental rights in a democratic system.274 Especially for this reason, a restric-
tion of the prerequisite of admissibility before Constitutional Courts is, at
the same time, an impairment of individual human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms. Indeed, e.g. the constitutional system of Togo allows the con-
stitutional complaint but also requires the meeting of conditions, making
its realisation more difficult [sic].275 The legal situation constitutes a seri-
ous and ongoing violation of the constitutional guarantee with regard to
the rights in the African Charter because the constitutional complaint
counts as one of the procedural guarantees. Unfortunately, this is not the
case in some Member States within the ECOWAS legal system. Acc. to
Art. 152 of the Constitution of Burkina Faso, e.g., those who are entitled
2.
270 Onoria, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the ex-
haustion of local remedies under the African Charter, in: African Human
Rights Law (2003), 1 (21).
271 The current State President of Togo.
272 Maman-Sani, Vacance de la présidence de la République: la constitution togo-
laise à l’épreuve des faits, in: Revue nigérienne de droit (2006), 11 (28).
273 Koussetogue Koude, Peut-on à bon droit parler d’une conception africaine des
droits de l’homme?, in: Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de l’Homme (2005), 539
(541).
274 Diop, La justice constitutionnelle au Sénégal. Éssai sur l’evolution, les enjeux et
les réfor- mes d’un contre-pouvoir juridictionnel, 254.
275 Benedek, Durchsetzung von Rechten des Menschen und der Völker in Afrika
auf regionaler und nationaler Level [Enforcing the rights of the individual and
the peoples in Africa on a regional and national level], in: ZaöRV (1994), 150
(151).
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to submit a complaint to the Constitutional Court are stipulated rather re-
strictively:
« Le Conseil constitutionnel est saisi par le Président du Faso, le Pre-
mier Ministre, le Présent de l’Assemblée Nationale, et un cinquième
(1/5) au moins des membres de l’Assemblée Na- tionale ».276
These prerequisites for admission represent a limitation of the right to an
effective complaint.277 This should be corrected at ECOWAS-level particu-
larly because it does not represent a “self-executing“ instrument under inter-
national law.278 In order to allow implementation at a national level, the
constitutional systems of the Member States recognise the African Charter
as a firm component of the bloc de constitutionnalité.279 Nevertheless, one
must wait and see how those seeking justice will be able to exercise the
provisions of the African Charta in court.280
276 The requirements have been relatively more favourable under the new constitu-
tion after the completion of the first edition of this book. See Art. 157 of the Loi
Constitutionnelle N°072-2015/CNT amending the Constitution of Burkina Fa-
so.
277 Onoria, The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the ex-
haustion of local remedies under the African Charter, in: African Human
Rights Law (2003), 1 (21).
278 Flauss, L’effectivité de la Charte Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples
dans l’or- dre juridiques des Etats Parties contractantes: Bilan et Perspectives, in:
Flauss/Lambert-Abdelgawad (Publ.), L’application nationale de la Charte afri-
caine des droits de l’homme et des peuples, 247 (249).
279 Flauss, L’effectivité de la Charte Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples
dans l’or- dre juridiques des Etats Parties contractantes: Bilan et Perspectives, in:
Flauss/Lambert-Abdelgawad (Publ.), L’application nationale de la Charte afri-
caine des droits de l’homme et des peuples, 247 (248).
280 Flauss, L’effectivité de la Charte Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples
dans l’ordre juridiques des Etats Parties contractantes: Bilan et Perspectives, in:
Flauss/Lambert-Abdelgawad (Publ.), L’application nationale de la Charte afri-
caine des droits de l’homme et des peuples, 247 (249).
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The ECOWAS Court of Justice as guarantor of the effective protection
of human rights
As shown in the introduction of the present paper, the ECOWAS Court of
Justice did not originally constitute a human rights court.281 The settling
of human rights disputes at continental level was reserved for other institu-
tions. The signatory states of the Charter became aware that the actual im-
provements of the human rights situation at continental level require pro-
cedural mechanisms.282 In order to specify this finding, two institutions
were installed. The African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights
was adopted in 1981. Art. 1 prescribes the signatory states with the prima-
ry obligation to observe human rights as stipulated in the Charter. The or-
gans of the convention put in place to monitor the contractual obligations
are the African Commission as well as the African Court on Human and
People´sRights.283 In principle, the African Court on Human Rights and
Peoples’ Rights embodies the natural monitoring organ in regards to the
guaranteed human rights in the African Charter. This Court , in particular,
has the authority to determine a human rights violation on application by
individual complainants and to order corrective measures. The judgement
of the African Court develops a binding effect for the signatory states.
The African Commission for Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights was es-
tablished acc. to the instructions in Art. 30 of the Charter. Therefore, the
doctrine describes the Commission as the primary judiciary body on the
African continent.284 Regarding its mandate, the Commission avails of an
extensive authority. According to the regulation in Art. 45 paragraph 2 of
the Charter, the following subjects of reference are bestowed on the Com-
mission: the promotion of human rights and peoples’ rights; protection of
3.
281 Ebobrah, A rights-protection goldmine or a waiting volcanic eruption? Compe-
tence of, and access to, the human rights jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Commu-
nity Court of Justice, in: African Human Rights Law Journal (2007), 307 (312);
Ndiaye, La protection des droits de l’homme par la Cour de justice de la
CEDEAO, Mémoire de Master II, Université Montesquieux Bordeaux IV, 14.
282 Gumedze, Bringing communication before the African Commission on Human
Rights and Peoples’ Rights, in: African Human Rights Law Journal (2003), 118
(128).
283 Österdahl, Implementing Human Rights in Africa. The African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights and Individual Communications, 177.
284 Ebobrah, Legitimacy and feasibility of human rights realisation through region-
al economic communities in Africa: the case of ECOWAS, 85; Elsheikh, The fu-
ture relationship between the African Court and the African Commission, in:
African Human Rights Law Journal (2002), 252 (253).
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human rights and peoples’ rights; interpretation of the regulations in the
Charter on request by a state party, an organ of the then OAU (Organisa-
tion of African Unity) or of an organisation recognised by the OAU. This
list and sequence clarify which weight is laid on human rights regarding
the Commission’s function. In addition, the Commission represents an in-
vestigative Commission (Art. 45 paragraph 1 of the Charter). Regarding
the procedure before the Commission, it must be stated that the complaint
by a state was preferred to the individual complaint. Generally, the signa-
tory states may submit complaints directly to the Commission (Art. 49 of
the Charter). Regarding the individual complaint before the Commission,
one must use the interpretation of Art. 55 paragraph 1 as there is no clear
definition for the individual complaint according to the wording of the
regulation. Rather, they are recorded in Art. 55 paragraph 1 of the Charter
as other “notifications“. On the other hand, individual complaints are not
directly admissible before the Commission. The possibility of access for in-
dividual complaints has been restricted by the fact that the chairperson of
the Commission must, with regard to submitted notifications, obtain the
votes of the members of the Commission before each session. The mem-
bers of the Commission then decide with an absolute majority of votes
(Art. 55 of the Charter). The fundamental prerequisite for this is the ex-
haustion of the national legal procedures (Art. 56 paragraph 5 of the Char-
ter). With regard to the binding effect, it must be pointed out that the de-
cisions are not binding (Art. 59 of the Charter). However, the Commission
has slowly developed recommendations.285
The human rights mission by the Commission was apparently not suffi-
cient.286 Not only were the possibilities of submission limited to the per-
sons entitled to complain, but the decisions by the Commission were also
not binding. Therefore, the signatory states of the organisation of the
African Union adopted an Additional Protocol to the Charter with regard
to the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights in the year 1998. This
took effect in January 2004. This allowed the first judges of the African
Court on Human and Peoples' Rights to take office.287 In July 2004, it had
285 Ebobrah, Legitimacy and feasibility of human rights realisation through region-
al economic communities in Africa: the case of ECOWAS, 85.
286 Ebobrah, Legitimacy and feasibility of human rights realisation through region-
al economic communities in Africa: the case of ECOWAS, 87; Wachira, African
Court on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights: Ten years on and still no justice,
8.
287 Ebobrah, Legitimacy and feasibility of human rights realisation through region-
al economic communities in Africa: the case of ECOWAS, 87.
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been decided that the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights
should become part of the African Court of Justice.288 This proposal was
adopted by the signatory states with the passing of an Additional Protocol
regarding theAfrican Court of Justice in 2009.289 However, the Protocol re-
garding the African Court of Justice has developed the control system at a
continental level very carefully, so that the rights embedded in the Charter
in favour of the individual can hardly be realised. Indeed, a separate decla-
ration of submission by the signatory states is required for the admissibility
of the individual complaint. In this context, Art. 8 paragraph 3 of Additio-
nal Protocol (2009) stipulates:
« Tout Etat partie, au moment de la signature ou du dépôt de son ins-
trument de ratification ou d’adhésion, ou à tout autre période après
l’entrée en vigueur du Protocole peut faire une dé- claration acceptant
la compétence de la Cour pour recevoir les requêtes énoncées à l’article
30 (f) et concernant un Etat partie qui n’a pas fait cette déclaration».
“Any Member State may, at the time of signature or when depositing
its instrument of ratifi- cation or accession, or at any time thereafter,
make a declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive
cases under Article 30 (f) involving a State which has not made such a
declaration.”
It is hereby confirmed that individual complaints are not automatically ad-
missible before the African Court of Justice (human rights section). There-
fore, the new African Court of Justice does not automatically have jurisdic-
tion over individual complaints.290 The individual complain arguing an in-
fringement of the Charter is only admissible if the Member State con-
288 Kindiki, The Proposed Integration of the African Court of Justice and the
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Legal difficulties and merits, in:
African Journal of International and Comparative Law (2007–2009), 138 (138);
Ipsen, Völkerrecht [International Law], 6. edition, § 7, Rn. 13; Dujardin, La
Cour Africaine de Justice et des Droits de l’Homme: Un Projet de fusion oppor-
tune et progressiste des juridictions panafricaines par l’Union Africaine, in: Re-
vue Juridique et Politique (2007), 511 (513).
289 The original designation in both official languages is: « Protocole portant Statut
de la Cour Africaine de Justice et des Droits de L’Homme » or “Protocole in the
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Right”.
290 Mubiala, L’accès de l’Individu à la Cour Africaine des Droits de l’Homme et des
Peuples, in: Promoting Justice, Human Rights and Conflicts Resolution
through international Law (2007), 369 (371).
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cerned has made a particular declaration.291 According to this declaration,
the signatory state must acknowledge the competence of the African Court
of Justice in this regard. Without this declaration of competence, individu-
al complaints are rejected as inadmissible by the Court of Justice. Article
30 (f) of this Protocol confirms the conditional requirements for the au-
thority on individual complaints as follows:
« Les entités suivantes ont également qualité pour saisir la Cour de
toute violation d’un droit garanti par la Charte africaine des droits de
l’Homme et des peuples, par la Charte africaine des droits et du bien-
être de l’enfant, le Protocole à la Charte africaine des droits de
l’homme et des peuples relatif aux droits de a femme en Afrique ou
par tout autre instrument juridique pertinent relatif aux droits de
l’homme, auxquels sont parties les Etats concernés […] (f) les per-
sonnes physiques et les organisations non-gouvernementales accrédi-
tées auprès de l’Union ou de ses organes ou institution, sous réserve
des dispositions de l’article 8 du protocole »
“The following entities shall also be entitled to submit cases to the
Court on any violation of a right guaranteed by the African Charter,
by the Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, the Protocol to
the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights on Rights of Wom-
en in Africa, or any other legal instrument relevant to human rights
ratified by States Parties concerned […] (f) Individual or relevant Non-
Governmental Organisations accredited to the African Union or to its
organs, subject to the provisions of Article 8 of the Protocol”.
A condition of this sort does not create an easy situation for the individual
complainant because it cannot be expected that all Member States readily
submit this necessary declaration of submission in due time.292 Indeed, the
signatory states had agreed on the idea of a Court on Human Rights at a
continental level. They are, however, not prepared to submit the necessary
291 Olinga, Regard sur le Premier Arrêt de la Cour Africaine des Droits de
l’Homme et des Peuples, Cour africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples,
Michelot Yogogombaye c. Sénégal, 15 décembre 2009, in: Revue Trimestrielle
des Droits de l’Homme (2010), 749 (752).
292 Nach derzeitigem Ratifizierungsstand haben nur 16 Vertragsstaaten das Proto-
koll über den Gerichtshof ratifiziert, Ratifizierungsstand [According to the cur-
rent ratification status, only 16 signatory states have ratified the Protocol regar-
ding the Court of Law], ratification status available at: http://www.african-court.
org/fr/ (last accessed on 26/08/2015).
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declaration.293 Subsequently, the African Court of Justice has little oppor-
tunity to examine the legal matter submitted to it in detail.294 As a result,
the individual complaints by persons living in the territory are systemati-
cally declared inadmissible by the African Court of Justice if the provisions
as per Art. 8 i. c. w. Art. 30 of the Additional Protocol (2009) are not
met.295 The regional legal process within the ECOWAS Community there-
fore represents the guarantor of effective legal protection. Based on the fu-
tility on a continental as well as national level, the task of monitoring the
Charter falls to the ECOWAS Court of Justice. The admissibility of the in-
dividual complaint before the ECOWAS Court of Justice should fulfil the
requirements of the reason of fairness in Art. 7 paragraph 1 of the African
Charter.
It can, from the aforementioned, be established that only the ECOWAS
Court of Justice can guarantee an effective protection of human rights for
the persons living in the territory of the Community. After reviewing the
constitutional systems of the Member States it can be deduced that the pos-
sibility for theindividual complaint to be submitted to the ECOWAS
Court of Justice can be justified by a deficient legal protection in most
member States.296 It can be deduced from this that the ECOWAS Court of
Justice has a supranational role as a Constitutional Court. The ECOWAS
acts as a guarantor due to the failure of the national legal protection sys-
tem. For, as shown in the introduction (Chapter 1), the goal of the Com-
munity is, the safeguarding of the human rights guaranteed in the Charter
within the legal system of the Community. Hence, the principle of effect-
ive legal protection is being applied. This principle is based on the idea
that the complainant is given the opportunity to raise attention to his
rights. However, if it is established that the national procedure does not
provide him with sufficient legal remedies, as in the case of the Togolese
constitutional code of procedure, through which the constitutional guar-
antees cannot be safeguarded by way of a constitutional complaint, the di-
rect admissibility of the individual complaint at Community level is justi-
fied.
293 O’Shea, A critical reflection on the proposed African Court on Human and Peo-
ples’ Rights, in: African Human Rights Law Journal (2001), 285 (287).
294 Bhoke, Judgement in the First Case before the African Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights a Missed Opportunity or a Mockery of International Law in
Africa?, in: Journal of African and International Law (2010), 187 (228).
295 Barsac, La Cour africaine de Justice et des droits de l’homme, 42.
296 Österdahl, Implementing Human Rights in Africa. The African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights and Individual Communications, 173.
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The same applies if the national legal system formally provides constitu-
tional guarantees but if these are not carried out on a fair basis (case Ko-
raou vs Niger). However, the Court of justice is not authorised to act ex-
officio. According to the previous basis of authority, an ex-officio-action
would be seen as a transgression of competence. It can only be employed
on application. This prerequisite adheres to the principle nullo actore, nul-
lus iudex (i.e. if there is no plaintiff, there is no judge).
In conclusion, it appears that the transfer of the human rights compe-
tence to the ECOWAS Court of Justice is based on the fact that, on the one
hand, there are obstacles at a continental level297 and, on the other hand,
the guarantee of the human rights enshrined in the Charter is in jeop-
ardy.298
The disregard of the constitutional state and the contempt for human
rights and fundamental rights within national legal systems of the Member
States was the reason for an extension of the competence of the ECOWAS
Court of Justice in 2005. In the preamble of the Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 it is
expressly pointed out that the extension of the responsibility of the Court
of Law is meant to serve the removal of the obstacle to realise the goals of
the Community. These goals mainly include the effective guarantee of the
rights in the African Charter and the democratic principles within the en-
tire system of the Community. The Court of justice embodies the assur-
ance of this guarantee and the safeguarding of the human rights recog-
nised in the Charter. The Court of justice is, so to speak, the guardian of
the African Charter on Human Rights and peoples’ Rights within the
ECOWAS legal system. The only problem is that, in terms of competence,
the relationship between the ECOWAS Court of Justice and the African
Court of Justice is not clearly defined.299
297 Wachira, African Court on Human Rights and People’s Rights: Ten years on
and still no justice, 15.
298 Onoria, The Locus Standi of Individual and Non-State Entities before Regional
Economic Integration Judicial Bodies in Africa, in: Journal of African and Inter-
national Law (2010), 91 (95).
299 Barsac, La Cour africaine de justice et des droits de l’homme, 46.
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Possible Conflict of Interest of the Constitutional Court of a Member
State
The procedural guarantees represent a positive obligation by the signatory
states (2). It is thereby left up to the signatory states on how they would
like to meet their obligations with regard to the procedural guarantees.
However, it can be gathered from the African Charter that the national
courts must be organised in such a way that structural as well as organisa-
tional problems should not arise. However, it can be gleaned from an ex-
amination of the legal systems of the ECOWAS Member States that there
is a certain prejudice of the judges. Therefore, the legal criteria of a judges’
bias must be focused on more closely (1).
Elements of the complaint of a conflicted court
The constitutional regulations guarantee the independence of the constitu-
tional judges with regard to other organs of the state for exemple acc. to
Art. 102 of the Togolese Constitution:
« Les membres de la Cour Constitutionnelle, pendant la durée de leur
mandat, ne peuvent être poursuivis ou arrêtés sans autorisation de la
Cour Constitutionnelle sauf les cas de fragrant délit. Dans ce cas, le
Président de la Cour Constitutionnelle doit être saisi immédiatement
et au plus tard dans les quarante-huit heures. »
Although the constitutional regulations guarantee the independence of the
constitutional judges, it cannot be excluded that the constitutional judges
may issue biased judgements based on personal interests. This can be ex-
plained: the independence of the judges is the objective aspect regarding
the performance of official duties. There is, however, a subjective aspect,
namely the impartiality of the judges. The impartiality of the judges must
be strictly differentiated from the independence. There are many cases re-
garding the jurisprudence of Member States which leave no doubt as to
the diffidence of the judges in general and that of constitutional judges in
particular.300 Within the francophone African judicial area, the Constitu-
II.
1.
300 Tambedou, De l’indépendance du Pouvoir Judiciaire au Sénégal, in: Revue Juri-
dique et Politique (2008), 271 (276).
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tional Court is regarded as the “chien de garde“301 of the constitution and
the fundamental freedoms as enshrined in it. However, with regard to the
performance of official duties, a certain proximity of the constitutional
judges to politics can be noted.302 This fact can be established by the inter-
ference of the executive in the functioning and jurisdiction of the constitu-
tional courts.303 The suspicion becomes blatant when the Constitutional
Court contributes to a challenge of the guarantee of the constitution. An
example of a definitive failure of its office was delivered by the Togolese
Constitutional Court in 2005 during the transfer of power after the death
of the State President .304 Bias represents a justified objection to the official
performance of the judges in the constitutional process. This is always the
case when objective facts are established that could lead a rationally think-
ing individual to doubt the impartiality and objectivity of the judges.305
Furthermore, it should be demonstrated that the judicature in general, and
the jurisdiction of national constitutional courts in particular, is under po-
litical pressure at a national level. Due to the special task of the courts, es-
pecially the constitutional courts, compliance with the law is a fundamen-
tal prerequisite for an impartial court when enforcing human rights.
301 Koupokpa, La perte du mandat par un parlementaire pour cause de démission
ou de l’exclu- sion de son parti en cours de législature en Afrique noire franco-
phone, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2013), 65 (78).
302 Ahadzi-Nonou, Les nouvelles tendances du constitutionalisme africain, in:
Afrique Juri- dique et Politique (2002), 35 (43); Diop, La justice constitution-
nelle au Sénégal. Éssai sur l’evolu- tion, les enjeux et les réformes d’un contre-
pouvoir juridictionnel, 263.
303 Tambedou, De l’indépendance du Pouvoir Judiciaire au Sénégal, in: Revue Juri-
dique et Politique (2008), 271 (276).
304 Maman-Sani, Vacance de la présidence de la République: la constitution togo-
laise à l’épreuve des faits, in: Revue nigérienne de droit, N°09 décembre 2006,
11 (28); Kokoroko, L’ap- port de la Jurisprudence constitutionnelle africaine à la
consolidation des acquis démocratiques, in: Revue Béninoise des sciences juri-
diques et administratives (2007), 85 (95); Kessougbo, La Cour constitutionnelle
togolaise et la régulation de la démocratie au Togo, in: Revue Béninoise des
sciences juridiques et administratives (2005), 59 (96).
305 Koupokpa, Lʼindépendance de la Cour de justice de la CEDEAO, Communica-
tion donnée au colloque international de Lomé, organisé par le Centre de Droit
Public de Lomé et le départe- ment de Droit administratif de la Faculté de Droit
de L’Université de Gand (02.03.2012), Lomé, 4; Decaux/Imbert/Pettiti, La
convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, Commentaire article par ar-
ticle, Art. 6, 261; Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [Euro-
pean Human Rights Convention], 4. edition, § 24, Rn. 45; Matscher, Der Ge-
richtsbegriff der EMRK [The concept of a court by the ECHR], in: FS
Baumgärtel, 363 (376).
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Even though it is recognised that the filing of a suit before international
courts is subject to the exhaustion of all national legal remedies, this can
be justified by the principle of subsidiarity to the international complaint
procedure. However, adherence to the principle of subsidiarity in the West
African context is currently problematic when it comes to the the guaran-
tee of the constitutional courts as a civil right as national judges in many
countries tend to render judgements in favour of the most powerful politi-
cal player, be it an individual or a state body, such as the executive in some
cases (The case Korau vs Niger or the case Fall Ameganvi vs Togo).
This could hinder the neutrality or impartial jurisdiction, as shown by
the decision of the Togolese Constitutional Court. Voices in literature
quite rightly point out that the decisions rendered by the constitutional
courts in the African legal system are in some cases “orientated“, biased or
erring in law.306 This bias by the national judges, which, without fail, leads
to a threat to the protection of human rights, must be removed by the
guardian of the regional protection of human rights. The ECOWAS Court
of justice has determined the right to a fair trial regarding initial proceed-
ings. It must be pointed out that the ECOWAS signatory states have under-
taken the process of democratisation since the 1990s. This means that the
principle of the rule of law and the adherence to fundamental freedoms by
governmental authorities is in need of a legal culture. This can only be
achieved if a functioning judicial system exists. Currently, the executive is
struggling to enforce the principles of the rule of law. This is clearly be-
cause the principle of the separation of powers is hardly ever adhered to.
The executive tries to impose a certain dominance in the constitutional sys-
tem of the state.307 The violation of the principle of separation of powers
leads to a situation whereby the judicial power is exposed to pressure by
the executive. The fragility of new democracies can be noted, in particular,
in this factual dependency of the jurisdiction.
In conclusion, it can be noted that there are, on the one hand, structural
problems in the procedural orders of Member States as a sign of a deficit of
legal protection within the signatory states. At the same time, these struc-
tural problems represent an obstacle to an effective protection of human
rights within national law. This situation justifies the admissibility of a di-
306 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (73, 75).
307 Kessougbo, La Cour constitutionnelle togolaise et la régulation de la démocratie
au Togo, in: Revue Béninoise des sciences juridiques et administratives (2005),
59 (96).
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rect human rights complaint before the ECOWAS Court of Justice. On the
other hand, the declaration of competence of the African Court on Hu-
man Rights as an admissibility requirement constitutes a serious obstacle
at continental level.
Conflicted judges as a violation of the positive obligation of the
Member State
Up til now, the State has been regarded as the violating party of the guar-
anteed human rights in the Charter. With the positive obligation of the
Member State, the question is addressed in which respect the Member
State is to be viewed as the guarantor of human rights. The violation of
this obligation by the State can only be measured with this in mind. It is
self-evident that the positive obligation is to be understood as the obliga-
tion by the signatory states to take measures to realise the recognised hu-
man rights. According to Art. 1 of the Charter:
« Les Etats membres de l’Organisation de l’Unité Africaine, partie á la
présente Charte, re- connaissent les droits, devoirs et libertés énoncés
dans cette Charte et s´engagent á adopter des mesures législatives ou
autres pour les appliquer ».
“The Member States of the Organisation of African Unity parties to
the present Charter shall recognize the rights, duties and freedom en-
shrined in this Charter and shall undertake to adopt legislative or oth-
er measures to give effect to them.”
The obligation laid out in the provisions is a primary obligation under in-
ternational law. The signatory states have a positive duty to realise these
rights because the adherence to the contractual rights is to be regarded pri-
marily as the task of the individual contracting states. Every signatory state
shall take national measures to achieve this contractual goal. The national
judicial guarantee of the aforementioned human rights comes into consid-
eration. Only if this guarantee fails at a state level can the international
guarantee be considered as an alternative. The international protective or-
gan materialises the collective measure mutually provided for by the con-
tracting states in order to close the deficit at a national level. The procedu-
ral guarantee is seen as the minimum in respect of the material legal guar-
antee. In other words: The infringement of material human rights is elimi-
2.
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nated by the procedural guarantee.308 Thus, procedural warranties help in
implementing substantive rights. Through the procedural guarantee, it is
up to the human rights entities to have the violation of their rights exam-
ined by an impartial court.
The state must take positive and recognisable measures which must
serve the independence of the control authorities. In this sense, the proce-
dural guarantees are taken into account in addition to the substantive
rights. In total, the contractual state carries two positive protective obliga-
tions: substantive protective duties and procedural protective duties. Only
in the procedural guarantee can the right to an impartial trial be realised.
However, it must be pointed out that the judicial power exercised by
theECOWAS Court of Justice entails several problems.
Foreseeable problems of the ECOWAS jurisdiction
Here, the question must be asked whether problems with the jurispru-
dence in convicted member State may arise that are caused by the human
rights jurisdiction of the Communal Court. In the following, a compari-
son of the national legal certainty and the equity under international law is
demonstrated (1). Nonetheless, the judicial power exercised by the ECOW-
AS Court of Justice could entail some problems (2). These can only be re-
solved if a dialogue between the two legal systems can be established (3).
Challenge to legal certainty
The suggested resumption of the national initial proceedings based on a
superseding legal effect causes tension between the legal certainty and the
correct decision. As discussed, judgements by a constitutional court devel-
op an effect with regard to the facts and the design. The design effect caus-
es a legal situation for the parties to the proceedings or in favour of third
parties that should be ensured by principles of a constitutional state: This
is the principle of legal certainty. This results in the right of protection of
the confidence of third parties. The prohibition of repealing constitutional
judgements has the advantage of securing this legal protection. The role of
III.
1.
308 Dröge, Positive Verpflichtungen der Staaten in der Europäischen Menschen-
rechtskonven tion [Positive obligations of the states within the European Hu-
man Rights Convention], 61.
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the international instance consists, however, in ensuring the accuracy and
correctness of the occurrence of national legal acts such as judicial deci-
sions. A decision that is taken after taking the human rights standards into
account should be given preference compared to the decision in violation
of human rights because fairness and justice have more weight than legal
certainty. The legal certainty which follows from a misjudgement in con-
stitutional proceedings is in turn a threat to legal peace and thus legal cer-
tainty because, if citizens no longer have confidence in the justice system,
they will go another route, namely political unrest.
This situation would in turn be an obstacle in ensuring peace.
As a result, the correction by the ECOWAS Court of Justice of a consti-
tutional court decision which violates human rights is preferable in order
to ensure legal peace within the entire constitutional system of the Com-
munity. Whoever benefitted under national law from the contravention of
the convention should not be better off than the individual complainant at
an international law level. The rights of the successful individual com-
plainant are more deserving of protection than those of the third party in
the initial proceedings. From a justice point of view, the immutability of
the legal force leads to non-acceptable situations, in the face of gross proce-
dural injustice. Moreover, the exceptional overcoming of the legal effect
due to gross procedural injustice serves both justice as well as legal certain-
ty. The resumption, especially of such decisions which produce obvious in-
justice within the national legal system, constitute definitive legal certain-
ty.
Overburdening of the Court of Justice and proposed solutions
In view of a population density of approx. 300 million inhabitants309, the
seven judges (in Abuja, Nigeria) are hardly able to guarantee the right to a
fair trial within a reasonable period (Art. 7 paragraph 1 of the African
Charter) if the lodging of regional individual complaints before the
ECOWAS Court of Justice would not be subject to the prior national ex-
haustion of legal remedies. There is, however, the possibility to anticipate
such problems. The possible alternative solutions may be realised from the
perspective of the Court of justice (a) as well as from the perspective of the
Member States (b).
2.
309 In addition, see http://news.abidjan.net/h/426775.html (last accessed on
25/02/2015).
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Landmark and pilot judgments as a possible solution
There are various possibilities of how a quasi-constitutional function could
be assigned to the Court .
The function of the ECOWAS Court of Justice regarding the setting of princi-
ples: It can be determined from the preamble of Protocol A/PS. 1/01/05
that the admissibility of the individual human rights complaint has a main
objective and a secondary objective. It is the main objective that the Court
of justice should guard the adherence to human rights in its jurisdiction.
The performance of this task is in the general interest of the Community
because the realisationof the integration process and the unified adherence
to international obligations of the Member States can only be achieved if
the regional Court of justice is able to ensure a unified interpretation and
application of the African Charter. There are many sections in the Com-
munity Agreement where in the least the commitment of the Community
to the Charter and the democratic principles are expressed (Preamble of
the Amendment Agreement).
The secondary objective is to grant the possibility of effective legal pro-
tection to every citizen through a direct human rights complaint at a re-
gional level. The realisation of the secondary objective serves the main ob-
jective (in the general interest of the Community). For these reasons, the
National Constitutional Courts consult the principles emerging from the
ECOWAS Court of Justice in addition to their own jurisdiction. This con-
sultation of the human rights principles from the ECOWAS Court of Jus-
tice in the constitutional jurisdiction should serve the objective to
strengthen the ECOWAS-standards in all signatory states. In this context,
two possibilities from the operative practice of the ECtHR could con-
tribute to the relief of the Court of justice . Namely, the passing of land-
mark judgments and of pilot judgments.
The Court of justice can make landmark judgments. These must be ad-
hered to by the National courts because the decisions of the Court are al-
ways based on the most current status of the Charter’s development. The
signatory states are bound by the Charter in the same way as they are
bound to the decisions by the Court of justice in this respect. Now the
question must be asked: How do legal practitioners in Member States
know that a certain decision by the Court of justice is a landmark judg-
ment? There are criteria with regards to this that may usually be of help
when it comes to their identification. This concerns namely the legal
question, and the Court ’s answer to this question – this answer must be a
counter-position regarding the same question in previous case law with re-
a.
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gard to the same question –, the time and the main reasons for the deci-
sion. Or behaviour that the Court of justice would have declared compati-
ble with the African Charter, might be declared by it incompatible at a lat-
er point in time. The opposite is also possible. This modus operandi at
least takes the further development of the understanding of human rights
on state and international level into account.310 With regard to such
changes in case law, the time limit of the legal force is expressed.311
The legal opinion of the Court of justice may change due to various fac-
tors. The change might be based on a need to coordinate the law. In this
case, the Court confirms a human-rights-friendly tendency of the majority
of the signatory states. The tendency justifies a change in case law. This ap-
proach does not represent a transgression of competences because in order
to interpret the agreements under international law, the subseaquent prac-
tice by the signatory states is to be taken into consideration acc. to Art. 31
VCLT. The Court of justice should use the evolutive approach of this regu-
lation to develop the law.312Judicial power after all counts to the most im-
portant functions of the Community. Therefore, the development of the
law by way of landmark judgments is in conformity with international
law. Especially for this reason the national legal systems of the Member
States should continue to orientate themselves according to the current sta-
tus of the human rights jurisdiction by the Court of justice . The content
of the Charter is mirrored, so to speak, in the judgments of the ECOWAS
Court of Justice.
The ECOWAS Court of Justice should primarily play its part as a Consti-
tutional Court through its pilot judgments and landmark judgments. A pi-
lot judgment represents a particular decision by the ECtHR (a kindred re-
gional Court), which is passed to adress a structural problem of a respon-
dent state. A pilot judgment is passed if several subsequent complaints of
the respondent member State involve the same problem. According to the
310 Polakiewics, Die Verpflichtung der Staaten aus den Urteilen des Europäischen
Court of Law für Menschenrechte, 49. [The obligations by countries resulting
from the judgments by the European Court of Human Rights, 49.].
311 Polakiewics, Die Verpflichtung der Staaten aus den Urteilen des Europäischen
Court of Law für Menschenrechte, 50. [The obligations by countries resulting
from the judgments by the European Court of Human Rights, 50.].
312 Cremer, Zur Bindungswirkung von EGMR-Urteilen. Anmerkung zum
Görgülü-Beschluß des BVerfG vom 14.10.2004, in: EuGRZ (2004), 683 (694).
[Regarding the binding effect of judgments by the ECtHR. [Comment regard-
ing the Görgülü judgment by the Federal Constitutional Court of] 14/10/2004,
in: EuGRZ (2004), 683 (694);].
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decision-making practice of the ECtHR, such problems can be of an organ-
isational as well as a structural nature.313 The ECtHR defined the practice
of pilot judgments as follows:
« La Cour a estimé que lorsqu’elle constate une violation découlant
d’une situation à caractère structurel concernant un grand nombre de
personnes, des mesures générales au niveau natio- nal peuvent s’impo-
ser dans le cadre de l’exécution de ses arrêts. Cette approche juridic-
tion- nelle adoptée par la Cour pour traiter les problèmes systémiques
ou structurels apparaissant dans l’ordre juridique National est désignée
par l’expression ‹ procédure d’arrêt pilote ›. Celle- ci a avant tout pour
vocation d’aider les Etats contractants à remplir le rôle qui est le leur
dans le système de la Convention en résolvant ce genre de problèmes
au niveau National, en sorte qu’ils reconnaissent par là même aux per-
sonnes concernées les droits et libertés définis dans la Convention,
comme le veut l’article 1, en leur offrant un redressement plus rapide
tout en allégeant la charge de la Cour qui, sinon, aurait à connaître de
quantités de requêtes sem- blables en substance ».314
In case of such a failure of the legal system within the respondent Member
State, a pilot judgment is issued. The ECOWAS Court of Justice may pass
pilot judgments in order to confirm its role as a Constitutional Court. In
such judgments, the general interest, rather than the individual interest of
the individual plaintiff is expressed. The practice of pilot judgments can
only be effective at a national level if an expansion of the legal force re-
garding the national parallel proceedings takes place. Only in this way can
a renewed sentencing of the Member State in subsequent proceedings, the
object of the complaint being based on the same behaviour of the Member
State, be avoided. This corresponds to the thought behind the obligation
to comply: resulting from the declaratory judgment, the respondent Mem-
ber State has the obligation, not only to change its behaviour toward the
individual complainant so as to conform to the convention, but also, in a
preventive fashion regarding all other National parallel cases suffering
from the same type of infringement, to remedy the situation according to
the declaratory judgment. This has the advantage of preventing a repeat
conviction of the Member State. This is consistent because, if the other na-
313 Die Definition des Piloturteils lässt sich dem Urteil Sejdovic gegen Italien ent-
nehmen: CEDH, Nr. 56581/00, Arrêt (01.03.2006), Affaire Sejdovic c. Italie,
par. 120.
314 CEDH, Nr. 56581/00, Arrêt (1.3.2006), Affaire Sejdovic c. Italie, par. 120.
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tional cases of the same Member State reach the ECOWAS Court of Jus-
tice, this Court would, without a doubt, arrive at the same result.315 This
also does not represent a contravention of the factual and personal limit of
the legal force. Indeed, the legal force limits itself to the parties to the pro-
ceedings. This means that the relevance of the declaratory judgment refers
at least to a certain object of dispute.316 The broader effect already support-
ed in the literature317 is based on the basic idea of the obligation to provide
a general effective national legal protection as a consequence of the
declaratory judgment.
The solution from the perspective of the national legal system
From the perspective of the national constitutional systems of the Member
States, it must be ensured that the human rights guaranteed in the consti-
tutions are also protected from a procedural point of view, in order to pre-
vent violations under international law.
The principle of subsidiarity: This international law principle takes state
sovereignty into account, as it is designed to effect primarily to the Mem-
ber States’ own responsibility to adhere to their obligations under interna-
tional law. The primary obligation to monitor the adherence to human
rights is the equal responsibility of both national Constitutional Courts
and national courts. Therefore, it is recommended to introduce the sub-
sidiary principle in theprotective system of the Community whenever all
Member States allow for the direct constitutional complaint by natural
and legal persons in their respective legal systems. Art. 7 par. 1 of the
Charter namely implies the obligation of the Member States to provide a
legal process against the violation of individual fundamental rights and hu-
b.
315 Rohleder, Grundrechtschutz im europäischen Mehrlevelssystem, 273 [Protec-
tion of constitutional law in the European multi-level system], 273.
316 Cremer, Zur Bindungswirkung von EGMR-Urteilen. Anmerkung zum
Görgülü-Beschluß des BVerfG vom 14.10.2004, in: EuGRZ (2004), 683 (690).
[Regarding the binding effect of judgments by the ECtHR. Comment regarding
the Görgülü judgment by the Federal Constitutional Court of] 14/10/2004, in:
EuGRZ (2004), 683 (690);].
317 Mückl, Kooperation oder Konfrontation? – Das Verhältnis zwischen Bundesver-
fassungsge richt und Europäischem Court of Law für Menschenrechte, Der
Staat 44 (2005), 403 (420).
[Cooperation or confrontation? – the relationship between the Federal Consti-
tutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights], in: Der Staat [The
State], 44 (2005), 403 (420).
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man rights. This would meet the obligation to the right and access to a
court. This includes the obligation to allow national constitutional com-
plaints against all measures of state powers. These substantive guarantees
are ineffective if, in order to enforce them, the constitutional principle of
fairness is not adhered to.318 Effective legal protection is primarily the task
of the signatory states. These will safeguard such if good procedural legal
conditions are created on a national level. But even in this case, the guaran-
tee as per Art. 7 par. 1 of the Charter must be ensured so that the Member
States do not create theoretical opportunities at a national level without
contributing to an effective legal protection system. The judicial systems of
the Member States must have identifiable objective characteristics which
comply with the principle of fairness. The constitutional guarantees in-
clude the right to a hearing in an equitable manner before an independent
and impartial court of law319 as well as the right to a decision and execu-
tion in an appropriate time period. In short, the procedural guarantee as-
sumes that the trial takes place on a fair basis before a court of law (see
Art. 6 ECHR). The compliance with this obligation will reduce an over-
load of the ECOWAS Court of Justice. Moreover, no parallel complaint
pending before National courts and the ECOWAS Court of Justice need to
be feared. However, the Court of justice should always have the last word,
with regard to judicial decisions by Member States.
From the above, a dialogue between the regional Human Rights Court
and National Constitutional Courts seems necessary, which would, in
turn, serve to improve and ensure an effective human rights protection.
Dialogue between both levels
ECOWAS Court of Justice case law will not be static but dynamic. It is
possible that the Court of justice issues a change in case law with regard to
certain questions in order to continuously take into account the improved
development status of human rights within the Community and taking in-
to account the practice of other comparable international courts. Such
3.
318 Okresek, Die Umsetzung der EGMR-Urteile und ihre Überwachung, in: Eu-
GRZ (2003), 168 (168). [the implementation of ECtHR judgments and their su-
pervision, in: EuGRZ (2003), 168 (168)].
319 Peukert, in: Frowein/Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention. EMRK-
Kommentar [European Human Rights Convention. ECHR-commentary],
3. edition, Art. 6, Rn. 112.
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changes in the jurisdiction towards an improved direction should be seen
by other Constitutional Courts of Member States as precedent judgment
within the framework of the dialogue process between the regional courts
and the Constitutional Courts of Member States. This dialogue which is al-
ready taking place between judicial bodies at a national level can be trans-
ferred to the relationship between the ECOWAS Court of Justice and the
National courts of the Member States.320 The aim of the dialogue between
the two levels is to avoid a clash between the two legal systems, i.e. to pre-
vent a conflict of jurisdiction between national courts and the internation-
al ECOWAS Court of Justice. It is therefore recommended that there is an
exchange of and reference to case law between both legal systems.321 This
dialogue should be carried out in both directions. Furthermore, a collabo-
ration between both (ECOWAS-level and National level) should be pro-
moted. In order to resolve alleged or actual conflicts between the national
Constitutional Courts, or courts with comparable competences, and the
ECOWAS Court of Justice, the idea of complementarity of the guarantee is
useful.
This discussion within the multi-level systems can be implicit or explicit.
The dialogue is referred to as explicit if the courts of both legal systems
quote each other. This is the case in the decision N° DCC 15–027 of the
Constitutional Court of Benin.322 When it quoted the judgment by the
ECOWAS Court of Justice in the legal matter of Mamadou Tandja vs the
Republic of Senegal when explaining its own legal interpretation. The ex-
change should not only be used with regards to its organisational and
structural aspects. There also needs to be an improved interlocking of in-
ternational law and state law with a strong mutual consideration regarding
the interpretation of both international and national law.323
320 Diop, La justice constitutionnelle au Sénégal. Éssai sur l’evolution, les enjeux et
les ré- formes d’un contre-pouvoir juridictionnel, 191.
321 Cremer, Zur Bindungswirkung von EGMR-Urteilen. Anmerkung zum
Görgülü-Beschluß des BVerfG vom 14.10.2004, in: EuGRZ (2004), 683 (694).
[Regarding the binding effect of judgments by the ECtHR. Comment regarding
the Görgülü judgment by the Federal Constitutional Court of] 14/10/2004, in:
EuGRZ (2004), 683 (694)].
322 Décision DCC 15–027 (12.02.2015), available at: www.cour-constitutionnelle-be
nin.org (last accessed on 25/04/2015).
323 Peters, Legal systems and constitutionalisation: Regarding the redefinition of
the relationships, in: DÖV (2010), 3 (55); Häberle, Europäische Verfas-
sungslehre, 6. edition, 92. [European Constitutional Theory, 6th edition, 92].
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The Reception of the Legal Force in theNational
Legal System
The exercise of its jurisdiction by the ECOWAS Court of Justice creates a
legal force. How does the national constitutional order perceive this bind-
ing force of the legal effect? At the same time, this also poses the question
of the national status of international law within the national legal systems
of the Member States. It will at this stage be shown how the binding effect
issued at the level of international law is implemented into the national le-
gal order. The declaratory judgment does not automatically breach the na-
tional legal force. However, this declaratory judgment has significant legal
consequences for the domestic legal system of the concerned state. The
question whether the legal effect is welcome or not welcome within the
national legal order must be primarily answered on the basis of national
law. This question is of decisive importance because the implementation
of judgments by international courts depends on how they are treated at a
domestic level. The removal of any obstacles to implementation depends
on the national law of signatory states.1 Therefore, the question of interac-
tion2 between international law and national law of Member States must
be asked. In the same manner, the questions must be asked of, firstly, what
provisions are made by the ECOWAS legal regulations regarding the legal
effect of its decisions and, secondly, how the domestic legal systems of the
Member States regard the guidelines under international law regarding the
legal effect from a legal point of view. In order to determine whether the
legal effect possesses a national enforcement character, reference must be
made to both Community and national legislation. The effectiveness of
the binding effect of the declaratory judgment in this specific case depends
on the Togolese code of procedure (for example) and the ECOWAS regu-
Chapter 4
1 Enabulele, Reflections on the ECOWAS-Community Court Protocol and the Con-
stitutions of Member States, in: International Community Law Review 12 (2010),
111 (113).
2 Cremer, Zur Bindungswirkung von EGMR-Urteilen. Anmerkung zum Görgülü-
Beschluß des BVerfG vom 14.10.2004 (2004), in: EuGRZ (2004), 683 (692). [Re-
garding the binding effect of judgments by the ECtHR. Comment regarding the
Görgülü judgment by the Federal Constitutional Court of] 14/10/2004, in: EuGRZ
(2004), 683 (692)].
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lation.3 The interaction of the National legal system and theECOWAS
Community’s legal system creates good conditions for an effective imple-
mentation of declaratory judgments by the Community’s Court . All this
demands, on the one hand, is the interpretation of the pertinent guidelines
of the Court of justice and the determination of the binding effect of the
decision and on the other hand, the examination of national regulations of
constitutional orders by the Member States regarding the reception of the
binding effect. This preliminary question is also important because many
problems regarding the implementation of international law do not regard
the ratification of international law but the national effectiveness of inter-
national law. In this respect, African countries do show a presentable histo-
ry of ratification of international law but, unfortunately, show behaviour
that is open to criticism regarding its domestic implementation.4
For a better understanding of the reception of the legal force into the na-
tional legal system in the signatory states, the importance of the African
Charter in the domestic legal system must first of all be demonstrated A)
because the national concretisation of the declaratory judgment (B) de-
pends on which rank is assigned to the Member States’ constitutional regu-
lations. Nevertheless, the failure to comply with the implementation obli-
gation has consequences under international law to the detriment of the
convicted signatory state (C).
Preliminary Question: Binding Force of International Law and the
ECOWAS Judgments
A preliminary question is defined as a legal question raised before the
main question (question préjudicielle) can be discussed. In this case, the
preliminary question does not entirely deviate from the sense of law provi-
sions.The special characteristic of the preliminary question raised corre-
sponding with this thought process is differently defined. It concerns the
clarification of the question of the status of international law within the
A.
3 Cremer, Zur Bindungswirkung von EGMR-Urteilen. Anmerkung zum Görgülü-
Beschluß des BVerfG vom 14.10.2004 (2004), in: EuGRZ (2004), 683 (695).[Re-
garding the binding effect of judgments by the ECtHR. Comment regarding the
Görgülü judgment by the Federal Constitutional Court of] 14/10/2004, in: EuGRZ
(2004), 683 (695)].
4 Enabulele, Reflections on the ECOWAS-Community Court Protocol and the Con-
stitutions of Member States, in: International Community Law Review 12 (2010),
111 (126).
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domestic legal systems of the Member States in a normative respect. Con-
trary to the meaning of the legal provisions, this preliminary question does
not require a concrete case before a national court.In order to answer all
these questions, the ranking of international law is discussed in franco-
phone (I) as well as Anglophone countries (II). It should not be overlooked
that since the Protocol of Good Governance came into force there has
been a degree of convergence of constitutional principles within the
ECOWAS signatory states (III).
Binding Force of the International Law in francophone Member States
Which rank is given to international law in the domestic legal system of
Member States (1), is a preliminary question to be resolved before the
question regarding the national concretisation of the legal force of the
ECOWAS judgment will be discussed. What is more is the consideration
of whether the reciprocity principle under International law can be ap-
plied in this case (2).
Question of rank
It may come as a surprise why, in the context of the investigation into the
validity of a constitutional court decision and the institution of an in rem
restitution according to International guidelines, a consideration of the do-
mestic status should be necessary. This question, however, should be clari-
fied for two reasons: if International law is ranked below the constitution,
the consequence for the implementation of an unconstitutional Interna-
tional rule becomes legally relevant.5 International law may only be ap-
plied when the constitution is changed accordingly. This means that if the
decision by the Court of justice , i.e. a judgment in accordance with Inter-
national law, violates the constitution, it can only be observed if the regu-
lation which is in violation has been changed in advance.
In the initial case, this question of rank was central to the debate regard-
ing the domestic implementation of the declaratory judgment. The gov-
ernment, as well as the Togolese Constitutional Court, refused to imple-
ment the judgment of the Court of justice in the initial case. The reasons
I.
1.
5 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (74).
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they gave for this were, amongst others, that the decisions by the Constitu-
tional Court were final. There was no further instance above the Constitu-
tional Court.6
Such reasoning is understandable from a certain perspective. Fundamen-
tally speaking it is not wrong if the signatory states prevent the implemen-
tation of declaratory judgments by the Court of justice . The declaratory
judgment basically means that the decision by the Constitutional Court
was made in violation of the Convention. The implementation of such a
judgment means that the concerned state would accept the violation of the
constitutional principle of finality of the decision. This, in turn, would in-
dicate that the International law is ranked above the constitution. At any
rate, this constellation equals a displacement of the constitutional princi-
ples by the International law. Thus, the judgment under International law
that was issued would rank above the constitutional law. This is precisely
what the state did not want to accept in the initial case. From the view-
point of the hierarchy of norms this refusal is justified because, at the level
of the domestic legal system, the constitution receives a higher rank. Inter-
national law is ranked below the constitution. Since the declaratory judg-
ment has International legal content, it would be second in rank in the hi-
erarchy of norms. The legal consequences of the constellation of norms are
interesting: A norm under International law that infringes on a constitu-
tional principle (e.g. the finality of legal force) cannot be implemented7
unless a change to the constitution was made beforehand.
It must, however, be taken into consideration that constitutional norms
and International law belong to different legal systems. They take different
principles into account. Even in case of a certain relationship between In-
ternational law and constitutional law, every legal system is independent
of the other – as soon as the signatory states have signed and ratified an In-
ternational treaty. The consequences of this mean that International law
demands a domestic implementation, regardless of the constitutional
norms that are inconsistent with it. Therefore, the signing parties must,
during the conclusion of the agreement, give attention to their constitu-
tional principles before the treaty is signed. Once signed, International law
must be easily enforceable and implementable. Therefore, from the point
6 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (74).
7 See criticism of the government in the initial case: Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose
jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des
Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (74).
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of view of International law, a conflicting constitutional principle does not
play a role. This is precisely the meaning of the regulation in Art. 26 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The International Court of Jus-
tice also confirms this interpretation in its Avena-judgment.8
The question of rank9 is therefore important because the National en-
forceability of human rights instruments depends on the respective Na-
tional legal system giving these instruments meaning10 and which rank the
International instrument has within the legal system of the Member State.
In order to clarify this preliminary question, the constitutional provisions
regarding the ranking of International law will be discussed in the follow-
ing. First of all, Art. 142 of the Togolese constitution must be explained. It
states that:
« Les traités ou accords régulièrement ratifiés ou approuvés ont, dès
leur publication, une autorité supérieure à celle des lois, sous réserve,
pour chaque accord ou traité, de son appli- cation par l’autre partie ».
After detailed examination of this provision, three basic requirements
must be met in order for International law to be valid on a National level:
the rule-consistent ratification, the publication in the official state gazette
and the application of the reciprocity principle. The domestic question of
the rank of International law will be analysed through a systematic exami-
nation of all constitutional regulations regarding International law and the
constitution. International treaties in general, and the Charter in particu-
lar, are directly applicable at a National level as long as they have been
properly ratified and published in the government gazette (Art. 142 of the
Togolese Constitution)11. Ever since the publication of the ECOWAS
Amendment Agreement and the associated Additional Protocol, the in-
struments of International law have a direct National legal force. There-
fore, no additional implementation measures are necessary. However, this
provision contains a number of uncertainties. Its vague and broad wording
8 CIJ, Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 31 mars 2004 en l’Affaire Avena et
autres res- sortissants mexicains (Mexique c. Ètats-Unis d’Amérique), Arrêt du 19
janvier 2009, par. 8.
9 Mellech, Die Rezeption der EMRK sowie der Urteile des EGMR in der französis-
chen und deutschen Rechtsprechung, 19 ff. [The reception of the ECHR and the
judgments of the ECtHR in the French and German jurisdiction, 19 ff].
10 Tama, Droit International et africain des droits de l’homme, 131.
11 See: Oumarou, La Cour constitutionnelle du Niger et le contrôle de conformité
des traités et accords internationaux à la Constitution: Remarques sur la Jurispru-
dence CIMA, in: Revue Juridiques et Politiques (2008), 503 (505).
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allows for two hypotheses with regards to the interpretation of Art. 142 of
the Togolese Constitution, because the regulation does not clarify whether
a differentiation based on the content-related rank of the norm is to be
done with regards to the question of rank. Fundamentally, the following
questions must be asked: what does « autorité supérieure à celle des lois » in
the regulations of Art. 142 in the Togolese Consituttion mean? Which
« loi » is meant in this regulation? The constitutional legislator leaves this
question unanswered. Scholarly opinions point to « loi » in the broadest
sense. The term « loi » means, according to the understanding of the civil
tradition any general and abstract provision inevitably containing a legal
command.12
« [Une] autorité supérieure à toute loi, peu importe sa place dans la
hiérarchie des normes»13.
What this means is that after proper ratification and publication of the In-
ternational law it is directly given a status below that of constitutional law,
on national level. Based on the order of validity in Art. 142 of the Togolese
Constitution, all International treaties ratified by Togo receive a status
above ordinary law.
These agreements are ranked below the constitution. Regarding the
African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights, however, it must
be pointed out that the Charter is incorporated into the constitution and is
an integral part of the constitution. The principle of reciprocity prevailing
in International law, and embedded in Art. 142 of the Togolese Constitu-
tion, does not apply here. Due to the special character of the Charter in the
Community’s Constitution of ECOWAS and in the constitutional system
of the Member States, a “constitutional instrument of West African Coun-
tries“14 must be surmised. In any case the Charter enjoys in that regard the
status of customary international law. These two conditions were adhered
12 Eissen, Le statut juridique interne de la Convention devant les juridictions répres-
sives, in: Cohen-Jonathan, Droits de l’homme en France, 1 (6); Grewe, The recep-
tion of the ECHR in Germany, in: dies./Gusy, Human Rights, 106 (115); Sauve/
Pauti, in: Thierry/Decaus, Droit International, 237 (240).
13 Amselek, Une fausse idée claire: la hiérarchie des normes juridiques, in: Renou-
veau du Droit constitutionnel. Mélanges en l’honneur de Louis Favoreu, 983
(1013).
14 Fall/Sall, Une constitution régionale pour l’espace CEDEAO: le protocole sur la
démocratie et la bonne gouvernance, available at: http://la-constitution-en-afrique
.org/article-34239380. html (last accessed on 16/05/2015); Adjolohoun, Droits de
l’homme et justice constitutionnelle en Afrique: le modèle béninois, 95.
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to in the African Charter on Human Rights. Now, the question remains
whether the other conditions have been met with regards to the uncondi-
tional entry into force of the Charter. Regarding liability, it does not make
a difference which domestic rank the Charter receives. Ranking by Nation-
al constitutional law has no consequence for the obligation to comply. The
Member State concerned cannot argue that the Charter and the legal regu-
lations of ECOWAS only receive their rank above the ordinary law within
the state-internal hierarchy of norms.15This transnational constitutional
content of the Charter – based on the proclaimed constitutional conver-
gence of West-African states in the Protocol on Good Governance and
Democracy from 2001 – confirms a special status of the Charter for all con-
stitutional systems in Member States. Therefore, the principle of reci-
procity can also not be applied here.16
Principle of reciprocity
The principle of reciprocity has its origins in customary International law
and establishes a legitimate objection to non-compliance with the obliga-
tion under International law.17 The International treaty is to be applied un-
conditionally, insofar as the basic principle of reciprocity according to the
monistic legal tradition is met. However, this principle cannot be applied
to the African Charter on Human Rights for the following reasons:
– objective obligations in the Charter;
– Validity of the principle of reciprocity only for bilateral International
treaties;
– Existence of a control organ within the system of the Charter.
The exclusion of the applicability of the principle of reciprocity is based on
the objective obligations in the Charter. The obligations ensuing from the
2.
15 Schaffarzik, Europäische Menschenrechte unter der Ägide des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts, in: DÖV (2005), 860 (861). [European human rights under the
aegis of the Federal Constitutional Court, in: DOV (2005), 860 (861).].
16 Rohleder, Grundrechtsschutz im europäischen Mehrlevelssystem, 169. [Protec-
tion of constitutional law in the European multi-level system, 169].
17 Simma, Das Reziprozitätselement in der Entstehung des Völkergewohnheit-
srechts, 45.[The element of reciprocity in the inception of customary Internation-
al law, 45.].
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Charter are of an objective nature.18 This excludes the so-called principle
exceptio non adimpleti contractus. In concrete terms, it cannot solely de-
pend on the compliance to the human rights laid out in the Charter by the
other signatory states. The Togolese state must also meet its obligations.
Every signatory state is obligated to unilaterally adhere to recognised hu-
man rights and account to International institutions. The goals of the
Charter are therefore superordinate in such a way that the signatory states
to the Charter must not provide for their own but for a mutual interest in
the adherence to the human rights stipulated in the Charter (the guaran-
tees according to the Charter) for all persons in the territory of the signato-
ry states.19 According to the wording in Art. 142 of the Togolese Constitu-
tion it can already be noted that the principle of reciprocity can only be
applied to bilateral treaties. This is due to « l‘autre partie contractante ».
The limitation to the other signatory party and not the other signatory par-
ties confirms the exclusion of the principle of reciprocity regarding multi-
lateral treaties.20 Therefore, the conduct of the other signatory states is in-
significant regarding the adherence to the obligations stipulated in the
Charter. After comparing the constitutional system of the ECOWAS Mem-
ber States, the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights re-
ceives a special status. This gives the Charter the legal nature of a special
International treaty. In confirmation of this special status of the Charter,
the adherence to the obligations is transferred from the Charter to the
ECOWAS Court of Justice.
Moreover, it must be pointed out that the African Charter belongs to
the bloc de constitutionnalité of the constitutional system of the Member
States. The term bloc de constitutionnalité means that all constitutional regu-
lations which the constitutional court refers to in its decision-making pro-
cess.21A number of voices in literature see the bloc de constitutionnalité as
18 Cohen-Jonathan, La fonction quasi constitutionnelle de la Cour Européenne des
Droits de l’Homme, in: Renouveau du Droit constitutionnel. Mélanges en l’hon-
neur de Louis Favoreu, 1127 (1128).
19 See also Mellech, Die Rezeption der EMRK sowie der Urteile des EGMR in der
französi- schen und deutschen Rechtsordnung, 16. [The reception of the ECHR
and the judgments of the ECtHR in the French and German jurisdiction, 16].
20 Mellech, Die Rezeption der EMRK sowie der Urteile des EGMR in der französis-
chen und deutschen Rechtsordnung, 16. [The reception of the ECHR and the
judgments of the ECtHR in the French and German jurisdiction, 16].
21 Adeloui, L’insertion des engagements internationaux en droit interne des États
africains, in: Revue Béninoise des Sciences Juridiques et Administratives (2011),
51 (85).
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the standard of review for International treaties and the constitutionality
of the laws.22 This means that the International treaties do not belong to
the standard of review of the constitutional conduct of the state organs.
However, the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
1948, as well as the two International pacts of 1966, receive a special status
in the constitutions of the member states of ECOWAS . Indeed, the men-
tioned human rights treaties are referred to in the preambles of the consti-
tutions. The Togolese constitutional legislator expressly points out that the
Charter is an integral part of the constitution. This particular statute of the
Charter needs to be explained further:
– The human rights enshrined in the Charter have constitutional status.
The constitutional legislator, as well as all other state powers, must
align their actions according to the Charter. In this context, the Charter
constitutes a standard of review regarding the actions of state organs.
– The Constitutional Court guarantees the adherence to the human
rights enshrined in the Charter in the same manner as those in the con-
stitutional regulations.
These annotations speak for the complementarity of the roles between the
Constitutional Courts and the ECOWAS Court of Justice. Remarkably, the
Constitutional Court of Benin referred to the Judgment DCC 10–04923 as
well as the Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy from 2001 in
the ECOWAS Protocol and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights in its reasoning in justifying the control of the constitutionality of
an electoral act. The Constitutional Court of Benin explained in this judg-
ment:
« Ne pas censurer la loi abrogative, c’est autoriser les députés à violer le
protocole A/SP1/12/01 de la CEDEAO et par conséquent l’article 147
de la Constitution qui confirme la suprématie de la norme supranatio-
nale sur la norme juridique Nationale».24
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court reaffirmed the reference to the
Charter in another consideration in this judgment:
22 Chantebout, Droit constitutionnel, 27 éd., 2010, 596; Bernhardt, The Convention
and Dome- stic Law, in: Macdonald/Matscher/Petzold (Publ.), The European Sys-
tem for the Protection of Human Rights, 25 (27).
23 Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin, Décision DCC 10–049 (05.04.2010), available
at: www. cour-constitutionnelle-benin.org (last accessed on 25/04/2015).
24 Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin, Décision DCC 10–049 (05/04/2010), available
at: www. cour-constitutionnelle-benin.org (last accessed on 25/04/2015).
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« [I]l s’ensuit que l’ensemble des dispositions de ces textes internatio-
naux font partie inté-grante de la Constitution béninoise et ont une va-
leur supérieure à la loi ».25
Based on the aforementioned it should be noted, that the ECOWAS signa-
tory states ascribe a special role to the Charter in their respective National
constitutional systems. At Community level, this special status is attached
to the transfer of the jurisidiction to the ECOWAS Court of Justice to
monitor the adherence to the human rights as stipulated in the Charter.
Organs have been set up to ensure adherence to the human rights guaran-
teed in the Charter. These include the African Commission on Human
Rights, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and – within the
ECOWAS legal system – the newly established ECOWAS Court of Justice.
The roles assigned to all mentioned International organs are complemen-
tary.
Binding Force in Anglophone Member States
It is necessary for the validity of a treaty under International law that the
signatory states have signed and ratified the agreement. Furthermore, the
effectivity of a treaty depends on how it is integrated into the National le-
gal system and how it is applied.26 What is important is that the Anglo-
phone Member States, stemming from the legal tradition of Common
Law, are not familiar with the concept of a hierarchy of norms.27 However,
with regards to the comprehensive effectivity of International law, this re-
II.
25 Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin, Décision DCC 10–049 (05.04.2010), available
at: www. cour-constitutionnelle-benin.org (last accessed on 25/04/2015).
26 Oppong, Legal Aspects of Economic Integration in Africa, 191.
27 Mückl, Kooperation oder Konfrontation? – Das Verhältnis zwischen Bundesver-
fassungsge- richt und Europäischem Court of Law für Menschenrechte, in: Der
Staat 44 (2005), 403 (405) [Cooperation or confrontation? – the relationship be-
tween the Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human
Rights], in: Der Staat [The State], 44 (2005), 403 (405)]; Tou- fayan, When British
Justice (in African Colonies) Point Two Ways: On Dualism, Hybridity and the
Genealogy of Juridical Negritude in Taslim Olawale Elias, in: Leiden Journal of
International Law (2008), 377 (396); Landauer, Things Fall Together: The Past
and Future Africas of T.O. Elias’s Africa and Development of International Law,
in: Leiden Journal of International Law (2008), 351 (352).
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quires a further legal step at the domestic level of these Member States.28
The implementation of international law by the national assembly of the
respective Member State is indeed necessary for the enforcement of an in-
strument of International law in all English-speaking ECOWAS Member
States. In this regard, the respective provision of Art. 12 par. 1 of the Con-
stitution of Nigeria of 1999 reads as follows:
“No treaty between the federation and any other country shall have
the force of law except to the extent to which any such treaty has been
enacted into law by the National Assembly.”29
Such a constitutional requirement is also contained in the constitutions of
other Member States that are not Anglophone countries.30 Art. 11 of the
Constitution of the lusophone Republic of Cape Verde is an exception in
that regard .31 Art. 11 (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Cape
Verde reads:
“The legal acts emanating from the relevant organs of the supranation-
al organisations of which Cape Verde is member, shall enter directly
into force in the domestic legal order”.32
28 Okene/Eddie-Amadi, Bringing Rights Home: The Status of International Legal
Instruments in Nigeria, in: Journal of African and International Law (2010), 409 
(410).
29 Ekhator, Improving access to environmental justice under the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights: The role of NGOS in Nigeria, in: African Journal of
International and com- parative Law (2014), 63 (69).
30 Art. 75 Abs. 2 Verfassung Ghana vom 8. May 1992, geändert durch Verfas-
sungsänderungs- gesetz vom 16. December 1996; Art. 10 d Verfassung Sierra
Leone vom 3. September 1991; Art. 79 (c) the Constitution of The Gambia of 16
January 1997; Art. 57 i. conn. with Art. 34 iii. b Constitution of Liberia of 19 Oc-
tober 1983; Art. 56 par. 8 the Constitution of Guinea-Bissau of 16 May 1984,
Amendment of 11 May 1991 are considered herein. Available at: http://www.cons
titutionnet.org/files/Guinea- Bissau%20Constitution.pdf (last accessed on
14/05/2015).
31 Ouguergouz, L’application Nationale de la charte africaine des droits de l’homme
par les autorités Nationales en Afrique occidentale, in: Flauss/Lambert-Abdelga-
wad (Publ.), Lʼapplication Nationale de la charte africaine des droits de lʼhomme
et des peuples, 163 (166); Enabulele, Reflections on the ECOWAS Community
Court Protocol and the Constitutions of Member States, in: International Com-
munity Law Review 12 (2010), 111 (124).
32 The Constitution of Cap Verde of 05/09/1992, available at: http://www.constituti
onnet.org/vl/ item/constitution-republic-cape-verde-1992 (last accessed on
15/05/2015).
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According to these constitutional provisions, Parliament has transformed
the African Charter e.g. through a so-called „African Charter Act“ in Nige-
ria into National law.33 This dualism is regrettable in the sense that a rati-
fied but not nationally implemented International law instrument will be
declared inapplicable by National courts.34 More specifically, the legal reg-
ulations within ECOWAS as well as the judgments by the Court of justice
in this regard, are invalid due to a lack of implementation.35 The practical
legal consequences of comparable regulations are also well-known within
the legal system of SADC. This concerned the dispute regarding Art. 231
of the South African Constitution and the effect of the SADC-Treaty on
the National legal system.36 For these reasons, voices in Anglophone litera-
ture disputethe direct binding effect of the instruments of the Community
within the ECOWAS legal system and therefore the judgments by the
ECOWAS Court of Justice with regards to the anglophone Member States.
To justify their rejection of the binding effect, they refer to the dualistic le-
gal tradition.37 Through the ratification of the Amendment Agreement
and the Additional Protocols of francophone West African countries, all
International law-instruments receive their rank above the law. Therefore,
the final decisions by the ECOWAS Court of justice develop the same legal
effect as the instruments of the Community that the judgments by the
Court of justice refer to.
Voices in literature speak of a direct legal effect of the African Charter
based on its special nature.38 It has already been mentioned above that the
judgments by the ECOWAS Court of Justice are final and incontestable
33 Egede, Bringing Human Rights Home: An Examination of the Domestication of
Human Rights Treaties in Nigeria, in: Journal of African Law (2007), 249 (250).
34 Enabulele, Reflections on the ECOWAS Community Court Protocol and the
Constitutions of Member States, in: International Community Law Review 12
(2010), 111 (125).
35 Ouguergouz, L’application Nationale de la charte africaine des droits de l’homme
par les autorités Nationales en Afrique occidentale, in: Flauss/Lambert-Abdelga-
wad (Publ.), Lʼapplication Nationale de la charte africaine des droits de lʼhomme
et des peuples, 163 (166).
36 Oppong/Niro, Enforcing Judgments of International Court in National Court,
in: Journal of International Dispute Settlement (2014), 1 (7).
37 ECOWAS Vanguard, „Issues for an ECOWAS of People“, Volume 2, Issues 4,
Feb. 2013, 7.
38 Ouguergouz, L’application Nationale de la charte africaine des droits de l’homme
par les autorités Nationales en Afrique occidentale, in: Flauss/Lambert-Abdelga-
wad (Publ.), Lʼapplication Nationale de la charte africaine des droits de lʼhomme
et des peuples, 163 (167).
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and may not be reviewed or changed by any other court. The nature of the
respective national legal order of the Member States is, therefore “self-exe-
cuting“.39 According to this, no national implementation measures are re-
quired to render the judgments of this Court of Law effective.
Opinion: It makes no difference whether the legal system of the Member
State belongs to the dualistic or the monistic system. Moreover, the Inter-
national law and the decision by the ECOWAS Court of Justice are legally
binding. The status assigned to International law within the National law
of the signatory states does not play a role.40 The special character of the
Charter within the constitutional order of the Community clarifies that it
is a self-executing norm and as such does not need a particular implementa-
tion measure within the respective constitutional system in order to re-
ceive validity at a National level. The Charter even belongs to the bloc de
constitutionnalité in francophone West African countries, i.e. one of the
standards of constitutional interpretation. In Anglophone countries, the
Charter is mentioned in the respective preambles. Furthermore, the Mem-
ber States have waived their sovereignty in this regard by transferring the
jurisdiction to the ECOWAS Court of Justice concerning the final authori-
ty of the Constitutional Courts or the Supreme Court.41
With regards to liability, it does not matter which domestic rank the
Charter is given. The determination of the rank by the National Constitu-
tional Court is of no consequence to the obligation of compliance. The
concerned Member State cannot submit that the Charter and the ECOW-
AS legal regulations are only given the rank above basic law within the do-
mestic hierarchy of norms.42 Therefore, the ECOWAS Court of Justice
alone has the right to speak the last word on whether a Member State's
39 Rohleder, Grundrechtsschutz im europäischen Mehrlevelssystem, 163. [Protec-
tion of constitutional law in the European multi-level system, 163].
40 Kilian, Die Bindungswirkung der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs
für Men- schenrechte auf die Nationalen Gerichte der Mitgliedstaaten der Kon-
vention zum Schutze der Men- schenrechte und Grundfreiheiten vom 4. Novem-
ber 1950, 114. [The Binding Effect of Decisions taken by the European Court of
Law for Human Rights with regards to the National Court of the Member States
regarding the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Constitution-
al Freedoms of 4 November 1950, 114].
41 Pache, Die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention und die deutsche Rechtsord-
nung [The European Convention on Human Rights and the German legal sys-
tem], in: EuR (2004), 393 (400).
42 Schaffarzik, Europäische Menschenrechte unter der Ägide des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts, in: DÖV (2005), 860 (861). [European human rights under the
aegis of the Federal Constitutional Court, in: DOV (2005), 860 (861).].
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conduct infringes on human rights or not. The declaratory judgments by
the ECOWAS Court of Justice, therefore, do not need a special measure of
recognition in order to be executed. Whether monism or dualism, the re-
sult remains the same: The Member States are subject to an obligation to
comply.43 In light of the development of human rights case law, the dualis-
tic principle is nowadays to be regarded as antiquated.44
Principle of the convergence of constitutions
It must be stated in advance that the constitutions of ECOWAS Member
States are predominantly influenced by International law.45 The Protocol
on Good Governance from 2001 is denoted as the Constitution of the
ECOWAS Community.46 It expressly orders the Member States to assign
the jurisdiction on human rights matters to the ECOWAS Court of Jus-
tice.47 The fact that all signatory states have recognised the Charter and the
associated human rights in the preambles of the Constitutions of the Mem-
ber States, the Charter receives the validity of International customary law
III.
43 Kilian, Die Bindungswirkung der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs
für Men- schenrechte auf die Nationalen Gerichte der Mitgliedstaaten der Kon-
vention zum Schutze der Men- schenrechte und Grundfreiheiten vom 4. Novem-
ber 1950, 114. [The Binding Effect of Decisions taken by the European Court of
Law for Human Rights with regards to the National Court of the Member States
regarding the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Constitution-
al Freedoms of 4 November 1950, 114].
44 Bernhardt, The Convention and Domestic Law, in: Macdonald/Matscher/Petzold
(Publ.), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights, 25 (30).
45 Sall, Le Droit International dans les nouvelles constitutions africaines, in: Revue
Juridique et Politique (1997), 339 (340).
46 Fall/Sall, Une constitution régionale pour l’espace CEDEAO: le protocole sur la
démocratie et la bonne gouvernance, available at: http://la-constitution-en-afrique
.org/article-34239380. html (last accessed on 16.05.2015); Alter/Helfer/McAllister,
A new International human rights court for West Africa: the ECOWAS Commu-
nity Court of Justice, in: The American Journal of International Law (2013) Vol.
107, 737 (775); Kane, La Cour de justice de la CEDEAO à l’épreuve de la protec-
tion des droits de l’homme, Mémoire de Maitrise, Université Gaston Berger
(2012- 2013), 14; Cowell, The impact of the protocol on good governance and
democracy, in: African Journal of International and Comparative Law (2011),
331 (333).
47 Alter/Helfer/McAllister, A new International human rights court for West Africa:
the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice, in: The American Journal of Interna-
tional Law (2013), 737 (757).
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within the order of the Community. The obligations in the Protocol of
Good Governance are not only directed at the governments of the signato-
ry states. There is more involved: it is not just about actions of the govern-
ment but also of those of the legislature and the judiciary. Addressees of
the responsible governance are, so to speak, all government officials.48
Moreover, the Charter belongs to the bloc de constitutionnalité of the re-
spective constitutional order of each Member State. Member States have
establishhed in their constitutional tradition that it is possible that the hu-
man rights guaranteed in the Charter can be violated by organs of the state
despite their affiliation to the respective Constitution. In this sense, e.g. the
Constitutional Court of Benin expressly refers its jurisdiction to the Proto-
col:
« Ces fraudes massives étaient du reste contraire aux principes de la
transparence et de la fiabilité garantis les articles 4 et 5 des protocoles
de la CEDEAO sur la démocratie et la bonne gouvernance ».49
In order to reduce this risk, the Member States have created another way at
ECOWAS level to ensure that sufficient attention is paid to the Charter.
This task was transferred to the ECOWAS Court of Justice. This means
that the Member States are aware that even the Constitutional Courts, who
are primarily supposed to guard the rights in the Charter, can fail. There-
fore, a possible correction measure at International level was created in the
Community. Thus, the Constitutional Courts and the ECOWAS Court of
Justice have a common complementary task: to give the African Charter an
effective binding force for all persons under the sovereignty of the Com-
munity.50 Notwithstanding the state-internal hierarchy of norms, the
norms of International law develop unreserved assertiveness, especially in
the area of human rights.51 It would jeopardise the purpose of the Protocol
48 Dolzer, “Good governanceˮ: neues transNationales Leitbild der Staatlichkeit? [a
new transNational role model in statehood?], in: ZaöRV (2004), 535 (535).
49 Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin, Décision DCC 10–049 (05.04.2010), available
at: www. cour-constitutionnelle-benin.org (last accessed on 25/04/2015).
50 Mückl, Kooperation oder Konfrontation? – Das Verhältnis zwischen Bundesver-
fassungsge- richt und Europäischem Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte, in: Der
Staat 44 (2005), 403 (431). [Cooperation or confrontation? – the relationship be-
tween the Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human
Rights], in: Der Staat [The State], 44 (2005), 403 (431)].
51 Schaffarzik, Europäische Menschenrechte unter der Ägide des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts, in: DÖV (2005), 860 (863). [European human rights under the
aegis of the Federal Constitutional Court, in: DOV (2005), 860 (863).].
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if the obligation under International law, would receive a different mean-
ing depending on the involved Member State.
In the legal matter of Togo vs the Parliamentarians, the government stat-
ed that the ECOWAS Court of Justice did not have any competence to or-
der a removal of the consequences of the violation of human rights be-
cause such an order would constitute an infringement of Art. 106 of the
Togolese Constitution. The ECOWAS Court of Justice did not share this
view of the government and therefore rejected the order of a retrial.
Following the entry into force of the Amendment Agreement of 1993
and the associated Additional Protocol, the Member States are prohibited
from preventing the application of the obligations under International law
which they have adopted from the agreement with reference to their Na-
tional law. This is because, acc. to Art. 26 of the Vienna Convention
(VCLT), International treaties must be adhered to due to the requirement
of good faith. Furthermore, the view of both the Togolese government and
the concurring opinion of the ECOWAS Court of Justice in the above
case , are acc. to Art. 27 VCLT not cogent and therefore dissatisfactory.
Art. 27 VCLT reads:
“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justifica-
tion for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to
article 46“
In connection with the competence of the ECOWAS Court of Justice and
the obligation of implementation by the Member States, the Togolese gov-
ernment could e.g. refer to Art. 106 of the Togolese Constitution in order
to reject the competence to review decisions by the Constitutional Court.
This objection is not valid because such a restriction of competence should
have been foreseen by the signatory states during the drafting of the agree-
ment. As long as such regulations do not find expression in provisions in
the agreement, the recourse to conflicting domestic law must be rejected.
They must logically adjust their entire legal system, including the Consti-
tution, to adhere to the guidelines of the obligations of the Community
under International law.52 At this point, a comparison with the compe-
tence of the ECtHR is of interest. The Member States indeed have made
provision for a certain limitation of the judicial power of the ECtHR in
52 Giegerich, Wirkung und Rang der EMRK in den Rechtsordnungen der Mitglied-
staaten [Effect and rank of the ECHR in the legal systems of Member States], in:
Dörr/Grote/Marauhn (Publ.), EMRK/GG, 2. edition, Kap. 2, Rn. 19.
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Art. 41 ECHR. In light of dynamic interpretation, the ECtHR even deems
this limitation partially incompatible with the purpose of the Convention.
In summary, it can be said that: when it comes to the interpretation of
the legal regulations within ECOWAS, it does not matter whether these
regulations are indeed valid within the domestic legal systems and which
National legal status they have been assigned. It is not up to the Court of
justice to worry about the question of National validity and state-internal
hierarchies of norms when it comes to the legal regulations within ECOW-
AS.53
National Articulation of Legal Force
It is irrelevant whether the concerned signatory state has already paid com-
pensation or not. It is the purpose of the declaratory judgment to effect a
concrete measure at domestic level. In implementing the decision of the
Court of justice, the defendant has a duty to reach a result. The convicted
Member State is namely subject to an obligation to succeed or obligation
to achieve results. Due to this obligation to achieve results, the convicted
signatory state must do everything possible that will lead to a termination
or restoration of the original status quo in accordance with the Conven-
tion. Even if the judgment by the Court of justice is of a purely declaratory
character, the plaintiff must not endure an ongoing violation after the
declaratory judgment. Rather, it is the duty of the State to design National
procedural regulations in such a manner that the continuation of the viola-
tion is terminated or, if necessary, a compensation is paid. The aim of the
obligation to achieve results is to enable the declaratory judgment to be en-
forced or implemented in practice. Based on this obligation to achieve re-
sults, the declaratory judgment has a conceptualising effect on domestic
law. The design effect is then expressed in the annulment an adaptation of
judgment the domestic Constitutional Court ruling. A concrete example
can be clearly noted in the aforementioned case. The parliamentarians
B.
53 Egede, Bringing Human Rights Home: An Examination of the Domestication of
Human Rights Treaties in Nigeria, in: Journal of African Law (2007), 249 (278);
Enabulele, Reflections on the ECOWAS-Community Court Protocol and the
Constitutions of Member States, in: Internatio nal Community Law Review 12
(2010), 111 (127). Also: Schaffarzik, Europäische Menschen- rechte unter der
Ägide des Bundes Constitutional Court, in: DÖV (2005), 860 (861) [European
human rights under the aegis of the Federal Constitutional Court, in: DOV
(2005), 860 (861)].
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who occupy seats in parliament after the judgment in violation of human
rights by the Constitutional Court, must, indeed, give up their seats. After
a successful human rights complaint, the plaintiffs are entitled to demand
their seats back. How this will be taken forward in detail is to be clarified
by means of the binding effect of national procedural law (I) and the indi-
rect binding effect of the state organs (II).
National procedural binding force
The declaratory judgment has procedural consequences for the domestic
legal system of the convicted Member State. The resumption is available to
the Member State as an adequate means of reparation of the violation re-
garding the convention. The domestic concretisation of the compensation
takes place by reopening the original proceedings (1). The resumption of
the original proceedings is meant to sufficiently effect the change in the
the National court's legal opinion (2) in order to reflect the substantive le-
gal effect of the ECOWAS judgment. Moreover, the legal decision by the
Court of justice sets the precedent for domestic parallel cases (3). De lege
ferenda, the declaratory judgment by the Court of justice should be the ba-
sis for a Question Prioritaire de Conformité (4).
Resumption of the initial proceedings
The cause of the declaratory judgment issued against the respondent was
the judgment of a violation of human rights by the Constitutional Court.
In order to restore the status quo according to the Charter, this cause must
be terminated.54 Several conditions are necessary in order for the resump-
tion of original proceedings. The resumption of the proceedings is not op-
posed to the institution of legal force.
I.
1.
54 Mückl, Kooperation oder Konfrontation? – Das Verhältnis zwischen Bundesver-
fassungsgericht und Europäischem Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte, in: Der Staat
44 (2005), 403 (404).
[Cooperation or confrontation? – the relationship between the Federal Constitu-
tional Court and the European Court of Human Rights], in: Der Staat [The
State], 44 (2005), 403 (404)].
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Prerequisites for a resumption
At this point, it must be differentiated between a completed violation (vio-
lation consommée) and violations that could be eliminated through future
changes. Because, due to the conviction, the Court of justice orders the
convicted Member State to terminate the persisting violations, the omis-
sion of repeated offences and to take measures to prevent future violations.
Therefore, the question arises of what happens should the violation be
complete. This means that the legal situation of the plaintiff cannot be re-
stored in hindsight. This addresses the question of the impossibility of per-
formance at International law level. In case of impossibility, the criteria of
the obligation of restitution have been stipulated by the Permanent Inter-
national Court of Justice with the following words:
« Restitution en nature, ou, si elle n’est pas possible, paiement d’une
somme correspondant à la valeur qu’aurait la restitution en nature. »55
The restitution has become impossible due to the fact that the violation
concerns a completed event.56
However, National court decisions contrary to International law are vul-
nerable due to the obligation of restitution.57 This addresses the question
of the infringing act as the restitution depends on the manner in which the
violation came about. There are many such cases in which the possibility
a.
55 Affaire relative à l’usine de CHORZÓW (demande en indemnité) (fond), CPJI,
Série A N° 17 (13.09.1928), 47.
56 Cremer, Zur Bindungswirkung von EGMR-Urteilen. Anmerkung zum Görgülü-
Beschluß des BVerfG vom 14.10.2004, in: EuGRZ (2004), 683 (691) [Regarding
the binding effect of judgments by the ECtHR. Comment regarding the Görgülü
judgment by the Federal Constitutional Court of] 14/10/2004, in: EuGRZ (2004),
683 (691)].; Kilian, Die Bindungswirkung der Entscheidungen des Europäischen
Gerichtshofs für Men- schenrechte auf die Nationalen Gerichte der Mitgliedstaat-
en der Konvention zum Schutze der Men- schenrechte und Grundfreiheiten vom
4. November 1950, 200. [The Binding Effect of Decisions taken by the European
Court of Law for Human Rights with regards to the National Court of the Mem-
ber States regarding the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and
Constitutional Freedoms of 4 November 1950, 200].
57 Cremer, Zur Bindungswirkung von EGMR-Urteilen. Anmerkung zum Görgülü-
Beschluß des BVerfG vom 14.10.2004, in: EuGRZ (2004), 683 (691). [Regarding
the binding effect of judgments by the ECtHR. Comment regarding the Görgülü
judgment by the Federal Constitutional Court of] 14/10/2004, in: EuGRZ (2004),
683 (691)].
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of resumption is excluded due to the nature of the matter58. E.g. a respond-
ing state is convicted based on the overly long duration of the trial,59 or the
plaintiff was arrested and released without any criminal proceedings. In
such cases, the granting of appropriate damages offers a reasonable com-
pensation in order to do justice to the interests of the individual plaintiff.
Except from such cases in which the restitution is impossible due to the na-
ture of the infringing act, a resumption of the proceedings in most cases
represents the only possibility for restitutio in integrum. This is typically the
violation of the Right to a fair trial acc. to Art. 7 par. 1 of the Charter.
The legal force of National courts is in no way an insurmountable obsta-
cle to the effectiveness of the judgment under International law. However,
the resumption of the trial cannot be carried out ex officio. This results
from the fact that the declaratory judgment is not directly binding to the
National instance (This is discussed in detail). It is, therefore, recommend-
ed to reopen the proceedings of restitution on application by the plain-
tiff.60 The concerned signatory state has a duty to act due to the declaratory
judgment: the obligation of implementation. The implementation can be
made more concrete through the resumption. The content of the obliga-
tion is to restore the original status quo. The restoration is made in the
form of a reinstatement into the previous state of affairs. Depending on the
nature of the violation, the retraction of the violating National legal act or
the violating measure must primarily be considered. The legal force cannot
be preferred to the duty to implement.61 In the case of a decision by the
Constitutional Court, a resumption of the proceedings in favour of the
convicted plaintiff (after his successful complaint by taking action under
58 Polakiewicz, Die Verpflichtung der Staaten aus den Urteilen des Europäischen
Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte, 98.[The obligation of countries resulting from
the judgments by the European Court of Human Rights, 98.].
59 Ress, Die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention und die deutsche Rechtsord-
nung [The European Convention on Human Rights and the German legal sys-
tem], in: EuGRZ 1996, 337, 351.
60 Kilian, Die Bindungswirkung der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs
für Men- schenrechte auf die Nationalen Gerichte der Mitgliedstaaten der Kon-
vention zum Schutze der Men- schenrechte und Grundfreiheiten vom 4. Novem-
ber 1950, 108. [The Binding Effect of Decisions taken by the European Court of
Law for Human Rights with regards to the National Court of the Member States
regarding the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Constitution-
al Freedoms of 4 November 1950, 108].
61 Schaffarzik, Europäische Menschenrechte unter der Ägide des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts, in: DÖV (2005), 860 (867). [European human rights under the
aegis of the Federal Constitutional Court, in: DOV (2005), 860 (867)].
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International law) must be considered. This is coherent because, according
to the principle of restitutio in integrum, the convicted signatory state must
restore the state of affairs for the plaintiff in such a way as if the Charter
had not been violated. Only if a complete reparation turns out to be im-
possible due to the nature62 of the matter, is compensation the only other
alternative. It must be pointed out that the restoration to the previous sta-
tus quo does not preclude a just compensation. On the contrary, the
restoration in the form of a reinstatement of the previous state of affairs
can be done together with an appropriate compensation. It is already ac-
cepted in the literature on International law that both obligations, i.e. the
natural restitution and the payment of compensation, may go hand in
hand.63
Furthermore, the legal force is not breached, but rather overcome, by
the resumption of the original proceedings on application by the plaintiff,
The exceptional overcoming of the legal force based on the jurisdiction by
the ECtHR has already been accepted in German constitutional case law.
The Federal Constitutional Court has outlined:
„Entscheidungen des Europäischen Court of Law für Menschenrechte,
die neue Aspekte für die Auslegung des Grundgesetzes enthalten, ste-
hen rechtserheblichen Änderungen gleich,die zur Überwindung der
Rechtskraft einer Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts führen
können“.64
Many legal systems within the European judicial area provide for a re-
sumption of proceedings after a conviction by the ECtHR. E.g. § 359 par. 6
of the German Crimimal Procedure Code. The Swiss Constitutional Pro-
cess Law makes even more explicit provision for a resumption of the origi-
nal constitutional complaint, should the ECtHR have determined a viola-
tion bySwitzerland. At this point it is advisable to quote the regulation:
« Art. 122: Violation de la Convention européenne des droits de
l’hommeLa révision d’un arrêt du Tribunal fédéral pour violation de la
62 Peukert, in: Frowein/Peukert, Europäische Menschnrechtskonvention. EMRK-
Kommentar[European Human Rights Convention. ECHR-commentary], 3. edi-
tion, Art. 41, Rn. 3
63 Schilling, Deutscher Grundrechtsschutz zwischen staatlicher Souveränität und
menschen- rechtlicher Europäisierung, S. 113; Ipsen, Völkerrecht, § 41, Rn. 66.
[Protection of the German constitutional law between state sovereignty and Eu-
ropeanisation of human rights, p. 113; Ipsen, International law§ 41, Rn. 66].
64 BVerfGE 128, 326 (326).
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Convention de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fonda-
mentales du 4 novembre 1950 (CEDH) peut être demandée aux condi-
tions suivantes : a. la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a consta-
té, dans un arrêt définitif, une violation de la CEDH ou de ses proto-
coles; b. une indemnité n’est pas de nature à remédier aux effets de la
violation; c. la révision est nécessaire pour remédier aux effets de la vio-
lation ».65
The constitutional sovereignty of the signatory state is not opposed to the
obligation to restitution.66 This is coherent as the individual human and
fundamental rights recognised in the Charter are not at the disposition of
the National constitutional legislator. The conditions of a resumption of
the proceedings do not play a significant role in the procedure to imple-
ment the judgment.67 In Austria, for example, in addition to fair compen-
sation, domestic measures are provided for in order to meet the obligation
of restitution (§ 33 StPO, renewal of the criminal proceedings acc. to
§§ 363a to 363c StPO).68
Moreover, the question must be asked which arguments for action the
winning individual plaintiff should put forward before the National
courts. Following this, one should ask which reasons the judgment of the
National court should contain when going over the new facts of the case.
For the main proceedings are, as shown, concluded and have therefore en-
tered into legal force. The decision by the ECOWAS Court of Justice serves
as a guideline for the constitutional assessment of the case when the Na-
tional Constitutional Court reconsiders judgment of the case.69 The fact
that a Constitutional Court has to reconsider an individual complaint fol-
65 La loi fédérale sur le Tribunal fédéral du 17 juin 2005, entrée en vigueur le 1er
janvier 2007; siehe dazu: CEDH, Nr. 10577/04, Arrêt (26.07.2007), Affaire Kress-
ler c. Suisse, par. 18.
66 Cremer, Zur Bindungswirkung von EGMR-Urteilen. Anmerkung zum Görgülü-
Beschluß des BVerfG vom 14.10.2004, in: EuGRZ (2004), 683 (696). [Regarding
the binding effect of judgments by the ECtHR. Comment regarding the Görgülü
judgment by the Federal Constitutional Court of] 14/10/2004, in: EuGRZ (2004),
683 (696)].
67 Pettiti, Le réexamen d’une décision pénale française après un arrêt de la Cour Eu-
ropéenne des Droits de L’Homme: La loi française du 15 juin 2000, in: Revue Tri-
mestrielle des Droits de l’Homme (2001), 3 (12).
68 See: Okresek, Die Umsetzung der EGMR-Urteile und ihre Überwachung, in: Eu-
GRZ 2003, 168 (171). [The implementation of ECtHR judgments and their su-
pervision, in: EuGRZ (2003), 168 (171)].
69 Mückl, Kooperation oder Konfrontation? – Das Verhältnis zwischen Bundesver-
fassungsge- richt und Europäischem Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte, in: Der
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lowing a declaratory judgment of the ECtHR in favour of the successful
human rights complainant despite having previously declared it judgment
inadmissable is now well-known in the jurisdiction of the German Consti-
tutional Court ever since the Görgülü case.70 Therefore, there is no loss of
sovereignty should the Constitutional Court render the declaratory judg-
ments by the ECOWAS Court of Justice effective. Based on the exemplary
role of the Constitutional Court, the effective implementation of Interna-
tional judgments by the Constitutional Court would be seen as a sign of
respect for the rule of law. This is also primarily the demand of the Proto-
col on Good Governance of 2001. By consulting this Protocol in the judg-
ments of the Constitutional Court of Togo in 2009, the opinion is con-
firmed that this Protocol represents a supra-National Constitution for the
West African Community.71 The Constitutional Court expressly quotes the
Protocol on Good Governance of 2001 in the salient reasons for the deci-
sion. However, the Constitutional Court cannot act ex nihilo.72 It requires
regulations with regard to the constitutional process to simplify the execu-
tion of the resumed proceedings. The court judgments and especially those
by the Constitutional Courts must have a legal basis. The Constitution, the
acts supplementing the Constitution (the lois organiques) and the rules of
procedure of the Constitutional Court are the legal bases for the Constitu-
tional Courts. Here, a reason for a resumption should be recorded.
The determination of the violation of human rights by the ECOWAS
Court of justice should be recorded in the acts supplementing the Consti-
tution either as “erreur de droit“73 or as a new fact, which represents a rea-
Staat 44 (2005), 403 (414) [Cooperation or confrontation? – the relationship be-
tween the Federal Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human
Rights], in: Der Staat [The State], 44 (2005), 403 (414)].
70 The Federal Constitutional Court had at first declared the complaint inadmissi-
ble: BVerfG (Chamber), a decision of 31/07/2001. After a successful human rights
complaint before the ECtHR, the proceedings is again presented to the Federal
Constitutional Court. As a reaction to the declaratory judgment by the ECtHR,
the Federal Constitutional Court has accepted the renewed constitutional com-
plaint submitted to it for decision-making and sustained the complaint, comp.
BVerfGE 111, 307 – Görgülü.
71 See the judgment by the Constitutional Court of Togo: Décision N°C-003/09 du
09 Juillet 2009.
72 Cremer, Entscheidung und Entscheidungswirkung [Decision and Effect of the
Decision], in: Dörr/Grote/Marauhn, EMRK/GG, 2. edition, chapter 32, Rn. 91.
73 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (68, 69); DCC 98–
098 du 11 décembre 1998; DCC 02–134 du 18 décembre 2002 de la Cour consti-
tutionnelle du Bénin.
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son for resumption. This is because the Constitutional Court did not take
sufficient account of the aspects relevant to human rights decisions when
dealing with the first final decision that violated human rights. In particu-
lar, there are already factors in some West African constitutional systems
that lead to a relativisation of the legal force of judgments by Constitution-
al Courts.74 Under the european jurisdiction the Federal Constitutional
Court of the Federal Republic of Germany has rightly pointed out that the
regional human right Court has better knowledge regarding the current
status and the development of human rights with respect to the current
conditions („à la lumière des conditions d’aujourd’hui“). Therefore, the juris-
diction of the ECOWAS Court of Justice lends itself as an aid for the inter-
pretation when it comes to the resumption of a trial.
It is recommended that the National Constitutional Court and the
courts quote the supporting reasons of the ECOWAS Court of Justice in
the declaratory judgment in the resumed trial because the act of violation
by the concerned state is to be found in the salient reasons of the judg-
ment. For this reason, the International judgment is also decisive for the
domestic Constitutional Court in justifying its own opinion.
As far as the successful individual plaintiff is concerned, he refers direct-
ly to the declaratory judgment of the ECOWAS Court of Justice.75 These
are the substantive consequences of the legal force, as the substantive legal
force of the ECOWAS judgment should be decisive in the renewed consid-
eration of the facts by the domestic Constitutional Court.76 In other
words: the cause of the action in the retrial represents the declaratory judg-
ment by the ECOWAS Court of Justice. This opinion also confirms the
most recent jurisdiction by the European Court of Human Rights.77 It
74 Adeloui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (68, 69).
75 Kilian, Die Bindungswirkung der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs
für Men- schenrechte auf die Nationalen Gerichte der Mitgliedstaaten der Kon-
vention zum Schutze der Men- schenrechte und Grundfreiheiten vom 4. Novem-
ber 1950, 107. [The Binding Effect of Decisions taken by the European Court of
Law for Human Rights with regards to the National Court of the Member States
regarding the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Constitution-
al Freedoms of 4 November 1950, 107].
76 Cremer, Zur Bindungswirkung von EGMR-Urteilen. Anmerkung zum Görgülü-
Beschluß des BVerfG vom 14.10.2004 [Regarding the binding effect of judgments
by the ECtHR. Comment regarding the Görgülü judgment by the Federal Con-
stitutional Court of 14/10/2004], in: EuGRZ 2004, 683 (698).
77 Maestriv. Italian, Urteil der Großen Kammer vom 17.02.2004, Ziffer 47[Judg-
ment by the Great Chamber of 17/02/2004, Clause 47].
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states that the resumption of the violating action or sovereign measure rep-
resents an appropriate measure of restitution.78 Because of this, the refer-
ence to the resumption of the trial should be mentioned in the declaratory
judgment so that is can be implemented effectively. Without this excep-
tional overturning of the final decision of the National Constitutional
Court, Art. 15 par. 4 of the Amendment Agreement would be null and
void which would not correspond with the will of the signatory states.79
Justification of the obligation to resume
The individual possibility to complain from within the ECOWAS legal cir-
cle is to be seen as formal justice. The guarantee in Art. 7 par. 1 of the
Charter, together with Art. 9 and 10 of Protocol A/SP./01/05 is a procedu-
ral guarantee of effective legal protection because, with the opening up of
this possibility to complain, an individual plaintiff is entitled to a procedu-
ral guarantee at the international level. This procedural guarantee primari-
ly derives from Art. 1a of the Charter:
« Toute personne a le droit à ce que sa cause soit entendue. Ce droit
comprend : le droit de saisir les juridictions Nationales compétentes de
tout acte violant les droits fondamentaux qui lui sont reconnus et ga-
rantis par les conventions, les lois, règlements et coutumes en vi-
gueur ».
This guarantee would not be of great importance for the plaintiff if no sub-
stantive legal consequences would arise in his individual case. The proce-
dural law is rather meant to concretise the substantive right. What good is
a declaratory judgment without revising the National judgment in favour
of the plaintiff? The disguise of legal force should not be a justification to
uphold Constitutional Court judgments opposed to the Charter.80 Thus,
every signatory state carries the responsibility when a violation is declared
b.
78 Bernhardt, The Convention and Domestic Law, in: Macdonald/Matscher/Petzold
(Publ.), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights, 25 (37).
79 Schaffarzik, Europäische Menschenrechte unter der Ägide des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts [European human rights under the aegis of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court], in: DÖV (2005), 860 (867).
80 Breuer, Von Lyons zu Sejdovic: Auf dem Weg zu einer Wiederaufnahme konven-
tionswidrig zustande gekommener Nationaler Urteile? [On the way to a resump-
tion of National judgments that have come about in a manner contrary to the
Convention], in: EuGRZ 2004, 782 (786).
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to undertake everything to remove any kind of obstacle to the implementa-
tion. These measures could be a reopening of a trial despite final judg-
ments or a legislative act.81
Thus, the possibility of individual complaints after the granting of a
declaratory judgment triggers a substantive change in the legal situation at
National level in favour of the plaintiff. The formal justice, i.e. the proce-
dural guarantee at ECOWAS legal level serves substantive justice. The re-
sumption is a realisation of this substantive justice. After the declaratory
judgment has been issued, the plaintiff has not yet felt the benefit of the
specific change of his rights. This rather happens once a favourable re-
sumption of the original proceedings take place. Only then does the plain-
tiff experience the effect of the procedural guarantee, as prescribed by
Art. 7 par. 1 of the Charter.
The change in legal opinion of a Constitutional Court or Supreme
Court is not foreign to constitutional legal systems. For example, § 129
par. 3 of the Constitution of Ghana stipulates:
“The supreme Court may, while treating its own previous decision as
normally binding, de part from a previous decision when it appears to
it right to do so, and all other courts shall be bound to follow the deci-
sions of the Supreme Court on questions of law.”
Such constitutional regulations should be welcomed as the interpretation
of the Constitution is a dynamic process. The case law of a Constitutional
Jurisdictions namely follows societal change and meets its needs. Regard-
ing the judgments of the ECOWAS Court of Justice, the same thought can
be applied with regards to the legal consequences of a declaratory judg-
ment. The case of the the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany can re-
peatedly be recalled when it has revised its legal opinion following a diver-
gence between itself and the ECtHR.82
81 Kilian, Die Bindungswirkung der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gerichtshofs
für Men- schenrechte auf die Nationalen Gerichte der Mitgliedstaaten der Kon-
vention zum Schutze der Men- schenrechte und Grundfreiheiten vom 4. Novem-
ber 1950, 201. [The Binding Effect of Decisions taken by the European Court of
Law for Human Rights with regards to the National Court of the Member States
regarding the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Constitution-
al Freedoms of 4 November 1950, 201].
82 Mückl, Kooperation oder Konfrontation? – Das Verhältnis zwischen Bundesver-
fassungsge- richt und Europäischem Court of Law für Menschenrechte [Coopera-
tion or confrontation? – the relationship between the Federal Constitutional
Court and the European Court of Human Rights], in: Der Staat 44 (2005), 403
(410).
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From the above, the regulations demand from the constitutional proce-
dural law of Member States that the jurisdiction must be adjusted to the
legal development within the ECOWAS Community. It is in fact conceiv-
able that the declaratory judgment of the ECOWAS Court of Justice
should be one of the reasons for a change in legal opinion of Constitution-
al case law. Consequently, § 129 par. 3 of the Constitution of Ghana needs
to be supplemented with respect to the guidelines of ECOWAS instru-
ments.
Declaratory judgment by the ECOWAS Court of Justice as a
prohibition of enforcement
It is questionable whether the application for the resumption of the origi-
nal proceedings hinders the execution of the final constitutional judg-
ment. It is important to remember at this point that the judgment by the
Constitutional Court that has entered into legal force develops certain ef-
fects (this was already addressed to in Chapter 1,). In its core, this applica-
tion cannot be assigned any restrictive effect as far as the execution is con-
cerned. However, as a result of the renewed consideration of the case after
a second final constitutional judgment, the enforcement of the first judg-
ment in violation of human rights is suspended.83 These legal conse-
quences should be provided for in National procedural law or respectively
in court procedure regulations. The domestic measure in violation of the
Charter and which has been declared as such by the ECOWAS Court of
Justice is no longer enforceable. The convicted Member State must cease
the execution of such measures in order to avoid a renewed violation of
the Charter. Therefore, the declaratory judgment serves at National level as
an interdiction against an execution.84
However, the Constitutional Court cannot remove the legal conse-
quences that were set in motion in the past. Rather, the legal force is valid
based on the first judgment issued in violation of human rights. The only
solution in this constellation is the cessation of the execution in future.
2.
83 Vgl. Hoffman-Holland, Resumption of a closed trial made final bya judgment],
in: Graf (Publ.), Strafprozessordnung [Criminal Procedure Code], § 360, Rn. 1.
84 Heckötter, Die Bedeutung der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention und der
Recht- sprechung des EGMR für die deutschen Gerichte [The meaning of the
European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisdiction of the ECtHR for
German courts], 256.
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The declaratory judgment by the ECOWAS Court of Justice hence devel-
ops an ex-nunc-effect at a National level. Even though third parties may
have possibly benefitted from the constitutional judgment in violation of
human rights, the known principles of unjust enrichment in civil law can-
not be applied to their full extent.85
Effects Transcending the Individual Case
It has been demonstrated above that the declaratory judgment can be ex-
tended to the legal systems of other Member States. Now the question
must be asked whether the same cross-case effect is imaginable for parallel
cases at domestic level. Above all, the ECOWAS legal system does not ex-
pressely limit the effect of its decision on the decided legal matter for.
However, the system of the ECHR specifies that the signatory states are on-
ly obligated in legal matters to which they are a party (Art. 46 par. 1 der
ECHR).86
Another argument for the legally binding parallel cases on national level
is that the declaratory judgment represents a significant legal consequence
on national level for the winning individual plaintiff by way of the re-
sumption of the original proceedings. However, the declaratory judgment
only develops a direct effect for the parties to the trial before the ECOWAS
Court of Justice, and thus only for the individual plaintiff and the respon-
sible Member State. However, the concerned Member State is required to
transfer the consequences of the final declaratory judgment by the ECOW-
AS Court of Justice to comparable domestic cases.87 The transfer of legal
consequences has the advantage for the Member State of avoiding another
future conviction.
3.
85 Pestalozza, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law], 3. edition,
§ 20, Rn. 74 f.
86 Rohleder, Grundrechtsschutz im europäischen Mehrlevelssystem [Protection of
constitutional law in the European multi-level system], 273.
87 Rohleder, Grundrechtsschutz im europäischen Mehrlevelssystem [Protection of
constitutional law in the European multi-level system], 273.
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ECOWAS Court of Justice Decisions as the basis for QPC
From a comparable point of view, the jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court
of Justice can represent the legal basis of a Question Prioritaire de Conformité
before the courts of the Member States. The mechanism in constitutional
law of the Question Prioritaire de Constitutionnalité (QPC) is actually a com-
mon institution of procedural law before the French Conseil constitution-
nel. The analysis of the QPC requires an account of the relevant French
constitutional regulation. Art. 61–1 of the French Constitution reads as
follows :
« Lorsque, à l’occasion d’une instance en cours devant une juridiction,
il est soutenu qu’une disposition législative porte atteinte aux droits et
libertés que la Constitution garantit, le Conseil constitutionnel peut
être saisi de cette question sur renvoi du Conseil d’État ou de la Cour
de cassation qui se prononce dans un délai déterminé».88
The basic functioning of the system of the QPC is atypical.89 It is a hybrid
system for this mechanism represents a combination of an abstract and
concrete judicial review.90 In principle, the QPC is triggered by the
question of a normal party to the process, i.e. a citizen, who disputes the
constitutionality of a legal norm applicable to a concrete case.91 However,
the proceedings which ensue do not function like the preliminary ruling
procedure within the framework of Art. 267 TFEU before the ECJ. Con-
trary to the preliminary ruling procedure, here a significant idiosyncrasy
arises: Only the highest courts in the various stages of the proceedings are
entitled to appeal before the Constitutional Council because the highest
domestic courts function as a filter during the assessment of the QPC. This
means that the court which is presented with the question, may not decide
on the constitutionality of the disputed legal norm. On the contrary, the
question is directed to the respective highest court (Cour de Cassation or
Conseil d‘État). Thus, the pending proceedings must be suspended until
the highest court or, where appropriate, the Constitutional Council has
reached a decision on the constitutionality of the law. The filtering process
4.
88 Art. 61–1 de la Constitution du 04 octobre 1958 suivant la modification du 23
juillet 2008.
89 Preußler, Question prioritaire de constitutionnalité, 31.
90 Preußler, Question prioritaire de constitutionnalité, 31.
91 Cartier, Le positionnement tactique et stratégique des acteurs du procès face à la
QPC, in: ders. (Publ.): La QPC, le procès et ses juges, 53 (53).
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takes place at the level of the highest court. Should the question be consid-
ered to require presentation, it will be transferred to the Constitutional
Council for a decision. This means that only the Constitutional Council is
authorised to decide on constitutionality. This shows that the QPC is a le-
gal remedy in the event of a concrete legal dispute. For this reason, the
QPC has both the legal nature of a concrete and an abstract judicial re-
view. Nevertheless, this is not a complete abstract control measure.92 It
must be pointed out that when it comes to the admissibility of the trial, it
is not necessary that the disputed legal norm is decisive for the outcome of
the pending procedures. Rather, it is sufficient that the respective legal
norm represents a violation of the human and civil rights guaranteed in
the Constitution.
Regarding the signatory states to ECOWAS, it must be pointed out that
a comparable mechanism is not entirely unknown to the constitutional
systems of the signatory states. Literally all francophone West African
states have a comparable procedure referred to as “Procédure de l‘exception
d‘inconstitutionnalité“. Therefore, Art. 104 par. 6 of the Togolese Constitu-
tion stipulates:
« Au cours d’une instance judiciaire, toute personne physique, ou mo-
rale peut, ‹ in limine li- tis ›, devant les cours et tribunaux, soulever l’ex-
ception d’inconstitutionnalité d’une loi. Dans ce cas, la juridiction sur-
soit à statuer et saisit la Cour constitutionnelle».93
Due to the fact that the object of the dispute is not the legal dispute as
such, but rather the constitutionality of the law, this trial is called a
procédure de l‘exception d‘inconstitutionnalité. Indeed, every citizen can dis-
pute the constitutionality of a law that has already entered into legal force
during the legal dispute. The court before which the proceedings are pend-
ing is obliged to submit them. In this case, the legal dispute is suspended
and the question of constitutionality of the disputed law is referred to the
92 Preußler, Question prioritaire de constitutionnalité, 37.
93 Art. 104 par. 6 Verfassung von Togo vom 14. Oktober 1992 [Constitution of To-
go of 14 October 1992]; Art. 122 Verfassung Benin vom 11. Dezember 1991[Con-
stitution of Benin of 11 December 1991]; Art. 132 par. 1 Verfassung Niger vom
25. November 2010[Constitution of Niger of 25 November 2010]; Art. 96 par. 4
Verfas- sung Guinea vom 07. May 2010 [Constitution of Guinea of 07 May 2010];
Art. 96 Verfassung Elfenbeinküste vom 23. July 2000[Constitution of Ivory Coast
of 23 July 2000]; Kanté, Models of Constitutional Jurisdiction in Francophone
West Africa, in: The Journal of Comparative Law (2008) Vol. 3, 158 (160).
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Constitutional Court.94 However, there is no possibility in the current le-
gal situation to assess the incompatibility of a legal norm with the African
Charter and the respective constitutional case law by the ECOWAS Court
of Justice. Therefore, the mechanism of the QPC should contribute to clos-
ing loopholes with certain adjustments in this regard.
This mechanism of the QPC can be applied to the domestic orientation
effect of the ECOWAS judgment because the jurisprudence of the ECOW-
AS Court of Justice is part of the meaning and capacity of the African
Charter within the constitutional order of the Community. Whenever the
conformity to International law of a norm, in light of the African Charter,
and with it the jurisprudence of the ECOWAS Court of Justice, is doubted
by the disputing parties, there must be domestic mechanisms in place,
which enable such questions to be indicatively answered. This would pro-
duce a cross-case effect of the decision by the ECOWAS Court of Justice.
However, the corresponding adjustment must be pointed out. The descrip-
tion and importance of the QPC should be adjusted because the Question
Prioritaire de Constitutionnalité is based on the question of compatibility
with the French Constitution. At this point, the question should be de-
scribed as a Question Prioritaire de Conformité (in the following referred to
as QPC) as those seeking justice should ask the question of the compatibili-
ty (Conformité) with the African Charter and the case law of the ECOW-
AS Court of Justice. This reference is important because the African Char-
ter, together with the jurisdiction by the Court of justice , represents an in-
strument of autonomy. The task of the national Constitutional Courts
would therefore, be to assess whether the allegation, primarily made
against a legal norm with regards to the African Charter or against the case
law of the Court of Law, has any foundation. In this respect, the national
94 Art. 24 LO und Art. 122 Verf B; Mipamb, L’exception d’inconstitutionnalité en
droit togolais, available at: www.courconstitutionnel.tg (last accessed on
22/06/2015); Bado, Verfassungs- gerichtsbarkeit und Demokratisierung im
frankophonen Westafrika, Länderstudie/Togo[Constitutional Jurisdiction and
democratisation in Francophone West Africa, country study Togo], 11, ab- rufbar
unter [available at]: http://intlaw-sgiessen.de/fileadmin/user_upload/bilder_und_
dokumente/forschung/ westafrikaprojekt/workingpapers/Draft_WP_2014_benin.
pdf (last accessed on 02/07/2015); Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin, Décision
DCC 10–117 (08.09.2010) available at: www. cour-constitutionnelle-benin.org
(last accessed on 25/04/2015); Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin, Décision DCC
10–149 (28.12.2010), available at: www.cour-constitutionnelle-benin.org (last
accessed on 25/04/2015).
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Constitutional Courts would contribute to consolidate the meaning of the
African Charter and the case law of the Court of justice at a National level.
The mechanism of the QPC should entail many advantages. First of all,
the domestic erga-omnes-effect of the jurisdiction by the ECOWAS Court of
Justice is established by the domestic Constitutional Courts.95 Indeed, the
decision by the domestic Constitutional Courts has an automatic erga-
omnes-effect. In this sense, regarding the capacity of the QPC-judgment in
the domestic legal system, the French Constitutional Council emphasises
in established case law judgment:
« Considérant que cette déclaration d'inconstitutionnalité prend effet à
compter de la date de publication de la présente décision ; que, d'une
part, elle est applicable à toutes les procédures dans lesquelles les réqui-
sitions du procureur de la République ont été adressées postérieure-
ment à la publication de la présente décision ; que, d'autre part, dans
les procédures qui n'ont pas été jugées définitivement à cette date, elle
ne peut être invoquée que par les parties non représentées par un avo-
cat lors du règlement de l'information dès lors que l'ordonnance de rè-
glement leur a fait grief » 96
The same tenor can be recommended for the proposed QPC in the domes-
tic constitutional order of ECOWAS. By declaring the QPC-decision of the
Constitutional Court compatible with ECOWAS case law, it also has an
erga-omnes-effect on the Court of Justice's decision. When accepting the
compatibility of a legal norm with the Charter or with the decision by the
ECOWAS Court of Justice, it must then be expressly referred to the respec-
tive decision by the Court of Law. Accordingly, the domestic acknowl-
edgement of the decision by the ECOWAS Court of Justice by the Consti-
tutional Court of Benin must be welcomed. In fact, regarding the defini-
tion of an arbitrary arrest, the Constitutional Court of Benin expressly re-
ferred to the relevant judgment by the ECOWAS Court of Justice:
« Notons que pour déterminer à partir de quand une arrestation et une
détention sont jugées arbitraires, la Cour de Justice de la CEDEAO,
dans son arrêt N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/05/10 du 08 novembre 2010 pronon-
cé dans l’espèce Mamadou TANDJA contre État du Niger a rappelé
95 Bernabé/Cartier, L’introduction d’un nouveau gène dans le procès, in: Cartier
(Publ.): La QPC, le procès et ses juges, 1 (21).
96 Conseil Constitutionnel, N°2011–160 QPC (09.09.2011), M. Hovanes A.; Conseil
Constitu- tionnel, N°2010–15/23 QPC (23.07.2010), Région Languedoc-Rous-
sillon et autres.
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que les conclusions de la « Commission des Droits de l’Homme de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies, en déterminant le mandat du
groupe de travail sur la détention arbitraire a considéré comme arbi-
traires les privations de liberté qui, pour une raison ou une autre sont
contraires aux normes Internationales pertinentes énoncées dans la Dé-
claration universelle des droits de l’Homme ou par les instruments in-
ternationaux pertinents ratifiés par les États ».97
This modus operandi should be applied to the mechanism of the QPC.
Even if the French Constitutional Council does not always expressly refer
to the jurisdiction by the ECtHR when it comes to the QPC, a convergence
of legal practices between the two legal systems can be seen in renowned
statemtents by the Constitutional Council.98 Moreover, with the introduc-
tion of the QPC, the contribution of the litigants to the communitarisation
and consolidation of constitutional jurisprudence will be decisively recog-
nisable in the constitutional system of ECOWAS. Furthermore, by intro-
ducing the QPC the Member States would avoid further convictions be-
cause the proposal is based on the assumption that the litigants should
have the opportunity within the framework of the QPC, by way of a consti-
tutional process, to remove a potential violation of their rights which is
embedded in the African Charter. This is consistent: The application of a
legal norm contrary to the Convention leads directly to a violation of the
Convention and therefore the rights of the citizens. Therefore, the proce-
dure of the QPC will contribute to the anticipation of the conviction of
Member States. Finally, a unified application of the African Charter and
judgments of the Court of justice will be established in Member States by
the QPC. This consideration takes the idea of precautionary compliance
with the obligations resulting from a declaratory judgment into account.
Indeed, every Member State has three kinds of obligations in case of a con-
viction: the obligation to terminate, the obligation of reparation and the
97 Cour constitutionnelle du Bénin, Décision DCC 15–025 (12.02.2015), available
at: www. cour-constitutionnelle-benin.org (letzter Zugriff am 27.04.2015).
98 Conseil Constitutionnel, N°2011–113/115 QPC (01.04.2011), M. Xavier P. et
autres; Conseil Constitutionnel, N°2010–38 QPC (29.09.2010), M. Jean-Yves G.;
Conseil Constitutionnel, N°2011- 147 QPC (08.08.2011), M Tarek J.; Conseil
Constitutionnel, N°2011–185 QPC (21.10.2011),
M. Jean-Louis C.; Conseil Constitutionnel N°2011–223 QPC (12.02.2012), Ordre
des Avocats au barreau de Bastia; Conseil Constitutionnel, N°2012–
243/244/245/246 QPC (14.05.2012), Société Yvonne Républicaine et autre;
Conseil Constitutionnel, N°2011–214 QPC (27.01.2012), Société COVED SA.
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obligation of prevention. With the introduction of the QPC, the obligation
of prevention will be met to a large extent.
However, the QPC as proposed here could entail a certain risk on both
sides: If the highest domestic courts should avail of a monopoly without
any control during the filtering process of the question to be referred to
the Constitutional Courts, this, on one hand, entails the potential danger
of an arbitrary refusal. This risk is already known in the French constitu-
tional process.99 Therefore, it is recommended that the highest court deal-
ing with the question must be obliged to give reasons for a possible refusal
of a submission to the Constitutional Court.100 This would serve to enable
a clean filtering process of the QPC at the highest courts. Furthermore, the
litigants should have a legal remedy against the refusal of a reference of the
QPC. On the other hand, the litigants may also misuse the QPC by possibly
abusing it to delay the pending trial (as a manoeuvre dilatoire). It is there-
fore recommended that the objection of incompatibility with the relevant
basis of the Charter or decision by the ECOWAS Court of Justice be clear-
ly stated before the respective court for the admissibility of the QPC. The
legal basis of the QPC-objection should also be clearly distinguished.
Moreover, it must be stated that the national Constitutional Courts
could, in certain cases, issue more guarantees than the ECOWAS Court of
Justice. This would be admissible since the regional system before the
ECOWAS Court of Justice is, after all, a subsidiary protection system ac-
cording to International practice.101 Therefore, the domestic Constitution-
al Court has the primary task to protect the human rights as guaranteed in
the African Charter from state interference. In this respect, the ECOWAS
protection system represents a lower threshold (plancher).102 The domestic
constitutional systems may reach an upper limit with regard to guarantee-
99 Bernabé/Cartier, L’introduction d’un nouveau gène dans le procès, in: Cartier
(Publ.): La QPC, le procès et ses juges, 1 (21).
100 Delanlssays, La motivation des décisions juridictionnelles relatives à la QPC au
prisme de l’efficience, in: Cartier (Publ.): La QPC, le procès et ses juges, 133
(137).
101 Villiger, The principle of subsidiarity in the European Convention on Human
Rights, in: Promoting Justice, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution through
International law (2007), 623 (625).
102 In comparison, the ECHR represents the minimum standard in the European
Council. Also: Lock, Das Verhältnis zwischen dem ECJ und Internationalen
Gerichten [the relationship between the ECJ and International courts], 280; Vil-
liger, The principle of subsidiarity in the European Convention on Human
Rights, in: Promoting Justice, Human Rights and Conflict Resolution through
International Law (2007), 623 (634).
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ing the Charter. Such approaches are known e.g. between the ECtHR and
the French Constitutional Council. Indeed, a certain divergence between
the Constitutional Council and the ECtHR in favour of more legal protec-
tion in the French constitutional system can be noted. This constellation is
shown in the decisions Nr. 2011–160 and Nr. 2010–15/23.103 These two de-
cisions clarify that the regional system represents a minimum standard and
the National constitutional system can do even more. All things consid-
ered, this approach is to be welcomed, because the understanding of the
principle of subsidiarity and the primary obligation of the signatory states
are clear.
In the end, the introduction of the QPC would enable the litigant to
challenge every legal norm, should there be legitimate doubts that it does
not comply with the guarantees of the Charter and the established case law
of the ECOWAS Court of Justice. Furthermore, the possibility of a QPC in
the legal system of the Member State would contribute to a certain au-
tonomisation of the African Charter regarding the constitutional jurispru-
dence of the Member States. This would be guaranteed if the Constitution-
al Courts would expressly refer to the African Charter and the relevant
judgment by the ECOWAS Court of Justice regarding the assessment of
the conformity of the QPC with National legal norms. The African Char-
ter, within the framework of the QPC, would also be seen as a domestic
tool of interpretation of the guarantee in the Convention. Furthermore,
the relationship of the constitutional guarantee and the guarantee of the
Charter would become clearer with the QPC. Regarding the question be-
fore domestic courts, the QPC would contribute to a differentiation be-
tween Exception d’Inconstitutionnalité and Question Prioritaire de Conformité,
because both procedures are similar yet have a different legal basis. The
Exception d’Inconstitutionnalité refers to the constitutional regulations
whilst the QPC refers to the guarantees of the African Charter and the cor-
responding decision by the ECOWAS Court of Justice. After all, with the
introduction of the QPC, the litigants would become rather familiar with
the African Charter and the ECOWAS-case law because such would form
the legal basis of their question. All in all, the QPC would help in the pro-
posed way the Charter and the case law of the ECOWAS Court of Justice
to become a vibrant legal source in the constitutional legal systems the
103 Conseil Constitutionnel, N°2011–160 QPC (09.09.2011), M. Hovanes A.;
Conseil Constitu- tionnel, N°2010–15/23 QPC (23.07.2010), Région Languedoc-
Roussillon et autres.
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Member States (droit vivant). Thus, the mechanism contributes to making
the guarantee of the Charter also justiciable within domestic law.
Effect on all state powers
Although the state is directly convicted, the violating act was not caused by
the state itself. Addressee of the declaratory judgment is the concerned
state organ, which committed the wrongdoing of the Member State. How-
ever, state organs are not party to individual complaint proceedings before
the ECOWAS Court of Justice. Precisely because of this, only the involved
signatory state is expressly named in the tenor of the declaratory judg-
ment.104 Nevertheless, the state organs of the sued Member State are indi-
rectly affected by the judgment.105 This raises the question of the effective-
ness and the mode of action of the declaratory judgment on the National
legal system of the responsible Member State. On which legal grounds are
the state organs obliged to observe International law in general and the de-
cisions by the ECOWAS Court of Justice in particular? This question begs
further clarification because Art. 15 par. 4 of the Amendment Agreement
does not provide indications of whether the legal decision by the ECOW-
AS Court of Justice also represents a legal obligation for the National state
organs (1). It is, however, certain that the national Constitutional Courts
have a special binding commitment (2).
II.
104 Kilian, Die Bindungswirkung der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gericht-
shofs für Men- schenrechte auf die Nationalen Gerichte der Mitgliedstaaten der
Konvention zum Schutze der Men- schenrechte und Grundfreiheiten vom 4.
November 1950[The Binding Effect of Decisions taken by the European Court
of Law for Human Rights with regards to the National Court of the Member
States regarding the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Con-
stitutional Freedoms of 4 November 1950], 113.
105 CIJ, Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 31. mars 2004 en l’Affaire Avena et
autres ressortissants mexicains (Mexique c. États-Unis d’Amérique), Arrêt du 19.
janvier 2009, par. 64; Kilian, Die Bindungswirkung der Entscheidungen des
Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschen- rechte auf die Nationalen Gerichte
der Mitgliedstaaten der Konvention zum Schutze der Menschen- rechte und
Grundfreiheiten vom 4. November 1950[The Binding Effect of Decisions taken
by the European Court of Law for Human Rights with regards to the National
Court of the Member States regarding the Convention on the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Constitutional Freedoms of 4 November 1950], 114.
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Indirect legal force for all state organs
The silence by the signatory states during the adoption of this Amendment
Agreement could be justified by assuming that the question of the binding
effect for the organs of the convicted Member State was left up to the Na-
tional law of the concerned signatory state.106 Which domestic organ is af-
fected depends on the content of the violating act.107 Although the declara-
tory judgment only has a declarative character, it directly intervenes in the
domestic legal system of the concerned convicted Member State. Thus, all
public authorities are bound by the legal binding force.108 The indirect
power of the case law of the ECOWAS Court of Justice to affect all state
organs can be derived from the principles of restitutio in integrum and ef-
fective legal protection.109 The ICJ thus decided in the legal matter of Ave-
na vs the United States as follows:
« Le comportement de tout organe de l’État est considéré comme un
fait de l’État d’après le droit International, que cet organe exerce des
fonctions législatives, exécutives, judiciaires ou autres, quelle que soit
la position qu’il occupe dans l’organisation de l’État, et quelle que soit
sa nature en tant qu’organe du gouvernement central ou d’une collec-
tivité territoriale de l’État ».110
In case of a constitutional judgment which led to a violation, the decision
regarding reparations has an indirect effect on the case law of the Constitu-
tional Court. Should it be a law that has been declared to be in violation of
human rights by the Court of justice , it must be assumed that the parlia-
ment will take this decision into account in the legislative amendment
procedure of the sentenced member state. A legal act of the executive
1.
106 Enabulele, Reflections on the ECOWAS-Community Court Protocol and the
Constitutions of Member States, in: International Community Law Review 12
(2010), 111 (113).
107 BVerfGE 111, 307 (323 in C I 2 d) – Görgülü.
108 Cremer, Zur Bindungswirkung von EGMR-Urteilen. Anmerkung zum
Görgülü-Beschluß des BVerfG vom 14.10.2004, in: EuGRZ 2004, 683 (692). [Re-
garding the binding effect of judgments by the ECtHR. Comment regarding
the Görgülü judgment by the Federal Constitutional Court of] 14/10/2004, in:
EuGRZ (2004), 683 (692)].
109 Rohleder, Grundrechtsschutz im europäischen Mehrlevelssystem [Protection of
constitutional law in the European multi-level system], 160.
110 CIJ, Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 31 mars 2004 en l’Affaire Avena et
autres res- sortissants mexicains (Mexique c. Ètats-Unis d’Amerique), Arrêt du
19 janvier 2009, par. 63.
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which leads to the violation of the Charter should be rectified by an appro-
priate measure.Everything, therefore, depends on the organ which was par-
ty to the violation.
It follows that the ECOWAS Court of Justice does not have to expressly
name the concerned state organ responsible for the misconduct in the
tenor of the judgment. The reason is clear: The specification of compe-
tence has already been regulated in domestic law. So to speak: The declara-
tory judgment is directed together with the to whom it may concern.111
The declaratory judgment is addressed to the state organs in their respec-
tive area of competence. With regard to the domestic courts, the successful
plaintiff receives an enforceable claim to restitution executable under In-
ternational law through the declaratory judgment. By qualifying the con-
duct of the state as a violation of human rights and consequently convict-
ing the state, the Court of Justice has indirectly convicted the domestic
court concerned. At this stage, it should be pointed out that the Court of
justice does not have the power to directly intervene in the domestic legal
proceedings. Therefore, its judgments do not have a direct effect.112 How-
ever, on the part of the courts, there is the obligation to give effect to Inter-
national judgments at a National level. However, the judiciary cannot de-
cide ex nihilo.113 To avoid an ultra vires, act the courts need a legal basis. It
is therefore recommended to provide for reasons for a resumption through
legislation on a National level in order to take the judgments by the
ECOWAS Court of Justice into account. This principle of reparation, de-
duced from common International law, is confirmed for example by § 359
No. 6 of the German Criminal Procedure Code. As a result, provisions
should be made for domestic compensation proceedings within the Na-
tional legal systems in the ECOWAS Community. Failure to comply is a
violation of Art. 7 par. 1 of the African Charter.
The task of the legislature concerning compliance with the judgment
can be justified on many grounds . As long as there are no new legal or
constitutional regulations with regards to the legal effect of the declaratory
judgment by the ECOWAS Court of Justice, the National courts in gener-
111 Schaffarzik, Europäische Menschenrechte unter der Ägide des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts [European human rights under the aegis of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court], in: DÖV (2005), 860 (864).
112 Rohleder, Grundrechtsschutz im europäischen Mehrlevelssystem [Protection of
constitutional law in the European multi-level system], 159.
113 Bernhardt, The Convention and Domestic Law, in: Macdonald/Matscher/
Petzold (Publ.), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights, 25
(38).
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al, and the Constitutional Courts in particular, are in a dilemma. Compli-
ance with the ECOWAS judgment means an infringement of theconstitu-
tional requirement of the finality of Art. 106 of the Constitution (of To-
go). Should the Constitutional Court however remain unimpressed by the
declaratory judgment, there would also be an infringement of Internation-
al law because of the violation of the obligation of compliance of an Inter-
national judgment.114 An easing of the legal effect in Art. 106 of the To-
golese Constitution is the only way to resolve this dilemma. Thus, it is nec-
essary that the National constitution-amending legislator or the simple leg-
islator take action.115 A law in violation of human rights per se already cre-
ates a normative basis for a permanent violation of the declaratory judg-
ment because those enforcing the law are bound by the legislation. Spe-
cialised courts are bound by the legal authorisations of the legislator and
the Constitutional Courts to the decision-making authority of the constitu-
tional legislator (or the constitution-amending legislator). They align their
actions to the guidelines given by the legislator. This was recently con-
firmed by the French State Council when it rejected the resumption of a
decision by the administrative court in violation of human rights from
1999.116 By the executive and the judiciary acting according to the guide-
line of the law, a law in violation of human rights would be per se the
strongest form of a breach of a declaratory judgment by the ECOWAS
Court of Justice. This makes the task of the legislature of implementing
the declaratory judgment even more urgent.
Many Member States of the European Council have recognised the dan-
ger of a violation of the Convention based on non-action of the legislature.
In order to prevent recurring violations, Germany and France, e.g. have
114 Mückl, Kooperation oder Konfrontation? – Das Verhältnis zwischen Bundesver-
fassungsge- richt und Europäischem Court of Law für Menschenrechte [Cooper-
ation or confrontation? – the relationship between the Federal Constitutional
Court and the European Court of Human Rights], in: Der Staat, 44 (2005), 403
(422).
115 Kilian, Die Bindungswirkung der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gericht-
shofs für Men- schenrechte auf die Nationalen Gerichte der Mitgliedstaaten der
Konvention zum Schutze der Men- schenrechte und Grundfreiheiten vom 4.
November 1950[The Binding Effect of Decisions taken by the European Court
of Law for Human Rights with regards to the National Court of the Member
States regarding the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Con-
stitutional Freedoms of 4 November 1950], 201.
116 Mellech, Die Rezeption der EMRK sowie der Urteile des ECtHR in der franzö-
sischen und deutschen Rechtsprechung, 84. [The reception of the ECHR and
the judgments of the ECtHR in the French and German jurisdiction, 84].
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made statutory provisions for the resumption of proceedings. In Germany,
it can be found in § 580 No. 8 of the Civil Procedure Act and in § 359
No. 6 of the German Criminal Procedure Act. In France, a retrial was in-
troduced into the French Criminal Procedure Act with the announcement
of the Act No. 2000–516 of 15 June 2000.117 Such measures are to be wel-
comed in the states of the European Council because the continued validi-
ty of a law in violation of human rights and declared as such by the
ECOWAS Court of Justice is a continuous criminal offence by the convict-
ed Member State.118 Therefore, the theoretical continued validity of the
law is, after the conviction and its practical application, a permanent crimi-
nal offence of the Member State under International law. It is therefore
necessary that the constitution-amending legislator creates conditions for a
resumption of a trial after sentencing the state on the basis of Constitution-
al Court judgments in violation of human rights. Here, it must also be
pointed out, taking into account the perspective of comparative law, that
an amendment to the Constitution following an International judgment is
nothing new. This is e.g. the case in some European countries which
amended their constitutions as a consequence of and in accordance with
judgments by the ECtHR.119 In this context, Ress rightfully considers the
117 See also Art. 626–1 to 626–7 of Act No. 2000–516 of 15/06/2000. Acc. to Art.
626–1 CPP: « [Le réexamen d’une décision pénale définitive peut être demandé
au bénéfice de toute personne reconnue coupable d’une infraction lorsqu’il ré-
sulte d’un arrêt rendu par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme que la
condamnation a été prononcé en violation des disposi- tions de la convention
européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales
ou de ses protocoles additionnels, dès lors que, par sa nature et sa gravité, la vio-
lation cons- tatée entraîne pour le condamné des conséquences dommageables
auxquelles ‹ la satisfaction équi- table › allouée sur le fondement de l’article 41
de la convention ne pourrait mettre un terme.»
118 Bernhardt, The Convention and Domestic Law, in: Macdonald/Matscher/
Petzold (Publ.), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights, 25
(39); Ress, Die Europäische Men- schenrechtskonvention und die deutsche
Rechtsordnung [The European Human Rights Convention and the German Le-
gal System], in: EuGRZ 1996, 337 (252).
119 Rohleder, Grundrechtsschutz im europäischen Mehrlevelssystem [Protection of
constitutional law in the European multi-level system], 175; such, Turkey has
changed its Constitution on 03/10/2001 and on 31/12/2002 with reg. to Art. 13,
26 and 76 (see: Conseil de L’Europe, Comité des Ministres, Résolution intéri-
maire ResDH 2004, 38 du 02.06.2004.); also as a consequence of the judgment
Incal vs. Turkey, judgment of 09/06/1998 Turkey has made changes to its Con-
stitution, see Ress, Aspekte der Entfaltung des europäischen Menschenrechtss-
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resumption as the only possibility to remedy a violation of the Conven-
tion.120
In some cases, the executive represents the state before International
courts. Indeed, the Member State is represented by the respective govern-
ment as the respondent in individual complaints proceedings before the
ECOWAS Court of Justice. However, this does not mean that the govern-
ment is to be regarded as a party before the regional human rights protec-
tion instance. It only acts as a representative of foreign affairs before the
Court of justice .121 Every Member State namely regulates the question of
who is authorised to represent the state before International instances. As a
result, it may occur that the reprimanded conduct of the state is an action
by a state authority or the administration. The action of the signatory state
that led to the conviction concerns all decisions in violation of human
rights. In this sense, decision means all sovereignactions by the concerned
Member States. Thus, it is clear that acts by the executive which are at-
tributed to the signatory state should be repealed.122 When determining a
violation of the Charter, the executive's leeway for consideration to retract
is reduced to nil because of the principle restitutio in integrum. The admin-
istration must comply with the declaratory judgment.123 Due to the obliga-
tion to comply with the judgment, the declaratory judgment indirectly
chutzes, in: Jahrbuch der Juristischen Gesellschaft Bremen [Aspects of the devel-
opment of the European protection of human rights] (2003), 17 (20); Sweden
has also changed its Constitution after the case Sporrong a. Lönnroth vs Schwe-
den of 23/09/1982 in accordance with the jurisdiction by the ECtHR, see also
Rinsche, Die Welt nach Caroline – Rechtliche und faktische Umsetzung des
EGMR-Urteils im Fall Hannover [The World after Caroline – legal and factual
implementation of the ECtHR judgment in the case of Hanover], in: Mann/
Smid (Publ.), FS Damm (2005), 156 (159).
120 Ress, Die Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention und die deutsche Rechtsord-
nung [The European Human Rights Convention and the German Legal Sys-
tem], in: Eu- GRZ 1996, 337 (251).
121 Rohleder, Grundrechtsschutz im europäischen Mehrlevelssystem [Protection of
constitutional law in the European multi-level system], 168.
122 Kilian, Die Bindungswirkung der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gericht-
shofs für Men- schenrechte auf die Nationalen Gerichte der Mitgliedstaaten der
Konvention zum Schutze der Men- schenrechte und Grundfreiheiten vom 4.
November 1950 [The Binding Effect of decisions taken by the European Court
of Law for Human Rights with regards to the National Court of the Member
States regarding the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Con-
stitutional Freedoms of 4 November 1950], 203.
123 Mückl, Kooperation oder Konfrontation? – Das Verhältnis zwischen Bundesver-
fassungsge- richt und Europäischem Court of Law für Menschenrechte [Cooper-
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binds the executive, in a broad sense. The conduct that led to the violation
must be removed or terminated. Precautions must be put in place in order
to prevent future violations. Thereby, the obligation to compensate can be
enforced. The domestic Constitutional Courts are subject to a separate
binding effect based on their position in the respective constitutional sys-
tem of the Member States.
Special binding effect of the Constitutional Court
At this stage, the question must be asked: on which grounds may the
ECOWAS Court of Justice assess constitutional courts judgments? For the
status of a constitutional court expresses the sovereignty of the signatory
state.124 In order to guarantee the last decision-making competence of the
Constitutional Court or Supreme Court, constitutional regulations are ex-
pressly provided for.125 However, the degree of the binding effect of the
ECOWAS Court of Justice is unrestricted. It does not depend on the pos-
ition of the responsible state organ. Rather, as a state organ, the Constitu-
tional Court (a) is just as liable toward the Member State as all other state
organs. Moreover, Constitutional Courts or Supreme Courts play such an
important role at a National level that they function as a role model (b).
2.
ation or confrontation? – the relationship between the Federal Constitutional
Court and the European Court of Human Rights], in: Der Staat, 44 (2005), 403
(414).
124 Kilian, Die Bindungswirkung der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gericht-
shofs für Men- schenrechte auf die Nationalen Gerichte der Mitgliedstaaten der
Konvention zum Schutze der Men- schenrechte und Grundfreiheiten vom 4.
November 1950 [The Binding Effect of Decisions taken by the European Court
of Law for Human Rights with regards to the National Court of the Member
States regarding the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Con-
stitutional Freedoms of 4 November 1950], 114.
125 See also: § 129 par. 2 Constitution of Ghana of 16 December 1996; Art. 106
Constitution of Togo of 14 October 1992; Art. 124 Constitution of Benin of 11
December 1991; Art. 94 Constitution of Mali of 25 February 1992; Art. 134
Constitution of Niger of 25 November 2010; Art. 99 Constitution of Guinea of
07 May 2010; Art. 98 Constitution of Ivory Coast of 23 July 2000; Art. 159 Con-
stitution of Burkina Faso of 02 June 1991; Art. 92 par. 2 Constitution of Senegal
of 22 January 2001; Sect. 230, 232, 233, 235 Constitution of Nigeria of 29 May
1999; Art. 65 Constitution of Liberia of 06 January 1984; Art. 92 Constitution
of Guinea Bissau of 16 January 1984; Sect. 126, 127 Constitution of The Gambia
of 16 January 1997; Art. 229 par. 1 Constitution of Cape Verde of 23 November
1999; Art. 122 par. 1 Constitution of Sierra Leone of 03 September 1991.
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Furthermore, even Constitutional Courts can infringe on the human
rights guidelines through the execution of judicial powers (c).
The Constitutional Court as a state organ
The Constitutional Court is part of the National judiciary and as such car-
ries the responsibility for and against the state. Every state is sovereign. The
Constitution contains regulations that correspond with the attribution of
sovereignty. However, unlike natural persons, the state itself cannot act. It
needs organs that carry out certain National tasks on its behalf through
natural persons referred to as organ administrators.126 For this reason, the
“actions of the organ administrators are attributed to the respective organ
and via this to the state. The action of the organ administrator is, therefore,
a direct action of the state“.127 In this sense, the attribution of the actions
of the constitutional bodies to the state is therefore especially applicable at
the International law level. Functionally, the Constitutional Court is to be
regarded as both a court and also as the highest constitutional body of the
state.128 At the level of International law, the term state organ has an even
broader meaning. Every official is included. The ICJ has defined the term
with regards to the liability of the state based on actions in violation of In-
ternational law as follows:
« L’expression ‹ organe de l’État › utilisée […] doit s’entendre dans son
acception la plus large. Elle ne se limite pas aux organes du gouverne-
ment central, aux hauts responsables ou aux personnes chargées des re-
lations extérieures de l’État. Elle recouvre les organes publics de
quelque nature et de quelque catégorie que ce soit, remplissant
a.
126 Maurer, Staatsrecht I. Grundlagen, Verfassungsorgane, Staatsfunktionen [State
Law I. Basics, Organs of the Constitution, Functions of the State], 4. edition,
391, Rn. 22.
127 Maurer, Staatsrecht I. Grundlagen, Verfassungsorgane, Staatsfunktionen [State
Law I. Basics, Organs of the Constitution, Functions of the State], 4. edition,
391, Rn. 22.
128 See also Art. 114 Constitution of Benin of 11 December 1991; Art. 99 Constitu-
tion of Togo of 14 October 1992; Art. 152 Constitution of Burkina Faso of 02
June 1991; Art. 88 Constitution of Ivory Coast of 23 July 2000; Art. 94 Constitu-
tion of Guinea of 07 May 2010; Art. 120 Constitution of Niger of 25 November
2010; Art. 85 Constitution of Mali of 25. February 1992.
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quelque fonction que ce soit et à quelque niveau que ce soit, y compris
au niveau régional au local».129
As a court, the Constitutional Court carries out judicial power and is there-
fore part of the judiciary in the separation of powers.130 As a general rule,
it may only act as public authority of the Third Power131 on application. In
a numbe of ways, the Constitutional Court is a court and therefore a state
organ. As a Court of Law, the decisions by the Constitutional Court devel-
op final legal force in a substantive and formal regard. It is the very top of
the judiciary in guarding the fundamental freedoms and human rights en-
trenched in the Constitution.As the highest constitutional organ, the Con-
stitutional Court is subordinate to no other constitutional organ. Rather, it
controls the actions of all other constitutional organs, in particular of the
parliament and the president of the state according to the Constitution. If
they exceed their competences, the Constitutional Court shall refer the
other Constitutional organs to their respective areas of competence. At
state level, its decisions develop the strongest effects on all state organs, in-
cluding the legislature and everyone.132
Role Model Function of the National Constitutional Court
The special position of a Constitutional Court finds expression in the legal
systems of the francophone West African states. That is to say, that they are
not connected to the regular instance procedure.133 In fact, the regulations
b.
129 CIJ, Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 31. mars 2004 en l’Affaire Avena et
autres ressortissants mexicains (Mexique c. États-Unis d’Amérique), Arrêt du 19.
janvier 2009, par. 64.
130 Art. 88 Constitution of Senegal of 22. January 2001; see also Sodan/Ziekow,
Grundkurs Öffentliches Recht [Basic Course Public Law], 5. edition, 130, Rn. 1;
Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [constitutional process law], 2. edition,
§ 4, Rn. 99.
131 Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Band [State Law of the
Federal Republic of Germany, Volume] II, § 32 I 2, 335.
132 Maurer, Staatsrecht I. Grundlagen. Verfassungsorgane, Staatsfunktionen[State
Law I. Basics, Organs of the Constitution, Functions of the State], 4. edition,
667, Rn. 9.
133 Art. 124 Constitution of Burkina Faso of 02 June 1991; Art. 113 Constitution of
Togo of 14 October 1992; Art. 125 Constitution of Benin of 11 December 1991;
Art. 102 Constitution of Ivory Coast of 23 July 2000; Art. 108 Constitution of
Guinea of 07 May 2010; Art. 136 Constitution of Niger of 25 November 2010;
Art. 81 Constitution of Mali of 25 February 1992.
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of the Constitutional Court are stipulated in their own chapter.134 As a re-
sult, it exercises its competence as the highest guardian of the Constitution
independently and autonomously. Because the existence, the statute and
the regulations regarding the competence of the Constitutional Court are
provided for in the Constitution itself, the Constitutional Court has an im-
portant position within the constitutional framework.135The safeguarding
of the human rights guaranteed by the Constitutional Court is first and
foremost the task of the National Constitutional Court. In order to remove
a certain discrepancy between the International jurisdiction on human
rights and the decisions by National state organs of Member States, the
Constitutional Court plays a model role. The Constitutional Court has, in
this regard, a levelling task.136 In otherwords, the Constitutional Court is a
guide within the structure of a state. The domestic Constitutional Court is,
so to say, the highest guardian137 of the Charter within the National legal
system. Moreover, the Constitutional Court plays a key role within the
structure of the state.138 It has the responsibility to make landmark judg-
ments to consolidate the rule of law. The case law of the Constitutional
Court has consequences for the entire domestic constitutional order. The
Constitutional Court gives other state authorities the incentive to comply
with International law at National level because the other state organs,
such as the highest specialised courts and the legislature, base their actions
on the control standards of the Constitutional Court.
Subsequently, it is clear that the respective Constitutional Court of the
ECOWAS signatory states has the highest responsibility within the state
structure, in particular with regards to the adherence to the judicial guar-
antee acc. to Art. 7 par. 1 of the Charter. Their role as “Co-Con-
134 Art. 152 Constitution of Burkina Faso of 02 June 1991; Art. 99 Constitution of
Togo of 14 October 1992; Art. 114 Constitution of Benin of 11 December 1991;
Art. 88 Constitution of Ivory Coast of 23 July 2000; Art. 93 Constitution of
Guinea of 07 May 2010; Art. 120 Constitution of Niger of 25 November 2010;
Art. 85 Constitution of Mali of 25 February 1992.
135 Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Band [State Law of the
Federal Republic of Germany, Volume] II, § 32 II 2, 344.
136 Schaffarzik, Europäische Menschenrechte unter der Ägide des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts [European human rights under the aegis of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court], in: DÖV (2005), 860 (860).
137 Schaffarzik, Europäische Menschenrechte unter der Ägide des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts, in: DÖV (2005), 860 (866). [European human rights under the
aegis of the Federal Constitutional Court].
138 Sodan/Ziekow, Grundkurs Öffentliches Recht [Basic Course Public Law],
5. edition, § 16, Rn. 6.
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troller“ next to the ECOWAS Court of Justice, entails significant conse-
quences regarding the implementation of the human rights entrenched in
the Charter. However, it is clear that these conditions for appealing to the
national Constitutional Courts do not make it easier to consolidate the le-
gal principles. Especially the Constitutional Courts have the responsibility
of entrenching the rule of law.139 Should this primary responsibility fail,
the violation must be removed at National level in hindsight. Consequent-
ly, this violation is the responsibility of the state under International law.
The National Constitutional Court must then remedy this error retrospec-
tively by reopening the original proceedings.140
In the following, the adherence to the legal decision by the ECOWAS
Court of Justice will be briefly discussed. The declaratory judgment of the
ECOWAS Court of Justice only has declarative character. In its role as the
highest guardian of the Charter, the Constitutional Court should establish
an erga-omnes binding effect for the Charter and the associated judgments
by the ECOWAS Court of Justice at National level. Art. 106 of the To-
golese Constitution and Art. 23 of the LO141 read as follows:
« Les décisions de la Cour Constitutionnelle ne sont susceptibles d’au-
cun recours. Elles s’im- posent aux pouvoirs publics et à toutes les auto-
rités civiles, militaires et juridictionnelles. »
Especially because these two regulations ascribe the strongest effect to the
decisions of the Constitutional Court, all other state powers should follow
the understanding of the International law and the associated judgments
by the ECOWAS Court of Justice before that of the Constitutional Court.
Should the Constitutional Court reject the binding effect of the declarato-
ry judgment by the ECOWAS Court of Justice, the other state powers
would not have any reason to pay attention to the declaratory judgment by
the Court of Law. They follow the opinion of the Constitutional Court
and are closer and more open to the Constitutional Court than they are to
139 Diop, La justice constitutionnelle au Sénégal. Éssai sur l’évolution, les enjeux et
les réfor- mes d’un contre-pouvoir juridictionnel, 268.
140 Also Cremer, Zur Bindungswirkung von EGMR-Urteilen. Anmerkung zum
Görgülü- Beschluß des BVerfG vom 14.10.2004, in: EuGRZ 2004, 683 (698).
[Regarding the binding effect of judgments by the ECtHR. Comment regarding
the Görgülü judgment by the Federal Constitutional Court of] 14/10/2004, in:
EuGRZ (2004), 683 (698)].
141 Loi Organique N°2004–004 (01.03.2004).
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the ECOWAS Court of Justice.142 The reason is obvious: The Constitution-
al Court is perceived as the highest court within the state structure and
also as the “pouvoir neutre“.143
The possibility of a judgment in violation of human rights
We will discuss the question, why the Constitutional Court of a Member
State should be bound by the decision by the ECOWAS Court of Justice.
At first glance, this binding effect is opposed to regulations, e.g. § 129
par. 2 of the Ghanaian Constitution. Nevertheless, the obligation of the
Constitutional Court of the Member State can be justified. The constitu-
tional regulations have a certain kinship with the human rights that are
guaranteed in the Charter.144
However, assessment benchmarks by the Constitutional Court at their
core are not to be confused with those of the ECOWAS Court of justice .
The control measures of the Constitutional Court are different compared
to those of the ECOWAS Court of Justice. Although the relevant human
rights instruments and the Charter are applicable in the ECOWAS signato-
ry states, the respective Constitutional Court assesses the constitutional
complaint against the benchmark of the domestic constitutional law. For
the suitability of these International obligations as a direct standard of ex-
amination in a Constitutional Court procedure is, according to the opin-
ion of the majority in literature, rather limited.145 Consequently, the Con-
stitutional Court is in the service of the respective National Constitution.
In contrast, the terms of the Human Rights Convention are to be inter-
preted autonomously by the ECOWAS Court of Justice.146 Therefore, at
c.
142 Heckötter, Die Bedeutung der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention und
der Recht- sprechung des EGMR für die deutschen Gerichte [The meaning of
the European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisdiction of the ECtHR
for German courts], 139.
143 Herdegen, Constitutional Court als pouvoir neutre, in: ZaöRV (2009), 257
(258).
144 Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht[Constitutional Process Law], 2. edition,
§ 3, Rn. 71.
145 Benda/Klein, Verfassungsprozeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law], 2. edition,
§ 3, Rn. 64.
146 Bernhardt, The Convention and Domestic Law, in: Macdonald/Matscher/
Petzold (Publ.), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights, 25
(34); Benda/Klein, Verfassungspro- zeßrecht [Constitutional Process Law], 2.
edition, § 3, Rn. 66.
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the level of International law, the African Charter, i.e. International law,
represents the subject of assessment of the individual complaint against ac-
tions of the state. In this sense, the ECOWAS Court of Justice is directly at
the service of the Charter. Actions by the state are directly assessed accord-
ing to the guidelines of the Charter. There are, in fact, precedence cases in
which some of the principles in the Constitutions do not comply with the
human rights guidelines.147 At European level, some Member States have
changed their Constitutions because of the ECHR in order to reconcile
them with the guidelines of the ECHR and ECtHR case law. All this con-
firms the autonomy of human rights despite the theoretical acknowledge-
ment of their principles in the legal systems of Member States.148 As far as
the case law of the Constitutional Court is concerned, there are concrete
examples in the West African judicial area, where sovereign acts of Nation-
al Constitutional Courts have caused justified fears regarding the rule of
law and the consolidation of democracy. The Togolese Constitutional
Court must be quoted in this respect. In 2005, the Constitutional Court
confirmed the unconstitutional transfer of power after the death of the for-
mer state president. This measure taken by the Togolese Constitutional
Court has attracted particular attention within the International Commu-
nity in general and the ECOWAS Community in particular.149 Moreover,
it is recognised within the West African Community that there is a conver-
gence of constitutional principles. This convergence is reflected in the in-
corporation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights into the
constitutional systems of the Member States. The ECOWAS Court of Jus-
tice is to be regarded as the authentic interpreter for the unification of the
interpretation of these constitutional principles formed by the African
Charter.150 The ECOWAS Court of Justice alone has more knowledge re-
garding the current state of development of the Charter. It is therefore log-
147 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Hissen Habré v. République du Sénégal, N
°ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/10 (18/11/2010), available at: www.courtecowas.org (last
accessed on 20/04/2015).
148 Bernhardt, The Convention and Domestic Law, in: Macdonald/Matscher/
Petzold (Publ.), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights, 25
(34).
149 Regarding the failure of the Togolese Constitutional Court, see Kessougbo, La
Cour constituti- onnelle togolaise et la régulation de la démocratie au Togo, in:
Revue Béninoise des Sciences Juri- diques et Administrative (2005), 61 (97);
Cowell, The impact of the protocol on good governance and democracy, in:
African Journal of International and Comparative Law (2011), 331 (339).
150 Kilian, Die Bindungswirkung der Entscheidungen des Europäischen Gericht-
shofs für Men- schenrechte auf die Nationalen Gerichte der Mitgliedstaaten der
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ical that the Constitutional Courts of Member States are subordinate to
the jurisdiction of this ECOWAS Court of justice .151
In summary: An overview of the constitutional regulations of Member
States clearly shows that obstacles still remain on national level of the
ECOWAS Member States which could block the implementation of the
judgments by the Court of justice . The majority of the opinions in litera-
ture argue for the precedence of the ECOWAS-instrument and therefore in
favour of the precedence of the judgments by the Court of justice above
National constitutional regulations.152 Member States cannot refer to the
inaction of their organs in order to justify the lack of effectiveness of their
obligations towards the ECOWAS Community.153
The ECOWAS Court of Justice has expressly deduced from Art. 15
par. 4 of the Amendment Agreement that it has no authority to order a di-
rect revocation of measures in violation of human rights, as a command to
state organs, in the tenor of a declaratory judgment. For this reason, the
declaratory judgment does not develop a direct legal binding effect with
regards to the state bodies of the responding Member State. Therefore,
they are only indirectly affected by the obligation to comply with the judg-
ment. Nevertheless, the declaratory judgment possesses a factual legal force
towards the state organs because of the right to effective legal protection
Konvention zum Schutze der Men- schenrechte und Grundfreiheiten vom 4.
November 1950[The Binding Effect of Decisions taken by the European Court
of Law for Human Rights with regards to the National Court of the Member
States regarding the Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Con-
stitutional Freedoms of 4 November 1950], 195.
151 BVerfGE, 74, 358 (370).
152 Enabulele, Reflections on the ECOWAS-Community Court Protocol and the
Constitutions of Member States, in: International Community Law Review 12
(2010), 111 (135 und 136); Egede, Bringing Human Rights Home: An Examina-
tion of the Domestication of Human Rights Treaties in Nigeria, in: Journal of
African Law (2007), 249 (253 und 284); Oppong/Niro, Enforcing Judg- ments of
International Court in National Court, in: Journal of International Dispute Set-
tlement (2014), 1 (21).
153 Egede, Bringing Human Rights Home: An Examination of the Domestication
of Human Rights Treaties in Nigeria, in: Journal of African Law (2007), 249
(253 und 253); the SADAC-Tribunal has accurately rejected the opinion of the
Zimbabwean government: Oppong/Niro, Enforcing Judgments of International
Court in National Court, in: Journal of International Dispute Settle- ment
(2014), 1 (7).
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(Art. 7 of the Charter). Thus, the duty to remedy applies to all state.154 The
actual, indirect commitment of the state organs is based on an Internation-
al legal obligation of the convicted Member State. The state organs are not
a party before the ECOWAS Court of Justice, therefore this Court of jus-
tice cannot directly convict them. On the basis of the right to effective le-
gal protection the Court should be able to give directives in the tenor of a
declaratory judgment, on how this goal could be achieved at a domestic
level. Such references have no direct effect on the domestic legal system of
the convicted state. The signatory state alone is bound by them. It is help-
ful for the convicted state to understand which route the Court of justice
expects. The guidelines in the tenor of the declaratory judgment create a
sound basis for the immediate national implementation of the judgment.
Moreover, the ECOWAS Court of Justice saves itself a renewed assessment
of the same case by way of an interpretative judgment because with the
clear statement in the tenor of the Court of justice s decision regarding the
resumption of the domestic proceedings it can hardly be presumed that
the parties will submit another application for the interpretation of the
declaratory judgment. This is because an interpretation procedure is based
on the ambiguity of the tenor which entails the expectation of the Court of
justice towards the result of the reparations. With respect to the effective
legal protection and an acceleration of the compliance with the judgment,
it is necessary to point out to the affected state organs in the main reasons
of the decision that they are to act in accordance with the Convention. The
Court of Law can make use of the method to aid the effectiveness of the
declaratory judgment. No exception can be deducted from the legal basis
for the transfer of human rights competences to the ECOWAS Court of
Justice as to which state action may be objected to before the Court of jus-
tice . Therefore, judgments by the Constitutional Court in violation of hu-
man rights are to be assessed by the ECOWAS Court of justice . With the
declaration of a violation of human rights by these judgments, the resump-
tion of the trial offers an appropriate solution to effectively grant the plain-
tiff their legal right. Based on the principle of non-appealability of final
constitutional decisions, the National Constitutional Courts should be au-
thorised to take sufficient account of the legal consequences of the declara-
154 Mückl, Kooperation oder Konfrontation? – Das Verhältnis zwischen Bundesver-
fassungsgericht und Europäischem Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte [Coopera-
tion or confrontation? – the relationship between the Federal Constitutional
Court and the European Court of Human Rights], in: Der Staat 44 (2005), 403
(417).
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tory judgment by reopening the initial trial. In order to reach a compro-
mise between justice in the individual case and legal certainty, National
Constitutional Courts should order the cession of the enforcement for the
future (ex-nunc-Wirkung) in the resumed trial. In this way the resumption
of the proceedings serves the removal of the consequences of the legal
force on a National level.
Consequences of Contempt of Judgments of the ECOWAS Court of Justice
The implementation of decisions by the ECOWAS Court of Justice repre-
sents an obvious, decisive step toward a better functionality of the mecha-
nism instituted by Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 for the direct individ-
ual complaint before the Court of justice . This goal can only be achieved
if the Member States feel bound by the decision of the Court of Law and
actually implement the latter in their domestic legal order. In this way, a
functional legal system on Community level can slowly develop.155 It is
not a valid argument that the domestic law of the signatory states opposes
the implementation of obligations under International law. This view is re-
iterated by the ICJ in its consistent case law, in particular in its latest judg-
mentinterpretation judgment in the case Avenas vs the United States. The
ICJ namely states that:
« La Cour n’a cessé de réaffirmer dans sa jurisprudence qu’un État ne
saurait invoquer son droit interne pour justifier de ne pas avoir exécuté
une obligation Internationale. Ainsi, en prenant les mesures qui leur
incombent en vertu de l’arrêt Avena, les États-Unis ne sauraient invo-
quer vis-à-vis d’un autre État leur propre Constitution pour se sous-
traire aux obligations que leur imposent le droit International ou les
traités en vigueur».156
Consequently, the question of sanction mechanisms in case of a violation
of the obligation to implement arises (II). Is there a legal basis for an alter-
native solution in case of a violation of the obligation to implement (I)?
C.
155 Gans, Die ECOWAS. Wirtschaftsintegration in Westafrika [ECOWAS. Econo-
mic Integration in West Africa], 71.
156 CIJ, Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 31 mars 2004 en l’Affaire Avena et
autres res- sortissants mexicains (Mexique c. États-Unis d’Amérique), Arrêt du
19. janvier 2009, par. 8.
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State liability due to a breach of the obligation to implement
Acc. to Art. 15 par. 4 of the Amendment Agreement, the signatory states
are obliged to acknowledge the declaratory judgment by the Court of jus-
tice as legally binding. In case of a conviction to pay compensation, the
content of the obligation to implement is obvious. In some cases, however,
the obligation to implement is based on the withdrawal of the disputed le-
gal act by the state in violation of the Convention – regardless of whether
it was an act of the administration, a court judgment, a legal norm that di-
rectly affects the individual or any other conduct by the state.157 It has
been shown, that the obligations derived from the African Charter repre-
sent objective obligations for the signatory states. For this reason, the viola-
tion of the obligation is established under International law by the convict-
ed Member State towards the individual plaintiff. Furthermore, the other
signatory states also have a legitimate interest in the implementation of the
declaratory judgment. This can be specified through the enforcement of
the General State Liability Act under International law.158 From the afore-
mentioned, it can be said: With regards to the object of the dispute, i.e. the
substantive legal force, the legal proceedings of State liability inevitably
neither have the same parties nor the same object of the dispute as the final
national decision establishing liability.159 Thus, the difference of the object
of the dispute with regard to the substantive legal force represents a signifi-
cant advantage in avoiding pendency when a new possibility of appeal is
opened (1).160 Regarding the accountability of the signatory states because
of a violation of the obligation to implement, it should be referred to the
general rule of state responsibility as well as the sanction mechanisms
within the ECOWAS Community (2).
I.
157 Frowein, in: ders./Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention. EMRK-
Kommentar [European Human Rights Convention. ECHR-commentary],
3. edition, Art. 46, Rn. 2.
158 Combacau/Sur, Droit International Public, 7. éd., 520.
159 CJUE, N°C-224/01, Arrêt (20.09.2003), Affaire Köbler v. Republik Österreich,
par. 39.
160 Breuer, Staatshaftung für judikatives Unrecht [State liability in case of judicial
injustice], 402.
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Introduction of a new complaint procedure due to a breach of the
obligation to implement
Commonly, the injustice under International law only arises against the vi-
olated subjects under International law161, which represent states or Inter-
national organisations. Through the declaratory judgment, the convicted
signatory state carries an obligation to implement. This implementation
preferably takes the shape of compensation in case of an established viola-
tion or the termination obligation in case of of still continuing infringe-
ments. If this obligation to implement is violated, this results in new rights
in favour of the individual plaintiff. Therefore, the individual plaintiff can
first claim the obligation to implement at a state level. Should a violation
of the obligation to implement be established, a second individual com-
plaint is set in motion before the ECOWAS Court of Justice based on the
violation of the obligation to implement.
The failure to comply with the judgment opens the opportunity to sub-
mit a new complaint to the Court of justice . The plea of non-compliance
has a different legal basis than the plea for the violation of human rights.
The possibility to submit a further individual complaint if a breach of the
obligation to comply is determined would contribute to the effective legal
protection. Indeed, such a possibility can be dogmatically justified: on one
hand, there is no need to fear the breach of legal force by a renewed com-
plaint against the convicted Member State because the fundamental ele-
ments of this complaint are different to those in the initial proceedings be-
fore this Court of justice . Here, the plaintiff submits the application based
on a violation of a general objective violation of an obligation, namely, the
obligation to observe the International commitment of the Member State
(Art. 15 par. 4 of the Amendment Agreement). In contrast to the initial
trial where the plaintiff asserts the violation of the individual and civil
rights acknowledged in the Charter, the application in a resumption of the
domestic proceedings refers to the declaratory judgment. In this respect, it
is recommended to create an appellate court at Community level, which
should not only be able to decide on a remedy against judgments in the
first instance but also on the complaint of a violation of the obligation to
implement.162 In this sense, the declaratory judgment gives the claimant a
1.
161 Schröder, in: Vitzthum/Proelß (Publ.), Völkerrecht [International Law], 6. edi-
tion, 7. section, Rn. 8.
162 Thus was the recommendation of the experts during the meeting in Guinea-Bis-
sau, “Legal and Human Rights Experts Propose Measures for Improving the Ef-
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subjective legal claim to the implementation of the judgment. For, the
declaratory judgment, with all due caution, gives rise to a subjective obli-
gation to perform in favour of the applicant.
From the above, the status of the individual as a subject of under Inter-
national law can be perceived. In principle, International law establishes
rights and duties between subjects under International law.163 Therefore,
the right of state responsibility forms a second corrective level164 in case of
unlawful conduct. Subsequently, the rules of state liability come into effect
if and only when, should a subject under International law has infringed
on its primary obligation through attributable action.165 The fact that the
individual may claim the imputability of an infringement of International
law means that he is awarded the status of a subject under International
law. While the individual was purely perceived as an object under Interna-
tional law, this opinion has increasingly been criticised in the second half
of the twentieth century.166 The situation has definitely changed with the
regulation in Art. 34 ECHR and Art. 10 d in the Additional Protocol A/
SP.1/01/05 (19/01/2005). Both regulations grant the individual a right to
judicial legal protection under International law. Thereby, access to an In-
ternational court and the introduction of court proceedings have been
made possible. The question with regard to the legal order of ECOWAS re-
mains, whether the individual has the same claim regarding the violation
of the implementation of the judgment because the regulation in Art. 10 d
A/SP.1/01/05 (19/01/2005) only allows for the complaint against the viola-
tion of the primary obligation by the signatory state, but not on the second
corrective level.
Enforcement of general state liability law
Here, the function and purpose of state liability law at the International
law level can be perceived. With regard to the violation of the obligation
2.
ficiency of the ECOWAS Court in Imple- menting Human Rights Mandate”,
available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on 18/04/2015).
163 Doehring, Völkerrecht [International Law], § 1, Rn. 17; Kau, Der Staat und der
Einzelne als Völkerrechtssub- jekte [The State and the individual as subjects un-
der International law], in: Vitzthum/Proelß (Publ.), Völkerrecht [International
Law], 6. edition, 131 (140).
164 Ipsen, Völkerrecht International Law], 6. edition, § 28, Rn. 6.
165 Ipsen, Völkerrecht [International Law], 6. edition, § 28, Rn. 6.
166 Ipsen, Völkerrecht [International Law], 6. edition, § 7, Rn. 1.
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to implement a declaratory judgment by the Court of justice , the general
rule of customary International law is applicable (a). In addition, there are
regional mechanisms of sanctions at ECOWAS-level (b).
Applicability of the general rules of customary International law
The states are responsible for attributable violations of International legal
obligations according to International law. In the customary practice be-
tween states, the case law of International courts and the jurisprudence of
International law, there is a consensus that the violation of International
law by a state establishes its responsibility.167
The International law perceives the state as a unit. It does therefore not
matter which state organ is responsible for the actual offence. What is im-
portant is the determination of the infringement of International law. The
state cannot escape its obligation by attributing the action in violation of
International law to another domestic organ.168 In this respect, the legal ac-
tions of the legislature, the executive as well as the judiciary are at-
tributable to the state. The independence of National courts cannot be an
argument against the attribution of a violation of International law. Subse-
quently, the International Justice Commission stipulates in Art. 4 of the
draft for state responsibility:
“The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that
State under International law, whether the organ exercises legislative,
executive, judicial or any other functions, what- ever position it holds
in the organisation of the State, and whatever its character as an organ
of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State”.169
a.
167 Ipsen, Völkerrecht [International Law], 6. edition, § 28, Rn. 1; Schröder, in:
Vitzthum/Proelß (Publ.), Völkerrecht [International Law], 6. edition, 7. section,
Rn. 6.
168 Breuer, Staatshaftung für judikatives Unrecht [State liability in case of judicial
injustice], 592; Van Genugten, Avena ou le system ju- ridique fédéral américain
à l’épreuve, in: Hague Justice Journal (2008), 53 (58).
169 UN Doc. A/56/10, Chapter 2 (attribution of conduct to a state), Art. 4, 44; CIJ,
Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 31 mars 2004 en l’Affaire Avena et
autres ressortissants mexicains (Mexique c. États-Unis d’Amérique), Arrêt du 19
janvier 2009, par. 65; Koupokpa, Lʼindépendance de la Cour de Justice de la CE-
DEAO, Communication donnée au colloque International de Lomé, organisé
par le Centre de Droit Public de Lomé et le département de Droit administratif
de la Fa- culté de Droit de L’Université de Gand (02.03.2012), Lomé, 18.
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From this, we should remember that the states are accountable for the in-
justice under International law that was caused by their courts. According
to common International law, states are responsible for disregarding their
obligations under International treaty law. As far as the system of protec-
tion within the ECOWAS Community is concerned, in the absence of a
provision such as Art. 41 and 46 ECHR, the common principles of state re-
sponsibility under international law applies to the obligations of Member
States arising from judgments by the Court of Law.170 Should a sued Mem-
ber State refuse to implement the binding final decision by the ECOWAS
Court of justice , the general rules under International law regarding state
liability are set in motion. The refusal of the obligation to comply repre-
sents a violation of the execution of the declaratory judgment.
Furthermore, the disregard or non-compliance with a declaratory judg-
ment is a violation of the principle of supremacy of the rule of law. This
basic principle in the Protocol on Good Governance from 2001 is a mile-
stone in the framework of fundamental rights in the ECOWAS Communi-
ty. This disregard is even classified in the system of the ECtHR as a serious
infringement of the Convention and triggers a multitude of sanctions: the
right of representation of the concerned Member State is withdrawn. In
the case of Loisidou, the Ministerial Committee expressly referred to the
serious nature of the violation in disregarding the declaratory judgment.171
In the event of acquiescence, the sued Member State will be forced to de-
clare its withdrawal.172 Only once – in the years 1969 and 1970 – has this
procedure been employed against Greece.173
Sanction mechanisms in the ECOWAS legal order
Apart from the general State Liability law described, ECOWAS makes pro-
vision for further sanctions based on the violation of an International obli-
b.
170 Doehring, Völkerrecht [International Law], 2. edition, Rn. 838; Schilling, Deut-
scher Grundrechtsschutz zwischen staatlicher Souveränität und menschenrecht-
licher Europäisierung [Protection of the German constitutional law between
state sovereignty and Europeanisation of human rights], 113.
171 Interim Resolution of 24 July 2000 DH (2000) 105, HRLJ 000, 272.
172 See: Okresek, Die Umsetzung der EGMR-Urteile und ihre Überwachung [).
[The implementation of ECtHR judgments and their supervision], in: EuGRZ
(2003), 168 (172).
173 Compare the Resolution fo the Ministerial Committee Res. DH (70)1
(15/04/1970).
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gation by the member States. Regarding the sanctions in case of a violation
of the obligation to implement, the Community provides for many step by
step possibilities. The sanctions are stipulated in Art. 77 of the Amendment
Agreement. According to Art. 77:
« 1. Sans préjudice des dispositions du présent Traité et des protocoles
y afférents, lorsqu’un État membre n’honore pas ses obligations vis-à-
vis de la Communauté, la Conférence peut adopter des sanctions à
l’encontre de cet Etat. 2. Ses sanctions peuvent comprendre: (i) lasus-
pension de l’octroi de nouveau prêt ou de toute nouvelle assistance par
la Communauté;
(ii) la suspension de décaissement pour les prêts, pour tous les projets
ou des programmes d’assistance communautaires en cours; (iii) le rejet
de la présentation de candidature aux postes statutaires professionnels;
(iv) la suspension du droit de vote; et (v) la suspension de la participa-
tion aux activités de la Communauté ».
“Where a Member State fails to fulfil its obligations to the Communi-
ty, the Authority may decide to impose sanctions on that Member
State. These sanctions may include: (i) suspen- sion of new Communi-
ty loans or assistance; (ii) suspension of disbursement on on-going
Community projects or assistance programmes; (iii) exclusion from
presenting candidates for statutory and professional posts; (iv) suspen-
sion of voting rights; and (v) suspension from participating in the ac-
tivity of the Community.”
With this regulation, it is clear: The other signatory states also have a direct
interest in implementation. It is questionable, however, who should be re-
sponsible for employing the procedure against the failing Member State?
The legal quality of the public International legal system and in particular
based on the character of the African Charter as an instrument of human
rights means that its violation is of greater importance for the other Mem-
ber States. This thought is expressed in Art. 15 of the Supplementary Act
A/SA.13/02/12 of 17 February 2012. To this end, acc. to Art. 15 par. 1 of
the Supplementary Act A/SA.13/02/12 of 17 February 2012 gives the other
Member States the primary right to submit an application for the declara-
tion of non-compliance with the judgments by the Court of justice . Apart
from the signatory states, also natural or legal persons may report a viola-
tion of the obligations under International law by the signatory states
(Art. 15 par. 1 of the Supplementary Act). Finally, the institutions of the
Community, as well as the Ministerial Committee and the Conference of
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the Heads of State, have the right to report (Art. 15 par. 1 of the Supple-
mentary l Act A/SA.13/02/12).
However, the procedure of reporting the violation of an obligation dif-
fers depending on the plaintiff. Notfication of a violation of the obligation
by natural as well as by legal persons, must be lodged with the ECOWAS
Community representative in the concerned Member State acc. to Art. 15
par. 2 of Supplementary Act A/SA.13/02/12 . This means that an individual
complaint before the ECOWAS Court of Justice in this regard is not pro-
vided for within the framework of Art. 15 par. 2 of the Supplementary Act
A/SA.13/02/12 . Thus, the Court of justice has declared an individual com-
plaint in this regard to be inadmissible with the argument that this legal
recourse is only open to Member States.174
Monitoring and Implementation of the Decisions by the ECOWAS
Court of Justice
The organs of the Community should ensure the execution of the declara-
tory judgment. The President of the European Court of Justice has quite
rightly reprimanded the Federal Republic of Germany based on the delay
of the implementation of judgments by the European Court of Human
Rights.175 The question must be asked, whether the ECOWAS legal system
makes provision for an implementation mechanism (1). Due to a lack of
implementation mechanisms, it is not surprising that some of the Member
States do not implement the judgments into the domestic legal system (2).
Monitoring of the implementation
The execution of the implementation measures of the declaratory judg-
ment is left to the sued Member State. According to the implementation
practice of the ECOWAS judgments, it is regrettable that there is no insti-
tution within the Community that can directly monitor the implementa-
II.
1.
174 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Hissein Habré v. République du Senegal, arrêt N° ECW/
CCJ/ RUL/05/13 (05.11.2013), available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed
on 18/04/2015).
175 See Der Tagesspiegel of 08/12/2006, Meldung im Internet [Report on the Inter-
net] available at: http://www. tagesspiegel.de/politik/International/europaeische
r-menschenrechtshof-praesident-ermahnt- deutschland/784798.html (last
accessed on 05/02/2015).
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tion of the judgments by the Court of justice .176 Moreover, there is no of-
ficial procedure to inform the public on how the decisions by the Court of
justice are implemented. It is therefore recommended to establish a body,
which must follow up on the implementation as well as of implementa-
tion measures of the judgments by the Community’s Court of justice .
This was a demand by experts during a meeting in Guinea-Bissau. They de-
manded, among other things, the creation of an executive organ which
must monitor the implementation of the judgments by the Court of jus-
tice .177 Furthermore, this organ could compile an annual list which shows
the status of implementation of the Court of justice judgments and which
must be made public. In this context, it is currently difficult to monitor
which member States have and have not implemented the judgments by
the ECOWAS Court of Justice. The practice at the point in time of my
conversation at the Court of justice in Abuja (Nigeria) was as follows: If
there is no complaint regarding the non-implementation of a judgment,
the Court assumes that the judgment has been implemented. Such a legal
situation is not favourable for the plaintiff who is ultimately powerless to-
wards the convicted Member State.
Status of the implementation according to previous practice by the
ECOWAS Court of Justice
The consequences of the lack of a Community organ for the monitoring of
the implementation measures are clearly noticeable. After an exchange
with the Court Registrar, it can be concluded that the decisions by the
Court of justice are not implemented equally by all Member States. To be
even more concrete, the status of implementation (stand until July, 10th
2015) is as follows: Niger, Senegal, Liberia and the ECOWAS Commission
have all implemented the decision of the Court of justice . Member States
such as Gambia, Nigeria, Togo, Burkina Faso and Ghana have unfortunate-
ly not implemented the decision by the Court of justice . Moreover, it must
be pointed out that, after several decisions against the Nigerian State, only
2.
176 Lambert-Abdelgawad, L’exécution des arrêts de la Cour européenne des Droits
de l’Homme, in: Revue Trimestrielle des Droits de l’Homme (2011), 939 (941).
177 “Legal and human rights experts propose measures for improving the efficiency
of the ECOWAS court in implementing human rights mandate”, available at:
www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on 18/04/2015).
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one decision has been implemented. Even the ECOWAS Commission has
not yet implemented several decisions by the Court of Law.
In conclusion, it can be recommended that the ECOWAS-System pro-
vides provision for the possibility of monitoring the implementation of the
declaratory judgments for the future and that the Court of justice itself
will enforce the demand for implementation in the tenor of the judg-
ment.178
178 Hamuli-Kabumba, La répression Internationale de l’esclavage. Les leçons de l’ar-
rêt de la cour de justice de la Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique
de l’ouest dans l’Affaire Hadijatou Mani Koraou c. Niger (27 octobre 2008), in:
Revue québécoise de droit International (2008), 25 (56).
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Result and Concluding Comment
Criticism of the Self-Restraint of the ECOWAS Court of Justice in the
Ameganvi et al vs. Togo Case
The criticism, directed at the self-limitation of the ECOWAS Court of Jus-
tice, can be viewed from three different perspectives: from a procedural
perspective (II.), from a legal-substantive perspective (III.) and from the
perspective of the basis of authorisation (I.).
Criticism of the Self-Restraint
Legal basis of the self-restraint
In clause 18 of the legal matter of Ameganvi et al vs Togo, the ECOWAS
Court of Justice elaborated:
« La Cour n’avait donc pas à aller au-delà de sa compétence pour se
prononcer sur la demande de réintégration, qui, si elle était ordonnée,
équivaudrait à l’annulation de la décision de la Cour Constitutionnelle
pour laquelle la Cour de Justice de la Communauté n’a pas de compé-
tence.»1
Such an elaboration can be noted several times in the rulings of the Court
of justice .2 The question now arises as to whether the rejection of the rein-
statement order and the reasoning of the Court can be justified under In-
ternational law.
In this clause, the Court of justice makes it expressly known that the au-
thorisation of International courts, such as the ECOWAS Court of Jus-





1 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Isabelle Ameganvi v. Republique Togo, Arrêt N° ECW/CCJ/
JUG/06/12, (13.03.2012), par. 18.
2 CCJ ECOWAS, JERRY UGOKWE v. FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF NIGERIA, Judg-
ment N° ECW/CCJ/JUD/03/05 (07/10/2005), par. 32, in: Community Court of Jus-
tice, ECOWAS, Law Report (2004–2009), 5; CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Moussa Léo
Kéita v. Mali, Arrêt N°ECW/CCJ/ APP/05/06 (22.03.2007), par. 35; Sall, La Justice
de l’intégration, 321.
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tions, courts in particular, are established by subjects under International
law. Their existence and tasks are thus dependent on the will of the sub-
jects under International law. Therefore, they do not enjoy the same free-
dom as the states as per the principle of sovereignty.3 Depending on the
needs, they have more or fewer tasks. They may not extend their scope and
power of action by themselves.4 Therefore their competence is limited.
Acting ultra vires5 is therefore prohibited. In the fulfilment of its task, the
ECOWAS Court of Justice may not exceed its competence. This is accurate
in this respect, since the principle of limited authorisation is one of the
fundamental principles of law of International organisations.6 Particularly
for this reason, the ECOWAS Court of Justice ensures that there is no
transgression of its competence in its decision-making process. Because, in
principle, it may only exercise its competence within the framework of its
founding act.7
Furthermore, the signatory states have some discretion when it comes to
the National realisation of obligations under International law.
What is disturbing in the legal practice of the Court of justice regarding
the rejection of a possible cassation power is that the Court of does not
state a reason why it does not consider itself to be authorised to control
legally binding judgments of the National courts of the Member States.
However, its legal position could derive from two important fundamental
principles under International law: the limited authorisation and the mar-
gin of discretion by the state. As a result, however, the power of control
can be derived from other principles under International law.
Implied authority
Indeed, the ECOWAS Court of Justice can refer to other principles of In-
ternational law regarding the perception of its constitutional function. The
International court organs have found possibilities, within the scope of
2.
3 Ebobrah, Legitimacy and feasibility of human rights realisation through regional
economic communities in Africa: The case of ECOWAS, 29.
4 Vitzthum, Völkerrecht, 4. edition, 4. Abschnitt, Rn. 189.
5 Vitzthum, Völkerrecht, 4. edition, 4. Abschnitt, Rn. 192.
6 Breuer, Zur Anordnung konkreter Abhilfemaßnahmen durch den EGMR [Regard-
ing the order of concrete corrective measures by the ECtHR], in: EuGRZ (2004),
257 (259).
7 Ebobrah, Legitimacy and feasibility of human rights realisation through regional
economic communities in Africa: The case of ECOWAS, 30.
Chapter 5 Result and Concluding Comment
288
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748901808, am 26.10.2021, 13:00:44
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
their competence, which primarily serve the realisation of their task and
the realisation of the purpose of their organisation.
There is no conditioning in the jurisdiction of the the ECOWAS Court
of Justice’s legal basis. It concerns the competence given to the Court . The
limitation of the competence does not change the fact that the competence
of the ECOWAS Court of Justice can be explained otherwise.8 The theory
under International law of limited authorisation does not change the fact
that International courts such as the ECOWAS Court of Justice apply the
instruments and techniques at their disposal in order to reach the objective
and purpose they were established to fulfil. One of these techniques is in-
terpretation. The purpose for the establishment of the Court of justice was
to ensure effective legal protection within the entire legal system of the
Community. The application of the principle of interpretation, i.e. the effet
utile9, serves the teleological interpretation of the Founding Protocol and
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. To realise the goal of
the Charter, an implied power of the ECOWAS Court of justice is created.10
The signatory states must accept such an implied legal basis.11 The safe-
guarding of the Charter requires a responsible realisation of this authorisa-
tion. Especially in the area of human rights, the implied authorisation
proves to be logical.12
8 Heckötter, Die Bedeutung der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention und der
Recht- sprechung des EGMR für die deutschen Gerichtev[The meaning of the
European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisdiction of the ECtHR for
German courts], 64.
9 Vitzthum, Völkerrecht, 4. edition, 4. Abschnitt, Rn. 190.
10 Katabazi and Others v. Secretary General of the East African Community and the
Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda, Reference No. 1 of 2007
(01. November 2007), Ziff. 18, available at: www.eacj .org  (last accessed on
08/04/2015); Ebobrah, Legitimacy and feasibility of human rights realisation
through regional economic communities in Africa: The case of ECOWAS, 30.
11 Heckötter, Die Bedeutung der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention und der
Rechtspre chung des EGMR für die deutschen Gerichte [The meaning of the
European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisdiction of the ECtHR for
German courts], 63.
12 Ebobrah, Litigating Human Rights before Sub-Regional Court in Africa:
Prospects and challenges, in: African Journal of International and Comparative
Law (2009), 79 (82); Ebobrah, Legitimacy and feasibility of human rights realisa-
tion through regional economic communities in Africa: The case of ECOWAS,
30; Ruffert/Walter, Institutionalisiertes Völkerrecht [institutionlised Internation-
al law], 2. edition, 78; Klabbers, An Introduction to International Organisations
Law, 3rd ed., 56.
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There are many examples in the jurisprudence of the International
Court of Justice in which the ICJ had not been explicitly authorised to or-
der measures, did, however, draw conclusions from the implied power and
e.g. ordered the release of US-American diplomats in Teheran.
This application of the implied authorisation may, however, not lead to
rendering an explicit limitation provided for by the signatory states to be
ineffective13.But at no point have the ECOWAS Member States expressly
excluded a restriction of the Court's review of judgments by a Constitu-
tional Court. It is therefore clear: The restraint expressed by the ECOWAS
Court of Justice is, in this context, rather questionable. The Court of jus-
tice 's self-conception may lead to a restriction of the authorisation, which
is, in turn, incompatible with the will of the signatory states. Because
reaching this goal is also one of the primary responsibilities of the Member
States. The Member States therefore also carry responsibility, which is why
the competence of the Court has been extended. A particular interest of a
signatory state must not suppress the general interest of the entire Com-
munity. On the contrary, the Court of justice has, within the framework of
its authorisation, a duty to interpret the Charter in accordance with inter-
national law in the interest of all persons within the sovereign territory of
the Community. Especially the wording of the competence to act is formu-
lated so broadly that the Court itself is responsible to derive its implied
power from it.14 It is authorised within the framework of this implied
power to do everything possible that complies with the inherent rights in
the Founding Treaty and Additional Protocols.15 Moreover, it would lead
to a weakening of the Court if its task was only to issue fixed judgments
without there being any hope for the plaintiff.
It is plaintiff's personal interest, that his individual rights be duly re-
spected following the declaration of a violation. The competence to de-
clare a violation of the Charter can go as far as to order concrete measures
which are meant to rectify the situation in contravention of the Conven-
tion. In the legal matter of Campbell vs Zimbabwe, the same broad inter-
13 Verdross/Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht, 3. edition, § 780, Punkt 2.
14 Vitzthum, Völkerrecht, 4. edition, 4. Abschnitt, Rn. 191.
15 Das ist ein in amerikanischer Gerichtshoheit bekanntes Prinzip der implied power.
Dazu: Zuleeg, Internationale Organisation, Implied Powers, in: Bernhard (Publ.),
EPIL II (1995), 1312 (1313). Vgl. ferner Köck, Die „implied powers“ der Europä-
ischen Gemeinschaften als Anwen- dungsfall der „implied powers“ Interna-
tionaler Organisationen überhaupt, in: FS Seidl-Hohenvel- dern, 1988, 279 ff.
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pretation of the Protocol can be noted.16The basis of this understanding of
competence can be deduced from the ancillary competence developed by
the ICJ in the Teheran case.17 Even if the ECOWAS Court of justice does
not have an express competence to order the termination of an act in viola-
tion of the Charter, an ancillary competence of the Court of justice can be
deduced from the primary obligation of the Member States to order cor-
rective measures. Prior to that, the Court must declare a violation of the
primary obligation. Should there be such a violation, the Court of justice
should be granted the ancillary competence. The ancillary competence of
the Court of justice can be implicitly derived from Art. 1 of the Charter.
Otherwise, there would be a prohibition norm derived from the authorisa-
tion. It follows that the ECOWAS Court of Justice is authorised to deter-
mine a breach of the primary obligation under International law and order
its termination in the form of an obligation to terminate.18 The reference
to the ancillary competence giving the Court of justice the power to de-
mand such corrective measures simplifies the implementation of the judg-
ment.19 The Court of Law should always be given an ancillary competence
in case a violation has not yet been completed as in this case, the Member
State still has the opportunity to guarantee the adherence to the primary
obligation by terminating the violating act in hindsight. Only in the case
of a completed event that is entirely in the past does the Court have the
authorisation to order reparations on a different legal basis under Interna-
tional law (in detail see chapter 3).20
16 Ebobrah, Litigating Human Rights before Sub-Regional Court in Africa:
Prospects and challenges, in: African Journal of International and Comparative
Law (2009), 79 (84).
17 CIJ, Affaire relative au personnel diplomatique et consulaire des États-Unis à Té-
héran, (États-Unis D’Amérique c. Iran), Arrêt du 29 Novembre 1979, par. 27; da-
zu EuGRZ 1980, 394 (403).
18 Breuer, Zur Anordnung konkreter Abhilfemaßnahmen durch den EGMR [Re-
garding the order of concrete corrective measures by the ECtHR], in: EuGRZ
(2004), 257 (261); Heckötter, Die Bedeutung der Europäischen Menschenrechts-
konvention und der Recht- sprechung des EGMR für die deutschen Gerichte
[The meaning of the European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisdic-
tion of the ECtHR for German courts], 64.
19 Heckötter, Die Bedeutung der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention und der
Rechtspre- chung des EGMR für die deutschen Gerichte [The meaning of the
European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisdiction of the ECtHR for
German courts], 64.
20 Heckötter, Die Bedeutung der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention und der
Rechtspre- chung des EGMR für die deutschen Gerichte[The meaning of the
European Convention on Human Rights and the jurisdiction of the ECtHR for
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In the absence of a prohibition norm,21 the International court may do
whatever it takes to concretise the goal of the agreement. In the legal mat-
ter of Katabazi vs the East African Community and Uganda22, the East
African Court of justice recognised its competence to review decisions by
the highest courts of Member States. This took place despite a lack of regu-
lations stemming from the basis of authorisation. The East African Court
of justice has, namely, approved the access for National persons by inter-
preting the Founding Agreement, in particular Art. 27. In this case, al-
though the East African Court of justice found that there was no express
regulation in the Agreement to declare the complaint admissible, it took
the the logical consequenceof the rule of law to affirm its competence:
“While the Court will not assume jurisdiction to adjudicate on human
rights disputes, it will abdicate from exercising its jurisdiction of inter-
pretation under Article 27 (1) merely because the reference includes al-
legation of human rights violation.”23
This statement by the East African Court of justice can be justified with
the help of two principles, namely, the ancillary competence and the non-
existence of a prohibition norm.24
Development of the law by International Courts
The international court organs have their jurisdiction through the will of
states. From this, they are able to create the law through the developing
case law. It must only be assumed, through the decision-making practice
by the Court of Law, that the developed legal practice can be identified as
3.
German courts], 50; Breuer, Zur Anordnung konkreter Abhilfemaß- nahmen
durch den EGMR[Regarding the order of concrete corrective measures by the
ECtHR], in: EuGRZ (2004), 257 (262).
21 Verdross/Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht [Universal International Law], 3. edi-
tion, § 1295.
22 Katabazi and Others v. Secretary General of the East African Community and the
Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda, Reference No. 1 of 2007 (01
November 2007), available at: www.eacj.org (last accessed on 08/04/2015).
23 Katabazi and Others v. Secretary General of the East African Community and the
Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda, Reference No. 1 of 2007 (01
November 2007), 16, available at: www.eacj.org (last accessed on 08/04/2015).
24 Verdross/Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht [unicersal International law], 3. edi-
tion, § 1295.
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sufficiently meaningful to the signatory states.25 The law-generating au-
thority26 is a logical consequence of the authorisation. Applicable law be-
fore international courts includes not only the Convention on internation-
al law, but also other legal sources which are listed in Art. 38 of the statute
of the ICJ. One of these sources is mainly the jurisprudence of Internation-
al courts. The development of the law is clearly expressed in the Protocol
by the SADC Tribunal. Acc. to Art. 21 par. 2 of the SADC Tribunal-Proto-
col, the Court of Law should not only consider the Founding Agreement
and the associated Protocols in its decision-making but also its own juris-
diction. The East African Court of justice is authorised with the following
words in Art. 21 par. 2 of the SADAC Tribunal-Protocol:
“The Tribunal shall develop its own Community jurisprudence having
regard to applicable treaties, general principles and rules of public In-
ternational law and any rules and principles of the law of States.”
The National Constitution of the convicted Member States does not repre-
sent an “écran National“, which should be opposed to the principle of ef-
fective legal protection of the Charter. Instead, the signatory states took
themselves the task to guarantee the rights in the Charter for the subjects
of their respective domestic legal system.27 In this regard, the East African
Court of justice states further:
“It is to my mind unthinkable that in such circumstances the court
should declare itself to be powerless and stand idly by”.28
25 Grosche, Rechtsfortbildung im Unionsrecht [Law development in Union Legisla-
tion], 68.
26 Kelsen, Die Einheit von Völkerrecht und staatlichem Recht [The unity of Inter-
national law and state legislation], in: ZaöRV 19 (1958), 234 (238).
27 Ouguergouz, Lʼapplication Nationale de la charte africaine des droits de lʼhomme
par les autorités Nationales en Afrique occidentale, in: Flauss/Lambert-Abdelga-
wad (Publ.), L’application Nationale de la Charte africaine des droits de l’homme
et des peuples, 163 (167); Somali, L’indépen- dance de la Cour Africaine des
droits de l’homme et des peuples, théories et réalités, in: Revue Togolaise des
Sciences Juridiques (2013), 51 (58); Badet, Commentaire de l’arrêt dame Hadidja-
tou Mani Koraou contre la République du Niger, CJ CEDEAO, in: Revue Béni-
noise des Sciences Juri- diques et Administratives (2010), 153 (178).
28 Katabazi and Others v. Secretary General of the East African Community and the
Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda, Reference No. 1 of 2007 (01. No-
vember 2007), 20, available at: www.eacj.org (last accessed on 08/04/2015); Ade-
loui, L’autorité de la chose jugée par les juridictions constitutionnelles en
Afrique, in: Revue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2012), 54 (73).
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From this and further statements by the East African Court of justice it can
be concluded that the complainant is dependent on the action of the
ECOWAS Court of Justice to obtain effective legal protection against inter-
ventions by the convicted signatory state. When interpreting and applying
Art. 9 par. 4 (together with Art. 10 d) of the Additional Protocol A/
SP.1/01/05 (19/01/2005), the ECOWAS Court of justice should take into
account the principle that the signatory states, by means of the reform
sought by this Additional Protocol, wish to guarantee practical and effect-
ive legal protection for the subjects within the territory of the Communi-
ty.29 It is therefore clear: A declaration without legal consequence for the
convicted Member State is contrary to the goal of the reform carried out in
2005 and constitutes a violation of effective legal protection.
Criticism from a Constitutional Perspective
From a procedural perspective, a certain confusion of the cassation author-
ity of a Court of justice and the role of the ECOWAS Court of Justice as a
Constitutional Court is regrettable. In order to clarify this, the differentia-
tion between object of dispute and party before National courts and the
ECOWAS Court of Justice must, on the one hand, be addressed (1.), and
on the other hand, the difference between the cassation authority of a
Court of justice and the role as a Constitutional Court of the ECOWAS
Court of Justice (2.) must be demonstrated.
Object of dispute and party to the dispute before National and the
ECOWAS Courts of Justice
The object of dispute refers to the constitutional guarantee before the Na-
tional Constitutional Court. Regarding the constitutional complaint, an
act of state power is facing an individual plaintiff. From a constitutional
point of view, the ECOWAS Court of Justice misjudges one of the most
important principles of substantive legal force: The legal force is always
II.
1.
29 Meyer-Ladewig, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [European Convention
on Human Rights]. Hand commentary, 2. edition, Art. 34, Rn. 3a.
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tightly bound to the object of the proceedings or the dispute.30 The ECJ
has confirmed this with the following words:
« Il y a lieu de considérer cependant que la reconnaissance du principe
de la responsabilité de l’État du fait de la décision d’une juridiction sta-
tuant en dernier ressort n’a pas en soi pour conséquence de remettre
en cause l’autorité de la chose définitivement jugée d’une telle déci-
sion. Une procédure visant à engager la responsabilité de l’État n’a pas
le même objet et n’implique pas nécessairement les mêmes parties que
la procédure ayant donné lieu à la dé- cision ayant acquis l’autorité de
la chose définitivement jugée. En effet, le requérant dans une action en
responsabilité contre l’État obtient, en cas de succès, la condamnation
de celui-ci à réparer le dommage subi, mais pas nécessairement la re-
mise en cause de l’autorité de la chose définitivement jugée de la déci-
sion juridictionnelle ayant causé le dommage. En tout état de cause, le
principe de la responsabilité de l’État inhérent à l’ordre juridique com-
munautaire exige une telle réparation, mais non la révision de la déci-
sion juridictionnelle ayant causé le dommage ».31
The objections therefore concern interventions by state organs. Thus, the
legal force of the decision by the Constitutional Court does not oppose the
control competence of the ECOWAS Court of Justice to review as the rea-
sons for litigation before this Court of justice are different compared to
those submitted to the National Constitutional Court. Also, the parties to
the proceedings before the ECOWAS Court of Justice (signatory state and
individual plaintiff) are not the same as those before the National Consti-
tutional Court. Consequently, the legal force of the Constitutional Court
and the legal force of the ECOWAS Court of Justice differ considerably
from a personal and objective point of view. The East African Court of jus-
tice has quite rightly referred to the difference between the reasons for the
suit brought before the Constitutional Court of Uganda and the basis of
the claim brought before it in the legal matter of Katabazi32, when reject-
30 Detterbeck, Streitgegenstand und Entscheidungswirkungen im öffentlichen
Recht [The object of Dispute and the Effect of Legal Decisions in Public Law],
33.
31 CJUE, N°C-224/01, Arrêt (20.09.2003), Affaire Köbler c. Republik Österreich
[The Republic of Austria], par. 39.
32 Katabazi and Others v. Secretary General of the East African Community and the
Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda, Reference No. 1 of 2007
(01. November 2007), available at: www.eacj.org (last accessed on 08/04/2015).
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ing the opinion of the Ugandan government. Thus, it dismissed the sancti-
ty of res judicata on the part of the Ugandan government.33
Confusion in the Excercise of Jurisdiction
In the decision-making practice of the ECOWAS Court of Justice, a certain
confusion between the possible cassatory authority and its role as a Consti-
tutional Court on human rights disputes can be noted. In order to contain
this confusion, an illumination of both authorities is necessary.
Upfront, the term cassation must be addressed. As a matter of fact, cassa-
tion means:
« Annulation par la cour suprême d’une décision passée en force de
chose jugée et rendue en violation de la loi ».34
From this definition, three attributes of a cassation court can be deduced:
– the cassation court is part of the same instance as the courts below;
– the cassation court has a cancellation competence;
– It is the task of the cassation court to safeguard the unified interpreta-
tion and application of state law.
In this definition it can be observed: The procedure before the National
courts are part of a completely different sequence of instances in compari-
son to the proceedings at the level of International law (ECOWAS Court
of Justice). However, the procedure for individual complaints before the
ECOWAS Court of Justice meets none of the above-mentioned criteria and
should therefore not be confused with a cassation court or equated with
such. Consequently, this Court of justice does not have a cancellation com-
petence such as the cassation court. Rather, the procedure established in
Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 (19/01/2005) is an extraordinary legal measure. This
2.
33 Katabazi and Others v. Secretary General of the East African Community and the
Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda, Reference No. 1 of 2007
(01. November 2007), 14, available at: www.eac j .org  (last accessed on
08.04.2015); Ebobrah, Litigating Human Rights before Sub-Regional Court in
Africa: Prospects and challenges, in: African Journal of International and Com-
parative Law (2009), 79 (95).
34 Guinchard/Debard (Publ.), Lexiques des Termes Juridiques, 18ème Édition
(2011), 121; Crei- felds, Rechtswörterbuch [legal Dictionalry], 19. edition, 650.
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is a procedure of an extraordinary nature and therefore fulfils another
task35. It serves the realisation of the primary obligation of the signatory
states.36
It is comparable to the National procedure for Constitutional Courts.
This procedure arises from the violation of the primary obligation of the
signatory states.37 The individual complaints procedure is an expression of
the lack of legal protection in the National legal systems of the Member
States. Within the framework of its competence, the Court of justice can
only order concrete corrective measures as a consequence of its declaratory
judgment. A repeal of the state’s objected intervention is irrelevant.
The ECOWAS Court of justice itself has already performed its role as a
Constitutional Court in the legal system of the Community by giving two
fundamental judgments with constitutional characteristics in 2010. It had
namaly convicted the Republic of Senegal in May 2010.38 It concerned the
violation of the non-retroactivity in the constitution-amending Act of 7
August 2008. In the tenor, the Court of Justice of the Republic of Senegal
ordered that the principle of non-retroactivity needed to be observed in the
amendment of the Constitution.The second decision in this regard con-
cerns the arrest in breach of human rights of the former state president of
the Republic of Niger, Mamadou Tandja. In its declaratory judgment, the
Court of justice emphasised the need to respect the fundamental freedoms
of the state president who had been deposed by a coup. Thus, the Court
ordered the release of the former state president Mamadou Tandja.39
35 Katabazi and Others v. Secretary General of the East African Community and the
Attorney General of the Republic of Uganda, Reference No. 1 of 2007 (01
November 2007), available at: www.eacj.org (last accessed on 08/04/2015); Ebo-
brah, Litigating Human Rights before Sub-Re gional Court in Africa: Prospects
and challenges, in: African Journal of International and Com- parative Law
(2009), 79 (95); Sall, La Justice d’intégration, 294; Peukert, in: Frowein/Peukert,
Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention. EMRK-Kommentar [European Human
Rights Convention. ECHR-commentary], 3. edition, 2009, Art. 34, Rn. 6.
36 Sall, La Justice d’intégration, 296; Meyer-Ladewig, Europäische Menschenrecht-
skonven- tion. Handkommentar, 2. edition, Art. 35 ECHR, Rn. 5 f.
37 Peukert, in: Frowein/Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention. EMRK-
Kommentar [European Human Rights Convention. ECHR-commentary], 3. edi-
tion, Art. 34, Rn. 6.
38 CCJ ECOWAS, Hissein Habre v. Republic of Senegal, Judgment N°
ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/10 (18.11.2010), in: Community Court of Justice, ECOWAS,
Law Report (2010), 71.
39 CCJ ECOWAS, Mamadou Tandjav. Republic of Niger, Judgment N°
ECW/CCJ/JUD/05/10 (08.11.2010), in: Community Court of Justice, ECOWAS,
Law Report (2010), 109.
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The ECOWAS Court of Justice contributes to the protection of the hu-
man rights stipulated in the Charter against infringements by the state.
Thereby, it was rightly qualified as a supra-National Constitutional
Court.40
Prior to these two decisions, the Court of justice had in 2007 already ex-
pressly mentioned this aspect of its competence and thus its function as a
Constitutional Court in the legal matter of Keita vs the Republic of Mali.41
Should the order of reparations in case of Constitutional Court judgments
inviolation of human rights be removed from the factual area of compe-
tence 42, the Additional Protocol would fail to fulfil its purpose. It is even
more so astonishing and regrettable that in its first declaratory judgment
on the case of dispute the Court of justice judgment extensively described
the violating act in the main reasons of its decision.43 The Court could
have drawn this conclusion within the framework of a methodical, accept-
able interpretation. This procedural aspect of the constitutional role of the
ECOWAS Court of Justice is closely linked to the substantive content of
the Charter.
Confusion regarding the applicable law
Criticism from a substantive perspective concerns, on the one hand, the
applicable law and, on the other hand, the objective nature of the obliga-
tions resulting from the judgment.
3.
40 Bolle, La Cour de Justice de la CEDEAO: une cour (supra)constitutionnelle?, in:
La Constitution en Afrique (08.11.2010), available at www.la-constitution-en-afri
que.org (last accessed on 08.03.2015); Kpodar, La communauté Internationale et
le Togo: éléments de réflexion sur l’ex- tranéité de l’ordre constitutionnel, in: Re-
vue Togolaise des Sciences Juridiques (2011), 38 (39).
41 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Moussa Léo Kéita c. Mali, Arrêt N°ECW/CCJ/APP/05/06
(22.03.2007), par. 35; Ebobrah, A critical Analysis of the human rights mandate
of the ECOWAS-Community Court of Justice, 26, available at: http://docs.escr-ne
t.org/usr_doc/S_Ebobrah.pdf (last accessed on 01/03/2015).
42 Should the untouchability of the decisions in violation of human rights by the
Constitutional Court be part of the domestic juridiction domaine reservé of the sig-
natory states, the Member States would have made provision for such during the
adoption fo the Founding Protocol and the Additional Protocol. See also:
Vitzthum, Völkerrecht [International Law], 4. edition, 4. section, Rn. 195.
43 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Isabelle Ameganvi v. Republique Togo, Arrêt N° ECW/
CCJ/ JUG/06/12, (13.03.2012), par. 18.
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In the case of the National courts, the National law is applied. This
means that the final judgments of National courts can be repealed by the
National cassation court, should they be contrary to National law. In con-
trast, in the individual complaints procedure before the ECOWAS Court
of Justice, International law is applied. Art. 19 par. 1 of Protocol A/P1/7/91
(19/01/2005) expressly points out that the International regulations are to
be applied, i.e. the applicable principles under International law as per
Art. 38 of the statute by the ICJ. This means that the declaratory judgment
by the ECOWAS Court of Justice has a different function compared to the
judgments of National courts of the Member States.
The obligations arising from declaratory judgments are of an objective
nature. They have a cross-case effect in the convicted signatory state and a
factual erga-onmes-effect for the Member States not party to the proceed-
ings (see in more detail chapter 3).
It is the task of the ECOWAS Court of Justice, just as it is with a Nation-
al Constitutional Court, to guarantee the safeguarding of certain funda-
mental freedoms and rights stipulated in the African Charter.44Especially
for this reason, the individual complaint fulfils an objective function of le-
gal protection that exceeds the mere declaratory judgment in a specific
case. In the Marckx case, the ECtHR already expressly clarified the aspect
of the cross-case effects of its declaratory judgment.45 Therefore, the case
law to be developed by the ECOWAS Court of Justice is in the general
interest of the legal order of the Community.46
Comment: This case law by the Court of justice is dangerous in many as-
pects:
The constant rejection of the review of court judgments creates an obsta-
cle for the signatory states with regards to the human rights competence of
the ECOWAS Court of Justice. Indeed, it is in the hands of the Member
States to create an obstacle by prematurely rendering judgments in viola-
tion of human rights by domestic courts, in order to seemingly fulfil the
44 Vgl. Peukert, in: Frowein/Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention. EM-
RK-Hand- kommentar[ European Human Rights Convention. ECHR-commen-
tary], 3. edition, 2009, Art. 34, Rn. 6.
45 ECtHR (GK), case No. 6833/74, Marckx v. Belgium (13/06/1979), clause 58 = Eu-
GRZ 1979, 454 (460).
46 Peukert, in: Frowein/Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention. EMRK-
Kommen- tar [European Human Rights Convention. ECHR-commentary], 3.
edition, 2009, Art. 34, Rn. 9; Meyer-Ladewig, Europäische Menschenrechtskon-
vention, Hand- kommentar [European Human Rights Convention. ECHR-com-
mentary], 2. edition, Art. 34, Rn. 3b.
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legal bases against the review competence of the ECOWAS Court of Jus-
tice.47 Bolle correctly viewed this narrow interpretation in an interpretative
judgment as questionable self-limitation.48
From the above, it can be recommended that the Court of justice should
amend its case law in this regard by differentiating between a possible cas-
sation-competence and its function as a Constitutional Court within the le-
gal system of the Community. The African Charter on Human and Peo-
ples' Rights is an International treaty with objective obligations. It is neces-
sary, particularly for this reason, to choose the interpretation that comes
closest to the purpose of the treaty. In this context, the ECtHR clarified in
the case Wemhoff vs Germany:
« [S’]agissant d’un traité normatif, il y a lieu d’autre part de rechercher
l’interprétation la plus propre à atteindre le but et à réaliser l’objet de
ce traité et non celle qui donnerait l’étendue la plus limitée aux enga-
gements des Parties ».49
It is particularly regrettable that the ECOWAS Court of Justice includes
the purpose of the later Additional Protocols in its interpretation only to a
minimal extent. It thereby overlooks the fact that “the individual norms
and parts of a system are to be seen rather as purposely linked to each oth-
er. A treaty with all its annexes, Additional Protocols, explanations etc.
now represents – in its area a self-contained system as well as a National
law“.50
Through the previous case law, the Court of justice has given itself a self-
limitation, thereby endangering the Charter. The Court may and should
review final judgments by the Constitutional Courts if human rights are at
stake. It is not a cassation if the Court of justice finds a violation in a do-
mestic Constitutional Court´s judgment and demands that the signatory
state draw the possible consequences from it. For these reasons and in light
47 Ebobrah, Litigating Human Rights before Sub-Regional Court in Africa:
Prospects and challenges, in: African Journal of International and Comparative
Law (2009), 79 (100).
48 Bolle, Quand la Cour de Justice de la CEDEAO s’autolimite, in: La Constitution
en Afrique (08.04.2012), available at: www.la-constitution-en-afrique.org (last
accessed on 08/03/2015).
49 Case Wemhoff v. Deutschland, ECtHR No. 2122/64, (27/06/1968), 20.
50 Matscher, Die Methoden der Auslegung der EMRK in der Rechtsprechung ihrer
Organe [Methods of interpretation by the ECHR in the jurisdiction of its or-
gans], in: Schwind (Publ.), Aktuelle Fragen zum Europarecht aus der Sicht in-
und ausländischer Gelehrter [Current questions regarding the European Law
from the viewpoint of domestic and foreign scholars], 103 (114).
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of its previous case law, the ECOWAS Court of Justice has ridden itself of
its task in this respect. It is not a cassation court according to domestic
hierarchical understanding but the interpretation of its human rights com-
petence should be undertaken in the future with particular care.
In conclusion: Should the International court have no competence to
demand the application of the Charter under International law, the follow-
ing dangers are to be feared:
– The signatory states are encouraged to continue to commit the same vi-
olations because they do not have to fear major repercussions apart
from paying compensation to the victims of an established violation;
– The plaintiffs must endure a legal relationship contrary to human
rights determined by the ECOWAS Court of Justice, despite the fact
that their legal situation is in need of improvement;by refusing to re-
view final National judgments, the signatory states enjoy an easy way
out of avoiding the control competence by the ECOWAS Court of Jus-
tice.
Marge Nationale d’appréciation as a possible Limit to the
Empowerment Authority?
The big problem international human rights organs are confronted with is
the boundary between the guarantee under International law and the com-
petence of the respective signatory state.51
The term marge Nationale d’appréciation
The National margin of discretion is to be seen as a source of tension be-
tween the requirement of effective protection of human rights and the
granted autonomy of the signatory states.52 The term marge Nationale d’ap-
preciation invented by the European Commission on Human Rights ad-
III.
1.
51 Bernhardt, Internationaler Menschenrechtsschutz und Nationaler Gestal-
tungsspielraum, in: Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung [International protection of
human rights and National margin of discretion, in International Law as the rule
of law], FS Mosler, 75 (75).
52 Bernhardt, Internationaler Menschenrechtsschutz und Nationaler Gestal-
tungsspielraum, in: Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung[International protection of
human rights and National margin of discretion, in International Law as the rule
of law], FS Mosler, 75 (78).
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dresses the question of how much leeway the Convention bodies of a sig-
natory state share should be granted in the realisation of human rights. For
the first time in the case Greece vs the United Kingdom53, the term has
been applied in more than 700 cases in the case law of the ECtHR.54
The characteristics of the term were demonstrated in the case Ireland vs
the United Kingdom as follows:
« Les limites du pouvoir de contrôle de la Cour […] se manifestent
avec clarté particulière dans le domaine de l’article 15. Il incombe
d’abord à chaque État contractant, responsable de la vie de sa nation,
de déterminer si un danger public la menace et, dans l’affirmative, jus-
qu’où il faut aller pour essayer de le dissiper. En contact direct et
constant avec les réalités pres- santes du moment, les autorités Natio-
nales se trouvent en principe mieux placées que le juge International
pour se prononcer sur la présence de pareil danger comme sur la na-
ture et l’étendue de dérogations nécessaires pour le conjurer. L’article
15 § 1 laisse en la matière une marge d’appréciation ».55
In the case Marckx56, ECtHR already introduced the term marge d’apprecia-
tion when rejecting the order of concrete corrective measures. But this can
be justified by the fact that, by the nature of the violation, the sued Mem-
ber State had many possibilities to remove the violation.57
In this case, the discretion of the convicted member State is reduced to
"zero". This should often be the case if the contravention against the guar-
antee of the Convention lies in a legislative act.58 In this regard, Maurice
Kamto, adds that the realisation of the African Charter is dependent on the
margin of discretion in the decision-making by the signatory states.59
53 Affaire Hellénique contre Royaume-Uni, Annuaire de la Convention Européenne
des Droits de l’Homme (1958–59) 2, 172 (177).
54 Greer, The margin of appreciation: interpretation and discretion under the Euro-
pean Con- vention on Human Rights, in: Human rights files No. 17, Council of
Europe, 2000, 5.
55 CEDH (plénière), Affaire Irlande v. Royaume-Uni N°5310/71, (18.01.1978);
par. 207.
56 ECtHR (GK), Marckx v. Belgium (13/06/1979), Ziff. 58 = EuGRZ 1979, 454.
57 ECtHR (GK), Marckx v. Belgien (13.06.1979), clause 58 = EuGRZ 1979, 454
(460).
58 Breuer, Zur Anordnung konkreter Abhilfemaßnahmen durch den EGMR [Re-
garding the order of concrete corrective measures by the ECtHR], in: EuGRZ
(2004),268 (268).
59 Kamto, Charte africaine, instruments internationaux de protection des droits de
lʼhomme, Constitutions Nationales: Articulation respectives, in: Flauss/Lambert-
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Appreciation of reverting to the discretion of the state
The state’s margin of discretion, however, is not unlimited.60 It should be
emphasised that the principle of effective legal protection is superior to the
National margin of discretion.61 Generally, the term of the state’s margin
of discretion is limited where the ECtHR has determined that the conduct
of a Member State is not tolerable in a democratic society.62 In the case of
Ireland vs the United Kingdom, the ECtHR gave the concerned signatory
state a certain prerogative with respect to its factual assessments but clearly
stated its boundary:
« Les États ne jouissent pas pour autant d’un pouvoir illimité en ce do-
maine. Chargée, avec la Commission, d’assurer le respect de leurs en-
gagements (Art. 19), la Cour à compétence pour en décider s’ils ont ex-
cédé la stricte mesure des exigences de la crise […]. La marge Natio-
nale d’appréciation s’accompagne donc d’un contrôle européen ».63
In case of a violation of Art. 7 of the Charter, the ECOWAS Court of Jus-
tice should set clear boundaries where the discretion of the concerned
Member State must be reduced to "zero". Consequently, the signatory
state must draw the necessary consequences if the ECOWAS Court of Jus-
tice declared a judgment by the National Constitutional Court to be in vi-
olation of human rights.64 The ECtHR already declared in many cases that
the resumption of such judgments in violation of human rights is the suit-
able and appropriate way to remedy the violation.65
2.
Abdelgawad (Publ.), L’ap- plication Nationale de la Charte africaine des droits de
l’homme et des peuples, 11 (31).
60 Bernhardt, Internationaler Menschenrechtsschutz und Nationaler Gestaltungs-
spielraum, in: Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung [International protection of hu-
man rights and National margin of discretion, in International Law as the rule of
law], FS Mosler, 75 (82).
61 Greer, The margin of appreciation: interpretation and discretion under the Euro-
pean Con- vention on Human Rights, in: Human rights files No. 17, Council of
Europe, 2000, 26.
62 Bernhardt, Internationaler Menschenrechtsschutz und Nationaler Gestal-
tungsspielraum, in: Völkerrecht als Rechtsordnung [International protection of
human rights and National margin of discretion, in International Law as the rule
of law], FS Mosler, 75 (84).
63 CEDH (plénière), Affaire Irlande v. Royaume-Uni N°5310/71, (18.01.1978);
par. 207 (in fine).
64 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Isabelle Ameganvi v. Republique Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/APP/
12/10 (07.10.2011), par. 66.
65 CEDH, Affaire Somogyi v. Italie, N°67972/01, (10.11.2004), par. 86.
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Even if it is regrettable that the ECtHR orders such measures only in the
main reasons for its decision66 and not in the tenor of a judgment, in the
case Assanidze vs Georgia the plaintiff was immediately released, one day
after issuing the judgment.67 In particular, the discretion of the signatory
states does not intervene in the procedural guarantee because this, in par-
ticular, is one of the core areas, in which state and subjective interests col-
lide. The demand for impartial justice however has more weight than the
margin of discretion (a)68 as there is no conflict when it comes to the guar-
antees of justice between state interests and International law (b). Subse-
quently, the procedural guarantees represent an obligation to show result
at the expense of the convicted signatory state.
Procedural guarantees as a basis for other human rights
In its judgment Assanidze vs Georgia, the ECtHR stipulates:
« La Cour rappelle que ses arrêts ont u caractère déclaratoire pour l’es-
sentiel et qu’en général il appartient au premier chef à l’État en cause
de choisir les moyens à utiliser dans son ordre juridique interne pour
s’acquitter de son obligation au regard de l’article 46 de la Convention,
pour autant que ces moyens soient compatibles avec les conclusions
contenues dans l’arrêt de la Cour […] Toutefois, en l’espèce, la nature
même de la violation constatée n’offre pas réel- lement de choix parmi
différentes sortes de mesures susceptibles d’y remédier».69
a.
66 Breuer, Zur Anordnung konkreter Abhilfemaßnahmen durch den EGMR [Re-
garding the order of concrete corrective measures by the ECtHR], in: EuGRZ
(2004),257 (263).
67 Breuer, Zur Anordnung konkreter Abhilfemaßnahmen durch den EGMR [Re-
garding the order of concrete corrective measures by the ECtHR], in: EuGRZ
(2004),257 (262).
68 Greer, The margin of appreciation: interpretation and discretion under the Euro-
pean Con- vention on Human Rights, in: Human rights files No. 17, Council of
Europe, 2000, 28 f.
69 CEDH, N°71503/01, Arrêt (08.04.2004), Affaire Assanidzé c. Géorgie, par. 202;
Peukert, in: Frowein/Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention. EMRK-
Handkommentar [European Human Rights Convention. ECHR-commentary],
3. edition, Art. 6, Rn. 140, 185; Breuer, Zur Anordnung konkreter Abhilfe-
maßnahmen durch den EGMR[Regarding the order of concrete corrective mea-
sures by the ECtHR], in: EuGRZ (2004), 257 (263); CEDH, N°15869/02, Arrêt
(23.03.2010), Affaire Cudac c. Lituanie, par. 79; CEDH, N°1620/03, Arrêt
(28.06.2012), Affaire Schütz c. Allemagne, par. 17.
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Fundamental principles can be derived from this statement by the ECtHR.
Regarding the procedural guarantees, the discretion of the signatory states
has been reduced to "zero".70 The reason is clear: The procedural guaran-
tees are the basis for the realisation of other human rights. Therefore, the
meaning of procedural guarantees should be clarified in relation to the pa-
per at hand.How can the procedural guarantee be defined in terms of the
present study? In order to answer this question, it is recommended to re-
flect on the (French and English) wording in Art. 7 par. 1 of the African
Charter:
« Toute personne a droit à ce que sa cause soit entendue. Ce droit com-
prend: a). le droit de saisir les juridictions Nationales compétentes de
tout acte violant les droits fondamentaux qui lui sont reconnus et ga-
rantis par les conventions, les lois, règlements et coutumes en vigueur;
b). le droit à la présomption d’innocence, jusqu’à ce que sa culpabilité
soit établie par une juridiction compétente; c). le droit à la défense, y
compris celui de se faire assister par un défenseur de son choix; d). le
droit d’être jugé dans un délai raisonnable par une juridiction impar-
tiale ».
“Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This
comprises: (a) the right to an appeal to competent National organs
against acts violating his fundamental rights as recognised and guaran-
teed by conventions, laws, regulations and customs in force; (b) the
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty by a competent
court or tribunal; (c) the right to defence, including the right to be de-
fended by counsel of choice; (d) the right to be tried within a reason-
able time by an impartial court or tribunal”.
The regulation in Art. 7 par. 1 of the Charter is to be divided into an or-
ganisational and a functional guarantee. Furthermore, the content of the
regulation in Art. 7 par. 1 of the Charter encompasses the procedural guar-
antee regarding the principle of fairness.71 The right to a fair procedure
comprises, amongst others, the claim to impartiality and independence of
70 Rohleder, Grundrechtsschutz im europäischen Mehrlevelssystem [Protection of
constitutional law in the European multi-level system], 76; Breuer, Zur Anord-
nung konkreter Abhilfemaßnahmen durch den EGMR [Regarding the order of
concrete corrective measures by the ECtHR], in: EuGRZ (2004), 257 (263).
71 Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [European Human
Rights Convention], 4. edition, § 24, Rn. 26.
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the presiding court.72 A certain equity consideration can be noted behind
Art. 7 of the Charter.73 Thus, the principle of the requirement of fairness
with respect to the structural and organisational elements of the procedu-
ral guarantee can be applied.74 The independence and impartiality with re-
gard to the organisational guarantee concern the decision-making body be-
cause, unlike the guarantee of independence, impartiality and the require-
ment of fairness, the claim to access to the court is not guaranteed abso-
lutely.75 Rather, the right to access to the court may be subject to limita-
tions.76 Even here, the principle of proportionality takes effect.77
Consequently, limitations are permissible as long as they serve a legiti-
mate goal and there is a reasonable relationship between the applied
means and the goals pursued.78
It is questionable, what the two organisational guarantees should be
benchmarked against. For a lack of firm criteria to measure independence
and impartiality of the court, the case law of International courts, as well
as the doctrine, must be referred to.79 According to ECtHR case law e.g.
the independence of a court can be determined by the following features:
the manner of the nomination of members of the court, the judges' term
of offices, the existence of guarantees against external influences (protec-
tion against external influence) and finally the external appearance of the
72 Peukert, in: Frowein/Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention. EMRK-
Kommentar [European Human Rights Convention. ECHR-commentary], 3. edi-
tion, Art. 6, Rn. 1.
73 Djogbènou, Procès équitable, in: Annuaire Béninoise de Justice constitutionnelle
(2013), 587 (613); Velu, Considérations sur les arrêts de la Cour européenne des
droits de l’homme relatifs au droit à un procès équitable dans les affaires mettant
en cause la Belgique, 17.
74 Matscher, Der Gerichtsbegriff der EMRK [The concept of court by the ECHR],
in: Prütting (Publ.), FS Baumgärtel, 363 (366).
75 Szymczak, La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et le juge constitu-
tionnel national, 414.
76 Szymczak, La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et le juge constitu-
tionnel nati- onal, 415.
77 Delmas-Marty/Izorche, Marge Nationale d’appréciation et Internationalisation du
droit: réflexions sur la validité formelle d’un droit commun pluraliste, in: McGill
Law Journal (2000- 2001), 923 (954).
78 Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention[European Human
Rights Convention], 4. edition, § 24, Rn. 49.
79 Tonnang/Fandjip, La Cour de Justice de la CEMAC et les règles du Procès équi-
table, in: Recueil Penant (2010) N°872, 329 (332); Dupuy, Les juridictions Inter-
nationales face au procès équitable. Le point de vue de la Cour Internationale, in:
Delmas-Marty u. a. (Publ.), Variations autour d’un droit commun, 239 (244).
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court. The ECtHR has expressed these criteria even more clearly in the le-
gal matter of Bryan vs the United Kingdom:
“In order to establish whether a body can be considered independent
regard must be had, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its
members and to their term of office, to the existence of guarantees
against outside pressures and to the question whether the body
presents an ap- pearance of independence”.80
With regards to the outer appearance, the maxim “justice must not only be
done it must also be seen to be done“ must be adhered to.81 The criteria of
independence mainly include the relationship of a court to the parties to
the proceedings as well as to the executive. Here, it must be assessed
whether the court as a whole and the individual judges entertain any rela-
tionship with the party and the executive.82 What is more are the tenure of
the judges and the freedom from instructions from other state powers. The
freedom from instructions for the judges means that they may not be sub-
ject to any form of justification obligation.83
In total, independence means a formal freedom from instructions. Fur-
thermore, the independence of the court and its members means the free-
dom from exterior coercion, pressure or influence; it is, so to speak, a state
which puts the judge in a position that allows him to make his decisions
solely on the basis of law and conscience.84 Regarding tenure, the irremov-
80 ECtHR, No. 19178/91, Judgment (22.11.1995), Case of Bryan v. The United King-
dom, par. 37 (emphasis by the author); CEDH, N°22107/93, Arrêt (25.02.1995),
Affaire Findlay c. Royaume-Uni, par. 73; CEDH, N°4/1998/907/1119, Arrêt
(02.09.1998), Affaire Lauko c. Slovaquie, par. 63; CEDH, N°6878/75, 7238/75 Ar-
rêt (23.06.1981), Affaire Le Compte c. Belgique, par. 57; Peukert, in: Frowein/
Peukert, EMRK-Kommentar [European Human Rights Convention. ECHR-com-
mentary], 3. edition, Art. 6, Rn. 205.
81 Peukert, in: Frowein/Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention. EMRK-
Kommentar [European Human Rights Convention. ECHR-commentary], 3. edi-
tion, Art. 6, Rn. 205; CEDH, N°22107/93, Arrêt (25.02.1995), Affaire Findlay c.
Royaume- Uni, par. 73.
82 Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [European Human
Rights Convention], 4. edition, § 24, Rn. 32; Matscher, Der Gerichtsbegriff der
EMRK [The concept of court by the ECHR], in: Prütting (Publ.), FS Baumgärtel,
363 (370).
83 Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [European Human
Rights Convention], 4. edition, § 24, Rn. 35.
84 Matscher, Der Gerichtsbegriff der EMRK [The concept of court by the ECHR],
in: Prütting (Publ.), FS Baumgärtel, 363 (369).
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ability of the judges plays an important role.85 Should there be a removal,
its criteria must be objectively defined in detail. This may only be possible
under special circumstances.86 The ECtHR rightly decided in a particular
case that a court had not been independent due to the fact that the respec-
tive decision-makers were too controlled by the government. The depen-
dence of the court was, in particular, confirmed by the ECtHR because the
nomination of the judges was subject to the assessment of the executive.
Through the broad control authority by the executive, the judges received,
from a legal point of view, the status of employees and it was therefore af-
firmed that they had been exposed to undue exterior coercion.87
One of the organisational guarantees, named in Art. 7 par. 1 of the
Charter, describes impartiality.88 It must be pointed out that impartiality
and independence are closely connected. The reason is clear: The objectivi-
ty of a trial and the judicial decision depends on the impartiality and the
independence of the decision-making body.89 Nevertheless, these two pro-
cedural guarantees are not interchangeable because independence is a fun-
damental prerequisite for impartiality.90 This basically refers to the subjec-
tive attitude of the judges. They should be above the parties and make
their decisions properly and to their best knowledge and conscience, re-
gardless of the person involved.91 Thus, the impartiality is an independent
criterion to be judged on by the ECOWAS Court of Justice.92 In order to
assess the impartiality, the actual and procedural circumstances of the indi-
85 Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [European Human
Rights Convention], 4. edition, § 24, Rn. 34.
86 Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [European Human
Rights Convention], 4. edition, § 24, Rn. 34.
87 CEDH, N°4/1998/907/1119, Arrêt (02.09.1998), Affaire Lauko c. Slovaquie,
par. 64.
88 CC CEDEAO, Manneh c. République de la Gambie, Arrêt, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/
3/08 (05.06. 2008), par. 21, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on
16.07.2015).
89 Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [European Human
Rights Convention], 4. edition, § 24, Rn. 39.
90 Peukert, in: Frowein/Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention. EMRK-
Kommentar [European Human Rights Convention. ECHR-commentary], 3. edi-
tion, Art. 6, Rn. 213.
91 Peukert, in: Frowein/Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention. EMRK-
Kommentar [European Human Rights Convention. ECHR-commentary], 3. edi-
tion, Art. 6, Rn. 213.
92 Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [European Human
Rights Convention], 4. edition, § 24, Rn. 40.
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vidual case must be taken into account. In this sense, one must differenti-
ate between subjective and objective impartiality.93
Subjective impartiality is to be understood as the relationship between
the members of a decision-making body and the parties to the proceedings.
The close relationship between independence and impartiality is expressed
through objective impartiality.94 Because objective impartiality poses the
question of whether the position held by a judge within the internal orga-
nisation of the court can cast doubts on his independence. If this question
is answered in the affirmative, the judge would be biased.95 Furthermore, a
judges' objective partiality is given, if a judge holds different positions as
“juge d’instruction“ and as “juge d’assise“ in the same proceedings.96 A crimi-
nal judge who was actually involved in the early stages of the trial as a
member of the prosecuting authorities is affected by the appearance of ob-
jective impartiality. Thus, it does not suffice that the concerned judge
showed himself to be impartial during the public trial.97 Furthermore, the
danger of objective impartiality is given, if one and the same judge is in-
volved in the civil or criminal jurisdiction with the same matter at differ-
ent instances.98
Moreover, the core of the procedural guarantee is the requirement of
fairness.99 This includes many partial guarantees,100 namely the require-
93 Decaux/Imbert/Pettiti, La convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme,
Commentaire article par article, Art. 6, 260; CEDH, N°22107/93, Arrêt
(25.02.1995), Affaire Findlay c. Royaume-Uni, par. 73.; Gundel, Verfahrens-
rechte [procedural rights], in: Bernhardt/Merten (Publ.), Handbuch der Grun-
drechte in Deutschland und Europa, Band [Handbook on fundamental rights in
Germany and Europe, volume] VI, § 146, Rn. 90.
94 Koupokpa, Lʼindépendance de la Cour de Justice de la CEDEAO, Communica-
tion donnée au colloque International de Lomé, organisé par le Centre de Droit
Public de Lomé et le département de Droit administratif de la Faculté de Droit
de L’Université de Gand (02.03.2012), Lomé, 4.
95 Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [European Human
Rights Convention], 4. edition, § 24, Rn. 45.
96 Decaux/Imbert/Pettiti, La convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme,
Commentaire article par article, Art. 6, 261.
97 Matscher, Der Gerichtsbegriff der EMRK [The concept of court by the ECHR],
in: Prütting (Publ.), FS Baumgärtel, 363 (376).
98 Matscher, Der Gerichtsbegriff der EMRK [The concept of court by the ECHR],
in: Prütting (Publ.), FS Baumgärtel, 363 (376).
99 Bertele, Souveränität und Verfahrensrecht [Sovereignty and procedural law],
180.
100 Mole/Harby, Le droit à un procès équitable, un guide sur la mise de l’article 6
de la Conven- tion européenne des droits de l’homme, 11.
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ment of equality of arms, the right to view the case files, the right to a fair
hearing (the right to a fair hearing as per Art. 7 par. 1 of the African Char-
ter) and lastly the right to know the reasons for the decision.101 For the
parties to the dispute, the right to a fair hearing includes the right to re-
ceive the opportunity to make a statement regarding the facts of the case
and the legal aspects during the entirety of the proceedings.102
Accordingly, the court must acknowledge the statements of the parties
as well as the submitted evidence according to the requirement of fair-
ness.103 Furthermore, Art. 7 par. 1 of the African Charter includes the re-
quirement of an even playing field. An even playing field as a procedural
guarantee should be understood as the adherence to a certain equality of
the parties during court proceedings. The requirement of an even playing
field represents a core element of the right to a fair trial. It requires that
each party to the proceedings, regardless of which court proceedings, re-
ceives an appropriate opportunity to present the facts during the proceed-
ings.104 Moreover, the principle of even playing field stipulates that the
court proceedings must be conducted under conditions which exclude any
disadvantage of one party to the proceedings in relation to the other par-
ties to the proceedings. With regards to this, the ECtHR stated:
« La Cour rappelle que le principe de l’égalité des armes – l’un des élé-
ments de la notion plus large de procès équitable – requiert que
chaque partie se voie offrir une possibilité raison- nable de présenter sa
cause dans des conditions qui ne la placent pas dans une situation de
désavantage par rapport à son adversaire ».105
101 Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [European Human
Rights Convention], 4. edition, § 24, Rn. 60.
102 Peukert, in: Frowein/Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention. EMRK-
Kommen- tar [European Human Rights Convention. ECHR-commentary],
3. edition, Art. 6, Rn. 142; Renoux, Le Conseil Constitutionnel et l’autorité ju-
diciaire, l’élabora- tion d’un droit constitutionnel juridictionnel, 364.
103 Renoux, Le Conseil Constitutionnel et l’autorité judiciaire, l’élaboration d’un
droit constitutionnel juridictionnel, 382.
104 Peukert, in: Frowein/Peukert, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention. EMRK-
Kommen tar[European Human Rights Convention. ECHR-commentary], 3.
edition, Art. 6, Rn. 147; Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonven-
tion [European Human Rights Convention], 4. edition, § 24, Rn. 60.
105 CEDH, Nr. 39594/98, Arrêt (07.06.2001), Affaire Kress c. France, par. 72;
CEDH, N°32367/96, Arrêt (05.10.2000), Affaire Apeh Üldözöteinek c. Hongrie,
par. 39; Szymczak, La Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et le juge
constitutionnel National, 122.
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The procedural guarantee demands further, regarding the right to view
case files, that each participant of the trial will be notified of all evidence
and statements submitted to the court.106 Here, the goal is them give him
the opportunity to comment on such. It, therefore, does not matter
whether the material is relevant to the issue or not. In this context, the EC-
tHR said in the legal matter of Kressler vs Switzerland:
« Dans sa jurisprudence constante, la Cour a notamment affirmé que
l’effet réel des observa- tions d’une autorité importe peu, mais que les
parties à un litige doivent avoir la possibilité d’indiquer si elles es-
timent qu’un document appelle des commentaires de leur part». 107
This opinion by the ECtHR is justified because it does not matter whether
the opposing party to the proceedings has actually made use of the advan-
tage of having viewed the case files or not. Rather, it is important to assess
whether such an advantage is an abstract existence and whether the oppos-
ing party to the proceedings could use this advantage should the need
arise.108If one party has a knowledge advantage over the other participants
to the proceedings and is able to draw procedural advantages from such,
this would constitute a violation of the principle of fairness corresponding
with Art. 7 par. 1 of the Charter (Art. 6 ECHR).109 Moreover, it is irrele-
vant whether the determination of a violation has any substantial effect on
the decision-making process.110
The procedural guarantees are the basis and prerequisite for the imple-
mentation of substantive human rights at domestic level. This view can be
justified by the fact that most of the complaints concern the reprimand of
procedural guarantees before domestic courts as well as before Internation-
al courts.111
106 Germelmann, Das rechtliche Gehör vor Gericht im europäischen Recht [The le-
gal hearing before a court in the European Law], 144; Bimpong- Buta, The role
of the Supreme Court in the development of constitutional Law in Ghana, 377.
107 CEDH, N°10577/04, Arrêt (26.07.2007), Affaire Kressler c. Suisse, par. 30.
108 Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [European Human
Rights Convention], 4. edition, § 24, Rn. 61.
109 Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [European Human
Rights Convention], 4. edition, § 24, Rn. 64.
110 CEDH, N°32367/96, Arrêt (05.10.2000), Affaire Apeh Üldözöteinek c. Hongrie,
par. 42.
111 Cohen-Jonathan, Quelques considérations sur la réparation accordée aux vic-
times d’une violation de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, in:
Les Droits de l’Homme au seuil du troisième millénaire. Mélanges en hommage
à Pierre Lambert, 109 (109).
A. Criticism of the Self-Restraint of the ECOWAS Court of Justice
311
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748901808, am 26.10.2021, 13:00:44
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Thus, the differentiation between the “obligations actives procédu-
rales“ and „droits substantiels“112 are of greatest importance for understand-
ing of the following statement.
First of all, the question must be clarified to which area of expertise the
regulation in Art. 7 par. 1 of the African Charter can be applied. The
question can be asked because, contrary to Art. 6 ECHR, there is no differ-
entiation in the type of procedure. Therefore, it can be presumed that
Art. 7 par. 1 of the Charter finds application for all court procedures.
Thus, the quality of the decision-making body does not play an important
role. Furthermore, the applicable procedural law is irrelevant for the mate-
rial scope of the regulation in Art. 7 par. 1 of the Charter. Subsequently,
Art. 7 par. 1 of the Charter can be applied to civil, criminal as well as ad-
ministrative court procedures.113 However, the question must be asked of
whether the adherence to the procedural guarantee, in particular, the prin-
ciple of fairness in the Constitutional Court proceedings, is necessary. This
question is justified because the constitutional procedural law is a special
procedure. Thus, in the Kraska case the Swiss government was of the opin-
ion that the adherence to the constitutional guarantee in Art. 6 ECHR
should not be applied to the constitutional complaint.114
The ECtHR did not follow this interpretation in its judgment in the
Kraska case.115 Now, after the development of the jurisdiction of the EC-
tHR, it is confirmed that the procedural guarantees should also apply to
proceedings before the Constitutional Court.116 In this regard, the ECtHR
expressly pointed out that it is irrelevant whether the proceedings before
the Constitutional Court is a referral for a preliminary ruling or a constitu-
112 Cohen-Jonathan, Quelques considérations sur la réparation accordée aux vic-
times d’une violation de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, in:
Les Droits de l’Homme au seuil du troisième millénaire. Mélanges en hommage
à Pierre Lambert, 109 (110).
113 Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [European Human
Rights Convention], 4. edition, § 24, Rn. 15.
114 CEDH, N°13942/88, Arrêt (19.04.1993), Affaire Kraska c. Suisse, par. 23.
115 CEDH, N°13942/88, Arrêt (19.04.1993), Affaire Kraska c. Suisse, par. 23.
116 EGMR, Nr. 47169/99, Urteil [judgment] (08/01/2004), legal matter of Voggen-
reiter vs Germany, clause 32; CEDH, N°20024/92, Arrêt (16.09.1996), Affaire
Süssman c. Allemagne, par. 40; Graben warter, Europäische Menschenrechts-
konvention [European Human Rights Convention], 4. edition, § 24, Rn. 15;
Ndiaye, La protection des droits de l’homme par la Cour de justice de la CE-
DEAO, Mémoire de Master II, Université Mon- tesquieux Bordeaux IV, 72.
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tional complaint against a court decision.117 In the case Süssman vs Ger-
many, the ECtHR emphasised that the plaintiffs wanted to enforce their
substantive claim by questioning constitutional law. Thus, the ECtHR ex-
plained:
« [E]lle estima que, si elle n’avait pas à se prononcer dans l’abstrait sur
l’applicabilité de l’ar- ticle 6 par. 1 aux Cours constitutionnelles en gé-
néral, il lui fallait néanmoins rechercher si des droits garantis aux re-
quérants par ce texte avaient été touchés en l’espèce. Elle rappela aussi
qu’en suscitant des questions de constitutionnalité, les intéressés utili-
saient l’unique moyen-indirect- dont ils disposaient pour se plaindre
d’une atteinte à leur droit de propriété ».118
The ECOWAS Court of Justice later confirmed this opinion in its jurisdic-
tion.119 The procedural guarantees are the prerequisite and basis for the re-
alisation of the substantive human rights in Charter, such as the freedom
of speech, the right to life.120 There are two reasons which justify the view
held in here. On one hand, the task of the adherence to human rights is
first and foremost that of the signatory state. On the other hand, there is
generally a principle of subsidiarity before International courts. Both rea-
sons can be substantiated by the primary obligation and the exhaustion of
the National legal remedies as a prerequisite for individual complaints be-
fore International instances.
The term ‘primary obligation’ and the principle of subsidiarity go hand
in hand. The principle of subsidiarity is based on the assumption that it is
primarily the task of the domestic bodies, the courts in particular, to en-
117 EGMR, Nr. 47169/99, Urteil (08.01.2004), legal matter of Voggenreiter vs Ger-
many, clause 32.
118 CEDH, N°20024/92, Arrêt (16.09.1996), Affaire Süssman c. Allemagne, par. 39;
Velu/Er- gec, La Convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, Art. 6,
par. 425.
119 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. État du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11
(07.10.2011), par. 66, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on
16.07.2015); Koupokpa, Lʼindépendance de la Cour de Justice de la CEDEAO,
Communication donnée au colloque interna- tional de Lomé, organisé par le
Centre de Droit Public de Lomé et le département de Droit administratif de la
Faculté de Droit de L’Université de Gand (02.03.2012), Lomé, 20.
120 Dröge, Positive Verpflichtungen der Staaten in der Europäischen Menschen-
rechtskonven- tion [Positive obligations of the states within the European Hu-
man Rights Convention], 61.
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sure the effective protection of human rights.121 For the guarantee of sub-
stantive human rights, the respective domestic rules of law of the signatory
states of the African Charter must, therefore, ensure such effective proce-
dural guarantees. It follows that the effectiveness of the substantive rights
depends on the adherence to procedural guarantees by the parties to the
treaty. The closest connection between the substantive complaint and the
procedural guarantee is clearly demonstrated in the Selmouni vs France
case:
« Cette règle se fonde sur l’hypothèse, objet de l’article 13 de la
Convention – et avec lequel elle présente d’étroites affinités – que
l’ordre interne offre un recours effectif quant à la vio- lation alléguée.
De la sorte, elle constitue un aspect important du principe voulant que
le mécanisme de sauvegarde instauré par la Convention revête un ca-
ractère subsidiaire par rap- port aux systèmes nationaux de garantie des
droits de l’homme. Ainsi, le grief dont on entend saisir la Cour doit
d’abord être soulevé, au moins en substance, dans les formes et délais
prescrits par le droit interne, devant les juridictions Nationales appro-
priées ».122
Furthermore, from the violation of the procedural guarantee, the ECtHR
drew the conclusion that Ireland had violated the substantive guarantee
under Art. 3 ECHR in the O‘Keeffe case.123 This ECtHR's argument is logi-
cal because the procedural guarantees are the fundamental prerequisite for
the realisation of the substantive rights entrenched in the Convention. The
domestic courts have the primary task to protect these rights from unlaw-
ful interference. Therefore, the signatory states are required to establish ef-
fective legal remedies.124 The ECOWAS Court of Justice proceeded in the
same manner in the case of Koraou vs the Republic of Niger. Indeed, the
Court of Law deduced a violation of the prohibition of slavery from the
violation of the procedural guarantee. It can be seen from this that the
ECOWAS Court of Justice demands from the Member States to establish
procedural regulations which enable everybody who feels that his rights
121 Twinomugisha, The role of the judiciary in the promotion of democracy in
Uganda, in: Af- rican Human Rights Law Journal (2009), 1 (8); Meyer-Ladewig,
Europäische Menschenrechtskon- vention. Handkommentar [European Human
Rights Convention. Commentary], 2. edition, Art. 35, Rn. 5.
122 CEDH, N°25803/94, Arrêt (28.07.1999), Affaire Selmouni c. France, par. 74.
123 CEDH, N°35810/09, Arrêt (28.01.2014), Affaire O’Keeffe c. Irlande, par. 187.
124 Villiger, Handbuch der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention [Handbook
on the European Human Rights Convention], 2. edition, § 7, Rn. 112.
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under the Charter have been violated to assert his rights before an inde-
pendent and impartial court.125
In this context, the decision by the ECOWAS Court of Justice in the
Ugokwe vs the Republic of Nigeria case is questionable in many respects.
On the one hand, the election disputes fall within the area of factual com-
petence of the Court of Law. In that respect, the opinion by the Court is
unacceptable.126 On the other hand, however, the Court had to assess
whether the signatory state had ensured the procedural guarantees before
the National courts of Nigeria with regards to the electoral disputes. This
would have justified the connection of the procedural guarantees to the
competence of the Court of Law. However, the ECOWAS Court of Justice,
unfortunately, did not take this approach.127 Thus, the violation of the
plaintiff's right to a fair trial by Nigeria's Court of Appeal remained with-
out legal protection at ECOWAS level.128
The particularity of the procedural guarantee can be determined, strictly
speaking, with the comparison to the right to an effective complaint.129
While the right to an effective complaint (Art. 13 ECHR, Art. 7 Abs. 1a of
the Charter) leaves a certain margin of discretion for the signatory states,130
there are particularities with respect to the procedural guarantee (Art. 7
125 CJ CEDEAO, Koraou c. Republique du Niger, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/06/08
(27.10.2010), par. 85, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on
24/07/2015); Badet, Commentaire de l’arrêt dame Hadidjatou Mani Koraou
contre la République du Niger, in: Revue Béninoise des Sciences Juridiques et
Administrative (2010), 153 (170).
126 CCJ ECOWAS, Ugokwe v. The Federal Federal Republic of Nigeria, Judgment,
N°ECW/ CCJ/JUD/02/05 (07.10.2005), par. 26, 33, available at: www.courtecow
as.org (last accessed on 16/07/2015).
127 CCJ ECOWAS, Ugokwe v. The Federal Federal Republic of Nigeria, Judgment,
N°ECW/ CCJ/JUD/02/05 (07.10.2005), par. 33, available at: www.courtecowas.o
rg (last accessed on 16/07/2015).
128 CCJ ECOWAS, Ugokwe v. The Federal Federal Republic of Nigeria, Judgment,
N°ECW/ CCJ/JUD/02/05 (07.10.2005), par. 19, 27, available at: www.courtecow
as.org (last accessed on 16/07/2015); see also criticism Koupokpa, Lʼindépen-
dance de la Cour de Justice de la CEDEAO, Communication donnée au col-
loque International de Lomé, organisé par le Centre de Droit Public de Lomé et
le département de Droit administratif de la Faculté de Droit de L’Université de
Gand (02.03.2012), Lomé, 17.
129 It must be pointed out that within the system of the African Charter, the regula-
tions in Art. 6 and Art. 13 ECHR are integrated in Art. 7 of the African Charter
mutatis mutandis.
130 CEDH, N°22414/93, Arrêt (15.11.1996), Affaire Chahal c. Royaume-Uni,
par. 145.
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par. 7 par. 1d. and Art. 6 ECHR). This can be justified by the fact that the
right to an effective complaint must continue to be linked to other regula-
tions of the respective Convention. Thus, the right to an effective com-
plaint is an accessory right to other substantive pleas. However, the prereq-
uisites in of the guarantees are, strictly speaking, stricter than the right to
an effective domestic complaint.131 The ECtHR even recognised the fact
that procedural guarantees absorb the right to an effective domestic com-
plaint. In this regard, the ECtHR explained:
« Bref, il n’y a eu violation ni de l’article 13 (art. 13) ni, à cet égard, de
l’article 6 par. 1 (art. 6–1), les exigences du premier (art. 13) étant
d’ailleurs moins strictes que celles du second (art. 6–1) et entièrement
absorbées par elles en l’espèce».132
Moreover, the procedural guarantees play an important role in a democrat-
ic state and are an external sign of the adherence to the principles of the
rule of law.133 Based on the role of the procedural guarantees for the en-
forcement of the principles of the rule of law, the International courts
leave hardly any margin of discretion for the signatory states.134 Further-
more, the ECOWAS Court of Justice demands, based on its importance for
the enforcement of the principles of the rule of law, that the principle of
fairness must also be adhered to in the constitutional procedural law be-
cause the rule of law requires the adherence to the procedural guaran-
tees.135 By referring to the Protocol on Good Governance from 2001 in
connection with the procedural guarantees, the ECOWAS Court of Justice
131 Villiger, Handbuch der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention [Handbook
on the European Human Rights Convention], 2. edition, § 19, Rn. 648; De
Bruyn, Le Droit à un recours effectif, in: Les Droits de l’Homme au seuil du
troisième millénaire, Mélanges en hommage à Pierre Lambert, 185 (191).
132 CEDH, N°15777/89, Arrêt (16.09.1996), Affaire Matos E Silva et al. c. Portugal,
par. 64.
133 CEDH, N°4/1998/907/1119, Arrêt (02.09.1998), Affaire Lauko c. Slovaquie,
par. 63; CEDH, Nr. 34869/05, Arrêt (29.06.2011), Affaire Sabeh El Leil c.
France, par. 46; Bertele, Souveränität und Verfahrensrecht [Sovereignty and
procedural law], 195.
134 CEDH, N°9024/80, Arrêt (12.02.1985), Affaire Colozza c. Italie, par. 32; CJ CE-
DEAO, Af- faire Ameganvi et al. c. État du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11
(07.10.2011), par. 67, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on 
16/07/2015).
135 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. État du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11
(07.10.2011), par. 66, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on
16/07/2015).
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made it clear that the judicial protection prescribed by Art. y referring to
the Protocol on Good Governance from 2001 in connection with the pro-
cedural guarantees, the ECOWAS Court of Justice made it clear that the
judicial protection prescribed by Art. constitutional procedural law be-
cause 136
Non-existence of a collision with National interests
For the assessment of the adherence to the rights in the Convention that
contain procedural guarantees, several particularities apply. The assessment
of the procedural guarantees, namely, follows a different pattern from the
other rights of defense.137 The usual assessment scheme is not applied.
Rather, the monitoring body assesses whether the conduct of the state or-
gansis reconcilable with the procedural guarantee in question. The reason
is clear: The procedural guarantees are defined more concretely than the
comparable rights of defense.138 Furthermore, it is hardly imaginable that
a conflict exists between the fairness principle and a National interest.
Thus, discretion by the signatory states is, strictly speaking, excluded with
respect to the procedural guarantees.139 Public interests, such as National
security or the protection of third parties, cannot justify a restriction of the
right to an independent, impartial court and a fair trial. There are also no
special circumstances in the interest of national security that could justify
the limitation of the principle of fairness. The procedural guarantees are
therefore to be viewed as universally implementable human rights.
b.
136 CJ CEDEAO, Affaire Ameganvi et al. c. État du Togo, N°ECW/CCJ/JUD/09/11
(07.10.2011), par. 67, available at: www.courtecowas.org (last accessed on
16/07/2015).
137 Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [European Human
Rights Convention], 4. edition, § 18, Rn. 29.
138 Grabenwarter, Europäische Menschenrechtskonvention [European Human
Rights Convention], 4. edition, § 18, Rn. 29.
139 Greer, The margin of appreciation: interpretation and discretion under the
European Convention on Human Rights, in: Human rights files No. 17, Coun-
cil of Europe, 2000, 28.
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Procedural Guarantees as the resulting obligation
As discussed above, the right to access to courts is not an absolute right.140
The substance of this right depends on the domestic reality in signatory
states. Therefore, when it comes to the right to access to courts, a certain
“marge Nationale d’appreciation“ by the High Contracting Parties141 applies
and there is, therefore, no absolute obligation to create domestic courts.142
However, the legal situation presents itself in a different light than the pro-
cedural guarantee of the principle of fairness. On the one hand, there is an
obligation to achieve results and, on the other hand, a positive obliga-
tion.143 The positive obligation is to be understood in the sense that the re-
spective signatory state must provide for regulations through legislation
that ensure the independence, impartiality and the principle of fairness.
Because as long as the courts exist, the signatory states must adhere to
the procedural guarantees of Art. 7 par. 1 of the Charter.144 Thus, the High
Contracting States carry an “obligation de résultat“ when it comes to proce-
dural guarantees.145 In this sense, the procedural guarantee receives more
attention than the substantive human rights.146 National discretion cannot
interfere with the procedural guarantee. In principle, the right to a fair tri-
al can only be adhered to if the signatory state can guarantee the impartial-
ity and independence of the judiciary. In this context, the ECtHR expressly
emphasises the absolute character of the impartiality and independence of
the judiciary in the case Micallef vs Malta.147 Absolute rights are first and
c.
140 Decaux/Imbert/Pettiti, La convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme,
Commentaire article par article, Art. 6, 259.
141 CEDH, N°38695/97, Arrêt (15.02.2000), Affaire Garcìa Manibardo c. Espagne,
par. 36; CEDH, N°9024/80, Arrêt (12.02.1985), Affaire Colozza c. Italie, par. 30;
CEDH, N°24488/04, Arrêt (15.04.2009), Affaire Guillard c. France, par. 33;
CEDH, N°34869/05, Arrêt (29.06.2011), Affaire Sabeh El Leil c. France, par. 47.
142 CEDH, N°38695/97, Arrêt (15.02.2000), Affaire Garcìa Manibardo c. Espagne,
par. 39.
143 Decaux/Imbert/Pettiti, La convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme,
Commentaire article par article, Art. 6, 245.
144 CEDH, N°38695/97, Arrêt (15.02.2000), Affaire Garcìa Manibardo c. Espagne,
par. 39.
145 Decaux/Imbert/Pettiti, La convention Européenne des Droits de l’Homme,
Commentaire article par article, Art. 6, 245.
146 Marauhn/Merhof, Grundrechtseingriff und -schranken [interference in funda-
mental rights and their limitations], in: Grote/Marauhn (Publ.), EMRK/GG,
2. edition, Kap. 7, Rn. 6.
147 CEDH, N°17056/06, Arrêt (17.10.2009), Affaire Micallef c. Malte, par. 86.
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foremost based on the fundamental guarantees in Art. 3 of the ECHR,
namely the prohibition of torture and the prohibition of inhuman or de-
grading treatment and the guarantee in Art. 4 of the ECHR.148 However,
the procedural guarantee could be seen as an absolute right due to its par-
ticular role when it comes to the enforcement of the rule of law. Moreover,
because of the obligation to adhere to the procedural guarantee in Art. 7
of the Charter, it is a dual obligation.
In the end, discretion is exercised when it comes to the right of access to
courts or the right to an effective complaint. This is justified by consider-
ing the circumstances of the individual case. Contrary to this, the state's
margin of discretion does not apply to procedural guarantees when it
comes to the principle of fairness. During the assessment of the conduct of
Member States regarding the procedural guarantee, the discretion, which
normally relates to other substantive reprimands, does not apply in prac-
tice because the procedural guarantees can not be illusory and theoretical.
Rather, procedural guarantees are effective and concrete guarantees.149
Consequently, the signatory states must do everything in their power to
meet the requirements of a fair trial as demanded by the Charter. When it
comes to the procedural guarantee, the signatory states carry an obligation
to achieve results. This is understandable when taking the special nature of
the principle of fairness in a democratic state into account.150 There is no
pretence of a possible conflict with National interests. Therefore, the prin-
ciple of fairness is a universally enforceable guarantee. A violation of the
procedural guaranteesis, at the same time, an interference with the under-
lying human rights.151 This demonstrates why, in case of a violation of the
procedural guarantees, the signatory states should not be allowed to exer-
cise discretion.
148 Marauhn/Merhof, in: Grundrechtseingriff und -schranken [interference in fun-
damental rights and their limitations], in: Grote/Marauhn (Publ.), EMRK/GG,
2. edition, Kap 7, Rn. 3; Greer, The margin of appreciation: interpretation and
discretion under the European Convention on Human Rights, in: Human
rights files No. 17, Council of Europe, 2000, 27.
149 CEDH, N°38695/97, Arrêt (15.02.2000), Affaire Garcìa Manibardo c. Espagne,
par. 43.
150 CEDH, N°9024/80, Arrêt (12.02.1985), Affaire Colozza c. Italie, par. 32.
151 Dannemann, Haftung für die Verletzung von Verfahrensgarantien nach Art. 41
EMRK [Liability in case of a violation of procedural guarantees acc. to Art. 41
ECHR], in: Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und Internationales Privatrecht
[magazine for foreign and International civil law](1999), 452 (465).
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Concluding Comment
Based on a judgment of the Togolese Constitutional Court contrary to in-
ternational law and the resulting declaratory judgment of the ECOWAS
Court of Justice, the present paper must answer several questions of both
constitutional and international law. The examination primarily identifies
a conflict of jurisdiction within the ECOWAS legal system. The source of
the conflict of jurisdiction is the constitutional principles of procedure by
the constitutional systems of the Member States and the introduction of an
individual complaints procedure before the ECOWAS Court of Justice. At
the centre is the core question of the position of the ECOWAS Court of
Justice as a Constitutional Court in the West African constitutional order.
Which obligations arise from its characterisation as a Constitutional
Court, based on its judgments for the courts of the Member States and, in
particular, for the Constitutional Courts?
It has been demonstrated in the first chapter that the ECOWAS Court of
Justice, which primarily monitored the interpretation and application of
the ECOWAS Community law, has developed into a Court of justice for
Human Rights. The reason for this is an interaction of the security policy,
the human rights situation and the awareness of the High ECOWAS
States, which maintain a close relationship between the economic growth
and the respect for principles of the rule of law in the West African coun-
tries.
The second chapter analysed the internal procedural binding force of
constitutional decisions from a domestic and constitutional point of view.
The consequences for the domestic Constitutional Courts and the parties
to the proceedings stemming from this were shown. The principles of irre-
vocability and non-appealability must thereby be taken into consideration
when it comes to Constitutional Court decisions that have acquired the
status of res judicata. Following this, the fundamental erga-omnes binding
effect is demonstrated based on the constitutional traditions of the Mem-
ber States in the ECOWAS Community. De lege lata, the decisions by the
Constitutional Courts of Member States develop an erga-omnes binding ef-
fect. Moreover, they are irrevocable and non-appealable. Therefore, there is
no legal remedy available.152 Subsequently, the decision of the decision by
B.
152 See also: § 129 par. 2 Constitution of Ghana of 1992; Art. 106 Constitution of
Togo of 14 October 1992; Art. 124 Constitution of Benin of 11 December 1991;
Art. 94 Constitution of Mali of 25 February 1992; Art. 134 Constitution of
Niger of 25 November 2010; Art. 99 Constitution of Guinea of 07 May 2010;
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the Togolese Constitutional Court in the initial case was evaluated from a
procedural point of view.
In the third chapter, the supra-National overcoming of the National le-
gal force, as analysed in the second chapter, is shown. It should be empha-
sised that the operating principle of the ECOWAS Court of Justice resem-
bles that of a Constitutional Court in many aspects. First of all, the ques-
tions the ECOWAS Court of Justice has to deal with in its human rights
mandate are of a Constitutional litigation nature. There are, namely, the
fundamental freedoms and individual human rights. Moreover, the deci-
sions of this Court of Law are final judicial judgments. They are final and
therefore non-appealable. Furthermore, the supra-National Court of justice
has an exclusive competence regarding the interpretation and application
of the African Charter on Human Rights at ECOWAS level.
From a possible viewpoint as a Constitutional Court of the Member
States, the declaratory judgments of the ECOWAS Court of Justice trigger
considerable consequences for the constitutional procedural principles of
the Member States.153 The extension of the ECOWAS Court of Justice's ju-
risdiction aims at securing the steering power and the effectiveness of re-
gional human rights law. Declaratory judgments in principle do not devel-
op a constitutive but rather a declarative effect. More precisely: the declara-
tory judgment of the Court of justice has no direct domestic force of appli-
cation. However, the organisational structure, the position and the func-
tioning of the Court of justice within the institutional framework of the
Community shows all the features of a Constitutional Court. In addition,
the scope of the decisions by this Court of justice has a constitutional func-
tion. The African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights are not at
the National legal systems by the Member States' disposition. They must
take the Charter into account.
Neither the domestic legislator nor the Constitutional Courts of the Mem-
ber States may dispose of the Charter. The interpretation of the African
Art. 98 Constitution of Ivory Coast of 23 July 2000; Art. 159 Constitution of
Burkina Faso of 02 June 1991; Art. 92 par. 2 Constitution of Senegal of 22 Jan-
uary 2001; Sect. 230, 232, 233, 235 Constitution of Nigeria of 29 May 1999;
Art. 65 Constitution of Liberia of 06 January 1984; Art. 92 Constitution of
Guinea Bissau of 16 January 1984; Sect. 126, 127 Constitution of The Gambia of
16 January 1997; Art. 229 par. 1 Constitution of Cape Verde of 23 November
1999; Art. 122 par. 1 Constitution of Sierra Leone of 03 September 1991.].
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Charter by the ECOWAS Court of Justice is an integral component of the
Charter within the ECOWAS legal system.154
Although res judicata constitutes a procedural guarantee, it is neverthe-
less necessary to justify an exceptional relativisation of this procedural
principle, because the legal force ensures the irrevocability of a judgment
that has been issued on a fair basis. As soon as the conditions under which
a judgment by a Member State has been issued represents an infringement
of the principle of fairness, there is no longer a valid reason to protect the
legal force against a challenge. It is well-known that a legal right must be
protected as long as it requires protection. An unfair judgment does not
constitute a legal right worthy of protection. As a result: the principle of
fairness replaces the legal force. The thesis presented here, is based on the
fundamental conflict between legal certainty (secured by the institution of
legal force) and substantive justice (supported by the institution of the
restitution in kind under International law). In case of a conflict between
the jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court of Justice and the domestic Consti-
tutional Court, the answer is clearly that the ECOWAS Court of Justice has
the last word. Otherwise there would not have been an individual human
rights complaint at the ECOWAS level. Thus, the institution of the restitu-
tio in integrum has more weight than that of res judicata. The result of the
declaratory judgment is the obligation of reparation. The appropriate
means of reparation is known to be the rescission of the judgment by the
Constitutional Court causing the violation. Should the Court of justice or-
der concrete corrective measures in the tenor of the judgment, such an or-
der is legally binding for the convicted signatory state. Thus, there is no
leeway left for the concerned signatory state. In such a case, the declaratory
judgment constitutes de facto a judgment granting reparation.
Regarding the procedural guarantee, the declaratory judgment is purely
a judgment granting reparation. In this regard, two fundamental problems
of a procedural nature present themselves. On the one hand, the relation-
ships between the Court of justice and the National courts with respect to
areas of competence. Therefore, the question must be asked: would it be
compatible with general International law if the Court of justice were al-
lowed to overrule the decisions of National courts? This question would be
answered in the affirmative if the ECOWAS Court of Justice had the com-
petence of a “cassation court” under customary International law.Such a
154 CIJ, Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 31 mars 2004 en l’Affaire Avena et
autres res- sortissants mexicains (Mexique c. Ètats-Unis d’Amérique), Arrêt du
19 janvier 2009, par. 8.
Chapter 5 Result and Concluding Comment
322
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748901808, am 26.10.2021, 13:00:44
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
competence cannot be derived from the basis of the Court's jurisdiction.155
However, this is followed by a substantive question, namely whether the
Court of justice may, despite this, order the resumption of a judgment
contrary to International law – irrespective of its legal force. With this
question, the distinction between the formal legal force and the substan-
tive legal force is legally relevant, because the ECOWAS Court of Justice
cannot itself issue cassation judgments against National courts on the basis
of its jurisdictional norms. However, in terms of legal consequence, a nec-
essary material result is to be expected from the convicted state. This re-
sults is an implicit authorisation to reopen the initial domestic proceed-
ings. Therefore, a power of the Court to annul the substantive legal force
can be deduced from the substantive-legal perspective. In other words: the
judgments by the ECOWAS Court of Justice do not have direct domestic
force, however, there is an obligation by national courts including the Na-
tional Constitutional Courts under International law to reopen the case
and to take the jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court of Justice into account.
Thereby, the National courts are largely bound by the interpretation of the
ECOWAS Court of Justice. Therefore, the judgments of the ECOWAS
Court of Justice are, in fact, binding in substance. The view taken here is
based on the basic idea that in the event of a Member States' court judg-
ment being contrary to International law, responsibility under Internation-
al law must necessarily lead to a rectification of the situation giving rise to
the liability. This aspect has been discussed argumentatively through the
material-legal relationship between the two legal systems as discussed in
the fourth chapter. Moreover, the procedural guarantee is the basis to
achieve this result for the signatory states. Subsequently, the consideration
of the National-specific reality does not apply to a procedural guarantee.
This is mainly the case if a violation of Art. 7 par. 1 of the African Charter
is established. After all, the violation of the procedural guarantee creates a
permanent situation contrary to International law in the National law of
the convicted signatory state. The intervention of the Court of justice is
therefore required to its greatest extent. The adoption of obligations under
International law by the ECOWAS Member States resembles the limita-
tion of sovereign state power in the area of human rights jurisdiction. To-
gether with this, the signatory states have accepted a limitation of the legal
force of their Constitutional Courts and equivalent judicial instances.
155 Protocole Additionnel A/SP.1/01/05 (19.01.2005) Portant Amendement du Pro-
tocole (A/P.1/7/91) Relatif à la Cour de Justice de la Communauté.
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The prevailing regulation regarding the erga-omnes binding effect does
not represent an insurmountable obstacle within the National law of the
ECOWAS signatory states. In the area of human rights, this binding effect
is to be viewed as provisional since the possibility of bringing a claim be-
fore the ECOWAS Court of Justice, based on the legally binding national
constitutional judgment already triggers the relativisation of the binding
effect. In case of a sustained declaratory judgment by the ECOWAS Court
of Justice, the provisional character of the judgment by the National Con-
stitutional Court is manifested. To express this metaphorically: the legal
force of National Constitutional Court judgments is untouchable insofar
as these judgments have been passed without errors. Should a misdirection
be detected at the level of International law, an actual breach of the legal
force is to be allowed. The corrective measure is the resumption of the ini-
tial domestic proceedings. Thus, the declaratory judgment by the ECOW-
AS Court of Justice develops a final judicial legal force under International
law and the decision by the domestic Constitutional Courts a provisional
National legal force. The resumption of the initial proceedings in terms of
human rights alone confirms the last decision-making competence of the
International Court of justice .
This results in the competence of the Court to order concrete corrective
measures. The approach of ordering corrective measures does not violate
the principle of the limited abatement of International courts. It is true
that the International organisation in general and International courts, in
particular, are only allowed to act within their assigned authority. Other-
wise, there would be the risk of a transgression of competence. However,
this principle is not contrary to the corresponding interpretation of Inter-
national law. The development of the law through case law is needed espe-
cially in cases where the text in International law is unclear with regards to
certain questions concerning the review competence regarding decisions
by Constitutional Courts. The opinion of the ECOWAS Court of Justice,
moreover, is not to be assumed since there are no norms of prohibition in
the legal basis of the Court of justice with respect to the assessment of
legally binding compensation by Constitutional Courts of Member States.
Furthermore, there is the possibility of ordering concrete corrective mea-
sures in close connection with the area of competence of the Court of jus-
tice . This is, namely, a logical consequence of the power to establish a vio-
lation of human rights entrenched in the Charter. This results in an ancil-
lary competence of the ECOWAS Court of Justice. This ancillary compe-
tence has been argumentatively justified in connection with the primary
obligation of the signatory states to the African Charter on Human and
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Peoples' Rights according to Art. 1 of the Charter. Due to the absence of a
prohibition norm, the ECOWAS Court of Justice is ultimately entitled to
draw the necessary consequences from its declaratory judgment, namely to
order corrective measures in the concerned signatory state. The resump-
tion by a Constitutional Court of a judgment, infringing International law
shall not preclude that interpretation.156 The Court of justice should ac-
cordingly refer to the standards of the International Court of Justice157 In
this context, Cohen-Jonathan detailed:
« [E]n tant que juridiction Internationale des droits de l’homme, la
Cour européenne pourrait atténuer ici la règle qu’elle s’est imposée de
ne pas signaler aux États les conséquences de leur infraction à la
Convention. Il nous semble que la cessation d’un acte illicite continu
est une conséquence implicite mais inévitable du constat effectué par
la Cour».158
The proposed solutions in the present study contribute to the prevention
of a danger in the current protection system of the ECOWAS Court of Jus-
tice. The danger of creating a de facto obstacle at state level which opposes
the obligation of implementation by the convicted signatory states. There-
fore, it has been shown that judgments with National legal force are not an
insurmountable obstacle regarding the review competence of the ECOW-
AS Court of Justice. If this were the case, Member States would be more
likely to evade their obligations under International law (from the Charter,
the Amendment Agreement and the associated Protocols). They would
then have a legally binding judgment prematurely issued by their National
Constitutional Courts in order to create the prerequisites for an inability
to review such by International judicial bodies. This easy circumvention
neither takes account of the purpose of the Charter nor that of the Addi-
tional Protocol of 2005.
156 Verdross/Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht [Universal International law], 3. edi-
tion, § 1295.
157 CIJ, Affaire relative au personnel diplomatique et consulaire des États-Unis à Té-
héran (24.05.1980), États-Unis d’Amérique c. Téhéran, par. 3. Vgl. Breuer, Zur
Anordnung konkreter Abhilfemaßnahmen durch den EGMR[Regarding the or-
der of concrete corrective measures by the ECtHR], in: EuGRZ (2004), 268
(261).
158 Cohen-Jonathan, Quelques considerations sur la réparation accordée aux vic-
times dʼune violation de la Convention Européenne des Droits de lʼHomme, in:
Les Droits de l’homme au seuil du troisiéme millénaire. Mélanges en hommage
à Pierre Lambert, 109 (120).
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Regarding the extent of the legal force of the declaratory judgment, the
following has been shown: the elements of the tenor are significant. Never-
theless, the main reasons for the decision assist with the interpretation of
the judgment. The relevant reasons for the decision by the ECOWAS
Court of Justice are all those determining the facts from which the Court
of justice gleans, by way of a necessary conclusion, the answer to the indi-
vidual plaintiff's complaintsubmission.
Thus, the main reasons for the decision are closely linked to the scope of
the procedural claim defining the object of dispute.
If ECOWAS case law is disregarded or not complied with, the con-
cerned Member State must guarantee that a new complaint can be submit-
ted to the ECOWAS Court of Justice against itself because the disregard of
a declaratory judgment constitutes a permanent situation contrary to Inter-
national law within the convicted signatory state. This state of offence con-
stitutes an attack on International law in general and affects state responsi-
bility.
The current loopholes within the ECOWAS Community can only be
closed if procedural reforms are initiated on both sides: The reforms
should be carried out in the Member States' constitutional procedure regu-
lations and at the ECOWAS level.
At ECOWAS level: the Protocol as well as the procedural system of the
ECOWAS Court of Justice should include the party-relatedness of the legal
force, the extent of the binding force of the ECOWAS judgment in the de-
cided case, the effectiveness of the judgments in the parallel-proceedings of
those Member States not party to the proceedings, the authority of the
Court of justice to order concrete corrective measures and, as a conse-
quence, an obligation of implementation. As soon as the adherence to hu-
man rights and principles of the rule of law has become a legal tradition
for the signatory states, the necessity of exhausting all National legal reme-
dies as a prerequisite for the admissibility before the ECOWAS Court of
Justice would become understandable.
Regarding the reforms at National level of the signatory states, an obli-
gation to implement should be included in the constitutional procedure
regulations of the Member Staes. It has been shown, with regard to the
partiality, that the current content of Art. 15 par. 4 of the Amendment
Agreement has a general binding effect of the decision of the ECOWAS
Court of Justice. Based on the development of the law within the legal sys-
tem of the Community and, in particular, the admissibility of an individu-
al complaint before the Court of justice , an amendment of the regulation
in Art. 15 par. 4 of the Amendment Agreement becomes necessary. De lege
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ferenda presumes a direct legal effect on the signatory state that is party to
the proceedings. This does not mean that the declaratory judgments have
no consequences for the signatory states not party to the proceedings.
Rather, the decisions of the Court of justice constitute a normative basis
for all Member States regarding their future behaviour, in order to prevent
possible own convictions. Thus, the decisions by the Court of justice devel-
op an orientation effect and have a guiding function atNational level. This
means that the effects of the ECOWAS declaratory judgments can be ob-
served in parallel proceedings by not directly involved Member States. Re-
garding the exceptional admissibility of individual complaints without pri-
or exhaustion of all National legal remedies, a step by step solution within
the ECOWAS Community should be found. Through the review of deci-
sions of National Constitutional Courts, a culture of impartiality in the re-
gion can slowly be established because the independence of the justice sys-
tem is confirmed on paper but the impartiality based on their subjective
imprints can only be guaranteed through a culture of rule of law and re-
sponsibility. As the consolidation of the rule of law principles and the ad-
herence to ECOWAS-standards within the signatory states is gradually
completed, the requirement to exhaust all National legal remedies as a pre-
requisite for the proceedings before the ECOWAS Court of Justice should
be required. This takes the notion of the need for legal protection and the
subsidiary system of International law into account.
With regards to the Protocol, it must be clearly added that the interpre-
tation of the Charter and the declaratory judgment by the ECOWAS Court
of Justice have priority before those of the Constitutional Courts of Mem-
ber States. In order to apply and implement the judgments by the regional
Court uniformly, the Member States should amend their procedural law
according to the ECOWAS-Protocol. A change in case law for these rea-
sons seems necessary because the ambiguous wording that the Court of
justice is not a cassation court further encourages the Member States to use
the doctrine of res judicata to undermine the competence of the Court of
justice .
In the fourth chapter, certain deficiencies regarding the reception of the
legal force in the domestic legal system of the signatory states were identi-
fied. Even if a judgment of the ECOWAS Court of Justice is of a declara-
tive character, it does not automatically have legal consequences for the
convicted Member State. There is, namely, the obligation to comply with
the judgment in the domestic legal system. There are, however, problems
regarding the status of International law within the National law of the
Member States, the strict erga-omnes effect of the judgments of domestic
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Constitutional Courts and the question of implementation of ECOWAS
declaratory judgments at National level. Subsequent to this, the question
of the addressees of obligations of implementation under International law
has been discussed. The position of International law in the hierarchy of
norms within the National legal system of the signatory state does not play
a role in terms of legal consequences. Should the ECOWAS Court of Jus-
tice establish a violation of the obligations adopted into the instruments of
the Community, the concerned Member State is liable to enforcement, re-
gardless of the position of International law within the domestic legal sys-
tem.159 When comparing the legal force of National judgments and that of
the institution of restitution in kind, the latter has more weight. An order
of restitution regarding the situation that is contrary to International law
does not equal the direct annulment of the judgment by the Constitution-
al Court. How the state is to achieve the result of the declaratory judgment
in conformity with International law judgment is left to its discretion. The
annulment is not absolutely essential. The signatory state could take anoth-
er domestic route in order to restore the legal status quo before the viola-
tion. From a comparative legal perspective, however, the resumption of
the original initial proceedings should be considered as an appropriate
means to restore a situation in accordance with International law. This can
be derived from the practice of ECtHR case law and the Member States of
the European Council. In this context, many Member States of the Euro-
pean Council have introduced the declaratory judgment of the ECtHR as a
reason for a resumption in their respective domestic legal systems (Ger-
many and France should be named here as examples).160
From a procedural perspective, all ECOWAS Member States should pro-
vide for the possibility of overcoming the legal force by way of exception
in their rules of procedure. The declaratory judgment should be estab-
lished as the constituent element of the resumption of the initial trial in
159 Comp.: ECJ, 26/62, Van Gend & Loos (05.02.1963), 25; ECJ, 6/64, Costa ENEL
(15.07.1964).
160 Pettiti, Le réexamen d’une décision pénale française après un arrêt de la Cour
Européenne des Droits de L’Homme: La loi française du 15 juin 2000, in: Revue
Trimestrielle des Droits de l’Homme (2001), 3 (13); Hoffmann-Holland, Wiede-
raufnahme eines durch rechtskräftiges Urteil abgeschlossenen Verfahrens [re-
sumption of a trial completed by a final judgment], in: Graf, Strafprozessord-
nung [Criminal Procedure Code], commentary, § 359, Rn. 35; Hart- mann, Die
Restitutionsklage [restitution action], in: Baumbach/Lauterbach/Hartmann
(Publ.), Zivilprozessordnung [Civil procedure Code, 71. edition, (2013), § 580,
Rn. 27.
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the rules of procedure of the Member States. For the parallel domestic pro-
ceedings the declaratory judgment should be applied as part of the facts of
the case of a question prio ritaire de conformité corresponding with the pre-
vailing exception d’inconstituti onnalité. For this purpose, the term confor-
mité statt constitutionnalité is preferred because state acts are not examined
in the light of the constitution but the African Charter and the associated
case law of the ECOWAS Court of Justice. According to the current legal
situation, the regulations of the legal force in National legal system are op-
posed to the obligation to comply with ECOWAS judgments because the
implementation of declaratory judgments clearly constitute an infringe-
ment of opposing constitutional law of Member States.161Herewith, the re-
spective regulations of the rules of procedure in the constitution of Mem-
ber States should thus be adjusted. A fundamental non-appealability of
constitutional court decisions should be maintained, but an exceptional
deviation from the non-appealability based on ECOWAS-declaratory judg-
ments should be provided for.162
The state powers of the Member States involved in the proceedings are
not party to the trial before the ECOWAS Court of Justice. For this very
reason, the signatory state alone is directly bound by the declaratory judg-
161 See also: § 129 par. 2 Constitution of Ghana of 1992; Art. 106 Constitution of
Togo of 14 October 1992; Art. 124 Constitution of Benin of 11 December 1991;
Art. 94 Constitution of Mali of 25 February 1992; Art. 134 Constitution of
Niger of 25 November 2010; Art. 99 Constitution of Guinea of 07 May 2010;
Art. 98 Constitution of Ivory Coast of 23 July 2000; Art. 159 Constitution of
Burkina Faso of 02 June 1991; Art. 92 par. 2 Constitution of Senegal of 22 Jan-
uary 2001; Sect. 230, 232, 233, 235 Constitution of Nigeria of 29 May 1999;
Art. 65 Constitution of Liberia of 06 January 1984; Art. 92 Constitution of
Guinea Bissau of 16 January 1984; Sect. 126, 127 Constitution of The Gambia of
16 January 1997; Art. 229 par. 1 Constitution of Cape Verde of 23 November
1999; Art. 122 par. 1 Constitution of Sierra Leone of 03 September 1991.
162 Thus, the adjustment of the respective regulations seems advisable, namely:
§ 129 par. 2 Constitution of Ghana of 1992; Art. 106 Constitution of Togo of
14 October 1992; Art. 124 Constitution of Benin of 11 December 1991; Art. 94
Constitution of Mali of 25 February 1992; Art. 134 Constitution of Niger of 25
November 2010; Art. 99 Constitution of Guinea of 07 May 2010; Art. 98 Con-
stitution of Ivory Coast of 23 July 2000; Art. 159 Constitution of Burkina Faso
of 02 June 1991; Art. 92 par. 2 Constitution of Senegal of 22 January 2001; Sect.
230, 232, 233, 235 Constitution of Nigeria of 29 May 1999; Art. 65 Constitution
of Liberia of 06 January 1984; Art. 92 Constitution of Guinea Bissau of 16 Jan-
uary 1984; Sect. 126, 127 Constitution of The Gambia of 16 January 1997;
Art. 229 par. 1 Constitution of Cape Verde of 23 November 1999; Art. 122
par. 1 Constitution of Sierra Leone of 03 September 1991.
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ment. However, the conviction of the Member State indirectly addresses
the concerned National bodies.163 Since domestic Constitutional Courts
are state organs, they are indirectly bound by the declaratory judgment of
the ECOWAS Court of Justice. The reason for this is: the signatory states
cannot act by themselves as they are, without exception, bound by their or-
gans. However, the actions of the state organs are ascribed to the signatory
state. Every signatory state is liable for the misconduct of one of its organs
and this is now an established rule of international state responsibility. The
best way to correct misconduct is: to reverse the National misconduct
which is in violation of human rights. Thus, the restitution in kind is to be
deduced as a direct consequence from the declaratory judgment. In the
case of a Constitutional Court decision, the resumption of a trial consti-
tutes an appropriate means of reparation. This is logical. In their role as the
highest guardians of the Charter, the Constitutional Courts and Supreme
Courts of Member States and the associated judgments of the ECOWAS
Court of Justice shall transfer an erga-omnes-commitment to the entire Na-
tional legal system. The reason for this is that the other organs of the state
are more open-minded towards the National Constitutional Court than to-
wards the ECOWAS Court of Justice. For this reason, the national Consti-
tutional Courts should play a jointly-responsible role for the implementa-
tion of the Charter at a National level. These proposed constitutional re-
forms are based on the fundamental finding of the contractual commit-
ments in accordance with state responsibility under International law, as
the ICJ has quite rightly explained.164
Both reforms should be able to contribute to the realisation of the pur-
pose of the Additional Protocol A/SP.1/01/05. The signatory states have
committed themselves to undertake such reforms. This is consistent: coun-
tries that commit themselves to International law, do not have any better
means available to meet their obligation than to adjust their National legal
systems to that of International law.165 The current state of procedural
rules oin the constitutions of Member States is an insurmountable obstacle
163 CIJ, Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 31 mars 2004 en l’Affaire Avena et
autres res- sortissants mexicains (Mexique c. États-Unis d’Amerique), Arrêt du
19 janvier 2009, par. 61.
164 CIJ, Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 31 mars 2004 en l’Affaire Avena et
autres res- sortissants mexicains (Mexique c. Ètats-Unis d’Amerique), Arrêt du
19 janvier 2009, par. 8.
165 Enabulele, Reflections on the ECOWAS-Community Court Protocol and the
Constitutions of Member States, in: International Community Law Review 12
(2010), 111 (135).
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for the implementation of ECOWAS-Court decisions. Reforming the pro-
cedural rules in the constitutions would be a preventive measure to pre-
vent blocking the implementation of ECOWAS-Court decisions. This view
is confirmed by the ICJ in its interpretation judgment regarding the Avena
vs the United States case:
« Un État qui a valablement contracté des obligations Internationales
est tenu d’apporter à sa législation les modifications nécessaires pour assu-
rer l’exécution des engagements pris ».166
The establishment of procedural regulations at domestic level would mean
that the African Charter and the decisions of the Court of justice would
always be present in the National organs of the Member States as a set of
rules for the implementation of the ECOWAS rulings. Subsequently, the
state organs would attribute great value to the judgments by the ECOWAS
Court of Justice.167 This is because the conviction of a Member State based
on an infringement of the human rights guaranteed in the Charter has no
effect if the judgment of the protective instance at regional level is seen by
the National organs as non-binding. A reform of the National legal sys-
tems of Member States is necessary, in order to expressly clarify the
question whether and to what extent the decisions by the ECOWAS Court
of Justice develop their effects.168 Such reforms are the only way to con-
firm Protocol A/SP.1/01/05 (19/01/2005) as an effective instrument of In-
ternational law.169 Without such reforms, plaintiffs must rely on the good-
will of the convicted signatory state after having endured long-winded pro-
ceedings before the ECOWAS Court of Justice.170 The cooperation be-
tween both levels of law alone could guarantee the effective protection of
166 CIJ, Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 31 mars 2004 en l’Affaire Avena et
autres res- sortissants mexicains (Mexique c. États-Unis d’Amérique), Arrêt du
19 janvier 2009, par. 8 (Her- vorhebung durch den Verfasser).
167 Mellech, Die Rezeption der EMRK sowie der Urteile des EGMR in der franzö-
sischen und deutschen Rechtsprechung, 2. [The reception of the ECHR and the
judgments of the ECtHR in the French and German jurisdiction, 2].
168 Oppong/Niro, Enforcing Judgments of International Court in National Court,
in: Journal of International Dispute Settlement (2014), 1 (21); Enabulele, Reflec-
tions on the ECOWAS-Com- munity Court Protocol and the Constitutions of
Member States, in: International Community Law Review 12 (2010), 111 (137).
169 Enabulele, Reflections on the ECOWAS-Community Court Protocol and the
Constitutions of Member States, in: International Community Law Review 12
(2010), 111 (137).
170 Oppong/Niro, Enforcing Judgments of International Court in National Court,
in: Journal of International Dispute Settlement (2014), 1 (4).
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human rights.171 In this context, the domestic procedural principles in the
constitution should be amended in accordance with the guiding principles
of regional International law. In established case law, the ICJ has, in this
regard, emphasised that the argument of the obstacle to implementation
must not be allowed to take effect in the light of the development of the
state liability law. With this in mind, the ICJ recently stated in its interpre-
tative judgment in the Avena case:
« La Cour n’a cessé de réaffirmer dans sa jurisprudence qu’un État ne
saurait invoquer son droit interne pour justifier de ne pas avoir exécuté
une obligation Internationale. Ainsi, en prenant les mesures qui leur
incombent en vertu de l’arrêt Avena, les États-Unis ne sauraient invo-
quer vis-à-vis d’un autre État leur propre Constitution pour se sous-
traire aux obligations que leur imposent le droit International ou les
traités en vigueur».172
Two constellations have been analysed for parallel National proceedings.
On the one hand, the transfer of an automatic erga-omnes-binding effect for
parallel National proceedings, and on the other hand, the procedure of the
Exception d’Inconstitutionnalité and the Question Prioritiare de Conformité
(QPC) were referred to. The automatic erga-omnes-binding effect for paral-
lel National proceedings means that in the case where a signatory state is
concerned, the signatory state is obliged to make amends or terminate its
obligation. However, this obligation should also apply for parallel proceed-
ings at National level. Due to the generalisation of the binding effect, the
convicted signatory state must prevent a new conviction. Thus, the declara-
tory judgment by the ECOWAS Court of Justice constitutes a de facto di-
rect erga-omnes binding effect for parallel domestic cases. Furthermore,
there would be doubts in parallel National proceedings regarding a legal
question that is of substantial importance to the human rights jurisdiction
before domestic Constitutional Courts. In this case, they are (as in case
Art. 276 par. 3 TFEU) obliged to make a submission. The party to the dis-
pute should also have the right to ask this legal question, to raise the
question as a Question Prioritaire de Conformité before National courts as
171 Ebobrah, A critical Analysis of the human rights mandate of the ECOWAS
Community Court of Justice, 25, available at: http://docs.escr-net.org/usr_doc/S
_Ebobrah.pdf (last accessed on 16/05/2015).
172 CIJ, Demande en interprétation de l’arrêt du 31 mars 2004 en l’Affaire Avena et
autres res- sortissants mexicains (Mexique c. États-Unis d’Amérique), Arrêt du
19 janvier 2009, par. 8.
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well as the Constitutional Courts. This means the suspension of the main
proceedings either on the initiative of the referring Constitutional Courts
or by the concerned party to the dispute. The decision by the ECOWAS
Court of Justice on this would then constitute a landmark decision for the
entire legal system of the Community.
The study at hand should, after all, serve as a small contribution to the
development of the National implementation of the judgments by the
ECOWAS Court of Justice and the effective legal protection within the
ECOWAS legal order. This can only be achieved if there is an improved
interlocking of regional International law and national constitutional law.
It is, therefore, necessary to maintain a constructive dialogue between both
legal systems, which can lead to effective and operative legal protection.
The joint participation of the National law of the Member States and the
ECOWAS legal instruments create good conditions for implementation
and at the same time lead to an optimal effectiveness of the African Char-
ter within the legal order of the Community.173 The reforms would help to
eliminate the incompatibility of the National law and the Protocol.174 Ac-
cess to the International ECOWAS Court of Justice is illusory if the execu-
tion of final, legally-binding declaratory judgments is refused on National
level. This would run counter to the idea behind Art. 7 par. 1 of the
African Charter.
Moreover, the establishment of a monitoring body which is responsible
for controlling the implementation of declaratory judgments by the Court
of justice is necessary. In this regard, the creation of an independent execu-
tive body would assist in expediting the implementation of the judgments.
Furthermore, the official status of implementation of the judgments by the
ECOWAS Court of justice should be published at regular intervals in or-
der to increase the attention of the public regarding the implementation of
judgments. The current sanction mechanisms could do with some im-
provements.
173 Schaffarzik, Europäische Menschenrechte unter der Ägide des Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichts [European human rights under the aegis of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court], in: DÖV (2005), 860 (865).
174 Enabulele, Reflections on the ECOWAS-Community Court Protocol and the
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Let us hope that the reform proposals will be heard so that Abuja, be-
cause of the ECOWAS Court of Justice stands for the West African consti-
tutional order as “The Capital of Human Rights Protection”.175
175 Kane, La Cour de justice de la CEDEAO à l’épreuve de la protection des droits
de l’homme, Université Gaston Berger, Maitrise en Sciences Juridiques 2012, 50;
Adjolohoun, The ECOWAS Court as a Human Rights Promoter? Assessing Five
Years’ Impact of Koraou Slavery Judgment, in: Netherlands Quarterly of Hu-
man Rights (2013), 342 (368).
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